US foreign policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958-­1975 by Gibson, Bryan R.
U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Iraq,	  





Professor	  Nigel	  J.	  Ashton
A	  thesis	  submitted	  to	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science
Department	  of	  International	  History
for	  the	  degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely 
my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the 
work of others.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may 
not be reproduced without my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, 
infringe the rights of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 99,416 words. 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, 
spelling and grammar by Marlene Gibson, Ashli Alberty, Nick McNally, Ranj 
Alaaldin, and Kelly Smith. 
2
Abstract
 This thesis analyses the ways in which U.S. policy toward Iraq was 
dictated by its broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most 
historians have focused on ‘hot’ Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and 
Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq’s significance as a Cold War battleground. 
This thesis shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War 
in the Middle East. It argues that U.S. decisions and actions were designed to 
deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf 
region. This was evident in the Eisenhower administration’s response to Iraq’s 
revolution in 1958, when it engaged in covert action to prevent communists from 
gaining control of the state; in the Kennedy administration’s efforts to bolster the 
first Ba’th regime during its war with the Kurds in 1963 because it perceived it as 
anti-communist; in the Johnson administration’s support for the anti-communist, 
Arab nationalist regimes during the mid-1960s; and in the Nixon 
administration’s decision to support the Kurdish rebels in 1972-75 after the 
second Ba’thist regime drew Iraq partially into the Soviet orbit. This suggests a 
clear pattern. 
 Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this thesis reveals 
new details on America’s decision-making toward and actions against Iraq 
during a key part of the Cold War. Significantly, it raises questions about widely 
held notions, such as the CIA’s alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba’thist coup and 
the theory that the U.S. sold out the Kurds in 1975. Finally, it argues scholars 
have relied excessively and uncritically on a leaked congressional report, the Pike 
Report, which has had a distorting affect on the historiography of U.S.-Iraqi 
relations. This thesis seeks to redress these historiographical deficiencies and 
bring new details to light.
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Introduction
	   In	  a	  perceptive	  remark	  made	  during	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  in	  January	  1959,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  observed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “not	  sufFiciently	  sophisticated”	  to	  meddle	  in	  the	  complex	  mix	  of	  internal	  Iraqi	  politics.1 	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  how	  the	  U.S.	  moved	  from	  being	  an	  unsophisticated	  observer	  of	  events	  in	  1958	  to	  become	  a	  direct	  protagonist	  in	  Iraq	  during	  1972-­‐75,	  through	  its	  covert	  support	  for	  Iraq’s	  Kurdish	  rebels.	  The	  motive	  for	  America’s	  shift	  was	  Iraq’s	  increasing	  importance	  to	  its	  global	  Cold	  War	  strategy,	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  contain	  the	  Soviet	  Union.2	  	   Traditionally,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  viewed	  the	  Gulf	  as	  a	  “British	  lake”	  and	  preferred	  to	  rely	  on	  Britain	  for	  its	  defense.3	  But	  as	  tensions	  between	  Washington	  and	  Moscow	  escalated	  in	  the	  late-­‐1940s,	  U.S.	  military	  planners	  recognized	  the	  vital	  role	  that	  access	  to	  Gulf	  oil	  would	  play	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  A	  U.S.	  military	  study	  from	  1946	  concluded	  that	  losing	  Iraqi	  and	  Saudi	  Arabian	  sources	  of	  oil	  would	  force	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  Fight	  an	  “oil-­‐starved	  war”	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  vice	  versa.4 	  This	  meant	  America’s	  regional	  strategy	  aimed	  to	  defend	  the	  Gulf,	  deny	  its	  oil	  resources	  from	  Soviet	  domination,	  and	  ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  region’s	  Western-­‐backed	  autocrats.5	  To	  achieve	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  sponsored	  the	  development	  of	  a	  regional	  defense	  system	  aimed	  at	  reinforcing	  what	  Secretary	  Dulles	  called	  the	  “Northern	  Tier”	  states,	  consisting	  of	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Turkey.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1950s,	  this	  group	  had	  organized	  themselves	  into	  a	  regional	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1 Memorandum of Discussion at the 393d Meeting of the NSC, January 15, 1959 (FRUS/1958-60/XII/doc.
157), p.376.
2 This argument has been raised in Douglas Little, “The United States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story,” 
Journal of Cold War Studies, 12/4 (2010), p.63-98; and Peter Hahn, Missions Accomplished?: The United 
States and Iraq Since World War I (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.38-62.
3 Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” 
Diplomatic History, 36/2 (2012), p.338.
4 W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), p.28.
5 See FRUS/1958-60/XII/doc.46, p.136.
security	  alliance	  known	  as	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact.6 	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Western	  Hashemite	  monarchy	  in	  1958	  upended	  America’s	  Gulf	  strategy,	  displaced	  Britain’s	  inFluence,	  and	  led	  to	  a	  Cold	  War	  competition	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  over	  which	  direction	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  would	  take.	  This	  contest	  would	  last	  for	  seventeen	  years—through	  four	  coup	  d’états,	  Five	  different	  regimes,	  innumerable	  plots,	  and	  a	  fourteen-­‐year	  long	  Kurdish	  War—before	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  led	  by	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  achieved	  absolute	  control	  of	  Iraq	  in	  1975.7 	  In	  short,	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  between	  1958	  and	  1975	  was	  the	  application	  of	  the	  broader	  principles	  of	  Cold	  War	  strategy	  on	  local	  political	  developments.	   This	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  whenever	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington	  believed	  Baghdad	  was	  developing	  closer	  relations	  with	  Moscow,	  they	  took	  steps	  to	  counter	  Soviet	  inFluence,	  often	  relying	  on	  covert	  action.	  Three	  instances	  stand	  out:	  First,	  in	  1958-­‐59	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  engaged	  Egyptian	  President	  Gamal	  Abd	  al-­‐Nasser	  to	  Find	  ways	  to	  prevent	  the	  communists	  from	  coming	  to	  power,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  overthrowing	  Iraq’s	  strong	  leader,	  Prime	  Minister	  Premier	  Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  Qasim;	  second,	  in	  1962	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  ordered	  the	  CIA	  to	  seek	  Qasim’s	  overthrow	  after	  he	  nationalized	  the	  concessionary	  holding	  of	  an	  American-­‐owned	  oil	  company;	  and	  Finally,	  in	  1972-­‐75	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  Financed	  and	  armed	  Kurdish	  rebels	  after	  Iraq	  signed	  a	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  order	  to	  destabilize	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  and	  prevent	  communists	  from	  joining	  the	  government.	  However,	  when	  it	  believed	  an	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  anti-­‐communist,	  the	  U.S.	  took	  steps	  to	  bolster	  and	  maintain	  its	  power,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  views	  of	  its	  allies.	  Two	  examples	  are	  prominent:	  First,	  after	  Qasim	  was	  overthrown	  in	  February	  1963	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  lent	  support	  to	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  which	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1950-59 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005); and Nigel Ashton, “The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation 
of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-58”, Review of International 
Studies, 19/2 (1993), pp.123-37.
7 For studies of Iraq history, see Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of 
Iraq (Princeton University Press, 1978); Edith Penrose and E.F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and 
National Development (London: Ernest Benn, 1978); Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (London: 
Westview Press, 1985); Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987); and Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Oxford University Press, 
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was	  engaged	  in	  a	  brutal	  war	  against	  the	  Kurdish	  rebels,	  who	  at	  this	  point	  were	  being	  assisted	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union;	  and	  second,	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  bolstered	  the	  anti-­‐communist,	  Arab	  nationalist	  regimes	  of	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  and	  later	  his	  brother	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif	  in	  the	  face	  of	  British,	  Iranian,	  and	  Israeli	  efforts	  to	  depose	  them.	  In	  all	  instances,	  U.S.	  actions	  in	  Iraq	  were	  based	  on	  the	  need	  to	  check	  Soviet	  inFluence,	  reinforce	  potential	  pro-­‐Western	  allies,	  and	  undermine	  perceived	  enemies.	  This	  was	  a	  logical	  extension	  of	  America’s	  broader	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  	   To	  fully	  articulate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  dictated	  by	  Cold	  War	  strategy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  situate	  this	  study	  within	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  There	  is	  a	  wider	  debate	  among	  scholars	  on	  the	  signiFicance	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  had	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  Fred	  Halliday	  is	  of	  the	  view	  that	  “the	  Cold	  War	  …	  had	  a	  limited	  impact	  on	  the	  Middle	  East,”8	  while	  on	  the	  other	  Fawaz	  Gerges	  has	  argued	  “the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  into	  regional	  politics	  exacerbated	  regional	  conFlicts	  and	  made	  their	  resolution	  more	  difFicult.”9	  Gerges	  is	  supported	  by	  another	  eminent	  Cold	  War	  historian,	  Arne	  Westad,	  who	  believes,	  “the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  a	  much	  neglected	  topic	  in	  the	  history	  of	  international	  affairs.”	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  he	  explains,	  is	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  “how	  to	  place	  the	  global	  conFlict	  within	  territories	  that	  were	  rife	  with	  conFlicts	  of	  their	  own	  making	  or	  those	  held	  over	  from	  the	  colonial	  era.”	  Westad	  argues	  the	  Cold	  War	  “belongs”	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  because,	  like	  Gerges,	  he	  believes	  it	  shaped	  not	  just	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics	  but	  its	  conFlicts	  as	  well.10	  This	  thesis	  will	  use	  Iraq	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  show	  how	  America’s	  application	  of	  Cold	  War	  principles	  to	  Iraq	  contributed	  to	  the	  escalation	  of	  local	  and	  regional	  conFlicts	  into	  wider	  Cold	  War	  confrontations	  that	  drew	  in	  the	  superpowers.
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   By	  comparison	  to	  the	  considerable	  literature	  on	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relations,11	  the	  historiography	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy.	  To	  date,	  there	  is	  only	  a	  single	  book	  examining	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  more	  broadly:	  Peter	  Hahn’s	  Missions	  Accomplished?	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Iraq	  since	  World	  War	  I.12	  Hahn	  argues	  the	  U.S.	  “monitored	  Iraq	  from	  a	  distance,	  aiming	  to	  deny	  any	  inroads	  by	  Soviet-­‐backed	  communism	  and	  to	  prevent	  any	  Flair-­‐ups	  in	  violence	  between	  Iraq	  and	  its	  neighbors.”13	  Relying	  on	  primary	  documents	  made	  available	  through	  the	  Department	  of	  State’s	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (FRUS)	  series	  and	  other	  secondary	  works,	  Hahn’s	  analysis	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  is	  aimed	  at	  “undergraduate	  students”	  and	  overlooks	  many	  key	  events.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  core	  argument	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  aimed	  to	  block	  Soviet	  inFluence	  is	  supported	  by	  this	  thesis.	   Hahn	  and	  other	  notable	  scholars	  have	  recognized	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  in	  1958	  as	  an	  important	  event	  for	  both	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics	  and	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Malcolm	  Kerr,	  for	  example,	  viewed	  the	  coup	  as	  a	  key	  turning	  point	  in	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “Arab	  Cold	  War,”	  since	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  turned	  against	  Nasser’s	  efforts	  to	  bring	  the	  Arab	  world	  under	  his	  command.14	  The	  revolution	  has	  also	  been	  termed	  an	  important	  turning	  point	  by	  numerous	  Cold	  War	  scholars.15	  From	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Iraq	  had	  been	  a	  key	  player	  in	  America’s	  “Northern	  Tier”	  containment	  plan	  and	  was	  the	  namesake	  for	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact.	  Therefore,	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Iraq’s	  pro-­‐Western	  monarch	  by	  a	  group	  of	  radical,	  Arab	  nationalist	  military	  ofFicers	  had	  a	  profound	  
13
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affect	  on	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy.16	  While	  Stephen	  Blackwell	  suggests	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  had	  a	  “common	  perception”	  of	  the	  communist	  threat	  to	  Iraq	  following	  the	  coup,	  many	  others	  argue	  that	  Anglo-­‐American	  perceptions	  toward	  Iraq	  were	  not	  so	  closely	  aligned.17	  This	  study	  disputes	  Blackwell’s	  notion	  and	  argues	  the	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  administration	  saw	  Iraq	  as	  part	  of	  its	  geostrategic	  contest	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  whereas	  Britain	  saw	  Qasim	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  Nasser	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  sought	  to	  bolster	  him.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  widely	  held	  notion	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  ‘special	  relationship’	  during	  this	  period.18	   U.S.	  covert	  action	  aimed	  at	  denying	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  a	  core	  theme	  covered	  in	  this	  thesis.19 	  Numerous	  publications	  have	  accused	  the	  CIA	  of	  trying	  to	  assassinate	  Qasim	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1959;20	  seeking	  unsuccessfully	  to	  “incapacitate”	  him	  again	  in	  1960;21	  and	  Finally,	  assisting	  in	  his	  overthrow	  by	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  in	  February	  1963.22	  Another	  signiFicant	  claim	  is	  that	  due	  to	  their	  interest	  in	  supporting	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  anti-­‐communist	  tendencies,	  the	  CIA	  provided	  its	  death	  squads	  with	  lists	  of	  known	  communists,	  who	  were	  rounded	  up	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  killed.23	  But	  using	  newly	  available	  documents	  and	  interviews,	  this	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  these	  claims	  are	  open	  to	  question	  and	  while	  the	  CIA	  was	  plotting	  against	  Qasim	  in	  the	  1962-­‐63	  period,	  none	  of	  its	  efforts	  were	  successful.	  	   Because	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  interest	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  during	  this	  period,	  the	  party	  is	  a	  major	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Founded	  in	  1943	  by	  Michel	  AFlaq,	  a	  Lebanese	  Christian,	  and	  Salah	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Bitar,	  a	  Syrian	  Sunni,	  the	  party’s	  motto	  of	  “unity,	  freedom,	  and	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socialism”	  pointed	  to	  its	  Arab	  nationalist,	  anti-­‐imperialist,	  and	  socialist	  ideology	  that	  was	  dedicated	  to	  bringing	  about	  a	  complete	  transformation	  of	  Arab	  society	  through	  revolutionary	  activism.	  After	  First	  coming	  to	  power	  in	  Iraq	  in	  1963	  and	  being	  overthrown	  later	  that	  year,	  the	  Ba’th	  returned	  to	  power	  in	  a	  coup	  in	  1968	  and	  ruled	  the	  country	  until	  the	  U.S.	  invasion	  in	  2003.24 	  Joseph	  Sassoon	  argues	  that	  although	  “the	  party’s	  ideology	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  Western	  democracy”	  because	  of	  its	  belief	  that	  democracy	  masked	  the	  tyranny	  and	  exploitation	  of	  the	  masses,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  not	  inherently	  anti-­‐Western.25 	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  this	  was	  particularly	  evident	  during	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime	  in	  Iraq	  in	  1963,	  again	  in	  1973-­‐74	  when	  the	  Ba’th	  improved	  Iraq’s	  relations	  with	  France	  and	  the	  West,	  and	  especially,	  as	  my	  previous	  research	  has	  shown,	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.26	  	   The	  U.S.	  also	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  Iraq’s	  Kurdish	  population	  due	  to	  their	  historic	  relationship	  with	  Moscow.27	  After	  the	  Allied	  powers	  reneged	  on	  their	  promise	  to	  give	  the	  Kurds	  a	  state	  composed	  of	  the	  southeastern	  corner	  of	  Turkey	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Sevrès	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  they	  carved	  up	  the	  Kurdish	  territories	  into	  modern	  day	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lausanne	  in	  1923.28	  Before	  long,	  the	  Kurds	  in	  Iraq	  rebelled	  against	  their	  new	  British	  colonial	  masters	  during	  the	  1920s,	  only	  to	  be	  put	  down	  by	  force.29	  The	  leader	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  during	  the	  period	  covered	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  Barzani,	  a	  born	  revolutionary.	  Having	  First	  engaged	  in	  combat	  during	  a	  rebellion	  against	  the	  British	  authorities	  in	  1919	  and	  again	  in	  the	  early	  1930s,30	  he	  later	  went	  on	  to	  play	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  short-­‐lived	  Kurdish	  Republic	  of	  Mahabad	  during	  1945-­‐46,	  in	  Soviet	  occupied	  Iran.	  As	  Archie	  Roosevelt	  explained,	  after	  Mahabad	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collapsed	  in	  late-­‐1946,	  Barzani	  led	  his	  followers	  in	  a	  Fifty-­‐day-­‐long	  running	  battle	  with	  the	  Iranian	  military	  until	  reaching	  safety	  in	  Soviet	  Azerbaijan.31	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  it	  was	  Moscow’s	  support	  for	  this	  short-­‐lived	  project	  that	  convinced	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  of	  the	  Soviet	  intention	  to	  use	  the	  Kurds	  to	  bypass	  America’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  containment	  strategy.	   The	  Kurdish	  conFlict	  broke	  out	  once	  again	  during	  the	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  administration.32 	  SigniFicantly,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  Douglas	  Little	  claims	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  role	  in	  encouraging	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  at	  this	  juncture.33	  In	  a	  review	  of	  his	  article,	  Roham	  Alvandi	  argues	  by	  contrast	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  substantial	  evidence	  to	  support	  Little’s	  claim”	  that	  the	  U.S.	  urged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  rebel	  against	  Baghdad.34	  Indeed,	  evidence	  unearthed	  at	  the	  Soviet	  archives	  in	  1994	  by	  Vladislav	  Zubok,	  a	  researcher	  from	  the	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  Centre,	  suggests	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  plan.35	  Using	  declassiFied	  primary	  materials	  and	  interviews,	  this	  thesis	  will	  support	  Alvandi	  and	  Zubok’s	  conclusions	  and	  argue	  the	  U.S.	  played	  no	  role	  in	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war.	  	   On	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  Hahn	  asserts	  the	  U.S.	  suspected	  the	  Kurds	  were	  being	  “encouraged	  and	  abetted	  by	  the	  Soviets,	  who	  hoped	  to	  gain	  inFluence	  in	  the	  country.”36	  This	  argument	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  Little’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  CIA	  encouraged	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds.37	  As	  Alvandi	  also	  observed,	  “the	  CIA	  may	  well	  have	  been	  pursuing	  its	  own	  policy	  of	  covert	  intervention	  in	  Iraq,	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  State	  Department.”38	  But	  while	  there	  is	  considerable	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evidence	  about	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  onward,39	  this	  thesis	  argues	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  support	  the	  Kurds	  nor	  did	  it	  encourage	  them	  before	  1972.	  	   Little	  and	  Hahn	  have	  also	  offered	  the	  First	  accounts	  of	  the	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  Hahn	  argues	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  “adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  detached	  friendliness,”	  while	  awaiting	  opportunities	  to	  improve	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  This	  approach	  was	  successful	  and	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  the	  U.S.	  providing	  foreign	  aid,	  political	  consultation,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  normal	  diplomatic	  activity.	  Hahn’s	  work	  is	  also	  signiFicant	  because	  it	  provides	  the	  First	  account	  of	  the	  U.S.	  response	  to	  two	  key	  events	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations:	  the	  breaking	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  during	  the	  June	  1967	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  War	  and	  the	  second	  Ba’thist	  coup	  in	  July	  1968.40	  He	  argues	  the	  U.S.	  regretted	  the	  severing	  of	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  monitor	  events	  from	  afar—such	  as	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  in	  1968—using	  information	  provided	  by	  Belgium,	  which	  had	  agreed	  to	  run	  a	  U.S.	  interests	  section.	  Hahn	  argues	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  initially	  favourable	  assessment	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  waned	  as	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  brutally	  consolidated	  power	  and	  pulled	  Iraq	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  orbit.41	  Although	  Hahn’s	  study	  neglects	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  British	  withdrawal	  on	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  and	  the	  region,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  excellent	  studies	  detailing	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘twin	  pillar’	  policy	  that	  sought	  to	  build	  up	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  take	  Britain’s	  place	  and	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  Filling	  the	  power	  vacuum	  left	  behind.42	  However,	  this	  thesis	  will	  provide	  greater	  detail	  than	  has	  previously	  been	  available	  on	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  over	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  1960s.
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   Until	  recently,	  the	  research	  on	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  during	  1969-­‐71	  has	  been	  limited,	  leaving	  the	  Richard	  Nixon	  administration’s	  policies	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  that	  period	  to	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  debate.	  Even	  Nixon’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  national	  security	  advisor,	  Henry	  Kissinger’s	  account	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  his	  memoir	  avoids	  a	  discussion	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  before	  1972.43	  This	  is	  because	  Nixon	  was	  uninterested	  in	  Iraqi	  and	  Gulf	  affairs	  during	  his	  First	  term,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  more	  urgent	  matters	  like	  the	  escalating	  war	  in	  Vietnam,	  the	  opening	  to	  China,	  and	  achieving	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.44	  Like	  previous	  administrations,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  maintained	  a	  strict	  non-­‐interference	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurds.	  But	  in	  mid-­‐1972,	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  underwent	  a	  major	  shift,	  leading	  to	  Nixon’s	  approval	  of	  a	  covert	  operation	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds.	  	   There	  has	  been	  substantial	  debate	  over	  why	  Nixon	  approved	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  scholars	  explain	  it	  as	  a	  retaliatory	  response	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  signed	  in	  April	  1972,45	  with	  Little	  arguing	  it	  was	  based	  on	  “Cold	  War	  logic.”46	  In	  his	  review	  of	  Little’s	  article,	  Alvandi	  dismisses	  the	  Cold	  War	  argument	  and	  suggests	  that	  Little	  downplayed	  the	  Shah’s	  role	  in	  drawing	  the	  U.S.	  into	  the	  Kurdish	  War.47	  Alvandi	  reasserts	  this	  argument	  in	  an	  article	  on	  U.S.-­‐Iranian	  relations,	  stating,	  “Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  were	  seeing	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Gulf	  through	  the	  Shah’s	  eyes.”48	  This	  theory	  is	  supported	  by	  Jonathan	  Randal,	  who	  argues	  the	  Shah	  over-­‐emphasized	  the	  Soviet-­‐
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Iraqi	  threat	  and	  played	  the	  “superpower	  rivalry	  card”	  to	  convince	  Nixon	  to	  build	  up	  Iran	  as	  the	  regional	  hegemon	  and	  tie	  down	  Iraq,	  his	  only	  regional	  rival.49	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  both	  Alvandi	  and	  Randal	  ascribe	  too	  much	  agency	  to	  the	  Shah,	  as	  evidence	  suggests	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds	  was	  driven	  by	  Cold	  War	  strategic	  considerations	  in	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  growing	  importance	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	   Controversy	  also	  surrounds	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  came	  to	  an	  abrupt	  halt	  in	  March	  1975,	  with	  one	  scholar	  stating	  the	  Nixon-­‐Ford	  administration	  never	  “cared	  one	  whit”	  about	  the	  Kurds	  and	  “dropped	  [them]	  cold”	  when	  the	  Shah	  traded	  his	  support	  for	  them	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  border	  concession	  from	  Iraq	  at	  an	  OPEC	  conference	  in	  March	  1975.50	  The	  source	  of	  this	  outrage	  stems	  from	  an	  article	  published	  by	  William	  SaFire	  in	  1976	  which	  accused	  the	  U.S.	  of	  selling	  out	  the	  Kurds,	  abruptly	  halting	  its	  Kurdish	  Operation,	  ignoring	  Barzani’s	  heartfelt	  pleas	  for	  help,	  and	  failing	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  assistance.51	  SaFire’s	  claims	  are	  based	  on	  a	  leaked	  copy	  of	  a	  top-­‐secret	  congressional	  report	  on	  the	  CIA’s	  activities,	  known	  as	  the	  Pike	  Report.52	  While	  the	  report	  provides	  valuable	  information	  on	  aspects	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  this	  thesis	  will	  show	  it	  was	  not	  an	  objective	  analysis.	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  leaking	  of	  the	  document	  in	  February	  1976,	  numerous	  scholars	  have	  uncritically	  repeated	  the	  arguments	  presented	  by	  Representative	  Otis	  Pike,	  who	  was	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  House	  Select	  Intelligence	  Committee	  which	  drafted	  the	  Pike	  Report,	  and	  William	  SaFire	  without	  investigating	  the	  sources	  on	  which	  their	  claims	  were	  based.53 	  	   In	  recent	  years,	  Kissinger	  has	  tried	  to	  challenge	  the	  Pike	  Report’s	  assertions.	  After	  leaving	  the	  White	  House	  in	  1977,	  he	  published	  a	  memoir,	  The	  White	  House	  
Years,	  but	  appeared	  reluctant	  to	  reveal	  his	  side	  of	  the	  story,	  allocating	  three	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sentences	  and	  a	  brief	  footnote	  in	  which	  he	  promised	  to	  “explain	  these	  [events]	  in	  a	  second	  volume.”54	  Two	  decades	  later,	  Kissinger	  published,	  Years	  of	  Renewal,	  which	  provided	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds	  in	  May	  1972;	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  the	  operation;	  his	  efforts	  to	  stave	  off	  a	  Kurdish	  offensive	  against	  Iraq	  during	  the	  1973	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war;	  and	  details	  about	  a	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	  operation	  to	  transfer	  captured	  Soviet	  weapons	  to	  the	  Kurds	  during	  1974-­‐75.55	  In	  effect,	  Kissinger	  set	  out	  to	  challenge	  the	  existing	  historiography	  and	  explain	  his	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  Prior	  to	  this	  publication	  none	  of	  these	  details	  were	  publicly	  available.	  While	  self-­‐serving	  at	  times,	  Kissinger’s	  account	  does	  reFlect	  records	  now	  available	  at	  the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  presidential	  libraries	  and	  the	  State	  Department’s	  recent	  publication	  of	  documents	  detailing	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  between	  1969-­‐76.	  What	  has	  become	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  Pike	  Report	  has	  distorted	  the	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  Recently	  declassiFied	  evidence	  supports	  Kissinger’s	  argument	  that	  the	  Shah’s	  decision	  to	  abandon	  the	  Kurds	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  will	  to	  some	  extent	  exonerate	  Kissinger	  and	  will	  disprove	  many	  of	  the	  Pike	  Report’s	  most	  controversial	  assertions.	   More	  broadly,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  newly	  available	  documentation,	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  redress	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  existing	  works	  detailing	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  during	  the	  1958-­‐75	  period.	  Chapter	  1	  will	  assess	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  and	  its	  leader,	  Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  Qasim.	  Chapter	  2	  recounts	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Qasim,	  in	  the	  period	  between	  Kennedy’s	  coming	  to	  ofFice	  and	  Qasim’s	  overthrow	  in	  February	  1963.	  Chapter	  3	  examines	  Kennedy’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  brief,	  nine-­‐month	  rule	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  argues	  Iraq	  was	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  Chapter	  4	  analyses	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  evolving	  relationship	  with	  the	  two	  nationalist	  regimes	  of	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  and	  his	  brother,	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif	  and	  the	  clear	  divergence	  of	  perception	  toward	  Iraq	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  closest	  allies,	  particularly	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  Chapter	  5	  examines	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	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and	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  1972.	  Chapter	  6	  details	  how	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  set	  up	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war	  in	  October	  1973.	  Finally,	  Chapter	  7	  focuses	  on	  the	  central	  role	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Henry	  Kissinger	  in	  both	  the	  running	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  and	  the	  tragic	  way	  in	  which	  it	  ended	  in	  March	  1975.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  will	  be	  evident	  that	  from	  Eisenhower	  to	  Ford,	  U.S.	  decisions	  and	  actions	  were	  based	  on	  a	  single,	  unifying	  perception:	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Iraq’s	  sovereignty.	  Because	  of	  this,	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  between	  1958	  and	  1975	  was	  based	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  Iraq’s	  perceived	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	   In	  examining	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  a	  number	  of	  primary	  sources	  were	  acquired	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  various	  secondary	  sources	  referenced	  herein.	  Primary	  research	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration	  (NARA)	  in	  College	  Park,	  Maryland,	  and	  the	  Eisenhower,	  Kennedy,	  Johnson,	  Nixon,	  and	  Ford	  presidential	  libraries.	  Through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  documents	  obtained	  at	  these	  archives,	  a	  detailed	  account	  can	  be	  crafted	  of	  U.S.	  perceptions,	  debates,	  policy	  recommendations,	  and	  actions	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  instances	  where	  documents	  remained	  classiFied,	  Mandatory	  Reviews	  (MR)	  were	  requested,	  leading	  to	  the	  further	  declassiFication	  of	  relevant	  documents.	  Besides	  archival	  research,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  online	  sources	  were	  consulted.	  First,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  FRUS	  series	  is	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  information	  on	  each	  of	  the	  administrations	  covered.	  However,	  these	  volumes	  are	  limited	  by	  a	  concentration	  on	  high-­‐level	  political	  exchanges	  and	  political	  sensitivity,	  meaning	  important	  documents	  were	  excluded.56	  The	  Johnson	  administration’s	  volume	  is	  particularly	  limited.	  Another	  online	  source	  utilized	  was	  the	  CIA’s	  CREST	  system,	  which	  offers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  declassiFied	  CIA	  materials	  covering	  all	  periods	  relevant	  to	  this	  study,	  including	  materials	  not	  available	  through	  other	  sources.57	  A	  third	  source	  is	  the	  State	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Department’s	  Access	  to	  Archive	  Database	  (AAD),	  which	  made	  available	  thousands	  of	  diplomatic	  cables	  produced	  between	  1973	  and	  1976.	  This	  source	  allowed	  for	  the	  re-­‐construction	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  between	  1972	  and	  1975	  and	  provided	  details	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  have	  been	  known.58	  Another	  important	  source	  of	  information	  was	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Oral	  History	  Collection	  made	  available	  through	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  which	  helped	  provide	  anecdotal	  evidence	  that	  conFirmed	  key	  details.59	  The	  National	  Security	  Archive	  (NSA)	  at	  George	  Washington	  University	  also	  provided	  useful	  information,	  especially	  its	  full	  set	  of	  the	  Kissinger	  transcripts	  and	  memorandums	  of	  conversation.60	  These	  documents	  helped	  re-­‐construct	  key	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  1974.	  Finally,	  in	  2008,	  the	  CIA	  released	  a	  cache	  of	  documents,	  A	  Life	  in	  Intelligence:	  The	  Richard	  Helms	  
Collection,	  which	  provided	  original	  documents	  detailing	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  which	  Helms	  helped	  run	  in	  his	  role	  as	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran	  between	  1973-­‐76.61	  These	  sources,	  in	  addition	  to	  news	  articles	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  and	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Both	  explained	  in	  detail	  Israeli	  operations	  inside	  Iraq	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  While	  interviews	  have	  their	  methodological	  limitations,	  details	  provided	  here	  have	  either	  been	  conFirmed	  or	  supported	  by	  documents	  or	  secondary	  sources.	  	   As	  a	  whole,	  this	  study	  relies	  upon	  recently	  available	  primary	  documents,	  interviews,	  and	  the	  available	  secondary	  resources	  to	  construct	  a	  detailed	  narrative	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  between	  1958-­‐75.	  This	  thesis	  advances	  existing	  historiographical	  debates	  by	  bringing	  to	  bear	  a	  signiFicant	  body	  of	  newly	  available	  primary	  source	  material.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  underlines	  that	  the	  established	  historiography	  has	  relied	  excessively	  on	  the	  Pike	  Report,	  which	  has	  distorted	  our	  understanding	  of	  events.	  Ultimately,	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  redress	  these	  historiographical	  deFiciencies	  and	  further	  develop	  the	  argument	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  between	  1958-­‐75	  was	  based	  on	  denying	  Soviet	  inFluence	  over	  Iraq,	  inline	  with	  its	  Cold	  War	  strategy.
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Chapter	  1:	  Eisenhower	  and	  the	  Qasim	  RegimeJuly	  1958—January	  1961
	   The	  following	  chapter	  examines	  the	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  its	  revolution	  on	  July	  14,	  1958	  and	  the	  chaotic	  period	  that	  followed.	  It	  will	  analyze	  the	  American	  decision	  making	  process	  and	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  approach,	  while	  identifying	  any	  missed	  opportunities,	  where	  had	  the	  U.S.	  acted	  differently,	  it	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  salvage	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  regime.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington	  and	  Baghdad	  perceived	  these	  events,	  how	  these	  perceptions	  compared	  or	  contrasted	  with	  those	  of	  its	  allies,	  and	  how	  they	  translated	  into	  the	  implementation	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  following	  Iraq’s	  revolution,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  policy	  contrasted	  with	  its	  regional	  allies	  due	  to	  concerns	  about	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  Flirtation	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  (ICP)	  and	  its	  perceived	  Soviet	  patron.	  Consequently,	  rash	  decisions	  were	  made,	  opportunities	  to	  ensure	  Iraq’s	  non-­‐alignment	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  were	  missed,	  and	  America’s	  actions	  helped	  push	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	   The	  historiography	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  and	  the	  1958-­‐59	  crisis	  is	  more	  extensive	  than	  other	  periods	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  The	  First	  account	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  management	  of	  the	  crisis	  was	  published	  by	  Nigel	  Ashton	  in	  1993,	  following	  the	  State	  Department’s	  publication	  of	  a	  FRUS	  volume	  on	  the	  subject.63	  In	  his	  article,	  Ashton	  argued	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  was	  not	  a	  joint	  venture,	  but	  “mirrored	  many	  of	  the	  suspicions	  which	  limited	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  two	  powers	  in	  the	  region	  throughout	  the	  1950s.”64	  Ashton’s	  argument	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  Stephen	  Blackwell’s	  piece	  on	  the	  revolution,	  where	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he	  argued	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  held	  “a	  common	  perception	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  threat	  that	  ensured	  their	  respective	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategies	  remained	  broadly	  in	  step.”65	  More	  recent	  works,	  however,	  support	  Ashton’s	  argument	  and	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  on	  the	  American	  response.	  Peter	  Hahn’s	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  for	  example,	  argues	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  reaction	  was	  premised	  on	  its	  recent	  experiences	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  across	  the	  developing	  world,	  and	  sought	  to	  “bolster	  friendly	  states,	  prolong	  Western	  inFluence,	  and	  deny	  Soviet	  encroachments.”66	  Ashton	  and	  Hahn’s	  arguments	  are	  further	  supported	  by	  W.	  Taylor	  Fain’s	  study	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  policies	  toward	  the	  Gulf	  region.67	  Building	  on	  Ashton,	  Hahn,	  and	  Fain’s	  arguments,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  recent	  declassiFication	  of	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Iraq	  (SCI)’s	  Files,	  this	  chapter	  reappraises	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  revolution.	  It	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  driven	  by	  Cold	  War	  concerns	  about	  the	  Qasim	  regime’s	  relationship	  with	  Moscow	  and	  disputes	  the	  notion	  that	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States	  viewed	  the	  Iraqi	  crisis	  in	  the	  same	  light.	  
I	   Before	  examining	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  revolution,	  an	  understanding	  of	  America’s	  policies	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  the	  region	  needs	  to	  be	  established.	  Israel’s	  defeat	  of	  the	  Arab	  armies	  in	  1948	  led	  to	  profound	  changes	  throughout	  the	  region,	  as	  Arab	  nationalism	  emerged	  as	  a	  dominant	  ideology.	  The	  Egyptian	  Revolution	  in	  1952	  was	  the	  First	  instance	  in	  which	  Arab	  nationalist,	  military	  ofFicers	  overthrew	  the	  corrupt,	  Western-­‐backed	  monarchy	  of	  King	  Farouk,	  and	  brought	  to	  power	  Egypt’s	  longtime,	  charismatic	  president,	  Gamal	  Abd	  al-­‐Nasser.68	  The	  loss	  of	  Egypt	  from	  the	  Western	  camp	  concerned	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  leading	  his	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  to	  consider	  bringing	  together	  the	  “Northern	  Tier”	  states	  of	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  and	  Pakistan	  into	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a	  collective	  security	  alliance	  aimed	  at	  containing	  a	  potential	  Soviet	  thrust	  southward	  toward	  the	  Gulf.69	  With	  Iraqi	  Premier	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said	  taking	  the	  initiative,	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact—as	  the	  alliance	  was	  commonly	  known—was	  formed	  in	  1955,	  sparking	  a	  Fierce	  debate	  among	  other	  Arab	  states,	  like	  Jordan,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  Syria,	  about	  whether	  to	  join.	  But	  when	  Britain	  joined	  the	  pact	  in	  April	  1955,	  Nasser	  rallied	  support	  against	  it	  and	  formed	  a	  mutual	  security	  alliance	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Syria.70	  The	  debate	  over	  the	  pact	  underscored	  just	  how	  fractious	  Arab	  politics	  was	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1948	  war.	  It	  also	  showed	  that	  Iraq	  stood	  out	  from	  the	  rest	  by	  joining	  in	  a	  non-­‐Arab,	  pro-­‐Western	  alliance.	   The	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  differed	  greatly	  in	  their	  understandings	  of	  and	  approaches	  toward	  Arab	  nationalism.	  As	  Fain	  observed,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  predisposed	  toward	  sympathizing	  with	  anti-­‐colonialist	  attitudes	  and	  was	  able	  to	  view	  British	  imperialism	  in	  the	  region	  as	  “both	  morally	  wrong	  and	  politically	  destabilizing.”71	  Indeed,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1950s,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  recognized	  that	  nationalism	  could	  be	  used	  to	  America’s	  advantage	  and	  channeled	  in	  directions	  consistent	  with	  its	  containment	  policies.72	  This,	  of	  course,	  put	  the	  U.S.	  at	  direct	  odds	  with	  the	  British,	  who	  viewed	  Nasser’s	  brand	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  national	  interests,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  it	  attacked	  Egypt	  along	  with	  France	  and	  Israel	  in	  October	  1956	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  removing	  Nasser	  from	  power.	  SigniFicantly,	  Britain	  and	  its	  allies	  failed	  to	  consult	  the	  U.S.	  in	  advance,	  which	  forced	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  issue	  threats	  and	  force	  their	  withdrawal.	  This	  left	  Nasser	  relatively	  unscathed,	  allowing	  him	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  hero	  and	  a	  champion	  of	  a	  new	  pan-­‐Arab,	  nationalist	  ideology,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  Nasserism.	  Buoyed	  by	  his	  success,	  Nasser	  commenced	  a	  subversive	  effort	  throughout	  the	  region	  aimed	  at	  overthrowing	  Western-­‐backed,	  “reactionary”	  monarchies	  and	  replacing	  them	  with	  Arab	  nationalist	  regimes.73	  	   In	  January	  1957,	  Eisenhower	  issued	  his	  eponymous	  doctrine	  that	  called	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  offer	  economic	  or	  military	  assistance	  “to	  secure	  and	  protect	  the	  territorial	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integrity	  and	  political	  independence	  of	  such	  nations	  ...	  against	  overt	  armed	  aggression	  from	  any	  nation	  controlled	  by	  international	  communism.”	  By	  not	  naming	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  directly,	  Eisenhower’s	  vague	  reference	  to	  “any	  nation	  controlled	  by	  international	  communism”	  meant	  that	  it	  could	  be	  used	  in	  other	  circumstances.74	  This	  would	  become	  important	  in	  the	  First	  half	  of	  1958,	  when	  Nasser	  achieved	  considerable	  success	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (UAR)	  in	  February	  1958.75	  	   Iraq’s	  premier,	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said,	  was	  alarmed	  by	  the	  UAR’s	  creation	  and	  sought	  to	  establish	  Iraq	  as	  a	  counterbalance	  to	  it	  two	  weeks	  later	  by	  forging	  a	  union	  with	  Jordan,	  known	  as	  the	  Arab	  Union	  (AU).	  In	  early	  July	  1958,	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan	  requested	  Iraqi	  assistance	  to	  quell	  internal	  disturbances.	  But	  unknown	  to	  Nuri,	  the	  military	  units	  he	  dispatched	  had	  been	  inFiltrated	  by	  self-­‐styled	  Iraqi	  Free	  OfFicers—an	  homage	  to	  Nasser’s	  Free	  OfFicer	  movement—and	  had	  to	  pass	  close	  to	  Baghdad	  on	  their	  way	  to	  Jordan.	  Upon	  receiving	  his	  movement	  orders,	  Colonel	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  led	  his	  forces	  into	  Baghdad,	  seized	  the	  radio	  station,	  occupied	  all	  strategic	  buildings,	  and	  announced	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  Iraqi	  Republic.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  rebels	  killed	  King	  Faisal	  II,	  Crown	  Prince	  Abd	  al-­‐Ilah,	  and	  eventually	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said.76	   By	  mid-­‐1958,	  it	  was	  already	  clear	  that	  British	  and	  American	  policies	  toward	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	  the	  region	  were	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other.	  Britain,	  with	  its	  colonial	  empire	  in	  decline,	  appeared	  to	  be	  clinging	  haplessly	  to	  its	  Middle	  Eastern	  assets,	  which	  were	  considered	  crucial	  to	  its	  postwar	  economic	  survival.	  Consequently,	  Britain	  viewed	  Nasser’s	  brand	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  national	  interests	  and	  could	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  dominate	  the	  Gulf	  region	  and	  its	  vital	  oil	  supplies.	  For	  the	  Americans,	  the	  region	  was	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  policy	  was	  geared	  toward	  preventing	  Soviet	  control	  of	  the	  region’s	  oil	  resources,	  even	  if	  this	  meant	  accommodating	  Nasser.	  The	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only	  condition	  was	  that	  Nasser	  keep	  communist	  forces	  on	  the	  fringes	  of	  power,	  which	  his	  union	  with	  Syria	  suggested	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  oblige.	  In	  short,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  further	  disagreements	  between	  Washington	  and	  London	  over	  how	  to	  assess	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  in	  1958.	  
II
	   The	  Iraqi	  coup	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  America’s	  strategy	  to	  contain	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  After	  all,	  Iraq	  had	  been	  a	  vital	  member	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact,	  was	  pro-­‐Western,	  and	  held	  considerable	  oil	  wealth.	  U.S.	  companies	  also	  had	  a	  23.75%	  stake	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  Petroleum	  Company	  (IPC).77	  Given	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  whereby	  a	  loss	  by	  one	  side	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  gain	  by	  the	  other	  and	  vice	  versa,	  U.S.	  policymakers	  feared	  the	  Soviets	  could	  leapfrog	  past	  the	  Northern	  Tier	  containment	  shield,	  establish	  a	  satellite	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  control	  Iraq’s	  vast	  oil	  reserves,	  and	  transform	  the	  Cold	  War	  balance	  of	  power.	  While	  this	  was	  a	  worst-­‐case-­‐scenario,	  it	  was	  not	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility.	  Consequently,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  British	  were	  forced	  to	  take	  immediate	  action	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Jordan	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  West’s	  position.	  However,	  on	  the	  question	  of	  intervention	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  British	  and	  Americans	  departed.	  The	  British	  wanted	  the	  U.S.	  to	  intervene	  militarily,	  but	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  inclined	  to	  “wait-­‐and-­‐see”	  how	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  government	  behaved	  before	  it	  would	  react.	  	   It	  took	  almost	  eleven	  hours	  for	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  coup	  had	  taken	  place	  in	  Baghdad.	  At	  8	  a.m.	  (EST),	  Secretary	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  informed	  Eisenhower	  that	  elements	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  “had	  moved	  upon	  the	  royal	  palace	  and	  had	  murdered	  Crown	  Prince	  Emir	  Abdul	  Illah.”	  He	  was	  uncertain	  about	  the	  King’s	  fate	  and	  that	  of	  his	  premier,	  but	  feared	  the	  worst.	  This	  led	  Eisenhower	  to	  call	  in	  his	  national	  security	  team	  to	  review	  the	  situation	  and	  “make	  sure	  that	  no	  facet	  of	  the	  situation	  was	  overlooked.”	  When	  the	  group	  gathered	  in	  the	  Oval	  OfFice,	  the	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  (DCI),	  Allen	  Dulles,	  explained:	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The	  coup	  …	  was	  executed	  by	  pro-­‐Nasser	  elements	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army,	  and	  a	  ‘Republican’	  government	  has	  been	  set	  up	  that	  includes	  pro-­‐Nasser	  people.	  We	  have	  no	  information	  as	  yet	  that	  Nasser	  himself	  is	  behind	  the	  coup.	  A	  strict	  curfew	  has	  been	  instituted	  in	  Iraq	  and	  almost	  Fifty	  ofFicers	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  have	  already	  been	  ‘retired,’	  including	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  pro-­‐West	  ofFicers.	  We	  have	  no	  reports	  on	  Iraqi	  forces	  outside	  Baghdad,	  and	  there	  is	  still	  just	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  brigades	  in	  or	  near	  Jordan	  might	  prove	  loyal	  to	  the	  monarchy.	  King	  Faisal	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Nuri	  as	  Said	  have	  disappeared	  but	  are	  presumed	  dead.On	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Nasser	  was	  behind	  the	  coup,	  Allen	  Dulles	  said	  that	  while	  the	  conspirators	  were	  pro-­‐Nasser,	  the	  CIA	  “lacked	  hard	  evidence	  implicating	  [him].”	  This	  conclusion	  dispels	  the	  notion	  that	  U.S.	  thought	  Egypt	  was	  behind	  the	  plot.78	  Eisenhower	  agreed	  little	  could	  be	  done	  in	  the	  short	  term	  and	  adopted	  a	  “wait-­‐and-­‐see”	  approach.79	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  Iraqi	  coup	  prompted	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  to	  take	  action	  in	  the	  region	  to	  protect	  Western	  interests	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Jordan.	  A	  few	  hours	  after	  the	  coup,	  Lebanon’s	  embattled	  President,	  Camille	  Chamoun,	  informed	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  that	  he	  “wanted	  U.S.	  military	  intervention	  in	  Lebanon	  within	  48	  hours.”	  This	  meant	  the	  U.S.	  could	  act	  militarily	  under	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  doctrine.	  After	  consulting	  with	  Congress,	  on	  July	  14,	  Eisenhower	  issued	  orders	  to	  the	  Commander	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Fleet	  for	  U.S.	  Marines	  to	  land	  in	  Beirut	  the	  next	  day.80	  Similarly,	  Jordan’s	  economic	  and	  political	  crisis	  was	  only	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  coup,	  since	  it	  meant	  the	  loss	  of	  subsidized	  petroleum,	  which	  soon	  led	  to	  shortages.	  On	  July	  17,	  the	  Jordanian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  informed	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  that	  it	  wished	  for	  military	  assistance	  to	  “crush	  [the]	  insurrection	  [in]	  Baghdad,	  [and]	  restore	  peace	  in	  accordance	  with	  AU	  constitution.”81	  While	  King	  Hussein	  believed	  he	  was	  the	  rightful	  heir	  to	  Iraq’s	  throne,	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  AU	  constitution,	  he	  could,	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therefore,	  call	  on	  the	  U.S.	  to	  intervene	  on	  Iraq’s	  behalf,	  but	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  proved	  hesitant.82	  There	  were	  several	  reasons	  for	  this:	  1)	  there	  was	  no	  guarantee	  a	  U.S.	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  would	  work;	  2)	  it	  could	  spark	  a	  regional	  war;	  and	  3)	  it	  ran	  the	  risk	  of	  pushing	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  regime,	  which	  had	  shown	  initial	  signs	  of	  moderation,	  right	  into	  the	  arms	  of	  the	  Soviets.	  Given	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  refused	  to	  endorse	  such	  a	  move:[The]	  U.S.	  believes	  [the]	  primary	  concern	  at	  [the]	  moment	  ...	  should	  be	  preservation	  [of	  the]	  independence	  and	  integrity	  of	  Jordan.	  [The]	  New	  request	  for	  assistance	  to	  destroy	  [the]	  insurrection	  in	  Iraq	  goes	  far	  beyond	  scope	  of	  purpose	  for	  which	  [the]	  U.S.	  and	  UK	  were	  requested	  and	  agreed	  to	  help	  Jordan.83Consequently,	  Eisenhower	  endorsed	  the	  sending	  of	  a	  British	  expeditionary	  force	  to	  Jordan	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  petroleum	  airlift	  to	  help	  alleviate	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  Taken	  together,	  this	  suggests	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  coup	  was	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  American	  intervention	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  British	  operation	  in	  Jordan	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  West’s	  uncertain	  position	  in	  the	  region.	   On	  July	  15,	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  Iraq,	  Brigadier	  Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  Qasim,	  met	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq,	  Waldemar	  Gallman,	  to	  offer	  assurances	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  U.S.	  citizens	  and	  property.	  Reporting	  to	  Washington,	  Gallman	  described	  Qasim	  as	  “affable”	  but	  appeared	  “anxious	  to	  get	  [the]	  revolutionary	  regime	  off	  to	  as	  good	  a	  start	  as	  possible	  with	  [the]	  U.S.”	  Though	  a	  brief	  exchange,	  Gallman	  was	  pleased	  Qasim	  was	  willing	  to	  meet	  him	  so	  soon	  after	  the	  coup.	  He	  then	  returned	  to	  the	  embassy,	  where	  he	  learned	  that	  Nuri	  had	  been	  discovered	  and	  was	  hanged.	  “How	  tragically	  ironic	  that	  on	  [the]	  very	  day	  [of	  the]	  landings	  made	  from	  [the]	  Sixth	  Fleet	  [in	  Lebanon],	  which	  Nuri	  had	  so	  long	  pleaded	  for,	  [that	  he]	  was	  put	  to	  death.”84	  On	  July	  17,	  the	  ambassador	  met	  with	  the	  newly	  appointed	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Abd	  al-­‐Jabbar	  al-­‐Jumarad,	  who	  reiterated	  Qasim’s	  assurances	  and	  the	  regime’s	  desire	  to	  maintain	  good	  relations	  with	  the	  West.	  He	  also	  emphasized	  that	  Iraq	  would	  adhere	  to	  all	  international	  treaties,	  maintain	  the	  Flow	  of	  oil,	  and	  wished	  to	  maintain	  western	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technical	  assistance.	  These	  were	  all	  good	  signs,	  which	  led	  Gallman	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  would	  be	  some	  moderate	  civilian	  inFluence	  within	  the	  new	  government.85	   The	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  failure	  to	  anticipate	  the	  coup	  led	  to	  an	  investigation	  by	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  (NEA).	  The	  report,	  released	  July	  16,	  concluded	  that	  “no	  signiFicant	  indication	  of	  the	  impending	  action	  in	  Iraq	  appeared	  in	  any	  sources	  available	  to	  [the	  Bureau	  of	  Research	  and	  Analysis	  or	  INR],	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  very	  close	  watch	  was	  being	  kept	  for	  precisely	  this	  development.”	  While	  there	  had	  been	  rumours	  regarding	  an	  impending	  coup,	  the	  NEA	  believed	  Nuri	  had	  countered	  these	  conspiracies.	  The	  problem,	  it	  seemed,	  was	  the	  coup	  was	  conducted	  by	  a	  small,	  close-­‐knit	  group	  of	  ofFicers	  and	  while	  Iraqi	  and	  U.S.	  intelligence	  knew	  of	  Qasim,	  he	  was	  never	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  cause	  for	  concern.	  The	  former	  Iraqi	  government	  maintained	  a	  very	  complete	  intelligence	  net	  within	  the	  Army	  itself	  which	  did	  not	  discern	  any	  questionable	  contacts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Col.	  Qasim,	  even	  though	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  itself	  aware	  (as	  were	  we)	  that	  Col.	  Qasim	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  Syrian	  subversive	  efforts	  while	  stationed	  in	  Jordan	  in	  late	  1956.The	  NEA	  concluded	  that	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  conspirators,	  absence	  of	  outward	  signs	  (like	  social	  discontent)	  of	  an	  impending	  coup,	  and	  skillful	  deception	  efforts	  made	  detecting	  the	  plot	  difFicult.86	   On	  July	  19,	  the	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  explained	  the	  coup	  was	  “remarkably	  rapid	  and	  successful”,	  the	  new	  regime	  was	  dominated	  by	  military	  Figures,	  and	  was	  trying	  to	  “encourage	  normal	  functioning	  civilian	  departments.”87	  The	  next	  day,	  the	  INR	  concluded	  the	  regime	  was	  in	  complete	  control	  of	  the	  country	  and	  warned	  that	  any	  “move	  by	  force	  from	  outside	  into	  Iraq	  would	  meet	  very	  little	  Iraqi	  support	  and	  its	  success	  would	  be	  highly	  unlikely.”88	  That	  day,	  Hugh	  Cumming,	  the	  INR’s	  director,	  sent	  Foster	  Dulles	  a	  memo	  suggesting	  additional	  positive	  signs	  coming	  from	  Iraq.Reports	  reaching	  us	  from	  Baghdad	  indicate	  that	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iraq	  1)	  desires	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  West,	  2)	  will	  maintain	  existing	  international	  agreements,	  3)	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being	  will	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retain	  membership	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact,	  4)	  will	  not	  nationalize	  the	  production	  of	  oil,	  and	  5)	  recognizes	  the	  UAR	  but	  is	  not	  joining.89With	  these	  assurances,	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  met	  all	  of	  the	  traditional	  requirements	  for	  diplomatic	  recognition:	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  people,	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  fulFill	  its	  international	  obligations	  under	  treaties.	  Later	  in	  the	  day,	  Foster	  Dulles	  agreed	  in	  principle	  to	  extend	  diplomatic	  recognition	  to	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  wanted	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  First.	  Fortunately,	  a	  pre-­‐arranged	  meeting	  of	  the	  pact	  was	  schedule	  later	  that	  month.90	  	   When	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  members	  met	  in	  London	  during	  July	  28-­‐29,	  talks	  focused	  on	  three	  questions:	  1)	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  alliance,	  2)	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  would	  join	  it,	  and	  3)	  diplomatic	  recognition	  of	  Iraq.	  As	  Foster	  Dulles	  later	  reported	  to	  Eisenhower,	  “we	  canvassed	  the	  prospects	  for	  …	  a	  new	  form	  in	  which	  to	  express	  the	  mutual	  security	  commitments	  for	  which	  all	  the	  Northern	  Tier	  countries	  are	  eager.”	  He	  was	  pressured	  to	  join	  the	  new	  pact,	  but	  remained	  non-­‐committal,	  stating	  it	  was	  a	  “very	  loose”	  obligation	  that	  required	  consultation	  and	  preferring	  instead	  that	  the	  existing	  pact	  members	  develop	  a	  new	  “formula”	  built	  upon	  the	  present	  organization.	  This	  would	  become	  the	  Central	  Treaty	  Organization	  (CENTO)	  and	  while	  the	  U.S.	  never	  joined,	  it	  did	  sign	  bilateral	  military	  agreements	  with	  Iran,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Turkey—the	  key	  member	  states-­‐and	  participated	  in	  a	  consultative	  role.91 	  On	  the	  question	  of	  recognizing	  Iraq,	  the	  pact	  members	  urged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  do	  so	  “without	  delay”	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  while	  maintaining	  the	  option	  of	  exerting	  constructive	  inFluence	  on	  the	  new	  regime.	  Right	  after	  Foster	  Dulles	  reported	  this	  news	  to	  Washington,	  Eisenhower	  directed	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  approve	  diplomatic	  recognition	  of	  Iraq.	  It	  was	  July	  30,	  1958.92	   A	  number	  of	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  period.	  Notably,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  the	  Iraq	  coup	  was	  indigenous,	  though	  inspired	  by	  Nasser.	  Fearing	  the	  crisis	  would	  spread	  throughout	  the	  region,	  the	  U.S.	  intervened	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  did	  not	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oppose	  British	  intervention	  in	  Jordan,	  while	  supporting	  it	  logistically	  and	  implementing	  an	  emergency	  airlift	  of	  oil.	  Soon	  thereafter,	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  regime	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  abide	  by	  international	  agreements,	  while	  protecting	  U.S.	  citizens	  and	  assets.	  With	  the	  regime	  in	  clear	  control	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  consulted	  its	  allies	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  and	  agreed	  to	  extend	  diplomatic	  recognition	  to	  Iraq.	  
III
	   During	  the	  fall	  of	  1958,	  a	  power	  struggle	  emerged	  between	  three	  distinct	  groups:	  1)	  the	  coup’s	  leader,	  Brigadier	  Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  Qasim,	  and	  his	  followers;	  2)	  UAR-­‐backed	  Arab	  nationalists,	  led	  by	  Colonel	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif;	  and	  3)	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Iraqi	  communists.	  The	  power	  struggle	  went	  through	  two	  distinct	  phases.	  The	  First	  involved	  a	  contest	  for	  power	  between	  the	  two	  Iraqi	  ofFicers	  that	  overthrew	  the	  monarchy:	  Qasim,	  who	  masterminded	  the	  plot,	  and	  Arif,	  who	  actually	  led	  the	  operation.	  The	  wedge	  between	  the	  two	  was	  the	  question	  of	  joining	  Egypt.	  For	  his	  part,	  Qasim	  was	  suspicious	  of	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  Nasser,	  while	  Arif	  endorsed	  the	  idea.93	  The	  second	  phase	  emerged	  in	  late	  1958,	  after	  Qasim	  foiled	  a	  Nasserist	  plot,	  which	  led	  to	  his	  increased	  reliance	  on	  the	  ICP	  for	  support.	  This,	  of	  course,	  would	  cause	  great	  concern	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  which	  incorrectly	  judged	  the	  ICP	  to	  be	  an	  arm	  of	  the	  Soviets.94	  	   Iraq’s	  power	  struggle	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration.	  Throughout	  late	  September	  and	  early	  October,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC)	  met	  regularly	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation	  unfolding	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  First	  meeting	  took	  place	  on	  September	  18,	  where	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  Charles	  Cabell,	  informed	  the	  NSC	  that	  Nasser	  was	  concerned	  “over	  the	  factional	  struggles	  among	  the	  leaders	  in	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iraq.”	  A	  week	  later,	  he	  reported	  that	  “internal	  maneuvering”	  was	  ongoing	  and	  that	  despite	  Qasim’s	  opposition	  to	  union,	  “there	  was	  still	  obvious	  military	  cooperation	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Iraq”.95
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   Qasim	  was	  aware	  of	  Arif’s	  ambitions,	  but	  he	  bided	  his	  time	  until	  early	  September	  when	  Arif	  went	  off	  script	  during	  a	  provincial	  tour—whipping	  up	  nationalist	  fervor	  for	  uniFication.	  Afterward,	  Qasim	  stripped	  Arif	  of	  his	  military	  posts,	  cutting	  him	  off	  from	  regular	  contact	  with	  the	  army.	  He	  allowed	  him	  to	  continue	  as	  Deputy	  Premier	  and	  Minister	  of	  Interior,	  but	  not	  for	  long.	  On	  September	  30,	  Qasim	  sent	  Arif	  into	  exile	  as	  Iraq’s	  ambassador	  to	  West	  Germany.	  With	  this,	  Nasser’s	  designs	  on	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  be	  slipping	  away	  from	  him.96	  On	  October	  1,	  the	  NSC	  discussed	  the	  implications	  of	  Arif’s	  dismissal	  with	  General	  Andrew	  Goodpaster,	  noting	  two	  other	  pro-­‐UAR	  cabinet	  members	  had	  also	  been	  cut.	  The	  next	  day,	  Allen	  Dulles	  offered	  the	  NSC	  the	  CIA’s	  assessment	  that	  Qasim	  was	  consolidating	  power	  while	  setting	  himself	  up	  as	  an	  ideological	  counterweight	  to	  Nasser’s	  brand	  of	  Arab	  nationalism.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  Arif,	  Dulles	  added,	  “in	  all	  probability	  …	  we	  have	  not	  heard	  the	  last	  of	  [him].”97	  He	  was	  right.	   Following	  Arif’s	  banishment	  to	  Bonn,	  Nasser	  sent	  agents	  to	  West	  Germany	  to	  plot	  his	  return	  to	  power.	  Essentially,	  the	  plan	  called	  for	  pro-­‐Nasser	  sympathizers	  to	  incite	  uprisings	  in	  Iraq’s	  provinces	  while	  spiriting	  Arif	  into	  Baghdad,	  where	  he	  would	  lead	  pro-­‐UAR	  elements	  in	  the	  army	  in	  a	  putsch	  against	  Qasim.	  Riots	  erupted	  in	  the	  countryside	  and	  Arif	  arrived	  safely	  in	  Baghdad	  on	  November	  4	  as	  planned,	  but	  he	  was	  soon	  discovered	  and	  arrested.	  The	  plot	  was	  a	  failure.98	  Viewed	  from	  Iraq,	  there	  was	  no	  question	  to	  Nasser’s	  direct	  involvement.	  According	  to	  an	  INR	  report,	  the	  attempted	  coup	  “precipitated	  the	  showdown	  stage	  in	  the	  power	  struggle	  within	  Iraq	  itself	  but	  has	  also	  created	  an	  open	  challenge	  to	  President	  Nasir.”	  Indeed,	  with	  Arif	  languishing	  in	  an	  Iraqi	  prison	  and	  his	  pro-­‐UAR,	  nationalist	  allies	  cut	  off	  from	  power,	  Qasim	  had	  become	  the	  “sole	  leader”—as	  he	  preferred	  to	  be	  called—of	  Iraq.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  what	  U.S.	  analysts	  described	  as	  a	  “public	  slap,”	  Qasim	  had	  sent	  a	  clear	  signal	  to	  Nasser	  that	  he	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  allowing	  Iraq	  to	  join	  Egypt,	  which	  also	  suggested	  he	  saw	  himself	  as	  an	  alternative	  pillar	  for	  inFluence	  in	  the	  Arab	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world.99	  This	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  phase	  of	  Iraq’s	  power	  struggle.	  SigniFicantly,	  by	  alienating	  the	  nationalists,	  Qasim	  now	  needed	  a	  new	  political	  base	  to	  rely	  upon	  and	  there	  was	  only	  one	  alternative:	  the	  communists.
IV	   In	  October	  1958,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  completed	  its	  review	  of	  its	  regional	  policy.	  Since	  May	  1958,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  “Basic	  National	  Security	  Policy”	  set	  out	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  “an	  imminent	  or	  actual	  communist	  seizure	  of	  control	  from	  within,”	  the	  U.S.	  should	  “take	  all	  feasible	  measures	  to	  thwart	  it,	  including	  military	  action	  if	  required	  and	  appropriate	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  situation.”100	  Ultimately,	  the	  NSC	  agreed	  this	  policy	  was	  adequate	  to	  manage	  the	  crisis	  and	  adopted	  NSC	  5820,	  which	  identiFied	  Five	  secondary	  considerations:	  1)	  seeking	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israel	  dispute;	  2)	  continued	  availability	  of	  peaceful	  navigation	  of	  the	  region;	  3)	  promotion	  of	  stable	  governments,	  political	  evolution,	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  resisting	  communist	  inFluence;	  4)	  continued	  availability	  of	  strategic	  positions,	  military	  overFlight,	  and	  staging	  bases	  (i.e.	  Bahrain);	  and	  5)	  the	  expansion	  of	  U.S.	  inFluence	  at	  the	  Soviet’s	  expense.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  instances,	  the	  overriding	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  deny	  the	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  the	  region	  and	  ensure	  the	  Flow	  of	  oil	  to	  the	  West.101	  	   Regarding	  Iraq,	  the	  NSC	  reafFirmed	  the	  existing	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy,	  which	  consisted	  of	  paying	  very	  close	  attention	  to	  developments,	  while	  preparing	  for	  the	  worst.102	  With	  speciFic	  reference	  to	  Iraq,	  on	  November	  4,	  the	  council	  approved	  NSC	  5820/1	  which	  identiFied	  U.S.	  policy	  objectives	  in	  Iraq	  as	  1)	  maintaining	  “friendly	  relations”;	  2)	  acquiescing	  to	  Iraq’s	  eventual	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact;	  3)	  giving	  sympathetic	  consideration	  to	  the	  continuance	  of	  military	  assistance	  in	  “limited	  amounts”;	  and	  4)	  encouraging	  friendly	  “elements”	  in	  Iraq,	  while	  avoiding	  
 35
99 DoS, Memorandum, Cumming to J.F. Dulles, “Intelligence Note: Significance of the Return to Iraq and 
Arrest of Col. Arif,” November 5, 1958 (FRUS/1958-60/XII/doc.142), pp.351-52.
100 NSC, “Statement of Basic National Security Policy,” NSC 5810/1, May 5, 1958 (FRUS/1958-60/III/doc.
139), p.109.
101 FRUS/1958-60/XII/doc.46, p.136.
102 White House, NSC 5820/1, November 4, 1958 (FRUS/1958-60/XII/doc.51), pp.196-7. 
identiFication	  with	  “speciFic	  individuals	  and	  political	  issues.”103	  What	  will	  become	  evident	  was	  that	  these	  guidelines	  were	  Flawed,	  since	  they	  were	  based	  on	  the	  false	  assumption	  that	  Iraq	  would	  remain	  “relatively	  stable”	  and	  “envisaged	  various	  degrees	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Arab	  nationalists”.104	   In	  the	  fall	  of	  1958,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  became	  concerned	  about	  Soviet	  subversion	  in	  Iraq.	  This	  analysis	  was	  based	  on	  three	  premises:	  1)	  concerns	  about	  the	  return	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  nationalism	  leader	  to	  Iraq,	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  Barzani,	  who	  had	  been	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  since	  1946;	  2)	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  arms-­‐supply	  relationship;	  and	  3)	  Qasim’s	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  the	  ICP	  for	  support	  following	  his	  fallout	  with	  Arif	  and	  the	  Arab	  nationalists.	   After	  the	  revolution,	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  Kurdish	  support	  for	  his	  regime	  Qasim	  calculated	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  win	  over	  Barzani.	  He	  sent	  feelers	  to	  Prague	  to	  promise	  Barzani	  and	  his	  followers	  amnesty.	  He	  accepted	  and	  returned	  to	  Iraq	  after	  a	  brief	  stopover	  in	  Cairo,	  where	  he	  met	  with	  Nasser.	  Upon	  Barzani’s	  return	  in	  October	  1958,	  Qasim	  apologized	  on	  behalf	  of	  Iraq,	  offered	  Financial	  restitution,	  provided	  him	  with	  accommodation	  at	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said’s	  former	  residence	  in	  Baghdad,	  and	  promised	  him	  a	  degree	  of	  Kurdish	  autonomy.	  However,	  Qasim’s	  wooing	  of	  Barzani	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  grave	  error,	  since	  he	  would	  go	  on	  to	  lead	  a	  fourteen	  year	  long	  rebellion	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  starting	  in	  1961.105	   The	  U.S.	  was	  concerned	  about	  Barzani’s	  return	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  so-­‐called	  “Red	  Mullah”,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  he	  was	  a	  potential	  Soviet	  agent	  with	  a	  history	  of	  troublemaking	  inside	  both	  Iraq	  and	  Iran.	  He	  was	  also	  popular	  among	  Iraq’s	  large	  Kurdish	  population.	  Given	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  saw	  his	  return	  from	  exile	  as	  a	  bad	  omen	  for	  Iraq’s	  future	  stability.	  On	  October	  14,	  Gallman	  expressed	  his	  concern	  about	  Barzani	  to	  Washington,	  indicating	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  Soviets	  would	  use	  him	  to	  subvert	  the	  regime.	  He	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  impending	  repatriation	  of	  Barzani’s	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followers	  and	  their	  families,	  which	  had	  swelled	  to	  850	  and	  included	  a	  number	  of	  Russian	  wives,	  which	  could	  be	  Soviet	  agents.	  Barzani’s	  Soviet	  connections	  and	  unrivaled	  popularity	  among	  Iraq’s	  Kurds	  meant	  his	  “ability	  [to]	  disrupt	  [Iraq’s]	  stability	  [is]	  almost	  endless.”106	  But	  what	  Gallman	  failed	  to	  realize	  was	  that	  Soviet	  efforts	  at	  indoctrinating	  Barzani	  in	  communist	  ideology	  were	  unsuccessful	  and	  had	  left	  him	  jaded	  about	  socialism	  and	  untrusting	  of	  Moscow’s	  intentions.107	  Not	  knowing	  this,	  Gallman’s	  instinct	  was	  to	  distrust	  Barzani	  and	  paint	  him	  as	  an	  enemy.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  the	  U.S.	  missed	  an	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  a	  leader	  who,	  despite	  his	  exile,	  did	  not	  threaten	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  could	  have	  been	  a	  powerful	  ally.	  	   Throughout	  the	  fall,	  further	  indicators	  convinced	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  that	  the	  ICP’s—and	  therefore	  Soviet—inFluence	  was	  growing	  in	  Iraq.	  For	  instance,	  on	  October	  16,	  Allen	  Dulles	  informed	  the	  NSC	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  had	  concluded	  an	  extensive	  trade	  agreement	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  It	  was	  also	  suspected	  that	  this	  deal	  included	  a	  large	  military	  component.108	  On	  November	  25,	  Cumming	  sent	  Foster	  Dulles	  a	  memo	  warning	  about	  the	  growing	  communist	  threat	  in	  Iraq.	  According	  to	  the	  memo,	  “tension	  between	  Qasim	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Nasir	  faction	  [may]	  have	  induced	  him	  to	  lean	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  support	  of	  [the	  left-­‐wing	  National	  Democratic	  Party	  (NDP)	  leader	  Kamil	  Chadirchi]	  and	  the	  Communists.”109	  Complicating	  matters,	  on	  December	  2	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  learned	  that	  a	  Soviet	  vessel	  had	  delivered	  a	  shipment	  of	  military	  hardware	  to	  Iraq,	  which	  was	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  First	  of	  a	  larger	  Soviet	  supply	  program.	  Viewed	  from	  Washington,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  uncertain	  whether	  Iraq	  had	  shifted	  its	  arms-­‐supply	  relationship	  to	  the	  Soviets	  or	  if	  it	  was	  adopting	  a	  “positive	  neutrality”	  policy	  similar	  to	  Egypt,	  which	  welcomed	  commercial	  and	  military	  relations	  with	  both	  blocs.110	   An	  historiographical	  point	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasized	  here.	  The	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  clearly	  convinced	  that	  the	  ICP	  was	  operating	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	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Soviet	  Union.	  However,	  as	  Johan	  Franzén	  explains	  in	  his	  work,	  Red	  Star	  Over	  Iraq,	  while	  Moscow	  was	  generally	  supportive	  of	  the	  ICP’s	  actions,	  there	  was	  actually	  little	  direct	  contact	  with	  its	  leaders.	  While	  some	  elements	  may	  have	  looked	  to	  Moscow	  for	  inspiration,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  revolution	  the	  ICP	  had	  abandoned	  the	  notion	  of	  seizing	  power	  directly,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  support	  the	  so-­‐called	  “national	  bourgeoisie,”	  which	  Qasim	  seemed	  to	  represent.111	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  Tripp,	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  ICP	  was	  unlike	  other	  Marxist	  groups	  around	  the	  world:	  ...to	  be	  a	  communist	  or	  communist-­‐sympathiser	  in	  Iraq	  …	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  doctrines	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism….	  Its	  focus	  on	  the	  evils	  of	  social	  injustice,	  economic	  exploitation	  and	  questions	  of	  wages	  and	  conditions	  of	  work	  won	  the	  ICP	  a	  wide	  base	  of	  support	  and	  made	  it	  the	  leading	  party	  of	  social	  reform….	  [The]	  ICP	  believed	  that	  in	  the	  short	  term	  only	  the	  army	  had	  the	  power	  to	  keep	  in	  check	  the	  forces	  of	  established	  social	  and	  economic	  privilege	  prior	  to	  their	  dismantling.	  Consequently,	  despite	  its	  weak	  representation	  in	  the	  ofFicer	  corps,	  it	  had	  backed	  the	  Free	  OfFicers.112But	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  matter	  was	  black	  and	  white:	  any	  communist-­‐inspired	  group	  must	  be	  opposed;	  a	  view	  that	  would	  cloud	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  Iraq’s	  post-­‐revolutionary	  power	  struggle.	   In	  December	  1958	  the	  struggle	  between	  Qasim	  and	  the	  nationalists	  was	  decided	  when	  the	  British	  informed	  the	  regime	  of	  a	  UAR	  plot	  to	  overthrow	  it.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  plot.	  On	  December	  3,	  an	  unnamed	  representative	  of	  the	  “Free	  OfFicers’	  movement”	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  seek	  support	  in	  overthrowing	  Qasim.113	  While	  embassy	  ofFicers	  were	  intrigued	  and	  recommended	  Washington	  provide	  “limited	  support”,	  the	  plot	  alarmed	  the	  State	  Department,	  which	  urged	  the	  embassy	  to	  exercise	  “extreme	  caution	  and	  reserve”	  and	  inform	  the	  provocateur	  that	  the	  U.S.	  cannot	  interfere	  with	  Iraq’s	  internal	  affairs.114 	  The	  department’s	  assessment	  proved	  correct.	  According	  to	  U.S.	  documents,	  the	  British	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had	  also	  caught	  wind	  of	  the	  plot	  and,	  fearing	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Nasser	  faction	  in	  Iraq,	  informed	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.115 	  Armed	  with	  this	  knowledge,	  the	  regime	  inFiltrated	  the	  conspiracy,	  recorded	  the	  plot’s	  details,	  and	  moved	  against	  it	  on	  December	  7,	  arresting	  Rashid	  Ali	  al-­‐Gaylani	  and	  two	  others.116	  Before	  long,	  the	  regime	  broadcasted	  the	  recordings	  which	  left	  no	  doubt	  Egypt	  was	  behind	  the	  plot.117	  	   The	  importance	  of	  Britain’s	  role	  in	  foiling	  the	  Rashid	  Ali	  plot	  cannot	  be	  understated.	  By	  tipping	  off	  Qasim,	  the	  British	  hoped	  they	  could	  cultivate	  him	  as	  an	  Iraqi	  alternative	  to	  Nasser’s	  inFluence	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  This	  strategy	  worked	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  since	  the	  Qasim-­‐Nasser	  rivalry	  escalated	  throughout	  1958-­‐59.	  However,	  it	  would	  eventually	  backFire	  in	  1961	  over	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis.	  For	  the	  Americans,	  the	  Rashid	  Ali	  plot	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  turning	  point	  in	  their	  perception	  of	  Iraq.	  This	  was	  because	  Qasim	  was	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  communists	  to	  protect	  himself	  from	  the	  nationalists,	  leading	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  ponder	  ways	  to	  halt	  this	  trend,	  including	  working	  with	  Nasser,	  Britain’s	  arch-­‐nemesis.	  
V	   A	  major	  shift	  in	  U.S.-­‐Egyptian	  relations	  occurred	  in	  mid-­‐December	  1958,	  leading	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  work	  with	  Nasser	  throughout	  1959	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  Given	  Nasser’s	  disparate	  motives	  from	  the	  Americans	  in	  seeking	  Qasim’s	  overthrow,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  that	  he	  manipulated	  U.S.	  fears	  about	  communism	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  assistance.	  However,	  Qasim’s	  reliance	  on	  communist	  support	  and	  his	  efforts	  to	  undermine	  Nasser	  created	  a	  rift	  that	  U.S.	  policymakers	  thought	  could	  be	  exploited	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals	  in	  the	  region.	  While	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  complexity	  of	  Iraq’s	  politics,	  Nasser	  did.	  Therefore,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  opted	  to	  work	  with	  Nasser	  against	  Qasim	  to	  advance	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Iraq,	  while	  simultaneously	  drawing	  Cairo	  away	  from	  Moscow.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  as	  Fain	  observed,	  U.S.	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policy	  clashed	  with	  Britain’s	  policy	  of	  supporting	  Qasim	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  Egyptian	  inFluence,	  an	  indication	  of	  “very	  different	  perceptions	  of	  threat	  to	  their	  regional	  interests.”118	   In	  mid-­‐December,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Rountree	  took	  a	  tour	  of	  the	  region	  that	  included	  stops	  in	  Cairo	  and	  Baghdad.	  It	  was	  during	  Rountree’s	  talk	  with	  Nasser	  on	  December	  14	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  U.S.-­‐Egyptian	  cooperation	  against	  Iraq	  was	  First	  raised.	  It	  was	  Nasser	  who	  raised	  the	  matter.	  He	  told	  Rountree	  that	  while	  he	  had	  indigenous	  means	  of	  dealing	  with	  Egypt’s	  “communist	  problem”,	  doing	  so	  in	  another	  country	  was	  “quite	  a	  different	  matter.”	  He	  observed	  the	  U.S.	  had	  greater	  experience	  in	  covert	  action	  and	  asked	  if	  Rountree	  had	  “any	  ideas”	  about	  what	  could	  be	  done	  in	  Iraq.	  Rountree	  replied	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “following	  [the]	  matter	  with	  interest”	  but	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  best	  if	  the	  Arab	  states	  Find	  a	  solution.	  Ignoring	  this,	  Nasser	  said	  the	  communist	  threat	  was	  a	  “common	  problem”	  which	  transcended	  inter-­‐Arab	  relations	  and	  insisted	  Egypt	  would	  oppose	  any	  Soviet	  attempt	  to	  assert	  itself	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  would	  do	  in	  the	  West.119	  This	  conversation	  was	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  U.S.-­‐Egyptian	  rapprochement	  and	  lead	  to	  tactical	  coordination	  of	  operations	  against	  Iraq	  throughout	  1959-­‐60.	   When	  Rountree	  arrived	  in	  Baghdad	  on	  December	  15	  hostile	  crowds	  greeted	  him	  at	  the	  airport.	  When	  he	  met	  Qasim,	  the	  Iraqi	  leader	  “expressed	  regret”	  for	  the	  incident	  and	  pointed	  to	  the	  implication	  of	  a	  “foreign	  power”	  in	  a	  recent	  plot	  against	  the	  regime.	  Rountree	  denied	  any	  U.S.	  involvement,	  saying	  the	  U.S.	  “had	  every	  intention	  of	  working	  for	  good	  relations”	  with	  Iraq,	  and	  warning	  that	  hostile	  states	  “would	  use	  every	  conceivable	  device	  to	  create	  suspicion	  and	  doubt”	  about	  America’s	  intentions.	  While	  Qasim	  appeared	  sincere	  in	  wanting	  to	  have	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  Rountree	  left	  Baghdad	  with	  a	  negative	  impression	  about	  the	  state	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  a	  view	  that	  would	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  actions	  that	  Eisenhower	  took	  next.120
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   On	  December	  17,	  the	  CIA	  produced	  a	  draft	  estimate	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  While	  the	  CIA	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  situation	  was	  “confused”	  and	  its	  intelligence	  was	  “inadequate	  for	  a	  conFident	  estimate”,	  the	  prospect	  of	  Iraqi	  communists	  seizing	  power	  was	  “a	  matter	  for	  most	  serious	  consideration”	  and	  therefore	  the	  report	  deserved	  circulation.	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  CIA	  concluded	  Qasim	  was	  not	  a	  communist,	  though	  they	  worried	  that	  his	  determination	  to	  keep	  Iraq	  free	  from	  Egyptian	  dominance	  had	  led	  to	  communists	  gaining	  unprecedented	  inFluence	  in	  the	  government.	  The	  CIA	  believed	  that	  only	  the	  army	  was	  capable	  of	  challenging	  Qasim	  but	  if	  it	  did	  not	  move	  in	  “the	  next	  few	  weeks,	  its	  capabilities	  [were]	  likely	  to	  dwindle	  rapidly.”	  Unfortunately,	  there	  was	  “no	  other	  signiFicant	  source	  of	  anti-­‐Communist	  energy	  and	  inFluence	  among	  the	  Arabs	  at	  present.”	  This	  reality	  led	  the	  CIA	  to	  conclude:	  “a	  Communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq	  would	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  basic	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  area	  and	  that	  it	  would	  set	  in	  train	  a	  course	  of	  events	  which	  would	  be	  extremely	  difFicult	  to	  reverse.”121	  	   Given	  Nasser’s	  proposal,	  Rountree’s	  hostile	  reception	  in	  Baghdad,	  and	  the	  CIA’s	  concerns	  about	  communist	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  mood	  was	  grim	  when	  the	  NSC	  met	  on	  December	  18.	  While	  the	  CIA	  had	  not	  reached	  any	  Firm	  conclusions,	  its	  director,	  Allen	  Dulles	  had.	  He	  told	  the	  council	  that	  Qasim	  was	  “in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Communist	  mob”	  and	  questioned	  whether	  he	  could	  retain	  power,	  which	  prompted	  Eisenhower	  to	  ask	  whether	  “it	  might	  be	  good	  policy	  to	  help	  [Nasser]	  take	  over	  in	  Iraq.”	  In	  response,	  Allen	  Dulles	  explained	  that	  overthrowing	  Qasim	  was	  no	  simple	  task	  and	  even	  if	  successful,	  “there	  were	  no	  important	  civil	  political	  Figures	  in	  Iraq”	  to	  replace	  him.	  The	  only	  logical	  substitute	  would	  be	  someone	  from	  the	  military,	  but	  not	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif,	  “who	  was	  not	  controllable.”	  Even	  so,	  Eisenhower	  pointed	  out,	  since	  “the	  Kremlin	  [is]	  our	  principal	  enemy”	  and	  “Nasser	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  [it],”	  then	  cooperating	  with	  him	  to	  prevent	  a	  Soviet	  takeover	  in	  Iraq	  was	  a	  logical	  solution.	  Gordon	  Gray,	  Eisenhower’s	  special	  assistant	  for	  national	  security	  affairs,	  recommended	  the	  NSC	  Planning	  Board	  review	  the	  existing	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  since	  it	  was	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  “was	  one	  
 41
121 “Communist Takeover in Iraq,” December 17, 1958, Op.Cit., pp.1-8.
that	  we	  could	  support.”	  Eisenhower	  agreed.122	  This	  exchange	  is	  very	  signiFicant.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  show	  that	  Eisenhower	  was	  prepared	  to	  work	  with	  Nasser	  against	  Qasim,	  but	  that	  he	  saw	  Iraq’s	  communists	  and	  the	  Soviets	  as	  a	  single	  entity,	  working	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  Iraq.	  	   Prior	  to	  the	  next	  NSC	  meeting	  on	  December	  23,	  Rountree	  met	  privately	  with	  Eisenhower,	  Vice	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  and	  Acting	  Secretary	  Christian	  Herter	  to	  discuss	  Nasser’s	  secret	  proposal.	  After	  giving	  his	  account,	  Rountree	  suggested	  he	  send	  Nasser	  a	  telegram	  expressing	  appreciation	  for	  the	  frank	  discussion,	  recounting	  his	  trip	  to	  Iraq,	  and	  indicating	  the	  president	  had	  been	  briefed	  on	  his	  proposal	  “off	  the	  record”.	  Eisenhower	  approved	  and	  a	  cable	  was	  sent	  to	  Cairo	  that	  evening.123	  When	  the	  NSC	  convened	  later	  that	  day,	  Rountree	  told	  the	  council	  Nasser	  understood	  the	  danger	  of	  communism	  and	  was	  at	  last	  prepared	  to	  “do	  something”.	  He	  explained	  that	  Cairo	  and	  Moscow	  were	  at	  odds	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Iraq,	  while	  American-­‐Egyptian	  interests	  were	  identical,	  though	  questions	  remained	  about	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  could	  trust	  Nasser.124	  	   The	  next	  morning	  Nasser	  sent	  the	  U.S.	  an	  unambiguous	  signal	  of	  his	  intention,	  when	  he	  delivered	  a	  speech	  denouncing	  communism	  “as	  among	  the	  enemies	  of	  Arab	  nationalism”.125	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  few	  weeks,	  Nasser	  initiated	  a	  campaign	  against	  Egyptian	  communists	  and	  increased	  his	  rhetorical	  attacks	  against	  Qasim.126	  The	  Eisenhower	  administration	  demonstrated	  its	  approval	  by	  providing	  emergency	  food	  aid	  to	  Egypt	  in	  late-­‐December,	  less	  than	  24-­‐hours	  after	  the	  initial	  request.127	  The	  conFluence	  of	  American-­‐Egyptian	  interests	  on	  the	  question	  of	  curbing	  communist	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq	  led	  to	  a	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  relations	  in	  the	  late	  1950s.
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   There	  was	  no	  debate	  in	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  over	  the	  dire	  implications	  of	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  What	  was	  discussed	  was	  whether	  a	  communist	  takeover	  was	  “imminent	  or	  actual”.	  Indeed,	  the	  CIA	  was	  correct	  in	  its	  assessment:	  “Communist	  control	  of	  Iraq	  would	  establish	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Middle	  East—contiguous	  to	  Syria,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Jordan,	  and	  Kuwait,	  and	  outFlanking	  two	  U.S.	  allies,	  Turkey	  and	  Iran.”	  It	  believed	  Soviet	  control	  over	  Iraq	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Western	  investments	  and	  vital	  oil	  supplies	  and	  could	  spark	  a	  Middle	  Eastern	  crisis.128	  However,	  these	  points	  were	  speculative.	  Qasim	  was	  not	  a	  communist,	  the	  Soviets	  were	  not	  in	  control	  of	  Iraq,	  and	  subsequent	  research	  has	  questioned	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  ICP	  took	  orders	  from	  Moscow.129	  And	  yet	  Eisenhower	  appeared	  eager	  to	  work	  with	  Nasser	  against	  Qasim.	  	   The	  basic	  national	  security	  policy	  required	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  “take	  all	  feasible	  measures”	  to	  prevent	  an	  “imminent	  or	  actual”	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  But	  this	  was	  a	  subjective	  question,	  dependent	  on	  the	  individual	  views	  of	  analysts.	  Consequently,	  the	  U.S.	  intelligence	  community	  struggled	  throughout	  the	  spring	  of	  1959	  with	  whether	  the	  “point	  of	  no	  return”	  in	  Iraq	  had	  been	  reached.	  For	  instance,	  on	  January	  7	  the	  CIA	  circulated	  a	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  (SNIE)	  arguing	  vaguely	  that	  Qasim	  had	  to	  take	  immediate	  action	  to	  curb	  communist	  inFluence	  or	  Iraq	  “will	  probably	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  Communist	  State.”130	  However,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  did	  not	  share	  this	  view.	  On	  January	  13	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador,	  John	  Jernegan,	  cabled	  Washington	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  view	  that	  the	  “point	  of	  no	  return	  has	  arrived”.	  He	  believed	  anti-­‐communist	  forces	  in	  the	  government	  still	  exist.131	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  the	  INR	  produced	  a	  report	  that	  concurred.	  It	  argued	  the	  communists	  had	  a	  “slight	  but	  possibly	  decisive	  advantage”,	  but	  the	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Arab	  nationalists	  were	  not	  Finished	  yet.132	  Clearly,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  held	  mixed	  views	  about	  whether	  communists	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Iraq.	  	   Views	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  working	  with	  Nasser	  against	  Iraq	  were	  equally	  mixed.	  A	  NSC	  document	  from	  January	  7,	  1959,	  suggests	  the	  CIA	  was	  not	  conFident	  Nasser’s	  conspiratorial	  apparatus	  in	  Iraq	  was	  “sufFiciently	  organized	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  initiate	  a	  successful	  coup,”	  though	  it	  acknowledged	  he	  “may	  still	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  stimulate	  senior	  ofFicers	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  to	  attempt	  a	  coup	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  a	  nationalist	  government	  free	  of	  Communist	  control.”133	  The	  INR’s	  view	  was	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  the	  CIA.	  It	  saw	  Nasser’s	  opposition	  to	  communism	  as	  helpful	  because	  it	  inspired	  anti-­‐communist	  elements	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  it	  also	  saw	  risks:	  an	  “indecisive	  coup	  attempt”	  by	  Egypt	  could	  trigger	  a	  “long-­‐drawn-­‐out	  civil	  conFlict”,	  while	  Iraq’s	  neighbours—Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia—were	  concerned	  about	  Nasser	  gaining	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  covert	  action	  against	  his	  efforts.134 	  In	  Baghdad,	  Jernegan	  advised	  a	  more	  cautious	  approach	  and	  warned	  against	  becoming	  too	  associated	  with	  Nasser,	  lest	  he	  push	  Qasim	  further	  into	  the	  Soviets'	  arms.135	  Jernegan’s	  cautious	  analysis	  eventually	  won	  out	  in	  the	  debate,	  even	  though	  Eisenhower	  personally	  thought	  working	  with	  Nasser	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq	  was	  worth	  the	  risk.	  	   When	  the	  NSC	  convened	  again	  on	  January	  15,	  Allen	  Dulles	  informed	  the	  members	  of	  a	  new	  conspiracy	  against	  Qasim,	  but	  its	  success	  seemed	  unlikely.136 	  SigniFicantly,	  Foster	  Dulles	  reported	  the	  British	  were	  “somewhat	  less	  pessimistic”	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq.	  He	  opined	  it	  was	  “essential	  to	  keep	  our	  hands	  off	  Iraq”	  since	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  “sufFiciently	  sophisticated	  to	  mix	  into	  this	  complicated	  situation”.	  Regardless,	  Eisenhower	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  Nasser	  option	  and	  ordered	  the	  NSC	  to	  determine	  how	  far	  it	  was	  willing	  to	  go.	  To	  this,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  cautioned	  against	  giving	  “carte	  blanche	  approval	  to	  everything	  that	  Nasser	  does”.	  The	  council	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agreed	  the	  U.S.	  had	  to	  examine	  all	  possible	  options	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  No	  decision	  was	  taken.137	  	   The	  Iraqi	  crisis	  took	  a	  negative	  turn	  on	  February	  7	  when	  six	  prominent	  nationalists,	  including	  Foreign	  Minister	  al-­‐Jumarad,	  resigned	  in	  protest	  after	  Qasim	  signed	  what	  was	  described	  as	  a	  “vast”	  technical	  aid	  program	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  According	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  the	  ministers	  believed	  their	  resignations	  would	  force	  Qasim	  to	  alter	  his	  pro-­‐Soviet	  policies,	  but	  the	  opposite	  happened.	  Instead	  of	  weakening	  communist	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  resignations	  allowed	  Qasim	  to	  appoint	  leftist	  or	  pro-­‐communist	  ministers,	  an	  act	  that	  prompted	  the	  CIA	  to	  reassess	  its	  estimate	  on	  Iraq.138	  	   On	  February	  17,	  the	  CIA	  circulated	  a	  new	  SNIE	  that	  highlighted	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  analysis	  of	  Iraq	  by	  America	  and	  that	  of	  its	  allies	  titled	  “The	  Communist	  Threat	  to	  Iraq.”	  The	  document	  makes	  clear	  America’s	  allies	  did	  not	  see	  Iraq	  with	  the	  same	  lens	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  national	  interests.	  For	  instance,	  while	  Britain	  was	  “far	  from	  oblivious”	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  communism,	  its	  hostility	  toward	  Nasser	  led	  it	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Qasim	  was	  a	  viable	  alternative.	  The	  CIA	  evidenced	  Britain’s	  decision	  to	  tip	  Qasim	  off	  about	  the	  Nasser-­‐backed	  Rashid	  Ali	  plot.	  Another	  important	  ally,	  Israel,	  was	  very	  concerned	  about	  the	  communist	  threat	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  brought	  Nasser	  and	  the	  West	  closer	  together	  or	  if	  he	  made	  a	  successful	  move	  in	  Iraq	  which	  conFirmed	  him	  as	  undisputed	  leader	  of	  the	  Arab	  world.	  The	  SNIE’s	  title	  itself	  underscores	  that	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  Iraq	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  competition	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  believing	  that	  Iraq’s	  communists	  were	  a	  Soviet	  proxy,	  whereas	  its	  allies	  were	  concerned	  with	  advancing	  or	  protecting	  their	  national	  interests.	  These	  differences	  would	  persist	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.139	  	   The	  next	  day	  the	  NSC	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  issued	  guidance	  for	  U.S.	  personnel.	  In	  many	  ways	  it	  built	  upon	  NSC	  5820/1,	  advising	  the	  U.S.	  to	  seek	  to	  dispel	  any	  suspicions	  that	  it	  was	  plotting	  against	  Iraq;	  counsel	  regional	  allies	  against	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provocative	  measures;	  and	  maintain	  enough	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Iraq	  to	  meet	  any	  requests	  made	  by	  the	  government.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  show	  a	  “correct”	  attitude	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  its	  desire	  for	  friendly	  relations;	  seek	  to	  develop	  contacts	  within	  the	  regime;	  take	  advantage	  of	  any	  opportunities	  presented;	  “cultivate	  discreetly	  individual	  and	  group	  friendships	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  creating	  a	  more	  favorable	  climate	  for	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations”;	  and	  “use	  every	  appropriate	  opportunity”	  to	  warn	  Iraqi	  leaders	  of	  the	  communist	  threat.140 	  Together,	  the	  operational	  guidance	  suggests	  the	  overriding	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  build	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  while	  avoiding	  provocative	  action.	  It	  is,	  however,	  evident	  that	  elements	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  were	  not	  following	  its	  own	  policy.	   According	  to	  the	  Church	  Report,	  within	  days	  of	  the	  NSC	  guidance,	  the	  CIA’s	  Near	  East	  Division	  sought	  approval	  from	  the	  “Health	  Alteration	  Committee”—a	  euphemism	  for	  the	  CIA’s	  assassination	  unit—for	  a	  proposed	  “special	  operation”	  to	  “incapacitate”	  an	  Iraqi	  colonel	  believed	  to	  be	  “promoting	  Soviet	  bloc	  political	  interests	  in	  Iraq.”	  Though	  CIA	  ofFicials,	  testifying	  Fifteen	  years	  later,	  could	  not	  recall	  exactly	  who	  the	  Iraqi	  colonel	  in	  question	  was,141	  it	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  Qasim	  was	  the	  target.142	  However,	  this	  seemed	  unlikely	  for	  three	  reasons:	  1)	  Qasim	  was	  a	  Brigadier	  General,	  not	  a	  colonel;	  2)	  he	  did	  not	  promote	  Soviet	  interests	  overtly;	  and	  3)	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  CIA	  ofFicials	  would	  not	  recall	  trying	  to	  kill	  a	  head	  of	  state	  Fifteen	  years	  on,	  whereas	  Colonel	  Fadhil	  al-­‐Mahdawi	  Fit	  the	  description	  perfectly.	  After	  all,	  al-­‐Mahdawi	  was	  a	  known	  communist	  sympathizer	  and	  was	  key	  to	  the	  regime’s	  repression	  of	  local	  anti-­‐communist	  forces	  due	  to	  his	  role	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  People’s	  Court.143	  In	  addition,	  the	  Church	  Report	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  division	  chief	  was	  not	  actually	  seeking	  the	  assassination	  of	  this	  individual,	  as	  has	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been	  suggested,144	  but	  rather	  “to	  prevent	  the	  target	  from	  pursuing	  his	  usual	  activities	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  three	  months.”	  Finally,	  the	  CIA	  added,	  “we	  do	  not	  consciously	  seek	  subject's	  permanent	  removal	  from	  the	  scene,”	  though	  “we	  also	  do	  not	  object	  should	  this	  complication	  develop.”145	  These	  points	  raise	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  CIA	  actually	  sought	  Qasim’s	  assassination.	  Even	  so,	  this	  episode	  suggests	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  sought	  approval	  for	  covert	  action	  within	  days	  of	  the	  NSC	  issuing	  guidance	  advising	  the	  exact	  opposite.	   On	  March	  6,	  the	  Iraq	  crisis	  escalated	  when	  a	  protest	  organized	  by	  the	  communist-­‐backed	  “Peace	  Partisans”	  in	  the	  northern	  Iraqi	  city	  of	  Mosul	  drew	  in	  as	  many	  as	  250,000	  people.	  Before	  long,	  tensions	  Flared	  and	  a	  group	  of	  disgruntled	  Arab	  nationalist	  Free	  OfFicers	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  city.	  Eventually,	  on	  March	  9,	  Qasim	  ordered	  the	  Iraqi	  Air	  Force	  (IAF)	  to	  bomb	  the	  city	  and	  the	  People’s	  Resistance	  Force	  (PRF)—the	  regime’s	  militia—began	  a	  campaign	  to	  retake	  control	  of	  the	  city	  with	  Barzani’s	  support.146 	  Between	  200	  and	  2,500	  civilians	  were	  killed.147	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  were	  stunned	  by	  the	  nationalist’s	  defeat	  at	  Mosul.	  They	  believed	  the	  failed	  uprising	  had	  increased	  Qasim’s	  strength	  and	  his	  pro-­‐communist	  allies	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  pro-­‐UAR	  nationalists.	  “It	  appear[ed]	  that	  the	  Mosul	  attempt	  was	  almost	  a	  last	  gasp	  of	  nationalist,	  anti-­‐Communist	  forces	  in	  Iraq,”	  and	  provided	  ample	  justiFication	  to	  purge	  all	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalists	  from	  positions	  of	  authority.	  On	  March	  26,	  the	  embassy	  reported	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  had	  rounded	  up	  approximately	  15,000	  of	  the	  regime’s	  opponents	  and	  nationalists	  had	  been	  purged	  from	  all	  government	  ministries,	  except	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry.148	  In	  their	  place	  Qasim	  appointed	  his	  own	  protégés,	  thereby	  “extending	  his	  own	  patronage	  networks.”	  As	  Tripp	  observed:[The]	  ICP	  gained	  the	  impression	  that,	  by	  rallying	  ‘the	  people’,	  it	  could	  effectively	  check	  any	  attempted	  coup	  d’état,	  reinforcing	  its	  belief	  that	  it	  could	  now	  play	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state.149
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It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Iraq	  announced	  its	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  on	  March	  24,	  leading	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  conclude	  the	  “Iron	  Curtain	  [is]	  descending”	  over	  Iraq.150	  	   When	  the	  NSC	  convened	  on	  April	  2	  to	  discuss	  Mosul,	  Eisenhower	  reiterated	  his	  interest	  in	  working	  with	  Nasser	  to	  save	  Iraq—an	  indication	  he	  had	  not	  yet	  decided	  on	  the	  matter.	  Allen	  Dulles	  was	  not	  certain	  this	  was	  a	  good	  idea,	  pointing	  out,	  “not	  all	  our	  friends	  and	  allies	  seem	  to	  have	  the	  same	  view	  on	  Iraq	  as	  we	  did.”	  The	  new	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  C.	  Douglas	  Dillon,	  rightly	  warned	  that	  if	  it	  became	  known	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  plotting	  with	  Nasser	  against	  Qasim	  it	  could	  drive	  Iraq	  further	  toward	  the	  communists.151	  At	  this	  point,	  Gordon	  Gray	  reminded	  the	  council	  U.S.	  policy	  required	  them	  to	  “take	  all	  feasible	  measures	  …	  including	  military	  action”	  to	  thwart	  a	  communist	  takeover.	  Everyone	  agreed,	  but	  there	  were	  no	  new	  ideas	  of	  how	  to	  prevent	  this.152	  As	  such,	  Eisenhower	  ordered	  State	  to	  produce	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  situation	  for	  the	  next	  NSC	  meeting	  and	  asked	  Herter	  to	  organize	  an	  interagency	  committee	  composed	  of	  the	  heads	  of	  relevant	  departments	  and	  agencies	  (i.e.,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  CIA,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  etc.)	  to	  review	  the	  matter	  and	  devise	  an	  action	  plan.153	   When	  the	  NSC	  next	  met	  on	  April	  17,	  Vice	  President	  Nixon	  was	  in	  the	  chair.	  The	  meeting	  arrived	  at	  pessimistic	  conclusions.	  Having	  read	  State’s	  brieFing	  paper,	  Nixon	  was	  concerned	  that	  little	  could	  be	  done	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  and	  was	  reluctant	  about	  working	  with	  Nasser,	  believing	  it	  “unlikely	  that	  we	  could	  Find	  any	  middle	  ground	  between	  Communistic	  control	  of	  Iraq	  and	  control	  by	  Nasser”.	  Likewise,	  General	  Nathan	  Twinning,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (JCS),	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  state	  of	  contingency	  planning,	  reminding	  the	  council	  that	  military	  action	  was	  sanctioned	  under	  the	  existing	  policy	  guidelines.	  While	  major	  decisions	  had	  to	  be	  deferred	  until	  Eisenhower’s	  return,	  the	  NSC	  approved	  the	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president’s	  earlier	  instruction	  to	  form	  an	  interagency	  committee	  for	  Iraq,	  directing	  it:	   …	  to	  develop	  integrated	  views,	  keeping	  their	  principals	  fully	  informed,	  and	  to	  report	  to	  the	  [NSC]	  each	  week	  unless	  otherwise	  directed.	  The	  group	  would	  be	  concerned	  with	  further	  consideration	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  State	  Department	  report,	  current	  developments,	  and	  feasible	  courses	  of	  action;	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  discussion	  at	  this	  meeting,	  particularly	  the	  urgency	  required	  to	  prevent	  a	  Communist	  take-­‐over	  in	  Iraq.154With	  this,	  the	  SCI	  was	  formed.	  	   By	  the	  time	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  formed	  the	  SCI	  in	  April	  1959,	  concerns	  about	  communist	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq	  dominated	  its	  thinking.	  By	  this	  point,	  the	  CIA	  had	  pointed	  out	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  diverged	  with	  its	  allies,	  Britain	  and	  Israel,	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Iraq.	  In	  both	  instances,	  they	  feared	  Nasser’s	  control	  of	  Iraq	  far	  more	  than	  the	  communists.	  And	  yet,	  the	  administration’s	  concern	  about	  the	  communists	  trumped	  any	  other	  consideration.	  By	  April	  no	  Firm	  decision	  on	  working	  with	  Nasser	  had	  been	  reached,	  though	  Eisenhower	  favoured	  the	  option,	  while	  most	  of	  his	  advisors	  were	  opposed.	  This	  disagreement	  led	  to	  contradictions	  between	  ofFicial	  policy	  and	  American	  actions,	  like	  the	  CIA’s	  application	  for	  covert	  action	  as	  the	  NSC	  issued	  its	  guidance	  on	  Iraq	  aimed	  at	  improving	  relations.	  What	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  fear	  of	  communism	  in	  Iraq	  put	  it	  at	  odds	  with	  not	  just	  its	  allies	  but	  with	  itself.155
VI	   Throughout	  the	  spring	  of	  1959	  the	  SCI	  and	  NSC	  met	  regularly	  to	  discuss	  the	  Iraq	  crisis.	  Clear	  divisions	  over	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  Iraq	  were	  evident.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  State	  urged	  a	  “hands-­‐off	  policy”	  and	  felt	  the	  U.S.	  “should	  not	  act	  precipitously	  in	  Iraq,	  since	  the	  consequences	  might	  be	  worse	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  [their]	  overall	  interests	  than	  not	  acting	  at	  [that]	  time”.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  CIA	  and	  Defense	  felt	  this	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was	  a	  mistake,	  believing	  the	  crisis	  had	  reached	  a	  “now	  or	  never”	  point	  and	  called	  for	  immediate	  action	  or	  at	  least	  contingency	  planning	  should	  the	  communists	  seize	  power.	  Rountree	  agreed	  and	  ordered	  CIA	  and	  Defense	  to	  prepare	  contingency	  plans.156	  Ultimately,	  these	  divisions	  made	  it	  difFicult	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  achieve	  consensus	  about	  what	  to	  do	  about	  Iraq.	   In	  late-­‐April,	  the	  SCI	  identiFied	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  options	  the	  U.S.	  could	  adopt	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  CIA	  identiFied	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  to	  help	  Nasser	  against	  Qasim,	  including	  collecting,	  collating,	  and	  evaluating	  intelligence;	  offering	  Financial	  assurances	  and	  arms	  to	  groups	  plotting	  against	  Qasim;	  and	  assisting	  Radio	  Cairo	  in	  propaganda	  efforts.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  CIA	  felt	  these	  options	  Fit	  the	  requirement	  of	  “doing	  something”	  to	  help	  stem	  the	  communist	  tide	  in	  Iraq.157 	  Similarly,	  the	  JCS	  identiFied	  a	  long	  list	  of	  actions	  against	  Iraq,	  including:	  1)	  encouraging	  Arab	  countries	  to	  bring	  pressure	  on	  Iraq	  to	  curb	  the	  communists;	  2)	  ceasing	  all	  economic	  and	  military	  aid	  to	  Iraq;	  3)	  stopping	  all	  oil	  purchases	  from	  Iraq	  to	  cripple	  the	  regime’s	  Finances;	  and	  4)	  helping	  pro-­‐Western	  Iraqis	  escape	  the	  country,	  whereupon	  they	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  opposition.	  Other	  options	  were	  promoting	  revolts	  inside	  Iraq	  and	  causing	  Qasim’s	  overthrow	  by	  encouraging	  a	  military	  coup,	  but	  both	  risked	  reinforcing	  the	  communists,	  as	  had	  happened	  after	  the	  Mosul	  rising.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  JCS	  suggested	  reinforcing	  the	  militaries	  of	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Jordan,	  and	  encouraging	  the	  British	  bolster	  its	  forces	  in	  Kuwait;	  increasing	  the	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  the	  region;	  possibly	  establishing	  a	  U.S.	  Middle	  East	  Command;	  imposing	  a	  naval	  blockade	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  coast	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  arms	  deliveries;	  denying	  Iraq’s	  ability	  to	  export	  oil;	  and	  encouraging	  Turkey	  and	  Jordan	  to	  intervene	  militarily.	  Regardless,	  the	  option	  the	  JCS	  preferred	  most	  was	  working	  with	  Nasser,	  either	  overtly	  or	  covertly,	  against	  Iraq,	  which	  it	  recommended	  be	  explored	  “in	  detail	  and	  on	  an	  urgent	  basis.”	  Finally,	  as	  a	  last	  resort,	  “national	  policy	  [required]	  that	  the	  [U.S.]	  develop	  plans	  for	  military	  intervention	  in	  Iraq.”	  Though,	  because	  this	  required	  consultation	  with	  Baghdad	  Pact	  members	  and	  key	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	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Organization	  (NATO)	  allies,	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  leak	  increased.158	  Consequently,	  the	  SCI	  decided	  it	  would	  review	  the	  existing	  military	  plans	  for	  Iraq	  “without	  consultation	  with	  any	  other	  nation.”	  This	  meant	  the	  British	  and	  Israelis	  would	  be	  cut	  out	  of	  the	  loop.159	  Taken	  together,	  Defense’s	  options	  were	  much	  more	  aggressive	  than	  those	  raised	  by	  CIA	  and	  were	  bound	  to	  upset	  State	  ofFicials.	  The	  SCI	  reported	  these	  options	  to	  the	  NSC	  on	  April	  30.160	   When	  word	  of	  the	  CIA/Defense	  options	  for	  Iraq	  reached	  Ambassador	  Jernegan	  he	  was	  “horriFied”	  and	  was	  recalled	  to	  Washington	  for	  consultations.161	  During	  that	  time	  he	  was	  called	  before	  the	  NSC	  to	  offer	  his	  assessment,	  where	  he	  presented	  a	  Five-­‐point	  explanation	  of	  Iraq’s	  leftward	  trend.	  The	  First	  …	  was	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  pro-­‐West	  attitudes	  and	  policies	  of	  the	  former	  Nuri	  regime.	  Secondly,	  Qasim	  himself	  and	  many	  other	  Iraqi	  leaders	  distrust	  the	  West	  and	  feared	  that	  we	  were	  working	  to	  destroy	  the	  new	  regime.	  The	  third	  reason	  was	  widespread	  fear	  that	  the	  regime	  would	  be	  brought	  down	  by	  Nasser	  and	  the	  UAR….	  [Fourth]	  the	  Communists	  themselves	  in	  Iraq	  had	  worked	  very	  hard	  and	  were	  extremely	  well	  organized.	  The	  Fifth	  reason	  was	  that	  Qasim	  may	  really	  want	  events	  to	  take	  the	  course	  they	  have	  been	  taking.	  He	  might	  be	  a	  Communist	  or	  a	  pro-­‐Communist.	  [But	  Jernegan	  felt]	  …	  that	  Qasim	  was	  scared	  and	  that	  [was	  why]	  he	  was	  tolerating	  the	  Communist	  activity….On	  contingency	  planning,	  Jernegan	  warned	  that	  “overt	  hostility”	  would	  drive	  Qasim	  “into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Soviets”.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  it	  had	  been	  Egypt’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Rashid	  Ali	  plot	  and	  the	  Mosul	  rising	  that	  pushed	  Qasim	  toward	  the	  communists	  and	  Soviets	  in	  the	  First	  place.	  And	  even	  if	  he	  was	  overthrown,	  “there	  was	  no	  one	  in	  sight	  who	  could	  replace	  Qasim”.	  Given	  this,	  Jernegen	  suggested	  the	  best	  step	  to	  take	  was	  urging	  Nasser	  to	  cease	  his	  direct	  attacks	  against	  Qasim	  and	  focus	  instead	  on	  Iraq’s	  communists,	  the	  real	  enemy.	  This	  was	  approved.162	  	   When	  SCI	  met	  on	  May	  19	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  Nasser	  had	  agreed	  to	  shift	  the	  focus	  of	  his	  propaganda	  away	  from	  Qasim	  and	  toward	  the	  communists.163	  When	  this	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development	  was	  reported	  to	  the	  NSC	  the	  following	  day,	  there	  was	  agreement	  that	  “some	  progress”	  had	  been	  made	  in	  Iraq.164	  By	  the	  end	  of	  May,	  Nasser’s	  easing	  of	  pressure	  on	  Qasim,	  when	  coupled	  with	  the	  ICP’s	  demands	  for	  the	  legalization	  of	  political	  parties,165	  was	  beginning	  to	  have	  an	  effect.	  For	  instance,	  in	  late	  May	  just	  before	  Qasim	  was	  to	  meet	  with	  Jernegan,	  he	  delivered	  a	  speech	  emphasizing	  Iraq’s	  neutrality	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  an	  act	  that	  led	  Jernegan	  to	  take	  a	  friendly	  tone	  when	  they	  met	  on	  May	  26.166	  	   Despite	  State’s	  victory,	  its	  differences	  with	  CIA/Defense	  persisted.	  In	  early	  June,	  Philip	  Halla,	  the	  SCI’s	  secretary	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NSC	  staff,	  sent	  Gordon	  Gray	  a	  memo	  summarizing	  a	  conversation	  he	  had	  with	  a	  senior	  CIA	  ofFicial.	  According	  to	  the	  memo,	  the	  CIA	  felt	  State	  was	  being	  “excessively	  cautious”	  on	  Iraq,	  disagreed	  over	  the	  scale	  of	  communist	  entrenchment,	  and	  were	  not	  fooled	  by	  Qasim’s	  recent	  efforts	  at	  limiting	  communist	  power.167	  Even	  so,	  during	  an	  NSC	  meeting	  on	  June	  4,	  Allen	  Dulles	  reFlected	  Jenegan’s	  sense	  of	  cautious	  optimism	  observing	  that	  while	  Iraq	  was	  “far	  from	  out	  of	  danger,”	  the	  “drift	  toward	  Communism	  in	  Iraq	  had	  at	  least	  slowed	  down”.	  This	  was	  because	  Moscow	  had	  apparently	  cautioned	  Qasim	  to	  “go	  a	  little	  slow”	  with	  his	  relationship	  with	  the	  ICP	  and	  his	  declaration	  of	  “positive	  neutrality”	  was	  a	  “tactical”	  move	  aimed	  at	  quelling	  Western	  fears	  of	  communist	  encroachment.168	  	   By	  mid-­‐June	  1959,	  the	  Iraqi	  crisis	  appeared	  to	  stabilize,	  leading	  some	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  question	  the	  need	  for	  a	  weekly	  SCI	  meeting	  since	  there	  was	  general	  agreement	  on	  continuing	  the	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  presently	  in	  place.169	  Rountree	  agreed	  and	  recommended	  that	  the	  NSC	  release	  the	  SCI	  “from	  the	  obligation	  to	  make	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weekly	  reports”	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  any	  signiFicant	  developments	  be	  raised.	  The	  NSC	  approved	  this	  suggestion	  when	  it	  next	  met	  on	  June	  18.170	  Soon	  thereafter,	  the	  CIA	  acknowledged	  its	  earlier	  estimates	  on	  Iraq	  had	  “been	  too	  gloomy”	  and	  there	  were	  “signs	  of	  growing	  resolve	  on	  Qassim’s	  part	  to	  move	  with	  increasing	  determination	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  Communists.”	  However,	  the	  CIA	  cautioned,	  “this	  [did]	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  tide	  has	  turned	  Finally	  and	  irrevocably	  against	  the	  Communists.”	  Indeed,	  Qasim’s	  recent	  crackdown	  could	  lead	  the	  ICP	  to	  “strike	  back	  to	  protect	  themselves	  and	  their	  position	  against	  the	  reprisals	  that	  would	  be	  likely	  if	  the	  nationalists	  gained	  dominance.”171	  This	  assessment	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  accurate.	  	   On	  July	  10,	  a	  communist-­‐inspired	  riot	  broke	  out	  in	  southern	  Iraq,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  physical	  clash	  between	  the	  communists	  and	  security	  forces.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  learned	  from	  a	  “number	  of	  high	  [Iraqi]	  Army	  ofFicers	  …	  that	  Communist	  ofFicials	  in	  government	  will	  be	  purged	  soon	  after	  the	  14	  July	  celebrations	  and	  conservative	  ofFicials	  will	  be	  called	  to	  serve.”172	  On	  July	  13,	  Qasim	  made	  two	  signiFicant	  announcements.	  First,	  he	  pledged	  elections	  would	  be	  held	  and	  a	  new	  parliament	  would	  be	  formed	  within	  a	  year.173	  Second,	  he	  announced	  he	  was	  expanding	  his	  cabinet	  by	  four	  members,	  one	  of	  whom	  was	  a	  known,	  female	  communist,	  Naziha	  Duleimi.	  While	  it	  was	  signiFicant	  that	  both	  a	  woman	  and	  a	  communist	  had	  been	  named	  to	  the	  cabinet,	  her	  ministerial	  portfolio	  was	  insigniFicant.174	  Interpreting	  Qasim’s	  move	  as	  an	  affront	  to	  their	  access	  to	  power,	  the	  next	  day	  the	  communists	  instigated	  a	  major	  crisis	  in	  the	  northern	  city	  of	  Kirkuk.	  	   The	  Kirkuk	  uprising	  was	  a	  crucial	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  post-­‐revolutionary	  Iraq.	  By	  July	  1959,	  tension	  between	  the	  Kirkuk’s	  large	  Kurdish	  and	  Turkmen	  populations	  had	  escalated	  because	  of	  an	  inFlux	  of	  impoverished	  Kurds	  moving	  into	  the	  city	  to	  avoid	  deteriorating	  economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  countryside.175	  Since	  the	  Mosul	  rising,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  aligned	  themselves	  with	  the	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communists	  against	  the	  Turkmen,	  creating	  a	  situation	  that	  was	  described	  as	  “explosive”.176 	  The	  catalyst	  for	  the	  crisis	  was	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  mayor	  in	  early	  July	  1959,	  the	  First	  of	  its	  kind.177 	  On	  July	  14,	  Fighting	  broke	  out	  when	  a	  communist-­‐organized	  rally	  crossed	  paths	  with	  a	  Turkmen	  protest—uncertainty	  remains	  over	  who	  attacked	  First.178	  Regardless,	  the	  Kurds	  backed	  by	  the	  PRF,	  went	  “berserk”	  and	  attacked	  shops	  and	  their	  owners.179	  It	  took	  two	  days	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence,	  leaving	  between	  thirty-­‐one	  and	  a	  hundred	  people	  dead	  and	  scores	  more	  injured.180 	  On	  July	  19,	  Qasim	  “strongly	  condemned”	  the	  violence,	  while	  making	  vague	  references	  to	  “anarchists”.181	  Before	  long,	  images	  of	  mutilated	  bodies	  were	  broadcast	  on	  Iraqi	  television	  with	  editorials	  saying,	  this	  was	  what	  “Communists	  are	  really	  like”.182	   After	  some	  initial	  confusion,	  U.S.	  policymakers	  realized	  the	  Kirkuk	  massacre	  was	  a	  watershed	  for	  the	  ICP’s	  standing.	  When	  Allen	  Dulles	  briefed	  the	  NSC	  on	  the	  clashes	  on	  July	  23	  it	  was	  clear	  the	  CIA	  had	  limited	  resources	  inside	  Iraq:	  “Apparently	  the	  Kirkuk	  outbreak	  had	  been	  put	  down	  more	  rapidly	  than	  our	  own	  or	  the	  Egyptian	  press	  had	  indicated.	  Still,	  however,	  no	  one	  knows	  much	  about	  why	  the	  outbreak	  began	  or	  how	  it	  began.”	  What	  was	  important,	  however,	  was	  that	  Qasim	  had	  singled	  out	  the	  communists	  for	  condemnation.	  This,	  of	  course,	  appeared	  to	  worry	  the	  Soviets,	  which	  extended	  Qasim	  an	  invitation	  for	  a	  state	  visit,	  which	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  conFirmation	  of	  ICP-­‐Soviet	  links.183	  At	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  Qasim	  accused	  the	  communists	  directly	  for	  the	  massacres,	  which	  led	  the	  ICP	  to	  issue	  a	  public	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apology	  in	  early	  August.184	  Meanwhile,	  Qasim	  began	  to	  purge	  communists	  and	  their	  sympathizers	  from	  the	  military	  and	  to	  rein	  in	  the	  PRF.185	  	   All	  of	  this	  led	  Jernegan	  to	  cable	  an	  optimistic	  assessment	  to	  Washington	  on	  August	  9,	  stating	  the	  “tide	  [was]	  running	  against	  Communism”,	  the	  ICP	  had	  “gone	  too	  far”,	  and	  Qasim	  “will	  now	  not	  only	  ...	  check	  any	  [communist]	  attempts	  to	  increase	  power	  but	  will	  also	  take	  concrete	  steps	  to	  reduce	  its	  present	  power.”	  The	  regime	  had	  also	  moved	  against	  the	  communist’s	  key	  sources	  of	  support:	  the	  PRF,	  trade	  and	  student	  unions,	  and	  pro-­‐communist	  army	  ofFicers.186 	  With	  these	  positive	  developments	  accumulating	  in	  late-­‐summer	  1959	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  the	  high	  tide	  of	  communism	  in	  Iraq	  was	  passing,	  a	  conclusion	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  too	  optimistic	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  
VII	   In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Kirkuk	  massacre,	  Qasim’s	  actions	  were	  both	  contradictory	  and	  confusing,	  which	  made	  it	  difFicult	  for	  U.S.	  policymakers	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq.	  For	  instance,	  a	  CIA	  estimate	  from	  December	  1959	  described	  Qasim	  as	  an	  “enigmatic	  Figure”	  who	  “considers	  himself	  uncommitted	  to	  any	  faction,	  and	  capable	  of	  playing	  a	  role	  above	  the	  struggle.”	  Nevertheless,	  the	  CIA	  believed	  he	  was	  “central	  to	  the	  short-­‐run	  outlook	  in	  Iraq”.187	  U.S.	  policymakers	  were	  pleased	  with	  the	  communist	  crackdown,	  but	  before	  long	  Qasim	  became	  convinced	  his	  policy	  of	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  communists	  and	  nationalists	  was	  in	  danger.	  	   Throughout	  August	  a	  drama	  played	  out	  between	  Qasim	  and	  the	  nationalists	  when	  a	  group	  of	  Free	  OfFicers	  involved	  in	  the	  Mosul	  rising	  were	  brought	  before	  Colonel	  al-­‐Mahdawi’s	  court,188 	  leading	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  Five	  military	  ofFicers	  and	  a	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civilian	  on	  August	  25.189	  Both	  Nasser	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  nationalists	  were	  outraged	  and	  the	  CIA	  learned	  in	  early	  September	  that	  Egypt	  had	  recommenced	  plotting	  Qasim’s	  overthrow.190	  The	  real	  tipping	  point	  came	  on	  September	  20,	  when	  Qasim	  approved	  the	  executions	  of	  a	  senior	  Free	  OfFicer	  and	  twelve	  other	  nationalist	  ofFicers	  involved	  in	  Mosul,	  in	  addition	  to	  four	  civilian	  members	  of	  Nuri	  as-­‐Said’s	  last	  government	  to	  balance	  criticism.191	  	   Iraq’s	  renewed	  instability	  prompted	  by	  the	  executions	  led	  the	  U.S.	  to	  once	  again	  revaluate	  its	  views	  on	  Iraq.	  On	  September	  24,	  a	  new	  SNIE	  was	  circulated	  that	  concluded	  Iraq	  had	  grown	  “even	  more	  unstable	  and	  uncertain”	  than	  ever.	  It	  also	  noted	  that	  while	  ICP	  activities	  had	  been	  limited	  in	  recent	  weeks,	  Qasim	  had	  “continued	  and	  even	  expanded”	  his	  ties	  with	  Moscow.	  Meanwhile,	  “reports	  of	  coup	  plots,	  including	  the	  assassination	  of	  Qasim,	  [had]	  increased	  in	  recent	  weeks,”	  though	  no	  organization	  “capable	  of	  bringing	  off	  a	  successful	  coup	  [was]	  known	  to	  exist.”192	  	   The	  instability	  also	  prompted	  the	  SCI	  to	  convene	  to	  assess	  the	  situation,	  its	  First	  meeting	  since	  June.	  Chairing	  the	  meeting	  was	  G.	  Lewis	  Jones,	  who	  had	  replaced	  William	  Rountree	  as	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Near	  East.	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  group	  was	  warned	  that	  “an	  assassination	  effort	  [was]	  likely”	  and	  “could	  set	  off	  violence”.	  However,	  because	  the	  “U.S.	  had	  abandoned	  intervention	  as	  a	  policy”	  there	  were	  few	  options	  available	  should	  a	  coup	  occur.	  One	  was	  to	  convince	  Egypt	  and	  Jordan	  to	  work	  together	  on	  Iraq,	  another	  was	  to	  work	  through	  the	  Arab	  League,	  which	  would	  be	  supported	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Lebanon.	  However,	  because	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  non-­‐intervention,	  all	  the	  CIA	  could	  do	  was	  prepare	  “all	  [they	  could]	  operationally	  in	  the	  area.”	  The	  CIA’s	  representative	  explained	  there	  was	  a	  “small	  stockpile	  [of	  weapons]	  in	  the	  area”	  and	  that	  it	  was	  supporting	  “elements	  in	  Jordan	  and	  the	  UAR	  to	  help	  Iraqis	  Filter	  back	  to	  Iraq.”	  Ultimately,	  he	  SCI	  agreed	  that	  non-­‐
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intervention	  was	  the	  best	  policy	  and	  decided	  to	  seek	  Jernegan’s	  assessment.193	  This	  document	  was	  signiFicant	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  conFirmed	  that	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  had	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  toward	  Iraq.	  Second,	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  been	  moving	  forward	  with	  some	  elements	  of	  Defense’s	  proposed	  contingency	  plan.	  	   When	  Jernegan	  responded	  on	  September	  28,	  it	  was	  clear	  the	  Iraqi	  situation	  had	  gotten	  worse	  and	  warned	  of	  a	  potential	  coup.	  He	  said	  the	  short-­‐range	  prospect	  for	  internal	  stability	  in	  Iraq	  was	  worse;	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  trend	  was	  slowing;	  U.S.	  capabilities	  were	  “extremely	  limited”;	  and	  that	  intervention	  “would	  only	  make	  matters	  worse.”194	  More	  importantly,	  he	  warned	  of	  a	  coup	  attempt	  “within	  a	  week”	  that	  would	  “start	  with	  the	  assassination	  of	  Qasim”.	  Jernegan’s	  warning	  was	  conFirmed	  two	  days	  later,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  “Nasser	  [was]	  counseling	  conspirators	  involved	  in	  [a]	  plan	  for	  [a]	  coup	  in	  Iraq	  within	  a	  week,	  including	  [the]	  assassination	  of	  Qasim.	  Nasser	  [was]	  ready	  to	  send	  UAR	  troops	  to	  oppose	  any	  counter-­‐move	  thereafter.”195	  	   Considering	  these	  developments,	  the	  NSC	  invited	  both	  Jones	  and	  Armin	  Meyer,	  the	  NEA’s	  director,	  to	  brief	  the	  council	  on	  October	  1.	  They	  explained	  the	  NEA	  had	  reached	  three	  main	  conclusions:	  (1)	  dramatic	  action	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Iraq	  was	  not	  desirable;	  (2)	  restraint	  by	  the	  Arab	  countries	  [was]	  the	  best	  means	  of	  restraining	  Iraq;	  (3)	  Kassem	  should	  be	  encouraged	  through	  third	  parties	  to	  maintain	  an	  independent	  Iraq	  which	  would	  resist	  the	  Communist	  threat.Jones	  reported	  numerous	  indications	  of	  an	  impending	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Qasim,	  but	  suggested	  these	  could	  be	  “Communist	  provocations.”	  However,	  should	  it	  happen,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  urge	  restraint	  upon	  its	  allies.	  Commenting,	  Allen	  Dulles	  told	  the	  council	  that	  Nasser	  had	  “urged	  the	  assassination	  plotters	  not	  to	  move	  too	  fast”	  and	  might	  “be	  laying	  plans	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  event	  chaos	  ensues.”	  ReFlecting	  a	  lack	  of	  concrete	  intelligence,	  he	  predicted	  the	  assassination	  attempt	  could	  occur	  “in	  the	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next	  two	  months.”196	  America’s	  spy	  chief	  was	  wrong.	  On	  October	  7,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  thrust	  itself	  into	  Iraqi	  politics	  for	  the	  First	  time,	  when	  an	  assassination	  team	  including	  a	  young	  Saddam	  Hussein	  attempted	  to	  kill	  Qasim,	  striking	  him	  in	  the	  shoulder	  but	  not	  killing	  him.	  He	  spent	  the	  next	  six	  weeks	  in	  the	  hospital	  recovering.197	  	   Despite	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary,198	  the	  body	  of	  evidence	  available	  does	  not	  suggest	  the	  U.S.	  was	  complicit	  in	  the	  attempted	  assassination.	  First,	  days	  before	  the	  attack	  Allen	  Dulles	  predicted	  it	  would	  occur	  within	  the	  “next	  two	  months”,	  not	  a	  week.	  Second,	  the	  SCI	  and	  NSC	  had	  just	  reafFirmed	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  Third,	  the	  SCI	  had	  raised	  concerns	  that	  Qasim’s	  assassination	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  communist	  takeover.199 	  Fourth,	  while	  the	  CIA	  was	  preparing	  for	  the	  contingency	  of	  a	  communists	  takeover,	  it	  had	  previously	  indicated	  it	  had	  few	  assets	  who	  could	  inFluence	  a	  post-­‐Qasim	  Iraq.200	  Finally,	  the	  CIA	  was	  not	  conFident	  pro-­‐Nasser	  elements	  could	  even	  carry	  off	  a	  coup,	  which	  proved	  accurate.201	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  as	  to	  why	  the	  U.S.	  would	  back	  a	  plot	  that	  was	  likely	  to	  fail?	  In	  addition,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  public	  and	  private	  actions	  do	  not	  suggest	  involvement.	  On	  October	  10,	  Eisenhower	  sent	  Qasim	  a	  “friendly	  message”	  to	  express	  relief	  that	  he	  had	  “escaped	  serious	  harm”	  and	  wished	  him	  a	  “speedy	  recovery.”202	  When	  Jernegan	  visited	  him	  in	  hospital	  the	  next	  day,	  Qasim	  “gave	  no	  indication	  that	  he	  thought	  the	  U.S.	  had	  been	  involved”.	  Privately,	  the	  U.S.	  took	  steps	  to	  discourage	  its	  regional	  allies,	  Jordan	  and	  Iran,	  from	  “taking	  military	  action”	  against	  Iraq.203	  Taken	  together,	  these	  actions	  do	  not	  suggest	  the	  U.S.	  was	  behind	  the	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Qasim	  in	  1959.	   On	  October	  13,	  the	  SCI’s	  CIA	  representative	  sent	  Jones	  a	  memo	  outlining	  the	  agency’s	  contingency	  plans	  for	  Iraq.	  The	  CIA	  anticipated	  a	  troubling	  scenario.	  While	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Qasim	  was	  “applying	  a	  measure	  of	  control	  over	  Communist	  activities”,	  the	  September	  20	  executions	  “caused	  an	  irreparable	  breach	  between	  Qasim	  and	  Nationalist	  elements	  within	  the	  country”.	  There	  was	  a	  “strong	  possibility”	  the	  regime	  would	  begin	  a	  harsh	  crackdown	  on	  the	  nationalists,	  potentially	  leading	  to	  another	  desperate	  attempt	  to	  remove	  Qasim,	  which	  the	  CIA	  felt	  could	  push	  him	  back	  toward	  the	  communists.	  If	  that	  happened,	  the	  nationalists	  could	  request	  Nasser’s	  help.	  The	  CIA	  knew	  that	  nationalist	  elements	  inside	  Iraq	  were	  in	  touch	  with	  Nasser	  at	  this	  point	  and	  that	  he	  was	  “seriously	  considering	  intervention	  under	  certain	  circumstances.”	  In	  terms	  of	  contingencies,	  the	  CIA	  was	  vague:	  “There	  [were]	  any	  number	  of	  possibilities,	  but	  most	  of	  those	  which	  would	  demand	  prompt	  policy	  decisions	  …	  [were]	  permutations	  and	  combinations	  based	  on	  a	  single	  central	  fact—the	  removal	  of	  Qasim.”204	  When	  the	  SCI	  met	  on	  October	  22	  there	  was	  again	  disagreement.	  Barring	  Qasim’s	  removal,	  the	  group	  saw	  three	  scenarios:	  1)	  Qasim	  becoming	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  the	  communists	  for	  support;	  2)	  reconciliation	  with	  the	  nationalists;	  or	  3)	  continuing	  to	  counter-­‐balance	  the	  opposing	  forces.	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  group	  felt	  the	  last	  scenario	  was	  most	  likely,	  a	  minority	  still	  felt	  Qasim	  would	  again	  embrace	  the	  communists.205	  Even	  so,	  following	  the	  attempted	  assassination,	  scores	  of	  nationalists	  were	  arrested	  and	  dragged	  before	  al-­‐Mahdawi’s	  court.206	  This	  appeared	  to	  conFirm	  the	  SCI’s	  worst	  fears.	  	   The	  regime’s	  crushing	  of	  the	  nationalists	  was	  cause	  for	  concern	  in	  Washington,	  since	  it	  left	  only	  two	  viable	  groups	  that	  could	  bolster	  the	  regime	  or	  overthrow	  it:	  the	  army	  or	  the	  communists.	  When	  Qasim	  was	  released	  from	  the	  hospital	  on	  December	  2,	  he	  held	  a	  six-­‐hour	  news	  conference	  where	  he	  reversed	  many	  of	  his	  earlier	  positions	  and	  absolved	  the	  communists	  of	  blame	  for	  the	  Kirkuk	  massacres.	  This	  prompted	  the	  CIA	  to	  call	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  SCI	  to	  review	  the	  situation.	  When	  the	  group	  met	  on	  December	  4,	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  consensus	  about	  what	  direction	  Iraq	  would	  take,	  but	  all	  believed	  the	  situation	  was	  dire.	  Qasim’s	  speech	  had	  led	  Jernegan	  to	  conclude	  he	  had	  Finally	  sided	  with	  the	  communists,	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which	  led	  the	  CIA	  and	  JCS	  representatives	  to	  fear	  for	  their	  own	  careers,	  lest	  they	  “lose”	  Iraq.	  As	  usual,	  State	  ofFicials	  were	  skeptical,	  with	  Meyer	  reminding	  everyone	  that	  Qasim	  was	  “a	  man	  who	  [could]	  change	  his	  attitude	  tomorrow.”	  This	  dispute	  prompted	  Jones	  to	  ask	  the	  CIA	  to	  draw	  up	  a	  new	  assessment.207	  When	  the	  CIA	  circulated	  its	  analysis	  on	  December	  15,	  it	  was	  more	  inclined	  toward	  Meyer’s	  view.	  “[We]	  believe	  that	  Qassim	  will	  continue	  his	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  himself	  in	  power	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  while	  maneuvering	  between	  the	  various	  political	  factions.”	  Importantly,	  while	  the	  CIA	  could	  not	  discount	  a	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  nationalists	  or	  communists,	  it	  believed	  only	  the	  army’s	  support	  for	  Qasim	  could	  ensure	  his	  survival.208	  	   The	  CIA	  assessment	  proved	  to	  be	  correct	  and	  throughout	  the	  spring	  of	  1960	  Qasim	  took	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  that	  reduced	  communist	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq,	  while	  becoming	  more	  reliant	  on	  the	  military	  for	  support.	  This	  shift	  began	  during	  Qasim’s	  time	  in	  the	  hospital	  when	  two	  moderate	  generals,	  Saleh	  al-­‐Abdi,	  the	  military	  chief	  of	  staff,	  and	  Najib	  al-­‐Rubayi,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Sovereign	  Council	  and	  Iraq’s	  de	  jure	  head	  of	  state,	  ran	  the	  country	  while	  he	  recovered.209 	  Indeed,	  a	  CIA	  analysis	  later	  observed,	  “Qassem	  has	  made	  no	  move	  to	  punish	  [these]	  two	  generals	  or	  to	  take	  back	  the	  functions	  [they]	  arrogated	  during	  his	  hospitalization,	  and	  he	  now	  appears	  content	  to	  allow	  the	  army	  to	  play	  a	  strong	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  role.”	  This	  in	  turn	  created	  an	  unprecedented	  period	  of	  stability	  in	  Iraq,	  which	  led	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  conclude	  the	  Iraqi	  crisis	  had	  Finally	  come	  to	  an	  end.210	   In	  January	  1960,	  Qasim’s	  Finally	  moved	  against	  the	  communists	  when	  he	  fulFilled	  his	  pledge	  to	  license	  political	  parties.	  When	  the	  ICP’s	  applied	  for	  a	  license	  he	  rejected	  it	  and	  instead	  approved	  a	  “Fictitious	  Communist	  Party”	  that	  had	  “no	  organisation	  or	  members”.211	  When	  word	  of	  this	  development	  reached	  Washington	  in	  late	  March,	  the	  SCI	  was	  upbeat	  about	  its	  implications.	  However,	  there	  were	  other	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favourable	  developments	  as	  well:	  the	  military	  had	  reasserted	  its	  inFluence	  and	  was	  in	  Firm	  control;	  a	  number	  of	  pro-­‐communist	  ofFicers	  had	  been	  dismissed;	  measures	  had	  been	  taken	  to	  restore	  conFidence	  in	  the	  economy;	  and	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  begun	  to	  show	  interest	  in	  establishing	  cultural	  and	  business	  agreements	  with	  America.	  On	  the	  negative	  side,	  Qasim	  continued	  his	  support	  for	  al-­‐Mahdawi.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  developments	  help	  conFirm	  State’s	  view	  that	  a	  “policy	  of	  friendship,	  non-­‐involvement	  and	  being	  ready	  to	  help	  if	  asked	  was	  beginning	  to	  pay	  off.”212	  On	  March	  24,	  Gordon	  Gray	  informed	  the	  NSC	  of	  the	  SCI’s	  encouraging	  conclusions.213 	  Indicative	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  crisis	  had	  passed,	  this	  was	  the	  last	  time	  the	  SCI	  would	  convene.	  	   Throughout	  April	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  see	  encouraging	  signs	  that	  Iraq	  had	  stabilized.	  On	  April	  7,	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  Charles	  Cabell	  informed	  the	  NSC	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  had	  crushed	  a	  number	  of	  communist	  instigated	  strikes	  with	  Qasim’s	  support	  and	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  informed	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  of	  Iraq’s	  interested	  in	  bids	  by	  Western	  Firms	  on	  its	  development	  program.214 	  These	  developments	  led	  to	  the	  CIA	  to	  revise	  its	  SNIE	  in	  May	  to	  conclude	  that	  while	  it	  “seems	  unlikely	  that	  Qasim’s	  tightrope	  act	  can	  go	  on	  indeFinitely,”	  the	  “surface	  calm”	  in	  Iraq	  “belies	  some	  short-­‐term	  predictions	  of	  impending	  crises	  that	  were	  plausible	  on	  occasion	  last	  year.”	  Certainly	  Qasim’s	  continued	  reliance	  on	  the	  army	  was	  an	  encouraging	  sign	  and	  seemed	  to	  be	  “primarily	  responsible	  for	  this	  tenuous	  stability.”	  Should	  this	  arrangement	  prevail,	  the	  CIA	  concluded,	  it	  was	  unlikely	  any	  spectacular	  developments	  would	  take	  place	  in	  Iraq	  in	  the	  next	  six	  months.	  The	  only	  uncertainty	  was	  Qasim’s	  assassination.215	  When	  the	  CIA	  reassessed	  the	  situation	  again	  in	  July	  it	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusions.216	  In	  short,	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  1960,	  the	  U.S.	  had	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concluded	  the	  communist	  crisis	  that	  had	  gripped	  Iraq	  following	  the	  revolution	  had	  Finally	  passed.217	   At	  this	  point,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  turned	  its	  attention	  toward	  preparing	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  new	  administration	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  who	  defeated	  Richard	  Nixon	  on	  November	  8,	  1960.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  transition,	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  (OCB)	  drew	  up	  plans	  for	  the	  region	  and	  Iraq	  for	  the	  new	  administration	  in	  mid-­‐December.	  Regionally,	  the	  plans	  reFlected	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  traditional	  policy	  of	  denying	  Soviet	  penetration	  into	  the	  area	  and	  securing	  continued	  cheap	  oil.	  With	  respect	  to	  Iraq,	  the	  OCB	  recommended	  the	  U.S.	  “continue	  efforts	  to	  develop	  Firm	  but	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Iraq	  Government.”	  Next,	  because	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  have	  stabilized,	  the	  OCB	  believed	  Iraq’s	  suspicions	  of	  U.S.	  intentions	  could	  “continue	  to	  diminish”	  and	  the	  new	  administration	  should	  “make	  every	  effort	  to	  develop	  contacts,	  both	  ofFicial	  and	  unofFicial,	  with	  personalities	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  other	  individuals	  of	  potential	  political	  importance.”	  Third,	  if	  Iraq	  requested	  U.S.	  cooperation,	  the	  OCB	  advised	  giving	  “prompt	  and	  friendly	  consideration,”	  though	  depending	  on	  the	  prevailing	  situation.	  Fourth,	  since	  restoring	  the	  Iraqi	  conFidence	  in	  the	  U.S.	  was	  crucial,	  the	  OCB	  recommended	  the	  United	  States	  Information	  Service	  (USIS)	  establish	  personal	  contacts	  and	  develop	  cultural	  programs,	  including	  language	  programs	  and	  exchanges,	  in	  a	  “discreet	  and	  unostentatious”	  manner.	  Finally,	  if	  the	  internal	  power	  structure	  shifts	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  brings	  a	  pro-­‐Western	  regime,	  “the	  U.S.	  should	  be	  prepared	  promptly	  to	  support	  it	  and	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  this	  opportunity	  to	  strengthen	  its	  position	  in	  the	  area.”218	  With	  transitional	  guidance	  in	  place	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  conFident	  the	  incoming	  administration	  would	  be	  on	  the	  right	  track.
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Conclusion
	   Prior	  to	  Iraq’s	  revolution,	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  the	  region	  was	  premised	  on	  two	  objectives,	  maintaining	  access	  to	  oil	  and	  denying	  Soviet	  inFluence.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  Arab	  nationalism	  as	  an	  ideological	  force	  that,	  if	  harnessed,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  advance	  both	  these	  goals.	  The	  Iraqi	  coup	  created	  exacerbated	  ongoing	  challenges	  to	  U.S.	  interests,	  forcing	  it	  to	  intervene	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  support	  a	  similar	  British	  military	  operation	  in	  Jordan	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  West’s	  remaining	  allies.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  stopped	  short	  of	  intervening	  in	  Iraq	  due	  to	  concerns	  that	  military	  action	  might	  spark	  a	  regional	  war	  and	  push	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Soon	  thereafter,	  the	  U.S.	  recognized	  the	  new	  regime	  and	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  maintaining	  friendly	  relations,	  acquiescing	  to	  Iraq’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact,	  considering	  limited	  military	  sales,	  and	  encouraging	  friendly	  elements	  within	  the	  country	  in	  November	  1958.	  So	  long	  as	  nationalists	  were	  in	  power,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  accept	  the	  Qasim	  regime.	   The	  power	  struggle	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1958,	  which	  pitted	  Qasim	  and	  his	  communist	  allies	  against	  Nasser-­‐inspired	  nationalists,	  raised	  concerns	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  that	  the	  Soviets	  could	  leapfrog	  over	  America’s	  containment	  shield	  to	  establish	  a	  presence	  simultaneously	  in	  three	  key	  regions:	  the	  Levant,	  Gulf,	  and	  Indian	  Ocean.	  The	  basis	  of	  these	  concerns	  was	  the	  return	  of	  the	  troublesome	  Kurdish	  nationalist	  from	  exile	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  Barzani;	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  arms-­‐supply	  relationship;	  and	  Qasim’s	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  the	  ICP	  for	  support	  against	  the	  nationalists.	  While	  the	  First	  two	  factors	  are	  reasons	  for	  concern,	  it	  seems	  the	  U.S.	  overestimated	  the	  ICP’s	  relationship	  with	  Moscow.	  This	  was	  because	  by	  this	  point	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  Soviets	  had	  actively	  worked	  through	  local	  communist	  groups	  to	  manipulate	  and	  shape	  events	  (i.e.,	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  East	  Asia).219	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Iraq,	  where	  the	  ICP	  appeared	  to	  be	  inFluenced	  but	  not	  controlled	  by	  Moscow.	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   The	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  fear	  of	  Soviet	  encroachment	  in	  Iraq	  led	  it	  to	  engage	  Nasser	  to	  avert	  a	  communist	  takeover.	  The	  U.S.	  government	  was	  split	  on	  this	  question.	  Eisenhower	  favoured	  working	  with	  Nasser,	  while	  Foster	  Dulles	  advised	  caution,	  arguing	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  knowledgeable	  enough	  in	  Iraqi	  affairs	  to	  entrust	  a	  foreigner—let	  alone	  Nasser—with	  advancing	  U.S.	  policy.	  	   Another	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  American	  perception	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  differed	  signiFicantly	  from	  that	  of	  its	  allies,	  Britain	  and	  Israel.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  assessed	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  British	  and	  Israelis	  were	  still	  angry	  about	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  and	  wanted	  to	  check	  Nasser’s	  rising	  inFluence	  in	  the	  region.	  Because	  both	  opposed	  its	  Flirtation	  with	  Nasser,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  opted	  to	  cut	  them	  off	  from	  their	  internal	  deliberations.	  This	  disputes	  Blackwell’s	  argument	  that	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  held	  a	  “common	  perception”	  of	  the	  communist	  threat	  to	  Iraq	  during	  this	  period.220	   The	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  fear	  of	  communism	  in	  Iraq	  peaked	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1959	  following	  the	  crushing	  of	  the	  nationalists	  after	  the	  Mosul	  rising.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  split	  on	  how	  to	  respond.	  Like	  before,	  Eisenhower	  wanted	  to	  work	  with	  Nasser,	  Allen	  Dulles	  was	  uncertain	  this	  would	  work,	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  worried	  that	  Nasser’s	  actions	  could	  push	  Qasim	  further	  toward	  the	  Soviets.	  This	  uncertainty	  led	  the	  NSC	  to	  establish	  the	  SCI	  to	  assess	  America’s	  options	  and	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover.	  But	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  the	  SCI	  was	  just	  as	  split	  over	  how	  to	  act	  as	  the	  NSC	  was,	  with	  State	  preferring	  a	  cautious	  approach,	  while	  CIA	  and	  Defense	  wanted	  to	  take	  aggressive	  action.	  Even	  so,	  the	  SCI	  devised	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  options,	  including	  covert	  and	  military	  action,	  which	  “horriFied”	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq.	  He	  persuaded	  the	  administration	  successfully	  to	  press	  Nasser	  into	  modifying	  his	  propaganda	  campaign	  against	  Iraq	  to	  focus	  not	  on	  Qasim	  but	  the	  communists	  and	  to	  continue	  engaging	  in	  contingency	  planning	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  communist	  takeover.	  Ultimately,	  the	  cautious	  approach	  won	  out	  and	  proved	  successful	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  especially	  after	  the	  ICP	  contributed	  to	  a	  coup	  attempt	  and	  massacre	  at	  Kirkuk	  in	  July,	  which	  led	  Qasim	  to	  
 64
220 Blackwell (1999), p.2.
move	  against	  it.	  With	  the	  communist	  threat	  apparently	  checked	  by	  1960,	  Iraq	  endured	  a	  period	  of	  relative	  stability,	  leading	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  conclude	  the	  crisis	  was	  over.	   It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  evidence	  presented	  here	  that	  America’s	  decisions	  and	  actions	  throughout	  1958-­‐59	  were	  driven	  by	  its	  perception	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  inFluence	  inside	  Iraq.221	  As	  the	  Soviets	  appeared	  to	  gain	  inFluence	  over	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  the	  U.S.	  took	  clear	  steps	  to	  counter	  it,	  as	  dictated	  by	  America’s	  established	  containment	  strategy.	  This	  chapter	  makes	  clear	  that	  beginning	  in	  late-­‐1958	  Washington	  viewed	  Baghdad	  as	  part	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  competition	  with	  Moscow	  and	  was	  determined	  to	  block	  any	  further	  Soviet	  advances.	  It	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  share	  a	  “common	  perception”	  of	  the	  communist	  threat	  and	  that	  claims	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Qasim	  in	  October	  1959	  cannot	  be	  substantiated	  from	  the	  primary	  evidence.222	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Chapter	  2:	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  Qasim	  RegimeJanuary	  1961—February	  1963
	   The	  following	  chapter	  examines	  the	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  Abd	  al’Karim	  Qasim	  regime.	  Even	  though	  Iraq	  had	  stabilized	  during	  1960,	  throughout	  1961-­‐62	  it	  became	  embroiled	  in	  a	  series	  of	  crises,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  Qasim’s	  overthrow	  by	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  in	  February	  1963.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  unlike	  other	  contemporary	  Cold	  War	  battlegrounds,	  like	  Berlin,	  Cuba,	  and	  Vietnam,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  did	  not	  view	  Iraq	  as	  a	  signiFicant	  Cold	  War	  contest.	  Consequently,	  it	  disestablished	  an	  interagency	  committee	  monitoring	  Iraq	  despite	  a	  series	  of	  crises,	  and	  did	  not	  allocate	  adequate	  resources	  to	  assess	  the	  ongoing	  situation,	  and	  downplayed	  a	  series	  of	  indicators	  suggesting	  Iraq	  threatened	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  Iraq	  downgraded	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  unilaterally	  in	  June	  1962	  that	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  realized	  its	  importance.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  administration	  accepted	  the	  State	  Department’s	  warnings	  retroactively	  and	  adopted	  an	  aggressive	  multi-­‐prong	  response,	  including	  both	  diplomatic	  pressure	  and	  covert	  action.	   Overall,	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  is	  limited	  to	  works	  detailing	  speciFic	  aspects	  of	  U.S.	  policy,	  like	  the	  Kuwait	  crisis,	  Kurdish	  War,	  and	  the	  CIA’s	  efforts	  to	  overthrow	  Qasim.	  Unfortunately,	  none	  of	  these	  works	  examine	  this	  period	  in	  depth.	  In	  terms	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  Hahn	  argued	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  “low	  key”	  before	  the	  February	  1963	  coup	  and	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  friendly	  relations.223	  This	  Fits	  with	  Ashton	  and	  Fain’s	  works	  on	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis,	  which	  both	  argue	  the	  American	  role	  was	  minimal.224 	  Next,	  Little’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurds	  claims	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the	  Kennedy	  administration	  encouraged	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Cold	  War	  strategy	  to	  tie	  up	  the	  Qasim	  regime.225	  However,	  evidence	  unearthed	  from	  the	  Soviet	  archives	  by	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  challenges	  Little’s	  claim,	  suggesting	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  plan.226	  Finally,	  scholars,	  former	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  and	  journalists	  have	  claimed	  the	  CIA	  was	  behind	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  February	  1963	  coup	  that	  overthrew	  the	  Qasim	  regime,227	  but	  Hahn	  disputes	  this	  notion,	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  U.S.	  documents.228	  As	  a	  result	  of	  recently	  declassiFied	  documents	  and	  interviews	  with	  former	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  many	  of	  the	  discrepancies	  about	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  can	  be	  clariFied.
I	   The	  source	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  problem	  with	  Iraq	  stems	  from	  the	  decision	  to	  disestablish	  the	  SCI	  within	  days	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy’s	  presidential	  inauguration.	  On	  January	  23,	  1961,	  Phillip	  Halla,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  member	  who	  served	  as	  the	  SCI’s	  secretary,	  sent	  James	  Lay,	  the	  NSC’s	  executive	  secretary,	  a	  memo	  outlining	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  question.	  Key	  arguments	  for	  disestablishment	  were	  that	  no	  meeting	  had	  been	  held	  since	  March	  1960,	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  have	  stabilized,	  and	  the	  communist	  threat	  was	  not	  as	  menacing	  as	  Cuba,	  Laos,	  or	  Vietnam,	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  necessitate	  a	  special	  committee.	  However,	  the	  SCI’s	  principal	  members	  held	  mixed	  views.	  While	  Defense	  had	  no	  Firm	  opinion,	  State	  and	  CIA	  favoured	  continuing	  since	  it	  allowed	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  monitor	  events	  in	  a	  troublesome	  country.	  Another	  reason	  for	  the	  SCI’s	  continuation,	  according	  to	  a	  CIA	  ofFicial,	  was	  that	  it	  provided	  a	  forum	  where	  ideas	  could	  be	  advanced	  with	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  acceptance	  than	  in	  bilateral	  talks	  with	  State	  alone.	  Furthermore,	  because	  of	  Iraq’s	  instability	  the	  CIA	  felt	  it	  was	  important	  to	  have	  an	  interagency	  mechanism	  in	  place	  to	  respond	  rapidly	  in	  the	  event	  of	  renewed	  crisis.	  And	  just	  because	  the	  communist	  threat	  had	  subsided,	  the	  CIA	  was	  not	  convinced	  it	  was	  gone	  altogether.	  Halla	  then	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noted	  a	  recent	  SNIE	  that	  concluded	  that	  Qasim	  still	  faced	  threats	  from	  nationalists	  and	  the	  military,	  which	  meant	  a	  successful	  coup	  could	  provide	  communists	  elements	  an	  opportunity	  to	  seize	  power.	  Despite	  these	  valid	  arguments,	  the	  committee	  was	  doomed	  because	  Kennedy’s	  national	  security	  advisor,	  McGeorge	  Bundy,	  did	  not	  see	  the	  relevance	  of	  keeping	  the	  committee	  in	  existence.229	  In	  hindsight,	  the	  disestablishment	  of	  the	  SCI	  was	  a	  clear	  mistake	  and	  it	  would	  take	  three	  successive	  crises	  in	  1961—the	  Kuwait	  Crisis	  in	  June,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  September,	  and	  the	  expropriation	  of	  the	  IPC’s	  concessionary	  holding	  in	  December—for	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  Finally	  grasp	  that	  Iraq	  necessitated	  much	  more	  attention	  than	  it	  was	  receiving.	   The	  First	  crisis	  began	  on	  June	  25,	  1961	  when	  Qasim	  declared	  Kuwait	  was	  “an	  indivisible	  part	  of	  Iraq”	  and	  mobilized	  troops	  along	  the	  border.	  The	  catalyst	  for	  this	  action	  was	  that	  Britain	  had	  granted	  Kuwait	  independence	  on	  June	  19	  and	  withdrew	  its	  military	  forces.	  State	  Department	  ofFicials	  noted	  Iraq	  was	  “advancing	  an	  old	  Iraqi	  claim,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  not	  in	  the	  past	  received	  much	  support	  from	  other	  Arab	  states	  and	  has	  had	  no	  recognition	  from	  the	  world	  at	  large.”230	  While	  U.S.	  oil	  companies	  owned	  a	  50%	  stake	  in	  the	  Kuwait	  Oil	  Company,	  Britain’s	  interests	  in	  Kuwait	  were	  more	  signiFicant,	  since	  its	  economy	  was	  dependent	  on	  Kuwaiti	  oil.231	  Even	  so,	  the	  U.S.	  response	  to	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis	  was	  muted	  by	  comparison	  to	  Britain’s.	  Indeed,	  Hahn	  was	  correct	  when	  describing	  the	  U.S.	  response	  was	  “low-­‐key”.232	  As	  Fain	  observed,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  hesitant	  about	  “identiFication	  with	  British	  action	  in	  Kuwait”	  because	  it	  could	  jeopardize	  the	  image	  “of	  a	  progressive	  anti-­‐colonial	  power	  trying	  to	  work	  productively	  with	  Arab	  nationalism.”233	  While	  Britain	  responded	  by	  sending	  5,000	  troops	  to	  Kuwait	  on	  July	  1,	  in	  what	  was	  known	  as	  Operation	  Vantage,	  Kennedy	  dispatched	  a	  U.S.	  Navy	  task	  force	  toward	  Bahrain	  only	  to	  recall	  it	  when	  the	  situation	  stabilized.234	  Diplomatically,	  the	  U.S.	  preferred	  to	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take	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  believing	  a	  multilateral	  framework	  would	  allow	  the	  Arab	  states	  to	  support	  efforts	  to	  counter	  Qasim	  without	  feeling	  coerced.235	  The	  British	  agreed	  and	  took	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  July	  1	  but	  the	  resolution	  was	  vetoed	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.236	  	   The	  crisis	  was	  not	  resolved	  until	  October	  when	  the	  British	  withdrew	  and	  were	  replaced	  by	  an	  Arab	  League	  force.237	  In	  addition,	  a	  former	  CIA	  ofFicial	  claims	  Qasim	  was	  paid	  a	  $50-­‐60	  million	  bribe	  in	  exchange	  for	  allowing	  Britain	  to	  withdraw.238	  Where	  this	  money	  came	  from	  is	  unknown,	  but	  in	  December	  1961	  Robert	  Komer,	  who	  was	  a	  senior	  NSC	  staff	  member	  and	  Kennedy’s	  advisor	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  affairs,	  and	  Ambassador	  Jernegan	  had	  concluded	  “Kuwait’s	  independence	  can	  only	  be	  assured	  if	  [the]	  Ruler	  uses	  his	  fantastic	  oil	  revenues	  to	  buy	  support	  from	  other	  Arab	  leaders,	  particularly	  Nasser	  and	  Jordanians.”	  In	  other	  words,	  Kuwait	  would	  need	  to	  buy	  its	  safety.239	  Ultimately,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  preference	  to	  defer	  to	  Britain	  on	  regional	  matters,	  like	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis,	  underscores	  the	  low	  priority	  the	  Gulf	  region	  was	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	   However,	  just	  as	  the	  Kuwait	  crisis	  was	  unfolding	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Iraq,	  a	  second	  crisis	  was	  brewing	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  region	  of	  northern	  Iraq.	  After	  returning	  from	  exile	  in	  1958,	  Qasim	  had	  promised	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  Barzani	  that	  he	  would	  implement	  Kurdish	  autonomy	  in	  northern	  Iraq.	  But	  by	  1961	  the	  government	  had	  taken	  no	  steps	  toward	  implementing	  this	  program,	  leading	  Barzani	  to	  leave	  Baghdad	  earlier	  in	  the	  year	  to	  return	  to	  his	  family’s	  stronghold	  in	  the	  north.	  Before	  long,	  age-­‐old	  rivalries	  and	  blood-­‐feuds	  led	  to	  skirmishes	  with	  rival	  tribes.	  On	  April	  13,	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  Board	  warned	  Allen	  Dulles—who	  Kennedy	  maintained	  in	  his	  position	  as	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  until	  November	  1961—“the	  laxity	  of	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  had	  permitted	  long-­‐standing	  tribal	  feuds	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  surface,	  and	  that	  the	  chances	  of	  rioting	  in	  the	  towns	  and	  some	  intertribal	  Fighting	  on	  a	  modest	  scale	  were	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better	  than	  even.”	  This	  warning	  went	  unheeded	  and,	  as	  the	  CIA	  later	  acknowledged,	  was	  far	  “too	  optimistic”.240	  	   Throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  1961,	  tensions	  in	  Kurdistan	  escalated	  and	  by	  late	  June,	  one	  U.S.	  ofFicial	  described	  northern	  Iraq	  as,	  “bordering	  on	  Ottoman	  Empire	  anarchy.”241	  Starting	  in	  mid-­‐July,	  Barzani	  began	  to	  settle	  old	  scores	  with	  neighbouring	  tribes,242	  while	  the	  government	  remained	  passive	  to	  the	  violence.243	  Due	  to	  the	  regime’s	  inaction,	  the	  Kurdish	  Democratic	  Party	  (KDP)244	  sent	  Qasim	  a	  “sharply-­‐worded”	  letter	  in	  mid-­‐August	  demanding	  the	  removal	  of	  “unfriendly	  Arab	  ofFicials”	  and	  government	  troops	  from	  the	  region;	  the	  transfer	  of	  Kurdish	  ofFicials	  back	  to	  the	  north;	  that	  Kurdish	  be	  used	  as	  the	  ofFicial	  language	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  areas;	  political	  freedom;	  and	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  Kurdish	  newspapers.245	  As	  a	  CIA	  ofFicial	  later	  recalled,	  this	  declaration	  marked	  the	  point	  when	  war	  between	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurds	  was	  inevitable.246 	  	   Throughout	  August,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  warned	  the	  State	  Department	  a	  rebellion	  was	  about	  to	  break	  out	  in	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  that	  could	  destabilize	  the	  entire	  region.	  Few	  in	  Washington	  took	  any	  notice.	  On	  August	  5,	  the	  U.S.	  Consulate	  in	  Tabriz	  warned	  that	  Iran	  and	  Turkey	  had	  begun	  arming	  Barzani’s	  rivals	  and	  were	  encouraging	  them	  to	  attack.247	  When	  this	  occurred,	  it	  was	  Barzani	  that	  emerged	  victorious,	  making	  him	  the	  dominant	  military	  power	  in	  the	  north.248	  Within	  days,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  reported	  that	  senior	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  were	  pondering	  whether	  an	  “effective	  deterrent”	  would	  be	  to	  bomb	  Kurdish	  villages.249	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Then,	  on	  August	  31,	  the	  embassy	  sent	  Washington	  a	  detailed	  report	  warning	  that	  some	  Kurds	  were	  planning	  actions	  aimed	  at	  provoking	  a	  military	  response	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  which	  could	  then	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  warfare	  in	  self-­‐defense	  and	  to	  internationalize	  their	  plight.	  As	  the	  embassy	  pointed	  out:[The]	  Kurds	  may	  have	  realized	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  great	  powers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  to	  dramatic	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  trouble,	  dissatisfaction,	  or	  potential	  crisis	  exist	  than	  they	  are	  to	  take	  an	  interest	  in	  an	  affair	  before	  it	  reaches	  the	  stage	  of	  trouble.250At	  the	  start	  of	  September	  1961,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tabriz	  reported	  a	  group	  of	  Kurds,	  not	  afFiliated	  with	  Barzani,	  had	  seized	  control	  of	  a	  key	  road.	  This	  development	  presented	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  with	  two	  options:	  1)	  granting	  the	  Kurds	  autonomy	  or	  2)	  dealing	  with	  them	  by	  force.251	  But	  Washington	  ignored	  these	  actions	  throughout	  August	  and	  early	  September.	  A	  CIA	  ofFicial	  stationed	  in	  Tabriz	  recalled	  sending	  CIA	  headquarters	  a	  warning	  about	  an	  imminent	  insurrection	  in	  northern	  Iraq.	  When	  he	  heard	  nothing	  back,	  he	  made	  some	  inquiries	  only	  to	  Find	  his	  warning	  had	  not	  been	  disseminated	  because	  “analysts	  in	  Washington	  thought	  it	  improbable	  that	  a	  band	  of	  ill-­‐armed	  tribesmen	  could	  challenge	  a	  modern	  army”.252	  UnsatisFied	  with	  this	  conclusion,	  he	  pressed	  senior	  CIA	  ofFicials	  to	  circulate	  a	  staff	  memorandum	  on	  September	  13,	  but	  by	  then	  the	  insurrection	  had	  already	  begun.253	  	   On	  September	  10,	  a	  group	  of	  non-­‐Barzani	  Kurds	  ambushed	  and	  massacred	  an	  Iraqi	  army	  column.254	  Fighting	  was	  so	  intense	  the	  Iraqi	  Air	  Force	  (IAF)	  was	  called	  in	  to	  save	  the	  beleaguered	  troops.255	  Another	  ambush	  occurred	  two	  days	  later,	  killing	  twenty-­‐three,256 	  and	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  north,	  Qasim	  ordered	  the	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mobilization	  of	  ground	  and	  air	  forces.	  On	  September	  14	  the	  IAF	  commenced	  the	  systematic	  bombing	  of	  the	  north,	  targeting	  Kurdish	  villages.257	  Up	  to	  this	  point	  Barzani	  had	  managed	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  conFlict,	  but	  this	  changed	  on	  September	  19	  when	  Qasim	  ordered	  the	  bombing	  of	  Barzan.258	  In	  response,	  Barzani	  joined	  the	  Fight,	  bringing	  with	  him	  his	  knowledge	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  and	  a	  cadre	  of	  Soviet-­‐trained,	  seasoned	  warriors.259	   Just	  as	  the	  revolt	  began,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  preoccupied	  with	  events	  in	  Europe.	  The	  Soviets	  had	  just	  sparked	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall.	  At	  the	  time,	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington	  had	  little	  reason	  to	  suspect	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  and	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis	  were	  connected,	  when	  in	  fact	  they	  were.	  According	  to	  Vladislav	  Zubok,	  the	  Kurdish	  uprising,	  while	  indigenous,	  Fit	  with	  a	  Soviet	  strategy	  devised	  in	  July	  1961	  aimed	  at	  distracting	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  from	  its	  maneuvering	  in	  Berlin.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  1994,	  Zubok	  cites	  a	  memo	  from	  KGB	  chief	  Alexander	  Shelepin	  to	  Soviet	  Premier	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  on	  July	  29,	  1961,	  that	  recommended	  creating	  crises	  “in	  various	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  which	  would	  favor	  dispersion	  of	  attention	  and	  forces	  by	  the	  USA	  and	  their	  satellites,	  and	  would	  tie	  them	  down	  during	  the	  settlement	  of	  the	  question	  of	  a	  German	  peace	  treaty	  and	  West	  Berlin.”260	  	   After	  listing	  the	  options	  for	  causing	  trouble	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  Shelepin	  turned	  to	  the	  Middle	  East.	  He	  planned	  “to	  cause	  uncertainty	  in	  government	  circles	  of	  the	  USA,	  England,	  Turkey,	  and	  Iran	  about	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  positions	  in	  the	  Middle	  and	  Near	  East”	  by	  using	  the	  KGB’s	  old	  connections	  to	  Barzani	  “to	  activate	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  population	  of	  Iraq,	  Iran,	  and	  Turkey	  for	  creation	  of	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  that	  would	  include	  the	  provinces	  of	  aforementioned	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countries.”	  Just	  as	  in	  1946,	  Shelepin	  believed	  a	  push	  for	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  would	  “evoke	  serious	  concern	  among	  Western	  powers	  and	  First	  of	  all	  in	  England	  regarding	  [their	  access	  to]	  oil	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Iran,	  and	  also	  in	  the	  United	  States	  regarding	  its	  military	  bases	  in	  Turkey”	  and	  create	  difFiculties	  for	  Qasim,	  “who	  [had]	  begun	  to	  conduct	  a	  pro-­‐Western	  policy,	  especially	  in	  recent	  time.”	  To	  this	  end,	  Shelepin	  proposed	  providing	  Barzani	  with	  arms	  and	  money.261 	  	   While	  this	  account	  Fits	  with	  the	  narrative	  that	  followed,	  the	  Soviet	  scheme	  failed	  to	  anticipate	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  would	  not	  be	  interested	  in	  Iraq	  or	  its	  Kurdish	  population	  or	  to	  realize	  Barzani	  neither	  trusted	  the	  Soviets	  nor	  intended	  to	  act	  as	  their	  agent.	  Nevertheless,	  Zubok’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  Soviets	  intended	  to	  use	  Barzani	  as	  a	  pawn	  to	  distract	  the	  U.S.	  from	  the	  crisis	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  ignoring	  of	  repeated	  warnings	  of	  an	  imminent	  Kurdish	  insurrection,	  challenges	  Douglas	  Little’s	  claim	  that	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  role	  in	  encouraging	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.262	  	   Throughout	  the	  fall	  of	  1961,	  both	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  and	  the	  Kurds	  tried	  to	  portray	  the	  conFlict	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms.	  For	  instance,	  at	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  September	  23	  Qasim	  sought	  to	  implicate	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  revolt,	  describing	  the	  Kurds	  of	  being	  “American	  stooges,”	  while	  exonerating	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  of	  any	  wrongdoing.263	  Meanwhile,	  in	  early	  October	  a	  group	  of	  Kurds	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  seek	  assistance	  in	  Fighting	  the	  regime.	  This	  was	  the	  First	  instance	  of	  such	  a	  request.	  The	  Kurds	  argued	  the	  U.S.	  had	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  since	  it	  “supports	  causes	  of	  liberty	  and	  justice”	  and	  suggested	  that	  Kurdistan	  would	  join	  CENTO	  and	  be	  a	  “bulwark	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union”	  if	  it	  were	  to	  become	  independent.	  To	  this,	  the	  embassy	  ofFicer,	  James	  Atkins,	  discouraged	  the	  Kurds	  from	  revolting	  and	  said	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy	  the	  U.S.	  could	  not	  involve	  itself	  in	  Iraq’s	  internal	  affairs,	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  until	  1972.264	  Nevertheless,	  these	  two	  examples	  show	  how	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  both	  Qasim	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and	  the	  Kurds	  sought	  to	  portray	  the	  conFlict	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms	  in	  order	  to	  win	  external	  support	  for	  their	  position.	   The	  Fighting	  season	  in	  Kurdistan	  ended	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  winter.	  The	  harsh	  wintery	  conditions	  high	  up	  in	  the	  Zagros	  Mountains	  made	  them	  unsuited	  for	  conventional	  warfare,	  but	  ideal	  for	  the	  guerrilla,	  alpine	  warfare	  operations,	  of	  which	  the	  Kurds	  were	  masters.	  So	  when	  Iraq’s	  offensive	  ground	  to	  a	  halt,	  the	  Kurds	  began	  to	  extract	  their	  revenge,265	  and	  by	  late-­‐November,	  Barzani	  had	  cut	  off	  the	  remaining	  Iraqi	  forces,	  inFlicting	  heavy	  losses,	  and	  capturing	  the	  equipment	  of	  at	  least	  two	  Iraqi	  regiments.266	  Fighting	  continued	  into	  1962,	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  March,	  Barzani	  was	  in	  Firm	  control	  of	  all	  of	  Kurdistan,	  though	  barring	  the	  major	  city	  centers,	  such	  as	  Sulaimaniya,	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  government	  retaliation	  against	  civilians.267	   Throughout	  this	  period	  a	  clear	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  conFlict	  was	  absent.	  While	  Hahn	  explains	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  muted	  response	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  stemmed	  from	  a	  “desire	  to	  maintain	  sound	  relations	  with	  Baghdad,”268	  the	  reality	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  perceive	  Iraq	  as	  relevant	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  at	  a	  time	  when	  crises	  in	  Berlin,	  Cuba,	  Vietnam,	  or	  even	  Kuwait	  took	  precedence.	  	   The	  third,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  signiFicant	  crisis	  from	  an	  American	  perspective,	  occurred	  in	  December	  1961,	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  passed	  Public	  Law	  80,	  which	  restricted	  the	  IPC’s	  concessionary	  areas	  (i.e.,	  the	  area	  in	  which	  the	  company	  could	  pump	  oil)	  to	  areas	  where	  oil	  was	  actually	  being	  produced.	  In	  effect,	  Iraq	  expropriated	  99.5%	  of	  the	  IPC’s	  concession.269 	  The	  catalyst	  for	  Iraq’s	  action	  related	  to	  the	  Kuwaiti	  question.	  On	  November	  30,	  Egypt	  sponsored	  a	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  requesting	  Kuwait’s	  admittance	  to	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  member	  state.	  At	  the	  time,	  Iraq	  warned	  it	  would	  downgrade	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  any	  state	  recognizing	  Kuwait.	  Few	  took	  notice,	  including	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  had	  already	  done	  so.	  At	  the	  UN,	  the	  U.S.	  supported	  the	  resolution,	  but	  it	  came	  to	  nothing	  as	  the	  Soviets	  vetoed	  it	  in	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order	  to	  gain	  favour	  with	  Baghdad.270	  Because	  of	  Western	  support	  for	  the	  Kuwait	  resolution	  at	  the	  UN,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  retaliated	  by	  passing	  Public	  Law	  80,	  which	  resolved	  an	  ongoing	  dispute	  it	  had	  had	  with	  the	  ICP	  after	  talks	  broke	  down	  in	  mid-­‐October.	  Since	  then,	  the	  regime	  had	  been	  threatening	  “legal	  action”	  and	  Kuwait’s	  bid	  at	  the	  UN	  gave	  a	  perfect	  reason	  to	  act.271	  	   U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  alarmed	  by	  Iraq’s	  expropriation	  of	  the	  IPC	  concessionary	  area	  and	  the	  Soviet	  veto,	  since	  these	  moves	  suggested	  a	  degree	  of	  coordination.	  This	  prompted	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  NEA	  Phillips	  Talbot	  to	  send	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Ball	  a	  memo	  on	  December	  18	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  situation.	  While	  noting	  Iraq	  had	  been	  drifting	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  since	  early	  1960,	  Talbot	  suggested	  this	  trend	  had	  reversed	  and	  “a	  new	  phase”	  in	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  “may	  have	  been	  opened.”	  He	  warned,	  “Iraq	  has	  moved	  increasingly	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  Iraqi	  political	  and	  economic	  affairs	  and	  in	  its	  propaganda	  position.”	  Another	  troubling	  sign	  was	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  had	  “taken	  several	  steps”	  to	  strengthen	  the	  communists’	  internal	  position.	  This	  led	  Talbot	  to	  conclude,	  “the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  …	  appears	  to	  be	  returning	  to	  something	  like	  the	  post-­‐revolutionary	  period	  in	  1958	  and	  1959,	  during	  which	  there	  was	  great	  alarm	  that	  Iraq	  was	  going	  communist.”	  Even	  so,	  Talbot	  was	  convinced	  maintaining	  a	  policy	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  regime	  was	  vital	  and	  U.S.	  oil	  Firms,	  which	  held	  a	  23.75%	  stake	  in	  the	  company,272	  could	  “retaliate	  against	  and	  place	  other	  pressures	  on	  Iraq.”	  To	  this,	  Talbot	  warned:[The	  U.S.]	  must	  resist	  Firmly	  all	  efforts	  to	  force	  us	  to	  undertake	  intervention	  of	  any	  type	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  Iraq	  unless	  and	  until	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  domestic	  communists	  stand	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  Iraq	  in	  absence	  of	  such	  intervention.This	  was	  because,	  “short	  of	  direct	  military	  action,	  whether	  by	  U.S.	  forces	  alone	  or	  in	  conjunction	  with	  others	  or	  by	  Iraq’s	  neighbors	  to	  the	  West	  (Turkey,	  Iran,	  Jordan	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia),	  [they	  lacked]	  effective	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  reversal	  in	  Iraqi	  policy.”	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In	  short,	  Talbot’s	  memo	  represented	  a	  clear	  warning	  to	  his	  superiors	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  start	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq.273	  	   The	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  the	  three	  crises	  of	  1961	  is	  puzzling.	  While	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  recognized	  the	  growing	  Soviet	  threat	  to	  Iraq	  and	  had	  pressed	  their	  superiors	  to	  take	  notice,	  little	  came	  of	  this.	  The	  fact	  that	  Talbot	  compared	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1961	  to	  the	  1958-­‐59	  crisis	  was	  signiFicant,	  and	  yet	  his	  message	  went	  unnoticed	  for	  another	  two	  months.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  taking	  a	  hard	  line	  on	  Soviet	  subversion	  elsewhere,	  the	  low-­‐key	  response	  to	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis,	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  and	  the	  IPC’s	  nationalization	  seems	  perplexing.	  There	  are	  three	  plausible	  explanations	  for	  this.	  First,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  crises,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  intensely	  focused	  on	  what	  it	  perceived	  as	  the	  more	  important	  Cold	  War	  contests	  in	  Europe,	  East	  Asia,	  and	  Latin	  America.	  Second,	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  Iraq	  as	  part	  of	  the	  British	  sphere	  of	  inFluence	  and	  was	  therefore	  hesitant	  about	  involving	  itself	  more	  closely.	  Finally,	  by	  the	  time	  Iraq	  again	  became	  relevant	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  already	  in	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  an	  interagency	  group	  focusing	  on	  problems	  just	  of	  this	  kind,	  known	  as	  the	  Special	  Group	  (Counter-­‐Insurgency	  or	  CI).	  
II	   From	  early	  1962	  onward,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  to	  one	  of	  engagement	  and	  covert	  action.	  This	  was	  driven	  by	  two	  factors.	  First,	  a	  recognition	  among	  senior	  Kennedy	  administration	  ofFicials	  of	  the	  need	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  aggressive	  policy	  to	  counter	  Soviet	  moves	  in	  Europe,	  Asia,	  Latin	  America,	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Second,	  Iraq’s	  expropriation	  of	  the	  IPC’s	  concessionary	  holding	  convinced	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  These	  conclusions	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  dual	  track	  approach	  (i.e.,	  overt	  and	  covert)	  to	  Iraq,	  where	  the	  State	  Department	  reassessed	  its	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	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focusing	  on	  engagement,	  fostering	  friendly	  relations	  and	  keeping	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  improving	  relations	  with	  the	  troublesome	  regime,	  while	  the	  CIA	  sought	  Qasim’s	  overthrow	  and	  his	  replacement	  with	  a	  regime	  more	  friendly	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  This	  argument	  challenges	  Hahn’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  “resist[ed]	  any	  temptation	  to	  intervene	  covertly	  against	  Qasim.”274	  	   On	  January	  18,	  1962	  the	  National	  Security	  Action	  Memorandum	  (NSAM)	  124	  established	  the	  Special	  Group	  (CI).	  Of	  its	  four	  functions,	  two	  are	  particularly	  relevant.	  The	  First	  was	  to	  insure	  “proper	  recognition	  [throughout]	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  that	  subversive	  insurgency	  …	  [was]	  a	  major	  form	  of	  politico-­‐military	  conFlict	  equal	  in	  importance	  to	  conventional	  warfare.”	  The	  second	  was:	  To	  insure	  the	  development	  of	  adequate	  interdepartmental	  programs	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  or	  defeating	  subversive	  insurgency	  and	  indirect	  aggression	  in	  countries	  and	  regions	  speciFically	  assigned	  to	  the	  Special	  Group	  (CI)	  by	  the	  President,	  and	  to	  resolve	  any	  interdepartmental	  problems	  which	  might	  impede	  their	  implementation.This	  meant	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  intended	  to	  use	  the	  Special	  Group	  (CI)	  as	  a	  central	  interagency	  group,	  discussing,	  agreeing	  upon,	  and	  directing	  all	  covert	  actions.	  NSAM	  124	  speciFically	  identiFied	  South	  Vietnam,	  Laos,	  and	  Thailand	  as	  areas	  to	  focus	  on,275	  but	  a	  number	  of	  former	  CIA	  ofFicials	  have	  suggested	  Iraq	  was	  added	  to	  the	  list.276	   It	  was	  not	  until	  early	  1962	  that	  the	  White	  House	  began	  to	  recognize	  Iraq’s	  signiFicance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  For	  instance,	  despite	  the	  IPC’s	  expropriation	  in	  December	  1961,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  mid-­‐February	  1962	  that	  the	  White	  House	  asked	  State	  to	  bring	  it	  up	  to	  speed	  on	  Iraq.	  The	  request,	  put	  forward	  by	  Komer,	  seemed	  abrupt,	  since	  no	  new	  developments	  had	  taken	  place	  inside	  Iraq	  since	  late	  1961.	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  this.	  First,	  the	  White	  House	  had	  Finally	  recognized	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  Iraq,	  or	  secondly,	  Talbot’s	  fear	  about	  pressure	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from	  U.S.	  oil	  companies	  had	  become	  reality.	  Either	  way,	  State	  forwarded	  Talbot’s	  memo	  to	  the	  White	  House	  on	  February	  15.277	   In	  April	  1962,	  after	  months	  of	  review,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  issued	  policy	  guidelines	  for	  Iraq.	  The	  policy	  objectives	  consisted	  of	  preserving	  Iraq’s	  position	  outside	  the	  Soviet	  bloc;	  continuing	  the	  availability	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  to	  non-­‐communist	  consumers;	  and	  maintaining	  correct	  relations	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  In	  the	  short-­‐term,	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  1)	  expand	  private	  and	  commercial	  ties	  with	  Iraq,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  competent	  design	  and	  construction	  contractors,	  and	  become	  a	  purchaser	  of	  Iraqi	  exports;	  2)	  serve	  as	  Iraq’s	  primary	  source	  of	  “modern	  and	  progressive	  technical,	  cultural,	  and	  social	  principles	  and	  techniques”;	  and	  3)	  convince	  Iraq	  to	  help	  “protect	  friendly	  nations	  from	  covert	  or	  overt	  aggression	  from	  external	  sources	  without	  impingements	  on	  national	  sovereignty.”	  In	  the	  long-­‐term,	  the	  U.S.	  wished	  to	  see	  a	  “progressive	  government	  devoting	  itself	  to	  peaceful	  domestic	  and	  regional	  development	  and	  relations,	  mindful	  of,	  and	  helpful	  in,	  achieving	  the	  basic	  Western	  aims	  in	  international	  affairs.”278	  	   To	  achieve	  these	  objectives,	  the	  State	  Department	  outlined	  political,	  psychological,	  economic,	  and	  military	  lines	  of	  action.	  Politically,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  to	  convince	  Iraq	  its	  policy	  was	  based	  on	  friendship	  and	  mutual	  interests	  and	  was	  capable	  of	  helping	  to	  improve	  Iraq’s	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  under	  conditions	  that	  would	  maintain	  its	  sovereignty.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  needed	  to	  encourage	  Iraq	  to	  seek	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  solution	  to	  its	  dispute	  with	  Iran	  over	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway—an	  issue	  that	  would	  be	  a	  major	  source	  of	  friction	  in	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  relations.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  Kuwait,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  maintain	  its	  policy	  of	  recognition	  and	  encourage	  Arab	  states	  to	  “make	  clear	  to	  Iraq	  the	  risks	  of	  any	  aggression	  aimed	  at	  seizing	  Kuwait’s	  territory.”	  Psychologically,	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  restore	  Iraq’s	  conFidence	  in	  America	  by	  increasing	  personal	  contacts,	  cultural	  activities	  (particularly	  English-­‐language	  and	  exchange	  programs),	  and	  expanding	  the	  United	  States	  Information	  Service	  (USIS)	  library	  in	  Baghdad.	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CIA	  sources	  were	  in	  a	  perfect	  position	  to	  follow	  each	  step	  of	  Ba’ath	  preparations	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  coup,	  which	  focused	  on	  making	  contacts	  with	  military	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  in	  Baghdad.	  The	  CIA’s	  major	  source,	  in	  an	  ideal	  catbird	  seat,	  reported	  the	  exact	  time	  of	  the	  coup	  and	  provided	  a	  list	  of	  the	  new	  cabinet	  members.More	  recently,	  Jack	  O’Connell,	  the	  CIA	  station	  chief	  in	  Amman	  from	  1963	  to	  1971,	  claimed	  the	  CIA	  had	  penetrated	  the	  Iraqi	  wing	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  in	  the	  early-­‐1960s.282	  He	  also	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  a	  case	  ofFicer	  for	  an	  agent	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  Ba’th.283	  Therefore,	  by	  at	  least	  1961	  the	  CIA	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  had	  cultivated	  at	  least	  one	  high-­‐level	  asset	  providing	  it	  with	  intelligence	  on	  its	  plans.	  	   The	  CIA	  also	  targeted	  Iraq’s	  military	  for	  intelligence	  on	  its	  Soviet-­‐made	  weapons	  systems	  and	  to	  Find	  a	  suitable	  replacement	  for	  Qasim.	  In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  CIA	  managed	  to	  penetrate	  a	  top-­‐secret	  Iraqi-­‐Soviet	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  project,	  which	  offered	  valuable	  insight	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  ballistic	  missile	  program.284	  According	  to	  a	  CIA	  operations	  ofFicer	  stationed	  in	  Iran	  during	  the	  early	  1960s,	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1962	  the	  White	  House	  ordered	  the	  CIA	  to	  commence	  planning	  for	  Qasim’s	  overthrow.	  The	  Agency	  entrusted	  Archie	  Roosevelt,	  Jr.	  with	  the	  operation.285	  Roosevelt’s	  role	  in	  the	  operation	  has	  been	  conFirmed	  by	  Roger	  Morris,	  a	  former	  NSC	  staffer	  from	  the	  Johnson	  and	  Nixon	  administrations,	  who	  wrote	  in	  2003	  that	  he	  had	  “often	  heard	  CIA	  ofFicers—including	  Archibald	  Roosevelt,	  a	  ranking	  CIA	  ofFicial	  for	  the	  Near	  East	  and	  Africa	  at	  the	  time—openly	  speak	  about	  their	  close	  relations	  with	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the	  Iraqi	  Baathists.”286	  While	  the	  CIA	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  the	  military	  was	  its	  primary	  focus.287	  	   Given	  the	  issuing	  of	  State	  Department’s	  policy	  guidelines	  in	  April	  and	  the	  testimony	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  CIA	  ofFicials,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1962	  the	  U.S.	  was	  employing	  a	  dual	  track	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  consisting	  of	  both	  diplomatic	  engagement	  and	  covert	  action.	  This	  conclusion	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  Hahn’s	  assertion.
III	   In	  early	  May	  1962,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  became	  concerned	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  was	  destabilizing	  and	  began	  contingency	  planning	  for	  Qasim’s	  eventual	  overthrow.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  question	  the	  NEA	  was	  monitoring	  Iraq	  closely,	  the	  numerous	  warnings	  sent	  up	  the	  line	  were	  not	  receiving	  the	  necessary	  attention.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  caught	  completely	  off	  guard	  when	  Iraq	  expelled	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  and	  downgraded	  its	  relations	  in	  June.	   On	  May	  3,	  the	  NEA	  circulated	  a	  report	  concluding	  there	  had	  “never	  been	  a	  period”	  since	  the	  1958	  coup	  that	  Qasim’s	  “overthrow	  has	  not	  been	  plotted	  by	  dissident	  elements.”	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  NEA	  observed,	  Qasim	  was	  “disliked,	  hated	  and	  privately	  ridiculed	  by	  almost	  all	  sections	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  public,	  including	  apparently,	  growing	  segments	  of	  the	  Army.”	  The	  NEA	  identiFied	  Five	  contingencies.	  First,	  should	  Qasim	  be	  overthrown	  by	  nationalists	  judged	  to	  be	  in	  control	  of	  the	  country	  with	  support	  from	  the	  public,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  consider	  prompt	  recognition.	  Second,	  should	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  seized	  power,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  delay	  recognition	  until	  it	  was	  satisFied	  it	  was	  in	  control	  of	  the	  country.	  Third,	  should	  the	  Kurds	  withhold	  support	  for	  a	  nationalist	  or	  Ba’thist	  government	  and	  demand	  autonomy	  within	  Iraq,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  recognize	  the	  new	  government	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  criteria	  to	  avoid	  any	  appearance	  of	  support	  for	  Kurdish	  claims.	  Fourth,	  should	  a	  protracted	  internal	  conFlict	  between	  communist	  and	  non-­‐communist	  elements	  occur,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  consider	  covert	  support	  to	  anti-­‐communist	  elements	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	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British,	  while	  avoiding	  intervention	  by	  the	  U.S.	  or	  any	  other	  Western	  power	  including	  Turkey	  and	  Iran.	  The	  NEA	  also	  recognized	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  Nasser	  apprised	  of	  any	  moves.	  Finally,	  if	  communists	  seized	  power,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  to	  determine	  “how	  best	  to	  channel	  or	  encourage	  what	  would	  in	  all	  probability	  be	  a	  reaction	  of	  deep	  alarm	  by	  Iraq’s	  neighbors.”	  This	  would	  include	  taking	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  UN.	  This	  report	  underscores	  how	  serious	  the	  NEA’s	  concerns	  were,	  and	  yet	  remarkably,	  this	  report,	  like	  previous	  warnings	  on	  Iraq,	  took	  nearly	  two	  months	  to	  reach	  the	  White	  House	  and,	  like	  before,	  it	  was	  only	  in	  response	  to	  a	  direct	  request	  for	  information.288	   The	  situation	  took	  a	  precarious	  turn	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  May	  when	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  that	  Iran	  was	  reconsidering	  its	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurds.	  This	  led	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  warn	  its	  embassy	  in	  Tehran	  on	  May	  24	  of	  “indications	  that	  important	  elements	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Iran	  …	  may	  be	  considering	  a	  change	  in	  basic	  Iranian	  policy	  from	  the	  past	  and	  present	  line	  of	  half-­‐hearted	  opposition	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  rebellion	  to	  one	  of	  covert	  cooperation	  with	  the	  rebels.”	  It	  ordered	  the	  embassy	  to	  “approach	  the	  Iranian	  Government	  at	  any	  appropriate	  level	  (including	  the	  Foreign	  OfFice,	  SAVAK,	  or	  the	  military)	  and	  convey	  informally”	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “unable	  to	  visualize	  any	  possible	  Iranian	  interests	  to	  be	  served	  by	  taking	  sides	  in	  a	  dispute	  between	  [the]	  Government	  [of]	  Iraq	  and	  Iraqi	  Kurds.”	  While	  recognizing	  Iran’s	  “almost	  uncontrollable	  …	  impulse	  to	  join	  the	  winning	  side	  of	  any	  conFlict,”	  State	  believed	  “interference	  on	  either	  side	  …	  portends	  more	  of	  danger	  than	  of	  advantage	  to	  the	  basic	  interests	  of	  Iran	  or	  the	  U.S.”	  Helping	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  department	  felt,	  would	  arouse	  unnecessary	  antagonism	  with	  Iraq,	  which	  might	  be	  considered	  unwelcome	  by	  both	  belligerents,	  and	  was	  not	  in	  Iran’s	  interests	  given	  its	  sizable	  Kurdish	  minority.	  The	  department	  concluded:	  Under	  the	  circumstances,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  a	  policy	  of	  strict	  neutrality	  and	  watchful	  waiting	  would	  be	  more	  advantageous	  to	  Iran	  than	  would	  a	  commitment,	  overt	  or	  covert,	  to	  interference.	  A	  policy	  of	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calculated	  inaction	  would	  have	  the	  positive	  advantage	  of	  leaving	  Iran	  a	  maximum	  freedom	  of	  maneuver	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  situation.289Two	  days	  later,	  the	  embassy	  reported	  it	  had	  raised	  the	  matter	  with	  the	  foreign	  ministry,	  which	  “was	  in	  complete	  agreement”	  with	  the	  U.S.	  position.	  Later,	  Iran’s	  monarch,	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Pahlavi,	  known	  commonly	  as	  the	  Shah,	  told	  the	  British	  that	  Iran’s	  “Kurdish	  policy	  [had]	  been	  re-­‐assessed	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  re-­‐afFirmed,”	  an	  indication	  that	  he	  had	  accepted	  U.S.	  advice.290	  	   This	  development	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  about	  both	  Iranian	  and	  U.S.	  policy.	  What	  brought	  about	  Iran’s	  sudden	  interest	  in	  the	  Kurds?	  Why,	  after	  years	  of	  viewing	  Barzani	  as	  a	  threat	  and	  supporting	  anti-­‐Barzani	  forces,291	  did	  the	  Shah	  decide	  to	  change	  his	  mind?	  Equally	  so,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  deteriorating	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  NEA’s	  concern	  that	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  was	  in	  danger,	  why	  did	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  respond	  so	  negatively	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  Iran	  supporting	  the	  Kurds?	  Viewed	  from	  Iran,	  helping	  the	  Kurds	  was	  a	  useful	  means	  of	  destabilizing	  Iraq,	  a	  country	  that	  had	  historically	  been	  its	  only	  local	  challenger	  for	  regional	  hegemony.	  But	  viewed	  from	  Washington,	  the	  Kurds	  maintained	  links	  with	  Moscow—albeit	  tenuous—and	  held	  nationalist	  ambitions	  that	  threatened	  Iran	  and	  Turkey,	  two	  of	  America’s	  closest	  regional	  allies.	  Therefore,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  any	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  even	  from	  an	  ally	  like	  Iran,	  would	  advance	  Moscow’s	  regional	  designs,	  which	  was	  anathema	  to	  its	  interests.	  	   Just	  as	  Iran	  was	  considering	  helping	  the	  Kurds,	  a	  crisis	  occurred	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  On	  June	  2,	  Iraq’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  Hashim	  Jawad	  called	  on	  Ambassador	  Jernegan	  to	  inform	  him	  Iraq	  was	  recalling	  its	  ambassador	  from	  Washington	  and	  he	  was	  required	  to	  leave.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  relations	  were	  downgraded,	  the	  Iraqi	  move	  stopped	  short	  of	  severing	  diplomatic	  relations.292 	  The	  catalyst	  for	  the	  decision	  was	  Kennedy’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  new	  Kuwaiti	  ambassador’s	  credentials	  the	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previous	  day,	  against	  which	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  long	  warned	  the	  U.S.	  government.293	  Iraq’s	  downgrading	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  caught	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  by	  surprise.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Kennedy	  explaining	  the	  break,	  Komer	  stressed	  his	  embarrassment.	  My	  face	  is	  exceedingly	  red	  over	  failing	  to	  let	  you	  know	  that	  receiving	  the	  Kuwait	  Ambassador	  would	  trigger	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Ambassador	  and	  Jernegan	  from	  Baghdad.	  Of	  course	  no	  break	  in	  relations	  is	  involved.	  This	  has	  been	  a	  standard	  Iraqi	  gambit	  with	  every	  country	  (Japan,	  Lebanon,	  Jordan)	  which	  has	  exchanged	  ambassadors	  with	  Kuwait	  after	  an	  Iraqi	  warning,	  and	  we	  had	  long	  been	  on	  notice	  that	  it	  was	  likely	  in	  our	  case	  too.	  Indeed	  we	  took	  the	  basic	  risk	  sometime	  ago	  when	  we,	  along	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  Arab	  states,	  recognized	  Kuwait’s	  independence.	  Your	  staff	  was	  fully	  in	  accord	  with	  this	  decision.	  I	  can	  only	  say	  that	  next	  time	  the	  White	  House	  signs	  off	  on	  something,	  we’ll	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  President	  knows	  about	  it	  too.294In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  downgrade	  Komer	  set	  about	  correcting	  the	  mistake.	  After	  a	  quick	  review,	  he	  sent	  State	  a	  memo	  on	  June	  4	  outlining	  three	  concerns	  about	  Iraq:	  1)	  Iraq	  was	  slowly	  but	  progressively	  swinging	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union;	  2)	  Qasim’s	  popularity	  was	  at	  an	  all	  time	  low;	  and	  3)	  “his	  overthrow	  [was]	  sooner	  or	  later	  inevitable,	  with	  unpredictable	  results.”	  Komer	  questioned	  the	  State	  Department’s	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy,	  but	  acknowledged	  there	  were	  few	  diplomatic	  alternatives.	  He	  then	  requested	  a	  review	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  focusing	  on	  how	  the	  U.S.	  could	  best	  react	  to	  an	  abrupt	  change	  in	  power,	  and	  ways	  to	  counter	  Iraq’s	  accelerated	  shift	  toward	  the	  Soviets.295	  These	  two	  memos	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  Iraq	  had	  received	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  which	  contrasted	  sharply	  to	  the	  close	  scrutiny	  Iraq	  had	  received	  under	  Eisenhower.	  Furthermore,	  Komer’s	  call	  for	  a	  review	  underscored	  the	  gap	  between	  White	  House	  ofFicials	  and	  the	  State	  Department,	  since	  State	  had	  completed	  a	  review	  of	  its	  Iraq	  policy	  just	  two	  months	  earlier.	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   The	  downgrade	  of	  relations	  led	  to	  increased	  scrutiny	  by	  the	  White	  House	  on	  Iraq.	  On	  June	  20,	  William	  Brubeck,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  executive	  secretary,	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  outlining	  its	  Iraq	  policy	  along	  with	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  studies,	  which	  suggested	  the	  situation	  was	  not	  as	  bad	  as	  it	  seemed.	  Brubeck	  explained	  the	  department’s	  view	  that	  Iraq’s	  hostile	  approach	  to	  the	  West	  appeared	  to	  be	  “deliberately	  designed	  to	  frighten	  the	  West	  by	  appearing	  to	  tack	  progressively	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc.”	  We	  believe,	  however,	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  leadership	  probably	  can	  go	  on	  playing	  this	  kind	  of	  brinkmanship	  without	  losing	  control	  to	  the	  Communists	  and	  that	  eventually	  anti-­‐Qasim	  nationalist	  pressures	  will	  become	  strong	  enough	  to	  force	  a	  change	  which	  will	  most	  likely	  produce	  another	  strongly	  nationalistic	  government	  but	  one	  with	  a	  more	  balanced	  foreign	  policy.Given	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  “should	  continue	  to	  adhere	  to	  our	  policy	  of	  maintaining,	  insofar	  as	  possible	  and	  under	  the	  handicaps	  imposed	  upon	  us,	  normal	  relations	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government.”	  On	  the	  question	  of	  a	  review,	  Brubeck	  attached	  the	  department’s	  recent	  policy	  review	  and	  contingency	  plans	  for	  a	  post-­‐Qasim	  Iraq	  and	  explained	  its	  belief	  that	  they	  were	  satisfactory.296	  	   The	  downgrade	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  at	  the	  start	  of	  June	  1962	  was	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  In	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  this,	  Iraq	  had	  hardly	  Figured	  in	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  faced	  much	  greater	  challenges	  elsewhere.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  NSC	  staff	  to	  warn	  the	  President	  that	  accepting	  Kuwait’s	  ambassador	  would	  lead	  Iraq	  to	  a	  downgrade	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  highlighted	  a	  communication	  breakdown	  between	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  the	  White	  House	  that	  had	  been	  apparent	  since	  1961.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  downgrade	  Finally	  forced	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  take	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  seriously.	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IV	   The	  period	  between	  the	  downgrade	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  in	  June	  1962	  through	  to	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  in	  February	  1963	  was	  a	  transition	  period	  for	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  Following	  the	  downgrade,	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  grew	  unstable	  as	  widespread	  plotting	  by	  numerous	  groups	  escalated,	  culminating	  in	  Qasim’s	  eventual	  overthrow.	  While	  the	  downgrade	  was	  troubling	  from	  an	  American	  perspective,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  given	  Iraq’s	  warnings.	  SigniFicantly,	  during	  this	  time	  the	  ongoing	  Kurdish	  War	  took	  on	  increasing	  relevance	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  twofold.	  First,	  Iran	  had	  decided	  the	  Kurds	  were	  a	  useful	  tool	  to	  destabilize	  Iraq,	  while	  tying	  down	  its	  military—a	  clear	  boon	  to	  Israel.	  Second,	  because	  of	  the	  hostile	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  U.S.	  diplomats	  began	  considering	  hostile	  actions	  to	  undermine	  the	  regime,	  including	  sending	  of	  Western	  journalists	  into	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan.	  Though	  the	  depth	  of	  ofFicial	  involvement	  is	  uncertain,	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1962	  a	  number	  of	  intrepid	  journalists,	  such	  as	  the	  New	  York	  Times’	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt,	  visited	  Kurdistan	  and	  learned	  First-­‐hand	  about	  the	  year-­‐long	  Kurdish	  War,	  which	  had	  gone	  virtually	  unnoticed	  in	  the	  West.	  But	  as	  front-­‐page	  articles	  on	  the	  Kurds	  began	  appearing	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1962,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  forced	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  revolt	  and	  articulate	  a	  set	  policy	  toward	  it.	  Furthermore,	  these	  articles	  helped	  dispel	  the	  perception	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  that	  Barzani	  was	  a	  communist	  by	  portraying	  him	  as	  a	  freedom	  Fighter,	  seeking	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  takeover	  in	  Iraq.	   Not	  long	  after	  the	  downgrade,	  British	  diplomats	  informed	  the	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  a	  “group	  of	  ofFicers”	  planned	  to	  overthrow	  Qasim	  and	  install	  a	  nationalist,	  anti-­‐communist	  regime.	  These	  ofFicers	  sought	  assurances	  of	  quick	  recognition	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  military	  supply	  lines,	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  army	  to	  cut	  its	  ties	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  embassy	  reported	  widespread	  plotting	  against	  the	  regime	  from:(1)	  pro-­‐Hashemite	  groupings,	  including	  tribal	  shaiks,	  old	  regime	  politicians,	  and	  some	  army	  ofFicers	  favoring	  close	  Jordan-­‐Iraq	  ties[;]	  (2)	  [a]	  group	  of	  high	  ranking	  ofFicers,	  some	  in	  command	  position,	  who	  fear	  Qassim’s	  decision	  making	  progressively	  forcing	  Iraq	  into	  [the]	  position	  [of	  a]	  Soviet	  satellite	  and	  feel	  early	  coup	  essential	  if	  Iraq’s	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independence	  [is]	  to	  be	  preserved….	  (3)	  [an]	  Anti-­‐Communist	  group	  seeking	  [to]	  remove	  Qassim	  and	  reestablish	  closer	  ties	  with	  [the]	  British	  and	  West.297In	  mid-­‐July	  1962,	  the	  CIA’s	  source	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  reported	  a	  coup	  was	  scheduled	  for	  the	  next	  day,	  but	  was	  cancelled	  at	  the	  last	  moment.298	  Three	  days	  later,	  Roger	  Davies,	  the	  American	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  in	  Baghdad,	  met	  with	  British	  Ambassador	  Sir	  Roger	  Allen	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation.	  Like	  the	  CIA,	  the	  British	  had	  cultivated	  sources	  within	  the	  Ba’th,	  since	  Sir	  Roger	  revealed	  speciFic	  details	  of	  the	  aborted	  coup,	  stating	  anti-­‐Qasim	  ofFicers	  had	  planned	  to	  assassinate	  Qasim	  during	  his	  recent	  trip	  to	  Karbala	  and	  seize	  Baghdad	  with	  armoured	  and	  air	  units,	  though	  he	  did	  not	  explain	  why	  it	  had	  been	  called	  off.299	  	   Nevertheless,	  Sir	  Roger	  was	  discouraged	  by	  the	  present	  situation	  and	  agreed	  little	  could	  be	  done	  besides	  maintaining	  “correct”	  relations.	  Even	  so,	  Davies	  indicated	  he	  was	  tempted	  to	  “explore	  jointly	  possibilities	  of	  developing	  some	  leverage	  to	  be	  used	  to	  counter	  pressures	  against	  us.”	  He	  also	  suggested	  encouraging	  covertly	  news	  reports	  of	  “terror	  attacks	  against	  Kurdish	  villages	  in	  the	  North	  to	  further	  denigrate	  Qassim’s	  image	  abroad”	  and	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  boycotting	  Iraqi	  oil.	  To	  this,	  Allen	  said	  it	  might	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  take	  an	  inventory	  of	  what	  resources	  both	  parties	  had	  available	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  Qasim.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  was	  that	  ofFicials	  in	  London	  felt	  there	  was	  no	  alternative	  to	  Qasim	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  sell	  the	  idea	  of	  Qasim’s	  removal	  to	  “certain	  circles	  in	  the	  Foreign	  OfFice.”300	  Though	  details	  of	  London	  and	  Washington’s	  deliberations	  are	  not	  available,	  the	  New	  York	  Times’	  dispatch	  of	  its	  Beirut	  bureau	  chief,	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt,	  to	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  that	  July	  hardly	  seems	  coincidental.	   On	  July	  21,	  the	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  drafted	  a	  lengthy	  analysis	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  After	  almost	  a	  year	  of	  Fighting,	  the	  embassy	  believed	  the	  revolt	  was	  a	  genuine	  nationalist	  movement,	  “free	  from	  foreign	  domination.”	  This	  was	  important	  because	  it	  dispelled	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Kurds	  were	  Soviet	  puppets.	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Despite	  Kurdish	  talk	  of	  “autonomy”,	  the	  embassy	  believed	  Barzani’s	  end-­‐goal	  “uniFication	  and	  independence	  of	  Kurdistan,”	  though	  he	  would	  likely	  “settle	  for	  much	  less.”	  The	  embassy	  continued	  to	  be	  bafFled	  by	  regime’s	  response	  to	  the	  revolt,	  describing	  Qasim	  as	  “dilatory	  and	  bafFling”.	  His	  only	  hope	  was	  that	  his	  scorched	  earth	  policies	  would	  starve	  the	  Kurds	  into	  submission	  during	  the	  winter,	  but	  it	  seemed	  that	  Barzani	  had	  already	  turned	  to	  the	  Shah	  for	  help.301	  	   In	  late	  July,	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  Assadollah	  Alam	  told	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran,	  Julius	  Holmes,	  the	  Shah	  was	  reconsidering	  his	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurds	  again.	  According	  to	  Holmes:[Alam]	  said	  that	  up	  to	  the	  present	  Iran	  had	  adopted	  a	  hands	  off	  policy	  only	  taking	  necessary	  steps	  to	  protect	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  border	  by	  the	  deployment	  of	  forces	  last	  summer	  when	  there	  was	  some	  possibility	  that	  Barzani	  wards	  might	  spill	  over	  into	  Iran.	  Alam	  said	  Barzani	  had	  approached	  the	  Shah	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  to	  seek	  assistance	  against	  Iraq.	  He	  made	  grand	  promises	  of	  incorporating	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  into	  Iran	  in	  return.	  While	  the	  Shah	  had	  rejected	  the	  offers,	  elements	  of	  Iran’s	  military	  believed	  helping	  the	  Kurds	  might	  be	  a	  viable	  means	  of	  undermining	  Qasim,	  who	  they	  saw	  as	  a	  Soviet	  puppet.	  This	  argument	  struck	  a	  chord	  with	  the	  Shah,	  who	  was	  again	  considering	  “more	  positive	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  Iraqi	  Kurds.”302	  	   Alam’s	  approach	  alarmed	  U.S.	  policymakers	  and	  set	  off	  a	  Flurry	  of	  consultations	  with	  U.S.	  embassies	  in	  Tehran,	  Ankara,	  and	  London.	  In	  Tehran,	  diplomats	  opposed	  the	  shift,	  arguing	  the	  U.S.	  should	  encourage	  an	  “enlightened	  Iranian	  policy”	  toward	  the	  Kurds.	  OfFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  felt	  Tehran’s	  suggestion	  was	  “fully	  consistent”	  with	  its	  views	  and	  agreed	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  “cannot	  be	  solved	  by	  military	  means	  alone.”303	  Though	  Ankara’s	  response	  is	  unavailable,	  a	  cable	  from	  State	  to	  Ankara	  suggests	  its	  policies	  were	  not	  “in	  harmony”	  with	  Tehran’s.	  Because	  of	  Iran	  and	  Turkey’s	  importance	  to	  CENTO,	  State	  instructed	  its	  ambassadors	  to	  urge	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both	  to	  coordinate	  on	  this	  issue	  better.304	  The	  British	  agreed	  and	  indicated	  they	  had	  adopted	  a	  “hands-­‐off”	  policy	  and	  continued	  to	  reject	  Kurdish	  requests	  for	  aid.305	  This	  suggests	  there	  was	  general	  agreement	  among	  America’s	  allies	  that	  Iran	  should	  avoid	  helping	  the	  Kurds.	  	   The	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  learned	  in	  early-­‐August	  that	  Qasim	  had	  called	  his	  Defense	  Council	  into	  session,	  was	  drawing	  up	  plans	  for	  an	  offensive	  against	  Barzani,	  and	  had	  transferred	  the	  “bulk	  of	  the	  First	  Division”	  to	  the	  north.306	  When	  the	  offensive	  opened	  on	  August	  17	  Barzani	  initiated	  a	  sabotage	  campaign	  targeting	  crucial	  Iraqi	  infrastructure,	  like	  degassing	  stations	  and	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines.307 	  A	  major	  escalation	  in	  the	  war,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  believed	  the	  revolt	  had	  turned	  into	  a	  “full-­‐Fledged	  storm-­‐cloud	  for	  Qasim.”	  Popular	  frustration	  against	  Qasim	  and	  his	  “pampered”	  generals	  was	  growing	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  crush	  the	  Kurds	  led	  to	  questioning	  of	  their	  high	  salaries,	  subsidized	  housing,	  and	  the	  purchase	  of	  expensive	  Soviet	  military	  equipment.308 	  According	  to	  a	  CIA	  ofFicial,	  it	  was	  this	  point	  that	  the	  CIA	  made	  “limited	  progress”	  convincing	  “inFluential	  Iraqis	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  overthrow.”309	  	  	   Starting	  on	  September	  10	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  published	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt’s	  three	  part,	  award-­‐winning	  series	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  The	  articles	  portrayed	  Barzani	  as	  a	  freedom	  Fighter	  desperately	  seeking	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  protect	  his	  people	  from	  a	  war	  imposed	  by	  a	  Soviet-­‐backed	  military	  dictator.	  Dispelling	  the	  moniker	  “Red	  Mullah,”	  Schmidt	  was	  certain	  Barzani	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  but	  a	  Kurdish	  nationalist	  wishing	  Iraq	  to	  was	  the	  West’s	  “strongest	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”	  Barzani	  told	  Schmidt,	  “we	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  the	  Communist	  party	  serves	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  we	  could	  serve	  the	  United	  States.”	  He	  accused	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  of	  indifference	  and	  warned	  he	  would	  turn	  to	  the	  Soviets	  to	  protect	  his	  people	  unless	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  him	  with	  aid.	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Barzani	  argued	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  “Look	  at	  our	  strategic	  location	  on	  the	  Flank	  of	  any	  possible	  Soviet	  advance	  into	  the	  Middle	  East	  through	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  remember	  that,	  whether	  as	  guerrillas	  or	  as	  regulars,	  we	  are	  the	  best	  soldiers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”310	  	   The	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  not	  pleased	  with	  Schmidt’s	  articles	  and	  took	  steps	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  articles	  had	  generated	  considerable	  sympathy	  for	  the	  Kurds	  among	  the	  American	  public	  and	  led	  to	  pressure	  on	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  make	  known	  its	  stance.	  On	  September	  11,	  the	  State	  Department	  issued	  its	  First	  public	  position	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  The	  United	  States	  considers	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  in	  Iraq	  an	  internal	  matter	  which	  should	  be	  resolved	  internally.	  Our	  Government	  does	  not	  support	  Kurdish	  activities	  against	  the	  Government	  of	  Iraq	  in	  any	  way	  and	  hopes	  an	  early	  peaceful	  solution	  will	  be	  possible….	  We	  believe	  the	  future	  well-­‐being	  of	  Kurds	  in	  Iraq,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  Iran	  and	  Turkey,	  is	  inseparably	  tied	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  they	  reside.	  We	  know	  Turkey	  and	  Iran	  share	  this	  view,	  and	  believe	  the	  Iraq	  Government	  feels	  the	  same	  way.311This	  would	  be	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  revolt	  from	  this	  point	  onward.	  If	  the	  articles	  were	  because	  of	  Davies’	  scheme,	  it	  seemed	  to	  have	  backFired.	  The	  Qasim	  regime	  seized	  upon	  the	  articles	  as	  “proof”	  of	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  and	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  rhetorical	  tirades.312	  For	  instance,	  on	  September	  30,	  Qasim	  warned	  of	  America’s	  “criminal	  activities”	  to	  divide	  the	  Iraqi	  people.	  Faced	  with	  these	  allegations,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  requested	  the	  department	  reiterate	  its	  policy	  position	  on	  the	  revolt,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  the	  U.S.	  took	  any	  action.313	   On	  September	  20,	  a	  Kurdish	  representative	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  made	  a	  strong	  plea	  for	  U.S.	  support	  against	  Qasim.	  While	  the	  U.S.	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refused	  politely,	  the	  conversation	  provided	  considerable	  intelligence	  on	  Kurdish	  relations	  with	  other	  regional	  actors.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Kurd	  reported	  Barzani	  maintained	  “close	  and	  friendly”	  relations	  with	  the	  Shah,	  who	  allowed	  goods	  to	  Flow	  freely	  across	  the	  border;	  received	  a	  monthly	  stipend	  of	  a	  thousand	  Iraqi	  dinars	  (approximately	  $2,800	  in	  1962)	  from	  the	  Soviets;	  and	  maintained	  regular	  contact	  with	  the	  Egyptians,	  who	  were	  “friendly	  but	  unhelpful.”	  Efforts	  at	  obtaining	  assistance	  from	  Kuwait	  were	  similarly	  fruitless.	  Conversely,	  the	  Israelis	  had	  shown	  an	  interest	  in	  helping,	  but	  Barzani	  had	  refused	  because	  he	  feared	  “Israel	  might	  purposely	  reveal	  [this]	  information	  and	  [the]	  ‘movement’	  would	  be	  harmed	  throughout	  Arab	  countries.”	  The	  Kurdish	  plea,	  when	  coupled	  with	  Schmidt’s	  articles,	  suggests	  Barzani	  had	  begun	  a	  diplomatic	  offensive	  aimed	  at	  building	  international	  support	  for	  their	  cause.314	  	   Throughout	  October,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  continued	  to	  go	  poorly	  for	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  leading	  it	  to	  lash	  out	  against	  vulnerable	  Kurdish	  civilians.	  On	  the	  night	  of	  October	  10-­‐11,	  the	  Kurds	  attacked	  an	  oil	  installation,	  killing	  and	  capturing	  several	  people	  and	  in	  late-­‐October	  carried	  out	  an	  additional	  attack	  on	  IPC	  facilities,	  including	  a	  reFinery	  and	  a	  pipeline	  leading	  toward	  Baghdad.	  The	  regime	  retaliated	  by	  attacking	  Kurdish	  civilians.	  For	  instance,	  in	  mid-­‐November	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  received	  reports	  of	  women	  and	  children	  being	  used	  as	  human	  shields,	  315	  systematic	  bombing	  and	  pillaging	  of	  Kurdish	  villages,	  and	  that	  the	  regime	  had	  “deliberately	  remov[ed]	  food	  and	  clothing	  from	  Kurdistan	  in	  [an]	  attempt	  to	  starve	  [the]	  Kurds	  into	  submission.”316	  But	  instead	  of	  breaking	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  atrocities	  served	  to	  unify	  them	  against	  the	  government,	  leading	  the	  embassy	  to	  conclude	  “almost	  all	  Kurds	  in	  the	  cities	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mountains	  support	  the	  revolt.”317	  	   The	  regime’s	  inability	  to	  defeat	  the	  Kurds	  led	  it	  use	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  its	  problems.	  When	  Qasim	  accused	  the	  U.S.	  of	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  on	  November	  21,	  the	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  pressed	  Washington	  to	  respond,	  but	  the	  Kennedy	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administration	  was	  divided.318 	  For	  instance,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  initial	  guidance	  was	  to	  authorize	  the	  embassy	  to	  send	  a	  note	  of	  protest	  and	  seek	  a	  personal	  meeting	  with	  Qasim	  to	  dispel	  the	  claims.319 	  But	  two	  days	  later	  it	  backtracked,	  arguing	  that	  any	  response	  would	  dignify	  Qasim’s	  attacks.320	  Regardless,	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Chargé	  d’Affairs	  in	  Baghdad,	  Roy	  Melbourne,	  had	  already	  arranged	  a	  meeting	  with	  Foreign	  Minister	  Jawad	  where	  he	  agreed	  to	  schedule	  a	  meeting	  with	  Qasim	  for	  early	  December,	  leading	  the	  department	  to	  recommend	  that	  Melbourne	  reiterate	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy,	  tell	  Qasim	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “mystiFied”	  about	  his	  hostile	  attitude,	  and	  to	  warn	  him	  about	  false	  intelligence	  alleging	  U.S.	  hostility.	  Melbourne	  was	  also	  to	  emphasize	  America’s	  desire	  for	  friendly	  relations,	  despite	  differences	  over	  Kuwait.321	  This	  meeting	  would	  never	  take	  place.	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  1962,	  the	  Kurds	  inFlicted	  a	  series	  of	  major	  defeats,	  leaving	  the	  Iraqi	  army’s	  morale	  at	  an	  all	  time	  low.322	  Qasim’s	  micromanagement	  of	  the	  war	  and	  distrust	  of	  his	  commanders	  created	  widespread	  resentment.	  Commanders	  were	  not	  given	  a	  free	  hand,	  restrictions	  had	  been	  placed	  on	  ammunition	  for	  troops,	  and	  the	  regime’s	  insistence	  that	  there	  was	  no	  war	  meant	  troops	  had	  been	  denied	  combat	  pay.323	  Inevitably,	  these	  actions	  provided	  conspiratorial	  groups,	  like	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  opportunities	  to	  build	  support	  for	  a	  coup	  among	  the	  military’s	  ranks.	  	   In	  early	  1963,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  the	  Kurds	  agreed	  to	  work	  together	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Qasim	  regime.	  The	  Ba’th	  knew	  if	  they	  were	  to	  ever	  seize	  power	  they	  needed	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  military,	  which	  was	  increasingly	  anxious	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  and	  only	  the	  Kurds	  could	  deliver	  on	  the	  military’s	  wish.	  Meanwhile,	  Barzani	  and	  his	  people	  needed	  a	  respite	  in	  the	  spring	  months	  so	  they	  could	  re-­‐plant	  crops	  devastated	  by	  Qasim’s	  scorched	  earth	  tactics.	  This	  convergence	  of	  interests	  led	  to	  secret	  talks	  in	  early	  January,	  where	  in	  return	  for	  Kurdish	  cooperation	  in	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overthrowing	  Qasim,	  the	  Ba’th	  was	  willing	  to	  concede	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  autonomy.324	  With	  the	  Kurds	  neutralized	  and	  the	  army’s	  morale	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  low,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  a	  Ba’thist	  coup.	   On	  January	  22,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  concluded	  Qasim	  was	  “weaker	  in	  all	  sectors	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  [the]	  Shawwaf	  Revolt	  in	  1959.”	  Domestic	  discontent	  was	  widespread	  and	  “rising	  to	  the	  point	  where	  [the]	  armed	  forces	  might	  not	  [be	  able	  to]	  effectively	  intervene	  to	  save	  [Qasim].”	  Because	  of	  Qasim’s	  attitude	  toward	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  embassy	  felt	  any	  “successor	  regime	  would	  …	  be	  an	  improvement	  from	  [the]	  standpoint	  [of]	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  interests.”	  The	  embassy	  also	  complained	  once	  again	  about	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  refusal	  to	  respond	  to	  Qasim’s	  anti-­‐American	  rhetoric:	  “U.S.	  silence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  attacks	  from	  Qasim	  can	  now	  begin	  [to]	  affect	  adversely	  U.S.	  prestige	  here	  and	  in	  [the]	  Arab	  area.”	  The	  net	  result	  was	  to	  “discourage	  rather	  than	  give	  hope	  to	  [the]	  bulk	  of	  Iraqis	  who	  [were]	  fed	  up	  with	  Qasim	  but	  [felt]	  individually	  helpless	  before	  [the]	  power	  he	  wields	  through	  [the]	  control	  of	  [the]	  security	  apparatus.”	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  Melbourne	  proposed	  the	  administration	  “give	  subtle	  but	  unmistakable	  public	  indications	  that	  [they]	  consider	  Qasim	  having	  internal	  difFiculties	  and	  distorting	  facts.”	  He	  also	  suggested	  these	  statements	  be	  broadcast	  widely	  “in	  order	  to	  penetrate	  local	  censorship.”325	  But	  once	  again	  Washington	  dithered,	  leading	  Melbourne	  to	  take	  matters	  into	  his	  own	  hands	  and	  lodge	  a	  complaint	  with	  Jawad	  directly.326	  When	  word	  of	  Melbourne’s	  actions	  reached	  the	  State	  Department	  on	  January	  19	  it	  was	  passed	  immediately	  to	  McGeorge	  Bundy,	  who	  informed	  President	  Kennedy.327	  	   Melbourne’s	  initiative	  was	  signiFicant	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  underscored	  just	  how	  frustrated	  the	  embassy	  was	  with	  Washington’s	  dithering	  on	  Iraq.	  Second,	  this	  was	  the	  First	  time	  since	  the	  downgrading	  of	  relations	  in	  June	  1962	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  Iraq	  had	  crossed	  President	  Kennedy’s	  desk,	  which	  was	  unusual.	  But	  despite	  word	  of	  his	  approach	  making	  its	  way	  to	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  U.S.	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government,	  nothing	  was	  done.	  On	  February	  2,	  Melbourne	  complained	  to	  State	  again	  about	  the	  complete	  lack	  of	  guidance	  on	  this	  matter,	  pointing	  out	  Qasim	  had	  lashed	  out	  at	  the	  U.S.	  once	  again.	  “Qasim’s	  latest	  outburst	  against	  us	  …	  reinforces	  [the]	  policy	  conclusions	  and	  recommendations”	  of	  the	  previous	  analysis,	  but	  since	  Qasim	  continued	  to	  attack	  the	  U.S.	  the	  ofFicial	  “silence”	  from	  Washington	  was	  not	  a	  “desirable	  alternative.”	  Worse	  yet,	  it	  was	  becoming	  an	  embarrassment.	  For	  instance,	  a	  “usually	  cautious”	  British	  ofFicial	  questioned	  the	  silence	  by	  asking,	  “don’t	  you	  ever	  deny	  these	  things?”	  This	  led	  Melbourne	  to	  conclude,	  the	  “point	  ha[d]	  been	  reached	  where	  continued	  silence	  [was]	  simply	  incompatible	  with	  national	  dignity	  and	  damaging	  [their]	  local	  and	  regional	  interests.”328	  	   Melbourne’s	  Final	  plea	  caught	  the	  administration’s	  attention.	  On	  February	  5,	  Secretary	  Rusk	  cabled	  him	  to	  advise	  that	  the	  department	  was	  “considering	  carefully	  whether	  on	  balance	  U.S.	  interests	  would	  be	  served	  [at]	  this	  particular	  juncture	  by	  abandoning	  [its]	  policy	  of	  avoiding	  public	  reaction	  to	  Qasim’s	  charges	  while	  objecting	  through	  normal	  diplomatic	  channels.”	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  stemmed	  from	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  U.S.	  presence	  in	  Iraq	  because	  the	  CIA	  was	  engaged	  in	  “signiFicant	  intelligence	  collecting	  operations.”329	  According	  to	  a	  memo	  sent	  to	  Bundy	  on	  February	  7,	  Iraq	  had	  become	  “one	  of	  the	  more	  useful	  spots	  for	  acquiring	  technical	  information	  on	  Soviet	  military	  and	  industrial	  equipment	  and	  on	  Soviet	  methods	  of	  operations	  in	  nonaligned	  areas.”330	  On	  February	  5,	  the	  State	  Department	  sent	  Iraq’s	  embassy	  a	  strong	  note	  of	  protest,	  demanding	  Iraq	  provide	  proof	  for	  the	  basis	  of	  Qasim’s	  allegations.331	  Apparently	  when	  Qasim	  learned	  of	  the	  note,	  he	  interpreted	  the	  U.S.	  note	  “as	  [a]	  military	  threat.”332	  This	  led	  the	  department	  to	  revert	  back	  to	  its	  policy	  of	  “not	  seek[ing]	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  public	  exchange	  with	  [Qasim].”333	  Given	  his	  excessive	  response,	  the	  department	  felt	  this	  approach	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maximized	  its	  room	  to	  maneuver,	  while	  not	  jeopardizing	  the	  CIA’s	  operations.	  But	  ultimately,	  this	  entire	  debate	  was	  irrelevant.	  	   Just	  after	  midnight	  (Baghdad	  time)	  on	  February	  8,	  a	  coalition	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  military	  launched	  a	  coup	  that	  overthrew	  Qasim.	  By	  noon	  the	  next	  day,	  the	  U.S.	  military	  attaché	  reported	  the	  rebels	  had	  “Finally	  seized	  control”	  of	  the	  city,	  predicting	  “conditions[could]	  be	  chaotic	  for	  some	  time”	  as	  the	  Ba’th	  unleashed	  its	  militia	  to	  “even	  old	  scores	  with	  the	  Communists.”334	  But	  the	  CIA’s	  prediction	  was	  more	  direct:	  “a	  blood	  bath	  is	  likely.”335	   It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  CIA	  “masterminded”	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup,336	  but	  other	  sources,	  like	  Hahn,	  observe	  that	  no	  declassiFied	  U.S.	  documents	  support	  this	  claim.337	  To	  resolve	  this	  debate	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  First,	  the	  CIA	  later	  identiFied	  a	  multitude	  of	  possible	  triggers	  for	  the	  coup:	  Qasim’s	  efforts	  to	  crush	  the	  Ba’th	  Party;	  his	  pro-­‐communist	  policies;	  the	  failed	  twenty-­‐month	  old	  military	  campaign	  against	  the	  Kurds;	  his	  bitter	  feud	  with	  Egyptian	  President	  Nasser;	  and	  Iraq’s	  loss	  of	  face	  internationally,	  especially	  among	  the	  Arabs,	  due	  to	  his	  “insane	  antics”	  over	  Kuwait.338	  Second,	  U.S.	  documents	  show	  signiFicant	  confusion	  over	  which	  of	  the	  many	  groups	  plotting	  against	  the	  regime	  had	  actually	  struck	  First;	  only	  later	  did	  it	  emerge	  that	  a	  coalition	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  military	  was	  responsible.339	  It	  appears	  that	  unlike	  in	  July	  1962,	  the	  CIA’s	  source	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  not	  warned	  the	  U.S.	  about	  the	  February	  coup.	  Finally,	  while	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  plotting	  against	  Qasim,	  the	  former	  CIA	  ofFicer	  who	  claims	  to	  have	  been	  orchestrating	  a	  coup	  denied	  involvement.	  He	  explained,	  “when	  Qassem	  was	  assassinated	  in	  early	  February	  1963,	  I	  was	  still	  engaged	  in	  contacting	  people	  who	  could	  play	  a	  role	  in	  a	  coup	  attempt	  against	  [him	  and	  whatever]	  progress	  we	  had	  made	  [in	  recent	  months]	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went	  for	  naught	  when	  Qassem	  was	  assassinated.”340	  Therefore,	  the	  balance	  of	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  U.S.	  was	  actively	  plotting	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  it	  was	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  February	  1963	  coup.	  Either	  way,	  there	  is	  little	  question	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  pleasantly	  surprised	  by	  its	  outcome.	  
Conclusion
	   The	  disestablishment	  of	  the	  SCI	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  a	  clear	  mistake.	  While	  stable	  during	  1960,	  throughout	  Kennedy’s	  term	  in	  ofFice	  Iraq	  experienced	  numerous	  crises,	  all	  of	  which	  justiFied	  greater	  scrutiny.	  The	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  SCI’s	  disestablishment	  made	  clear	  that	  both	  CIA	  and	  State	  were	  concerned	  about	  Iraq	  and	  wanted	  to	  continue	  monitoring	  its	  progress.	  The	  1961	  Kuwait	  Crisis	  alone	  should	  have	  raised	  enough	  concern	  in	  the	  White	  House	  to	  validate	  the	  SCI’s	  reestablishment.	  But	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  low-­‐key	  response	  to	  the	  Kuwait	  Crisis	  reFlects	  an	  understanding	  that	  the	  Gulf	  was	  a	  British	  problem	  and	  so	  Washington	  focused	  its	  energy	  on	  containing	  Moscow’s	  aggressive	  moves	  in	  Europe,	  East	  Asia,	  and	  Latin	  America.	  	   The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  September	  1961	  also	  reFlects	  this	  reality.	  While	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  U.S.	  instigated	  the	  revolt	  in	  order	  to	  undermine	  the	  Qasim	  regime,341	  evidence	  shows	  the	  opposite.	  The	  Shelepin	  memo	  clearly	  indicates	  the	  Soviets	  intended	  to	  use	  Iraq’s	  Kurdish	  minority	  to	  distract	  the	  U.S.	  from	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis	  and	  threaten	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  Iran	  and	  Turkey,	  which	  both	  had	  large	  Kurdish	  minorities.	  In	  reality,	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  revolt	  were	  largely	  indigenous,	  relating	  mostly	  to	  Qasim’s	  failed	  land	  reforms	  and	  his	  divide-­‐and-­‐rule	  tactics.342	  ReFlecting	  America’s	  disinterest	  in	  the	  region,	  during	  the	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  revolt,	  mid-­‐level	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  Tehran	  had	  warned	  their	  superiors	  in	  Washington	  that	  the	  revolt	  could	  lend	  the	  Soviets	  an	  opportunity	  to	  bypass	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CENTO	  and	  establish	  an	  independent	  Kurdish	  republic.	  Given	  the	  Shelepin	  memo,	  it	  seems	  these	  warnings	  were	  valid,	  yet	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  still	  did	  nothing,	  underscoring	  its	  deferral	  of	  responsibility	  to	  the	  British.	   It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  expropriated	  the	  IPC’s	  concessionary	  holding	  in	  December	  1961	  that	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  began	  to	  recognize	  Iraq’s	  threat	  to	  its	  interests.	  However,	  for	  reasons	  unknown,	  these	  concerns	  were	  not	  passed	  to	  the	  White	  House	  for	  another	  two	  months.	  When	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  realized	  the	  importance	  of	  Iraq’s	  move	  in	  early	  1962,	  it	  adopted	  a	  dual	  track	  approach	  to	  Iraq	  which	  consisted	  of	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  engage	  the	  regime	  and	  convince	  it	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  friendly	  relations,	  while	  having	  the	  CIA	  seek	  ways	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  one	  more	  amicable	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  It	  seems	  evident	  that	  the	  diplomatic	  approach	  was	  given	  priority	  over	  the	  covert	  one,	  largely	  because	  the	  CIA	  lacked	  viable	  assets	  inside	  Iraq	  capable	  of	  seizing	  and	  maintaining	  power.	  It	  was	  also	  engaged	  in	  an	  operation	  to	  obtain	  valuable	  intelligence	  on	  Soviet	  weapons	  systems.	  But	  the	  diplomatic	  track	  suffered	  a	  major	  setback	  in	  June	  1962	  when	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  abruptly—though	  not	  unexpectedly—downgraded	  diplomatic	  relations.	  In	  the	  aftermath,	  Robert	  Komer’s	  embarrassment	  for	  not	  warning	  President	  Kennedy	  about	  the	  downgrade	  in	  advance	  led	  to	  a	  renewed	  interest	  in	  Iraq	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  which	  continued	  through	  to	  the	  February	  1963	  coup.	  Even	  so,	  the	  White	  House’s	  response	  to	  the	  downgrade	  underscored	  a	  communication	  breakdown	  with	  the	  State	  Department,	  which	  had	  consistently	  raised	  concerns	  about	  Iraq	  and	  had	  acted	  unilaterally	  to	  review	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  prepare	  contingencies	  should	  Qasim	  be	  overthrown.	  	   Starting	  in	  early	  1962,	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  took	  on	  greater	  importance	  due	  to	  Iran’s	  sudden	  interest	  in	  supporting	  them	  against	  Baghdad.	  While	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  sought	  to	  dissuade	  the	  Shah	  from	  helping	  Barzani,	  its	  efforts	  were	  in	  vain.	  Even	  after	  the	  downgrade,	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  advise	  Iran	  against	  assisting	  the	  Kurds.	  However,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  British	  and	  American	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad	  during	  this	  time	  conspired	  on	  ways	  to	  undermine	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  including	  sending	  Western	  journalists	  into	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  to	  interview	  Barzani.	  While	  the	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evidence	  is	  circumstantial,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt’s	  trip	  to	  Kurdistan	  in	  July	  and	  August	  and	  subsequent	  articles	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  were	  the	  product	  of	  this	  scheme.	  While	  Schmidt’s	  articles	  proved	  beneFicial	  in	  dispelling	  the	  view	  that	  Barzani	  was	  a	  communist,	  it	  also	  forced	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  revolt	  and	  issue	  a	  policy	  statement.	  Unfortunately,	  Qasim	  seized	  upon	  the	  articles	  as	  proof	  of	  a	  U.S.-­‐led	  conspiracy	  aimed	  at	  destabilizing	  Iraq	  and	  initiated	  an	  aggressive	  anti-­‐American	  campaign.	  Once	  again,	  there	  was	  a	  deep	  disconnect	  between	  U.S.	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington	  over	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  Qasim’s	  rhetoric,	  with	  the	  embassy	  advocating	  engagement,	  while	  the	  White	  House	  maintained	  ofFicial	  silence	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  Iraq	  severing	  relations	  altogether,	  which	  could	  jeopardize	  the	  CIA’s	  intelligence	  gathering.	  Understandably,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  prioritized	  obtaining	  intelligence	  over	  countering	  Qasim’s	  rhetoric,	  much	  to	  the	  embassy’s	  frustration.	   This	  chapter	  leads	  to	  a	  number	  of	  conclusions.	  The	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  low-­‐key	  approach	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  1961-­‐62	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  faced	  a	  communist	  threat.	  Given	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  more	  pressing	  Cold	  War	  challenges	  at	  the	  time	  in	  Berlin,	  Cuba,	  and	  Vietnam,	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  hardly	  took	  precedence.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  dispels	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  Furthermore,	  while	  this	  thesis	  substantiates	  claims	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  been	  plotting	  to	  overthrow	  Qasim	  during	  the	  1962-­‐63	  period,	  a	  CIA	  ofFicial	  involved	  in	  plotting	  against	  Qasim	  denied	  the	  CIA	  was	  behind	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup,	  explaining	  instead	  that	  his	  plan	  to	  overthrow	  Qasim	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  Finalized	  when	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  seized	  power.	  In	  short,	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  behind	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  remains	  open	  to	  debate.
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Chapter	  3:	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  First	  Ba’thist	  RegimeFebruary—November	  1963
	   The	  following	  chapter	  examines	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  nine-­‐month	  rule	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  after	  its	  successful	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  on	  February	  8,	  1963.	  It	  will	  elucidate	  and	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  American	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  Coming	  on	  top	  of	  America’s	  triumph	  over	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  in	  early	  1963	  was	  a	  signiFicant	  victory	  for	  America’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  containment	  strategy.	  The	  subsequent	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  June	  1963	  further	  increased	  Iraq’s	  importance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  With	  the	  U.S.	  backing	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  supporting	  the	  Kurds,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  convinced	  by	  mid-­‐1963	  that	  Iraq	  had	  become	  a	  “Cold	  War	  battleground.”343	   In	  terms	  of	  power	  structures	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Command	  (NCRC),	  which	  consisted	  of	  twelve	  Ba’thists	  and	  four	  Arab	  nationalist	  ofFicers,	  exercised	  supreme	  power.344	  Qasim’s	  former	  deputy,	  Abd	  al-­‐Salim	  Arif	  was	  named	  President	  and	  General	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr	  Prime	  Minister.	  But	  it	  was	  Ali	  Salih	  al-­‐Sa’di’s	  roles	  as	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister,	  Minister	  of	  the	  Interior,	  and	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Regional	  (Iraq)	  Ba’th	  Party	  and	  his	  control	  over	  the	  militant	  National	  Guard,	  that	  made	  him	  the	  most	  powerful.345	  Under	  Al-­‐Sa’di’s	  direction	  the	  National	  Guard	  targeted	  the	  regime’s	  opponents,	  especially	  communists.	  Claims	  vary	  on	  how	  many	  people	  were	  killed	  during	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime,	  with	  Little	  indicating	  “hundreds,”	  Tripp	  suggesting	  up	  to	  3,000,	  and	  Batutu	  between	  1,500	  and	  5,000.346	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Iraq’s	  dramatic	  rejection	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was,	  as	  Kennedy’s	  top	  Middle	  East	  advisor,	  observed,	  “almost	  certainly	  a	  net	  gain”	  for	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.347	  	   Despite	  Iraq’s	  clear	  importance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  historiography	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  single	  paragraph	  in	  both	  Hahn’s	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  Douglas	  Little’s	  examination	  of	  CIA	  covert	  action	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.348	  The	  scholarship	  on	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  is	  slightly	  more	  extensive,	  with	  Little	  arguing	  that	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  were	  mired	  by	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  and	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  effort	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire.349	  Building	  on	  Little’s	  valuable	  contribution,	  this	  chapter	  with	  show	  that	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  actually	  took	  an	  active	  interest	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  because	  of	  Iraq’s	  perceived	  importance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.
I	   The	  U.S.	  viewed	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  as	  a	  welcome	  surprise	  and	  believed	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  After	  all,	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Qasim	  regime	  was	  replaced	  by	  an	  anti-­‐communist,	  Arab	  nationalist	  Ba’thist	  regime	  which	  initiated	  a	  brutal	  campaign	  against	  Iraq’s	  communists.	  While	  the	  CIA	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  providing	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  with	  lists	  of	  communists,	  who	  were	  then	  arrested	  and	  in	  many	  case	  killed,350	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  below	  that	  the	  available	  evidence	  does	  not	  support	  this	  claim.	  Nevertheless,	  with	  Qasim	  overthrown,	  and	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  crushing	  the	  communists	  as	  the	  Soviets	  decried	  the	  coup,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  very	  satisFied	  with	  the	  coup’s	  outcome.	  	   Even	  though	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  on	  February	  8,	  1963	  came	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  the	  Kennedy	  administration,	  it	  was	  not	  unwelcome.	  While	  Komer	  made	  this	  clear	  in	  his	  message	  to	  Kennedy	  that	  day,	  there	  was	  also	  uncertainty	  about	  who	  would	  emerge	  after	  the	  inevitable	  power	  struggle	  within	  the	  new	  regime.	  Either	  way,	  Komer	  wrote,	  the	  new	  regime	  “[would]	  be	  preferable	  to	  Qasim’s”	  and	  “relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	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and	  Iraq	  [would]	  be	  considerably	  improved.”351	  A	  key	  reason	  for	  Komer’s	  sense	  of	  optimism	  was	  the	  U.S.	  view	  that	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  anti-­‐communist.	  Indeed,	  after	  seizing	  power	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  militia,	  known	  as	  the	  National	  Guard,	  went	  house-­‐to-­‐house	  rounding	  up	  hundreds—if	  not	  thousands—of	  suspected	  communists	  and	  their	  sympathizers.	  According	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad,	  on	  February	  12	  “reliable	  sources”	  indicated	  2,400	  communists	  had	  been	  rounded	  up	  and	  were	  under	  detention.	  The	  embassy	  also	  reported	  as	  many	  as	  a	  thousand	  people	  had	  been	  killed	  in	  the	  four	  days	  since	  the	  coup.352	  By	  February	  20	  the	  embassy	  reported	  14,000	  people	  were	  in	  custody,	  10,000	  of	  them	  believed	  to	  be	  communists.353	  Many	  of	  these	  people	  perished.	  	   On	  February	  13,	  William	  Brubeck,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  executive	  secretary,	  sent	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  outlining	  the	  steps	  the	  U.S.	  had	  taken	  in	  the	  days	  since	  the	  coup,	  including	  instructions	  provided	  to	  U.S.	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad.	  The	  consensus	  was	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  were	  set	  to	  improve,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  take	  a	  cautious	  approach.	  He	  warned,	  “any	  indication	  of	  interference	  in	  Iraqi	  internal	  affairs	  must	  be	  avoided”	  and	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  “avoid	  creating	  the	  impression	  that	  [it]	  sired	  the	  regime	  or	  [was]	  trying	  to	  father	  it.”	  After	  outlining	  programs	  being	  considered,	  including	  new	  arms	  and	  economic	  assistance	  policies,	  Brubeck	  indicated	  the	  department	  was	  prepared	  to	  offer	  counter-­‐insurgency	  and	  policy	  training	  to	  Iraq,	  but	  only	  if	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  was	  resolved.	  He	  concluded	  even	  though	  the	  “new	  regime	  appear[ed]	  to	  be	  a	  vast	  improvement	  over	  Qasim,	  [they	  could	  not]	  consider	  that	  it	  [would]	  be	  pro-­‐American	  or	  that	  it	  [would]	  be	  free	  from	  internal	  pressures	  of	  an	  extremist	  nature.	  It	  remain[ed]	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  cohesive	  it	  remain[ed],	  and	  how	  responsibly	  it	  act[ed].”	  This	  warning	  would	  prove	  prophetic,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  months	  before	  the	  regime	  imploded.354
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   Like	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  masterminded	  the	  1963	  coup,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  CIA	  provided	  the	  Ba’th	  with	  “lists	  of	  suspected	  Communists	  and	  other	  leftists”	  that	  were	  used	  to	  murder	  “untold	  numbers	  of	  Iraq’s	  educated	  elite.”355	  This	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  Richard	  Sale,	  an	  investigative	  journalist	  who	  interviewed	  former	  U.S.	  intelligence	  ofFicials	  “with	  intimate	  knowledge”	  of	  the	  operation.	  These	  ofFicials	  alleged	  the	  “CIA	  provided	  the	  submachine	  gun-­‐toting	  Iraqi	  National	  Guardsmen	  with	  lists	  of	  suspected	  communists	  who	  were	  then	  jailed,	  interrogated,	  and	  summarily	  gunned	  down.”356	  The	  source	  of	  this	  allegation,	  as	  Batatu	  observed,	  was	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan,	  who,	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  told	  an	  interviewer:	  Permit	  me	  to	  tell	  you	  that	  I	  know	  for	  a	  certainty	  that	  what	  happened	  in	  Iraq	  on	  8	  February	  had	  the	  support	  of	  American	  Intelligence….	  Do	  you	  know	  that	  …	  on	  8	  February	  a	  secret	  radio	  beamed	  to	  Iraq	  was	  supplying	  the	  men	  who	  pulled	  the	  coup	  with	  names	  and	  addresses	  of	  the	  Communists	  there	  so	  that	  they	  could	  be	  arrested	  and	  executed?357While	  much	  of	  the	  historiography	  has	  focused	  on	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  the	  Ba’th	  with	  lists,	  few	  have	  latched	  on	  to	  Batatu’s	  explanation	  that	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  “ample	  opportunity	  to	  gather	  such	  particulars	  in	  1958-­‐59,	  when	  the	  Communists	  came	  wholly	  into	  the	  open.”358	  The	  existence	  of	  these	  lists	  is	  supported	  by	  documents,	  but	  the	  evidence	  supports	  Batatu’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  created	  them	  on	  their	  own.	  For	  instance,	  an	  INR	  analysis	  from	  February	  15	  stated	  “[Communist]	  party	  members	  [are	  being]	  rounded	  up	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  lists	  prepared	  by	  the	  now-­‐dominant	  Ba’th	  Party.”359	  A	  separate	  INR	  analysis	  from	  February	  21	  pointed	  out	  that	  during	  the	  1958-­‐59	  period,	  the	  communists	  had	  “exposed	  virtually	  all	  its	  assets”	  whom	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  “carefully	  spotted	  and	  listed.”360	  Therefore,	  the	  existence	  of	  lists	  is	  not	  in	  dispute	  but	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  the	  Ba’th	  would	  need	  the	  CIA’s	  help,	  since	  they	  already	  knew	  who	  their	  enemies	  were.	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   In	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  viewed	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  as	  a	  major	  setback	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  regional	  policy.	  As	  the	  INR	  point	  out,	  “all	  the	  available	  evidence	  indicate[d]	  that	  the	  Soviets	  [had]	  suffered	  a	  setback	  in	  Iraq	  and	  in	  their	  general	  Middle	  Eastern	  policies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  coup.”361	  This	  was	  because	  the	  new	  regime	  seemed	  determined	  to	  crush	  the	  local	  Iraqi	  communists	  for	  good,	  which	  the	  CIA	  felt	  would	  undermine	  Moscow’s	  inFluence.362	  But	  this	  sense	  of	  optimism	  was	  not	  unanimous.	  The	  INR	  pointed	  out	  that	  because	  Iraq	  was	  so	  reliant	  on	  Soviet	  military	  assistance	  both	  sides	  had	  much	  to	  lose	  from	  a	  complete	  disengagement.363	  	   Given	  the	  potential	  for	  an	  Iraqi	  shift	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  on	  February	  18	  President	  Kennedy	  sent	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Rusk	  a	  note	  asking,	  what	  was	  being	  done.	  In	  particular,	  Kennedy	  wanted	  to	  know	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  arms	  relationship	  and	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  could	  potentially	  meet	  its	  needs.	  He	  inquired,	  “if	  the	  Russians	  cut	  off	  their	  aid	  [to	  Iraq],	  are	  we	  planning	  to	  make	  any	  offers	  to	  them?”364	  Four	  days	  later,	  Rusk	  wrote	  to	  Kennedy:We	  seek	  quiet	  friendship	  with	  Iraq,	  avoiding	  efforts	  to	  press	  favors	  on	  the	  new	  regime	  but	  standing	  ready	  to	  be	  helpful	  where	  we	  can	  without	  materially	  increasing	  the	  current	  aid	  level….	  We	  have	  privately	  assured	  the	  new	  regime	  that	  we	  won’t	  interfere	  in	  its	  internal	  affairs.Rusk	  explained	  he	  had	  instructed	  the	  U.S.	  Chargé	  d’Affairs	  in	  Baghdad,	  Roy	  Melbourne,	  to	  assure	  senior	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  of	  America’s	  friendship;	  to	  expound	  the	  administration’s	  impartiality	  in	  regional	  matters,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  Nasser;	  and	  to	  spell	  out	  America’s	  global,	  Cold	  War	  concerns	  and	  policies.365	  On	  the	  question	  of	  arms,	  Rusk	  advised	  caution	  since	  Iraq	  was	  likely	  to	  continue	  obtaining	  arms	  from	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the	  Soviet	  Bloc.366	  However,	  should	  Iraq	  turn	  to	  the	  U.S.	  for	  arms,	  Rusk	  argued	  the	  U.S.	  should	  “limit	  the	  categories	  and	  quantities”	  of	  what	  could	  be	  made	  available,	  since	  a	  major	  arms	  package	  would	  complicate	  matters	  with	  other	  regional	  states,	  like	  Israel.	  He	  also	  said	  State	  wanted	  to	  send	  a	  new	  ambassador	  to	  Iraq	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  In	  short,	  the	  State	  Department	  wanted	  to	  once	  again	  adopt	  a	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  for	  the	  time	  being.367	   In	  late	  February,	  two	  NEA	  ofFicials,	  Robert	  Strong	  and	  Andrew	  Kilgore,	  drafted	  interim	  policy	  guidelines	  for	  Iraq.	  Distributed	  on	  March	  2,	  the	  NEA	  believed	  the	  new	  regime	  would	  “emphasize	  pan-­‐Arabism	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Iraqi	  national	  interests,	  and	  [would]	  be	  neutralist,	  reformist,	  and	  socialist	  (Scandinavian	  type).”	  Even	  so,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  “live	  with”	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  regime	  and	  identiFied	  four	  challenges:	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  IPC	  conFlict,	  constitutional	  development,	  and	  economic	  development.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  instances,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  urge	  Iraq	  to	  make	  reasonable	  concessions,	  especially	  the	  dangerous	  Kurdish	  question,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below.	  On	  the	  IPC,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  “continue	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  UK,	  encourage	  U.S.	  shareholders	  to	  be	  Flexible,	  and	  “express	  pleasure”	  at	  any	  Iraqi	  initiatives	  on	  unsettled	  issues.	  The	  U.S.	  would	  encourage	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  to	  move	  toward	  constitutional	  reform	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  legislative	  democracy.	  Similarly,	  it	  would	  promote	  economic	  development	  and	  “demonstrate	  willingness	  to	  assist	  Iraq	  in	  feasible	  ways	  without	  materially	  increasing	  the	  aid	  level.”	  On	  regional	  relations,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  encourage	  friendly	  Iraqi	  relations	  with	  Turkey	  and	  Iran,	  in	  particular,	  and	  would	  not	  oppose	  federation	  with	  Egypt,	  Syria,	  or	  Kuwait,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  decision	  was	  not	  coerced.	  Finally,	  on	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict,	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  maintain	  its	  “stance	  of	  even-­‐handed	  impartiality	  between	  Israel	  and	  the	  Arab	  countries.”368	   The	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  response	  to	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  suggested	  it	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  outcome.	  Given	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	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clearly	  believed	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Qasim	  regime	  with	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  had	  altered	  Middle	  Eastern	  Cold	  War	  calculus	  in	  America’s	  favour.	  In	  short,	  after	  years	  of	  setbacks,	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  was	  a	  much-­‐needed	  American	  victory	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Even	  so,	  with	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  regime	  back	  in	  power	  in	  Baghdad,	  the	  policy	  adopted	  thereafter	  suggested	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  it	  against	  Soviet	  machinations,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  dangerous	  Kurdish	  question.
II	   Soon	  after	  the	  coup,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  became	  concerned	  about	  how	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  would	  approach	  the	  Kurdish	  question.	  OfFicially,	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  “as	  strictly	  an	  internal	  Iraqi	  matter	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  role	  for	  the	  United	  States	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly”	  and	  diplomats	  were	  advised	  to	  “limit	  themselves	  to	  expressions	  of	  hope	  that	  the	  GOI	  and	  the	  Kurds	  will	  be	  able	  to	  come	  promptly	  to	  a	  mutually	  satisfactory	  agreement”.369 	  But	  the	  U.S.	  found	  itself	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position	  when	  the	  Soviets	  initiated	  clandestine	  radio	  broadcasts	  that	  called	  on	  the	  Kurds	  to	  join	  the	  communists	  in	  resisting	  the	  new	  regime	  and	  backed	  Kurdish	  demands	  for	  “complete	  regional	  autonomy	  and	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  income	  from	  oil	  that	  [was]	  produced	  in	  Kurdish	  territory.”370	  The	  conundrum	  was	  that	  a	  “failure	  to	  Find	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  would	  beneFit	  only	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  communists,”371	  but	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  was	  determined	  to	  take	  a	  hard	  line	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  sympathized	  with	  the	  Kurds’	  nationalist	  aspirations,	  the	  Soviet	  move	  meant	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  had	  to	  increase	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.	   The	  Kurdish	  question	  was	  also	  tied	  to	  another	  important	  issue:	  Arab	  unity.	  The	  Ba’th	  wished	  to	  bring	  Iraq	  into	  a	  union	  with	  either	  Egypt	  or	  Syria,	  or	  both.	  The	  regime’s	  selection	  of	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif,	  who	  had	  long-­‐supported	  uniFication	  with	  Egypt,	  as	  Iraq’s	  new	  president	  suggested	  the	  Ba’th	  was	  seeking	  to	  placate	  pro-­‐Nasser,	  Arab	  nationalist	  elements	  in	  the	  military.	  But	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  would	  be	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a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  uniFication.	  On	  February	  22	  Iraq	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  Cairo	  for	  talks	  with	  Nasser	  on	  the	  prospect	  of	  bringing	  Iraq	  into	  union	  with	  Egypt	  and	  Syria.	  Accompanying	  the	  delegation	  to	  Cairo	  were	  two	  Kurds,	  who	  met	  with	  Nasser	  in	  private.	  The	  Kurds	  argued	  if	  Iraq	  was	  to	  join	  two	  predominantly	  ethnic	  Arab	  states,	  Egypt’s	  large	  Arab	  population	  would	  water	  down	  Iraq’s	  large	  Kurdish	  demographic.	  Given	  this,	  the	  Kurds	  argued	  for	  guarantees	  of	  autonomy	  within	  Iraq	  or	  even	  full	  independence,	  to	  which	  Nasser	  “gave	  his	  full	  backing	  to	  Kurdish	  demands	  for	  autonomy	  within	  Iraq	  and	  hoped	  that	  [a]	  rapid	  agreement	  could	  be	  reached.”	  Nasser	  was,	  however,	  pessimistic	  about	  whether	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  could	  achieve	  this—an	  assessment	  that	  would	  prove	  accurate.372	   By	  early	  March,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  became	  concerned	  that	  the	  regime’s	  initial	  efforts	  at	  resolving	  tensions	  with	  the	  Kurds	  were	  failing.	  While	  Barzani	  had	  taken	  steps	  to	  show	  good	  faith,	  like	  releasing	  around	  1,500	  Arab	  prisoners,	  the	  government	  never	  followed	  through	  with	  its	  promises	  to	  release	  Kurdish	  prisoners,	  lift	  the	  economic	  blockade,	  and	  accept	  the	  principle	  of	  Kurdish	  autonomy	  within	  a	  uniFied	  Iraq.	  This	  prompted	  the	  Kurds	  to	  approach	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  ask	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  urge	  the	  regime	  to	  settle	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  peacefully.373 	  	   When	  word	  of	  the	  approach	  reached	  Washington,	  Komer	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  warning	  of	  trouble	  in	  Iraq.Some	  of	  our	  spies	  are	  beginning	  to	  get	  quite	  worried	  about	  [the]	  risk	  that	  [the]	  Kurdish	  problem	  [might]	  Flair	  up	  to	  bedevil	  [the]	  new	  Iraqi	  regime.	  It’s	  hard	  to	  tell	  whether	  talks	  in	  Baghdad	  are	  going	  well	  or	  badly,	  but	  there	  are	  many—Turks,	  Iranians,	  Nasser,	  and	  above	  all	  Soviets—who	  might	  see	  a	  stake	  in	  egging	  Kurds	  on.	  In	  particular,	  Komer	  reported	  the	  Shah	  wanted	  to	  use	  the	  Kurds	  to	  undermine	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  which	  he	  believed	  was	  “too	  cozy	  with	  Nasser,”	  who	  he	  distrusted.	  Komer	  indicated	  State	  had	  warned	  him	  to	  “keep	  [his]	  hands	  off”	  Iraq	  but	  acknowledged	  the	  Shah	  was	  unlikely	  to	  “take	  [their]	  advice.”	  SigniFicantly,	  Komer	  had	  directed	  the	  CIA	  to	  prepare	  contingency	  plans	  for	  a	  renewed	  Kurdish	  War	  and	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asked	  that	  Bundy	  support	  these	  measures	  at	  the	  next	  Special	  Group	  (CI)	  meeting,	  held	  in	  a	  few	  days’	  time.	  Ultimately,	  Komer	  recommended	  the	  U.S.	  engage	  in	  preventative	  diplomacy	  to	  stave	  off	  a	  renewed	  conFlict,	  which	  he	  felt	  would	  threaten	  the	  regime’s	  survival.	  In	  addition,	  he	  recommended	  the	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  raise	  these	  concerns	  with	  the	  regime.374	  While	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Special	  Group	  (CI)’s	  discussion	  remain	  classiFied,	  Komer’s	  memo	  suggests	  the	  U.S.	  was	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  Kurdish	  issue	  insofar	  as	  it	  threatened	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime’s	  survival.375	   On	  March	  3,	  Melbourne	  met	  with	  Iraq’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  Talib	  Shabib	  to	  raise	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  concerns	  about	  the	  Kurds.	  Shabib	  said	  his	  government	  was	  “prepared	  to	  concede”	  cultural	  autonomy	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  was	  unwilling	  to	  go	  any	  further.	  Should	  Fighting	  resume,	  Shabib	  said,	  the	  regime	  planned	  to	  “conduct	  [a]	  campaign	  on	  different	  lines	  from	  Qasim,”	  suggesting	  it	  would	  co-­‐opt	  anti-­‐Barzani	  Kurds	  and	  Arab	  tribes	  from	  the	  north	  to	  turn	  the	  Kurds’	  guerrilla	  tactics	  against	  them.	  Melbourne	  said	  he	  was	  skeptical	  a	  military	  solution	  was	  possible,	  pointing	  out	  Kurdish	  “guerrillas	  were	  led	  by	  competent,	  former	  army	  ofFicers	  fully	  trained	  in	  tactics.”	  The	  cavalier	  nature	  of	  Shabib’s	  comments	  reinforced	  Melbourne’s	  concern	  of	  a	  resumption	  of	  hostilities,	  leading	  him	  to	  warn	  Washington	  that	  war	  was	  “likely	  to	  erupt	  at	  any	  time.”376	  	   Melbourne’s	  warning	  immediately	  caught	  the	  CIA’s	  attention.	  On	  March	  5,	  Ray	  Cline,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  Directorate	  of	  Intelligence,	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  warning	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  renewed	  Kurdish	  War.	  He	  argued,	  “[the]	  emergence	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Communist	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  [had]	  removed	  the	  main	  inhibition	  on	  Soviet	  support	  of	  Kurdish	  dissidence,	  and	  this	  problem	  may	  have	  important	  implications	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  Iraq.”	  He	  identiFied	  a	  number	  of	  important	  conclusions.	  First,	  should	  Fighting	  resume,	  the	  new	  regime	  would	  be	  no	  more	  effective	  at	  defeating	  the	  Kurds	  than	  Qasim.	  Second,	  despite	  his	  long	  exile	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Barzani	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  but	  would	  accept	  Soviet	  support	  if	  scorned	  by	  the	  West.	  Third,	  due	  to	  Iran	  and	  Turkey’s	  large	  Kurdish	  minorities,	  both	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	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spread	  of	  Kurdish	  nationalism	  across	  their	  borders,	  especially	  if	  Barzani	  adopted	  a	  pro-­‐Soviet	  attitude.	  Finally,	  Barzani’s	  military	  success	  had	  made	  him	  overconFident,	  which	  explained	  why	  he	  was	  demanding	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  than	  the	  regime	  was	  prepared	  to	  concede.	  Cline	  concluded	  that	  if	  the	  regime	  did	  not	  make	  viable	  concessions	  to	  the	  Kurds	  soon,	  a	  resumption	  of	  Fighting	  was	  inevitable.377	  	   Clearly	  by	  early-­‐March	  1963,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  concerned	  about	  resumption	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  The	  consensus	  was	  that	  war	  would	  only	  serve	  to	  advance	  Moscow’s	  interests	  and	  could	  threaten	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  Given	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  urged	  Iraq	  to	  seek	  accommodation	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  
III	   In	  April	  1963,	  a	  major	  shift	  occurred	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  prompted	  by	  Iraq’s	  request	  to	  purchase	  American	  arms.	  According	  to	  Melbourne,	  the	  Qasim	  regime	  had	  ordered	  a	  dozen	  helicopters	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	  the	  “present	  Soviet	  attitude	  on	  [the]	  Kurdish	  question”	  had	  led	  Iraq	  to	  conclude	  it	  “had	  no	  expectation	  of	  obtaining	  them.”	  As	  such,	  Shabib	  inquired	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  had	  “comparable	  helicopters	  available	  for	  sale	  to	  Iraq	  within	  reasonable	  time	  limits	  for	  delivery.”378	  Soon	  thereafter,	  Iraqi	  diplomats	  in	  Washington	  queried	  the	  State	  Department	  about	  purchasing	  forty	  light	  tanks	  and	  twelve	  tank	  transporters.379	  Understandably,	  Iraq’s	  request	  seemed	  to	  convince	  U.S.	  policymakers	  that	  Iraq	  had	  indeed	  switched	  camps	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   The	  request	  prompted	  an	  interagency	  review	  of	  the	  U.S.	  arms	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  There	  was	  a	  clear	  consensus	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government	  that	  this	  was	  a	  positive	  development	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  but	  the	  heightened	  possibility	  of	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  complicated	  matters.	  The	  JSC	  was	  very	  optimistic	  about	  Iraq’s	  request	  for	  arms,	  circulating	  a	  position	  paper	  on	  March	  9.	  It	  believed	  the	  new,	  anti-­‐communist	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  provided	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“opportunities	  favorable	  to	  the	  Free	  World,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  increase	  its	  inFluence	  in	  the	  area”	  and	  advised	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  should	  focus	  on	  “solidifying	  the	  position	  of	  the	  new	  Government	  of	  Iraq,	  strengthening	  its	  anticommunist	  posture	  and	  its	  conFidence	  to	  deal	  with	  communist	  threats	  or	  blandishments,	  and	  fostering	  favorable	  relations	  between	  Iraq	  and	  the	  U.S.	  allies	  in	  the	  area.”	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  JCS	  believed	  that	  arms	  sales	  could	  help	  shift	  Iraq’s	  military-­‐supply	  relationship	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  and	  toward	  Western	  suppliers	  and	  recommended	  any	  military	  assistance	  be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  be	  balanced	  against	  America’s	  other	  commitments	  in	  the	  region	  (i.e.,	  Israel,	  Iran,	  Jordan,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  UK,	  and	  Egypt).380	  The	  State	  Department	  agreed	  with	  these	  recommendations	  and	  sent	  a	  more	  detailed	  draft	  of	  the	  proposal	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  the	  helicopter	  sales,	  the	  department	  did	  not	  raise	  objections	  and	  identiFied	  two	  models	  the	  embassy	  could	  propose,	  but	  the	  tank	  sales	  were	  much	  more	  problematic	  due	  to	  concerns	  that	  Iraq	  would	  use	  them	  against	  either	  the	  Kurds	  or	  Israel.	  This	  created	  a	  conundrum.	  Refusing	  the	  sale	  could	  affect	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  adversely	  and	  potentially	  force	  Iraq	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  the	  Soviets	  for	  arms.	  As	  such,	  the	  department	  asked	  the	  embassy	  to	  consider	  these	  problems	  before	  it	  would	  approve	  the	  sale.381	  At	  the	  end	  of	  March,	  Komer	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo,	  where	  he	  observed	  State	  was	  willing	  to	  sell	  both	  the	  helicopters	  and	  tanks,	  but	  had	  reservations.	  He	  the	  asked,	  “are	  we	  being	  sufFiciently	  imaginative	  to	  hit	  this	  target	  of	  opportunity?”382	  Clearly,	  Iraq’s	  request	  had	  elicited	  an	  enthusiastic	  response	  from	  U.S.	  policymakers,	  although	  it	  also	  heightened	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  	   On	  April	  2,	  after	  weeks	  of	  discussion,	  Hal	  Saunders,	  a	  Middle	  East	  analyst	  on	  the	  NSC	  staff,	  informed	  Bundy	  that	  State	  had	  agreed	  to	  sell	  twelve	  helicopters	  to	  Iraq	  for	  between	  $4-­‐15	  million.	  Saunders	  recommended	  taking	  a	  cautious	  approach	  toward	  Iraq,	  consisting	  of	  “being	  as	  helpful	  as	  possible	  [to	  Iraq]	  without	  getting	  into	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an	  unwarranted	  big	  new	  aid	  program.”	  He	  noted	  Iraq’s	  requests	  were	  vague	  and	  that	  they	  had	  not	  responded	  to	  the	  administration’s	  initial	  proposal.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  saw	  “no	  serious	  problem	  in	  selling	  light	  tanks,	  small	  arms	  and	  [ammunition],	  [communication]	  equipment,	  or	  even	  transport	  aircraft	  if	  requested.”383	  With	  this	  endorsement,	  the	  U.S.	  agreed	  “in	  principle”	  to	  sell	  the	  tanks	  to	  Iraq,	  which	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  conveyed	  on	  April	  12.	  From	  the	  guidance	  provided	  to	  the	  embassy,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  NSC	  had	  dismissed	  the	  argument	  that	  Iraq	  posed	  a	  military	  threat	  to	  Israel,	  Turkey,	  and	  Iran.	  The	  Kennedy	  administration	  argued	  the	  tanks	  fulFilled	  “legitimate	  Iraqi	  defensive	  and	  internal	  security	  needs,”	  presented	  the	  West	  to	  Iraq	  as	  a	  viable	  alternative	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  arms,	  and	  suggested	  Iraq	  lacked—and	  would	  not	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  obtain—the	  logistical	  capability	  to	  threaten	  Turkey	  or	  Iran.384	  	   The	  reasons	  for	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  approval	  of	  the	  weapons	  sale	  to	  Iraq	  were	  driven	  by	  Cold	  War	  considerations.	  While	  there	  were	  reasons	  for	  opposing	  the	  sale,	  like	  the	  potential	  threat	  Iraq	  posed	  to	  Israel,	  Iran,	  and	  Turkey,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Kurds,	  it	  seems	  these	  concerns	  were	  trumped	  by	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  desire	  to	  draw	  Iraq	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets.	  Therefore,	  the	  force	  driving	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Ba’thist	  Iraq	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  regional	  considerations	  but	  rather	  concerns	  about	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  threat	  it	  posed	  to	  the	  region.	  
IV	  	   Throughout	  April	  and	  May,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  desire	  to	  wean	  Iraq	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  through	  arms	  sales	  led	  to	  heightened	  concern	  about	  a	  resumption	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  This	  led	  the	  U.S.	  to	  press	  its	  regional	  allies,	  Turkey	  and	  Iran,	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  conFlict	  should	  Fighting	  resume,	  while	  urging	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  to	  seek	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  Indeed,	  as	  Saunders	  argued,	  “[Iraq’s]	  interests	  [would]	  be	  better	  served	  if	  the	  government	  [could]	  control	  the	  Kurds	  than	  if	  the	  Kurdish	  rebellion	  [was]	  successful	  enough	  to	  invite	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Soviet	  or	  Iranian	  meddling.”385	  The	  fact	  is,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  saw	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  arms	  sale	  and	  could	  threaten	  the	  survivability	  of	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  Consequently,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  had	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  prevent	  war.	  	   On	  April	  2,	  the	  State	  Department	  cabled	  its	  embassies	  in	  Ankara	  and	  Tehran	  to	  raise	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  with	  both	  governments.	  The	  cable	  argued	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  was	  not	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  either	  state,	  could	  only	  beneFit	  communists	  or	  pro-­‐Nasser	  forces,	  and	  increased	  the	  possibility	  of	  “parallel	  uprisings”	  in	  Turkey	  and	  Iran,	  which	  the	  Soviets	  would	  be	  eager	  to	  exploit.	  The	  department	  believed	  Iranian,	  Turkish,	  and	  American	  interests	  “would	  be	  best	  served	  by	  [an]	  equitable	  solution	  [to	  the]	  Kurdish	  problem	  …	  in	  [the]	  context	  of	  [the]	  previously-­‐agreed	  local	  government	  [autonomy]	  formula.”	  However,	  should	  Fighting	  resume	  the	  U.S.	  felt	  obliged	  to	  warn	  Iran	  and	  Turkey	  to	  “stay	  out	  of	  what	  could	  become	  a	  political	  and	  military	  morass	  for	  a	  foreign	  state.”	  It	  is	  clear	  State	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  Iranian	  meddling,	  since	  Tehran	  might	  be	  “tempted	  [to]	  support	  [the]	  Kurdish	  rebels	  in	  [an]	  effort	  [to]	  divert	  hostile	  Kurdish	  action	  from	  its	  own	  territory.”	  This	  temptation,	  the	  department	  argued,	  would	  be	  “short-­‐sighted	  and	  inimical	  to	  Iran’s	  overall	  security	  interests.”386	  	   In	  early	  May,	  the	  U.S.	  began	  to	  detect	  further	  preparations	  for	  war,	  leading	  the	  department	  to	  instruct	  its	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  convey	  to	  the	  regime	  America’s	  “serious	  apprehensions	  at	  [the]	  trend	  of	  events”	  and	  to	  urge	  it	  to	  present	  the	  Kurds	  with	  “serious	  counter-­‐proposals	  …	  [to]	  lay	  [the]	  groundwork	  for	  real	  negotiations.”	  The	  embassy	  was	  also	  instructed	  to	  say	  while	  the	  U.S.	  saw	  the	  conFlict	  as	  a	  strictly	  internal	  matter,	  “in	  the	  spirit	  of	  full	  frankness	  and	  cordiality	  …	  we	  have	  no	  alternative	  but	  to	  urge	  avoidance	  …	  of	  violence	  from	  which	  only	  GOI’s	  sworn	  enemies,	  the	  Communists,	  could	  proFit.”387	  This	  message	  was	  conveyed	  to	  the	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foreign	  minister	  on	  May	  4	  and	  he	  was	  also	  told	  the	  government	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  preparing	  a	  counter-­‐proposal,	  but	  this	  seemed	  unlikely.388 	  	   On	  May	  22,	  Melbourne	  met	  with	  Iraqi	  Prime	  Minister	  Ahmed	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr,	  a	  Ba’thist	  military	  ofFicer	  who	  had	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  February	  coup,	  to	  urge	  the	  regime	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  It	  was	  clear	  the	  regime	  showed	  no	  interest	  in	  doing	  so,	  with	  al-­‐Bakr	  dismissing	  the	  Kurdish	  proposals	  as	  “so	  outlandish	  that	  [he]	  really	  could	  not	  use	  them	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  discussion.”	  But	  to	  Melbourne,	  al-­‐Bakr's	  position	  was	  just	  as	  rigid	  as	  the	  Kurds,	  with	  him	  insisting	  the	  Kurds	  could	  get	  “administrative	  decentralization”	  but	  not	  “political	  autonomy.”	  Going	  further,	  al-­‐Bakr	  said	  he	  “could	  not	  permit	  this	  Kurdish	  challenge	  to	  Iraqi	  sovereignty	  to	  continue	  much	  longer.”	  To	  this	  Melbourne	  reported,	  “[the]	  Kurds	  had	  told	  embassy	  ofFicers	  and	  others	  [that]	  their	  proposals	  [were]	  fully	  negotiable”	  and	  merely	  the	  basis	  for	  negotiations,	  whereupon	  both	  sides	  would	  give	  and	  take	  until	  an	  agreeable	  compromise	  could	  be	  made.	  This	  argument	  had	  no	  effect,	  with	  al-­‐Bakr	  offering	  “no	  assurance	  or	  indication	  that	  [the	  Iraqi	  government]	  would	  …	  resort	  to	  force	  against	  [the]	  Kurds.”389	  Despite	  al-­‐Bakr’s	  ambiguity,	  his	  hardline	  stance	  on	  negotiations	  suggested	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  was	  likely.	  	   Melbourne’s	  conversation	  with	  al-­‐Bakr	  prompted	  the	  INR	  to	  circulate	  a	  memo	  on	  May	  27	  highlighting	  the	  department’s	  concern	  about	  a	  resumption	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  The	  report	  differentiated	  between	  the	  regime,	  which	  it	  blamed	  for	  the	  impasse,	  and	  the	  military,	  which	  was	  “not	  anxious	  to	  renew	  the	  Fighting”	  and	  appeared	  frustrated	  with	  the	  regime’s	  interference	  in	  military	  matters.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  rejected	  the	  army’s	  plan	  of	  operations	  that	  called	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  “least	  possible	  force”	  and	  replaced	  it	  with,	  what	  the	  INR	  described	  as,	  a	  “plan	  of	  virtual	  extermination.”	  The	  INR	  believed	  a	  renewal	  of	  Fighting	  would	  take	  on	  Cold	  War	  dimensions,	  since	  it	  would	  weaken	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  regime	  and	  could	  lead	  Moscow	  to	  offer	  the	  Kurds	  Financial	  aid	  and	  clandestine	  arms—though	  this	  would	  be	  challenging	  given	  the	  physical	  difFiculties	  of	  inFiltrating	  arms	  into	  northern	  Iraq	  via	  Turkey	  or	  Iran.	  However,	  the	  INR	  emphasized,	  the	  Kurdish	  leadership	  viewed	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Moscow	  with	  “suspicion	  and	  bitterness”	  and	  would	  only	  accept	  Soviet	  arms	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  The	  INR	  recommended	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  mediated	  by	  an	  impartial,	  non-­‐Arab,	  Muslim	  mediator,	  like	  the	  International	  Red	  Crescent.	  But	  should	  Fighting	  break	  out,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  caught	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position	  of	  having	  to	  balance	  its	  desire	  for	  a	  peaceful	  settlement	  and	  its	  need	  to	  support	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.390	  	   In	  early	  June	  1963,	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  Kurds	  broke	  into	  the	  open,	  when	  the	  regime	  arrested	  members	  of	  the	  Kurds’	  negotiating	  delegation;391	  declared	  martial	  law	  throughout	  the	  north;	  and	  issued	  an	  ultimatum	  for	  the	  Kurds	  to	  lay	  down	  their	  arms	  within	  24	  hours	  and	  declare	  allegiance	  to	  the	  government	  or	  “suffer	  [the]	  consequences.”392	  By	  this	  point,	  Iraq	  had	  amassed	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  its	  army—roughly	  45,000	  troops—in	  Kurdistan.393	  Fearing	  war,	  Melbourne	  cabled	  Washington	  to	  warn	  that	  war	  was	  inevitable	  and	  that	  the	  regime	  had	  deluded	  itself	  into	  thinking	  it	  would	  score	  an	  easy	  victory.394	  	   In	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  Iraq’s	  offensive	  against	  the	  Kurds	  on	  June	  10,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  took	  active	  steps	  to	  stave	  off	  war,	  including	  consulting	  with	  and	  urging	  restraint	  on	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  Fearing	  the	  worst,	  the	  U.S.	  also	  urged	  its	  allies,	  Turkey	  and	  Iran,	  to	  avoid	  involvement	  should	  war	  resume.	  Unfortunately,	  despite	  American	  concerns,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  determined	  to	  crush	  the	  Kurds	  militarily.	  
V	   When	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  attacked	  the	  Kurds	  in	  June	  1963,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  concern	  that	  the	  war	  would	  become	  a	  vehicle	  for	  Soviet	  subversion	  proved	  accurate.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  war	  reopened,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  went	  on	  a	  diplomatic	  offensive,	  condemning	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime,	  supporting	  the	  Kurdish	  demands	  for	  autonomy,	  and	  urging	  one	  of	  its	  satellites—Outer	  Mongolia—to	  level	  charges	  of	  genocide	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.	  For	  its	  part,	  the	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U.S.	  tried	  to	  maintain	  the	  middle	  ground,	  urging	  the	  Ba’th	  to	  seek	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  while	  also	  offering	  limited	  military	  aid.	  However,	  as	  Soviet	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  increased,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  forced	  to	  do	  the	  same	  for	  Iraq.	  In	  short,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  new	  front	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   On	  June	  15,	  an	  ofFicial	  Soviet	  news	  agency,	  TASS,	  accused	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  of	  “Hitlerite”	  treachery,	  using	  “fascist	  SS	  detachments,”	  and	  of	  genocide.	  The	  statement	  asserted	  Iraq’s	  Kurdish	  policy	  was	  in	  direct	  violation	  of	  the	  UN	  charter	  and	  should	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  to	  all	  nations.	  Then,	  on	  June	  20,	  another	  ofFicial	  Soviet	  newspaper,	  Pravda,	  repeated	  the	  charges	  but	  included	  a	  threat	  to	  suspend	  Soviet	  aid	  to	  Iraq.	  These	  two	  articles	  were	  the	  opening	  salvo	  of	  an	  intensive	  Soviet	  diplomatic	  and	  propaganda	  campaign	  against	  Iraq	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  Iraqi-­‐Kurdish	  conFlict	  take	  on	  relevance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.395	   Within	  days	  of	  the	  reopening	  of	  the	  war,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  received	  numerous	  reports	  of	  Iraqi	  atrocities	  against	  the	  Kurds.	  On	  June	  19,	  the	  embassy	  cabled	  Washington	  to	  report	  massacres	  against	  civilians	  trying	  to	  Flee	  buildings	  set	  on	  Fire	  by	  Iraqi	  troops,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  women	  and	  children	  as	  human	  shields.396 	  Faced	  with	  these	  ghastly	  accounts,	  Bundy	  convened	  the	  Special	  Group	  (CI)	  on	  June	  20.	  Though	  accounts	  of	  the	  meeting	  remain	  classiFied,	  details	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  alternative	  sources.	  For	  instance,	  on	  June	  19	  Komer	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  recommending	  taking	  “a	  strong	  line”	  at	  the	  meeting	  and	  outlining	  some	  key	  points	  to	  address.	  The	  memo	  indicated	  Kennedy	  had	  taken	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  conFlict,	  asking	  to	  what	  extent	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  Iraq	  was	  “motivated	  by	  his	  reading	  [of]	  how	  [the]	  Soviets	  have	  come	  out	  directly	  in	  support	  of	  [the]	  Kurds;	  ergo,	  we	  should	  support	  the	  Iraqis.”	  This	  logic	  suggests	  Kennedy	  perceived	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  which	  Komer	  said	  made	  “good	  sense	  on	  many	  counts.”	  However,	  ofFicials	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  were	  very	  much	  against	  this	  analysis,	  particularly	  the	  head	  of	  the	  NEA,	  Phillips	  Talbot,	  who	  Komer	  and	  the	  CIA	  felt	  was	  “too	  wafFly.”397	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Komer	  also	  raised	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  assistance	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  arguing	  “[it	  did	  not]	  do	  much	  good	  for	  [the	  U.S.]	  to	  help	  arm	  [the]	  Iraqis	  and	  for	  [the]	  Turks	  to	  close	  the	  border	  if	  [the]	  Iranians	  [were]	  simultaneously	  peddling	  stuff	  to	  [the]	  Kurds.	  So	  [an]	  essential	  part	  of	  any	  policy	  must	  be	  to	  beat	  up	  the	  Shah	  on	  this	  score.”398	  Another	  memo,	  sent	  to	  Kennedy	  on	  June	  21,	  suggested	  the	  group	  decided	  to	  increase	  military	  and	  economic	  assistance	  to	  Iraq.399	  A	  third	  memo,	  sent	  by	  Brubeck	  to	  Bundy,	  suggested	  this	  included	  increasing	  funds	  from	  $800,000	  to	  a	  million	  for	  a	  participant	  training	  program	  for	  Iraqi	  ofFicials,	  technicians,	  and	  educators	  in	  their	  Fields	  of	  specialization	  in	  America;	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  Title	  IV	  program	  for	  food	  assistance;	  $10,000	  in	  Flood	  assistance;	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  40	  light	  tanks,	  12	  tanks	  transporters,	  500	  heavy	  trucks,	  and	  15	  large	  helicopters,	  though	  details	  of	  these	  sales	  were	  under	  negotiation.400	  Clearly,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  had	  led	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  approve	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  assistance	  for	  Iraq.	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  split	  over	  the	  Kurds	  provided	  the	  U.S.	  with	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  obtain	  intelligence	  on	  Soviet	  military	  hardware	  (SOV-­‐MAT)	  that	  Iraq	  had	  received	  under	  Qasim.401	  On	  June	  27,	  an	  ofFicial	  identiFied	  only	  as	  “TAP”—believed	  to	  be	  Thomas	  A.	  Parrott,	  a	  high-­‐level	  CIA	  ofFicial	  on	  assignment	  to	  the	  White	  House	  at	  the	  time402—drafted	  a	  cryptic,	  top-­‐secret	  memo	  to	  an	  undisclosed	  individual	  stating:	  At	  Iraqi	  request,	  the	  proposal	  for	  the	  big	  item	  of	  equipment	  has	  been	  suspended	  indeFinitely.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  are	  worried	  about	  the	  security	  implications	  for	  themselves	  at	  this	  particular	  time.Hopefully	  the	  air	  delivery	  will	  go	  off	  the	  First	  week	  of	  July.	  This	  includes	  tank	  batteries,	  rockets,	  revolvers,	  ammunition,	  and	  the	  special	  item.403
 115
398 Ibid., p.1. 
399 White House, Memorandum, Keysen to the President, “United States Military and Economic Assistance 
to Iraq,” June 21, 1963 (KPL/NSF/Countries/Box117a/Iraq.6/63-8/63/doc.14), p.1. 
400 DoS, Memorandum, Brubeck to Bundy, “United States Military and Economic Assistance to Iraq,” June 
19, 1963 (KPL/NSF/Countries/Box117a/Iraq.6/63-8/63/doc.22), pp.1-2. 
401 Department of Defense, Memorandum, Sloan to Komer, “Aid to Iraq,” July 10, 1963 (JKF/NSF/RKF/
Box426/Iraq-1961-63), pp.1-2. 
402 Email correspondence from Kennedy Library, November 21, 2011.
403 White House, Memorandum, TAP to unknown, “Iraq,” June 27, 1963 (KPL/NSF/Countries/Box117a/
Iraq.6/63-8/63/doc.19), p.1. 
This	  suggests	  the	  Iraqis	  were	  fearful	  the	  Soviets	  would	  discover	  their	  provision	  of	  SOV-­‐MAT	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  lead	  to	  further	  aggression.	  Further	  details	  of	  this	  operation	  are	  revealed	  in	  a	  cable	  sent	  in	  late-­‐July	  from	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq,	  Robert	  Strong,	  to	  State,	  where	  he	  argued	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  “unlikely	  [to]	  make	  deliveries	  [of	  SOV-­‐MAT]	  at	  any	  price	  if	  there	  [was	  a]	  real	  risk	  [that	  the]	  Soviets	  will	  learn	  of	  them.”	  He	  indicated	  the	  Iraqis	  were	  aware	  of	  their	  leverage	  and	  were	  determined	  to	  extract	  a	  high	  price.	  Given	  this,	  he	  advised	  the	  U.S.	  “exert	  every	  precaution	  to	  avoid	  showing	  overeagerness”	  and	  use	  “extreme	  care	  to	  avoid	  jeopardizing	  our	  larger	  interests.”	  He	  also	  recommended	  he	  be	  put	  in	  charge	  of	  coordinating	  the	  operation	  to	  attain	  these	  sensitive	  materials	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  duplication	  and	  prevent	  misunderstandings.404	  These	  exchanges	  make	  clear	  the	  U.S.	  was	  trying	  to	  capitalize	  on	  Iraq’s	  frustration	  with	  the	  Soviets	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  intelligence	  on	  Soviet	  military	  capabilities,	  which	  could	  allow	  it	  to	  establish	  benchmarks	  on	  Russia’s	  technological	  advancement.	  Despite	  Iraq’s	  reticence,	  the	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relationship	  suddenly	  was	  becoming	  more	  important	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  U.S.	  policymakers.	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  June,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  had	  concluded	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  “abandoned	  any	  pretense	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  Iraqi	  internal	  affairs”	  and	  was	  intent	  to	  “make	  Iraq	  [an]	  open	  Cold	  War	  battleground.”405	  Beyond	  its	  pro-­‐Kurdish	  propaganda	  and	  the	  small	  monthly	  stipend	  to	  Barzani,	  in	  early	  July	  the	  CIA	  learned	  the	  Soviets	  had	  suspended	  military	  shipments	  to	  Iraq	  at	  the	  end	  of	  May.406	  On	  June	  27	  Melbourne	  warned	  Washington:If	  [the]	  Soviet	  Union	  can	  help	  in	  [the]	  overthrow	  [of	  the	  government],	  even	  for	  another	  Nationalist	  based	  regime,	  it	  [is]	  hoping	  for	  some	  subsequent	  environment	  wherein	  it	  can	  gain	  tolerance	  for	  local	  Communists	  and	  rebuild	  its	  inFluence.Given	  the	  likelihood	  that	  any	  successor	  regime	  would	  come	  from	  the	  military,	  he	  recommended	  the	  embassy	  increase	  its	  contacts	  with	  the	  ofFicers	  through	  the	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“supply	  of	  equipment	  and	  services	  of	  [a]	  type	  which	  would	  not	  upset	  [the]	  middle	  east	  power	  balance.”407	  In	  short,	  the	  U.S.	  saw	  the	  building	  of	  an	  arms-­‐supply	  relationship	  with	  Baghdad	  as	  a	  viable	  means	  of	  securing	  its	  long-­‐term	  inFluence	  with	  Iraq.	   The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  diplomatic	  offensive	  against	  Iraq	  peaked	  in	  early	  July	  when	  it	  convinced	  its	  ally,	  Outer	  Mongolia,	  to	  submit	  an	  item	  to	  the	  agenda	  for	  the	  upcoming	  General	  Assembly	  charging	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  with	  conducting	  a	  genocidal	  war	  against	  the	  Kurds.408	  The	  Mongolian	  claim	  caused	  quite	  a	  stir,	  but	  this	  was	  just	  the	  beginning.	  On	  July	  9,	  Moscow	  issued	  a	  statement	  accusing	  “CENTO	  members	  and	  Syria”	  of	  undertaking	  “joint	  measures”	  against	  the	  Kurds.	  According	  to	  the	  CIA,	  this	  statement	  was	  “designed	  to	  refute	  Baghdad’s	  claim	  that	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  is	  strictly	  an	  internal	  affair	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  basis	  for	  an	  appeal	  for	  UN	  or	  other	  international	  action	  in	  the	  matter.”	  In	  short,	  the	  Soviets	  were	  trying	  to	  internationalize	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  and	  draw	  it	  deeper	  into	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  next	  day,	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  at	  the	  UN	  announced	  it	  was	  considering	  taking	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Security	  Council.409 	  Then,	  going	  further,	  the	  Soviets	  proposed	  inscribing	  charges	  of	  genocide	  against	  Iraq	  at	  the	  UN’s	  Economic-­‐Social	  (ECOSOC)	  committee.410	  Finally,	  on	  July	  11	  the	  Soviets	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  President	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  “serious	  situation	  resulting	  from	  events	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  and	  from	  interference	  of	  states	  in	  military	  operations	  undertaken	  against	  [the]	  Kurdish	  people	  by	  Iraqi	  authorities.”411	  For	  the	  First	  time,	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Kurds	  had	  made	  its	  way	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  international	  diplomacy,	  but	  problematically,	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  UN’s	  most	  powerful	  member,	  was	  not	  on	  their	  side.	   The	  genocide	  charge	  presented	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  with	  a	  particularly	  difFicult	  problem.	  The	  fact	  was	  that	  an	  ethnically	  Arab	  government	  was	  engaging	  in	  a	  ruthless	  military	  campaign	  against	  a	  distinct	  ethnic	  minority,	  targeting	  civilians,	  and	  committing	  atrocities	  with	  some	  regularity.	  By	  deFinition,	  Iraq	  was	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committing	  genocide.412	  The	  problem,	  however,	  was	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  Western	  allies	  were	  hesitant	  to	  support	  the	  Soviet	  position.413	  The	  Kennedy	  administration	  saw	  the	  genocide	  charge	  as	  a	  Soviet	  maneuver	  aimed	  at	  punishing	  the	  Ba’th	  for	  its	  repression	  against	  the	  communists:[The]	  Mongolian	  genocide	  charge	  at	  United	  Nations	  presents	  [a]	  difFicult	  problem	  for	  [the]	  USG.	  We	  very	  rarely	  oppose	  inscription	  of	  items,	  even	  when	  we	  [are]	  against	  [its]	  substance….	  However,	  in	  view	  of	  [the]	  special	  circumstances	  surrounding	  [the]	  Kurdish	  issue,	  including	  tendentious	  nature	  of	  [the]	  wording	  of	  [the]	  item	  and	  [the]	  fact	  that	  it	  represents	  a	  Soviet	  effort	  to	  penalize	  a	  country	  for	  adopting	  a	  less	  sympathetic	  policy	  toward	  [the]	  Soviet	  Bloc,	  Department	  is	  considering	  opposing	  inscription.414This	  was	  pure	  Cold	  War	  politics.	  When	  faced	  with	  an	  aggressive	  Soviet	  diplomatic	  offensive,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  forced	  to	  back	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  regardless	  of	  its	  atrocious	  tactics	  against	  the	  Kurds.	   It	  seems	  that	  Moscow’s	  diplomatic	  maneuvers	  at	  the	  UN	  were	  only	  part	  of	  its	  strategy	  for	  Iraq.	  In	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  July	  3,	  pro-­‐communist	  elements	  attempted	  a	  coup,	  seizing	  Camp	  Rashid,	  an	  important	  military	  base	  just	  to	  the	  southeast	  of	  Baghdad.	  Fortunately,	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  “acted	  swiftly	  and	  evidently	  according	  to	  [a]	  well	  planned	  system”	  and	  suppressed	  the	  attempt.415	  The	  CIA	  was	  convinced	  the	  Soviets	  were	  behind	  the	  plot.	  According	  to	  an	  intelligence	  summary	  from	  July	  13:Iraqi	  security	  forces	  have	  arrested	  two	  more	  members	  of	  a	  Soviet	  bloc	  intelligence	  net	  in	  Baghdad.	  Their	  confessions	  have	  provided	  direct	  evidence	  that	  the	  net	  was	  organized	  and	  directed	  by	  [redacted]	  and	  have	  implicated	  local	  Soviets	  with	  …	  staging	  the	  3	  July	  1963	  coup	  attempt.416This	  appeared	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  Soviet	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  regaining	  control	  of	  Iraq:	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There	  is	  strong	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  [Soviet]	  bloc	  involvement	  in	  the	  3	  July	  uprising	  at	  Camp	  Rashid,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  USSR	  will	  work	  both	  through	  propaganda	  media	  and	  covertly	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Ba’ath	  in	  Iraq,	  calculating	  that	  any	  successor	  regime	  would	  be	  more	  favorable	  to	  Communist	  interests.417	  The	  Camp	  Rashid	  coup	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  viewed	  Iraq	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  prize	  important	  enough	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  covert	  action	  to	  regain	  control.	  Clearly,	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  ofFicials	  both	  viewed	  Iraq	  as	  an	  important	  battleground	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	   Just	  prior	  to	  the	  coup,	  Ambassador	  Strong	  had	  arrived	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  had	  arranged	  to	  present	  his	  credentials	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  al-­‐Bakr	  in	  early	  July.418 	  When	  the	  two	  met	  on	  July	  7,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  evident.	  Al-­‐Bakr	  explained	  that	  if	  Iraq	  was	  to	  avoid	  communist	  control,	  outside	  support	  was	  essential.	  He	  described	  “Iraq’s	  battle	  against	  [the]	  communists”	  as	  a	  “U.S.	  battle”	  and	  explained	  that	  he	  wanted	  “cordial	  relations”	  with	  the	  West,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  would	  maintain	  a	  non-­‐aligned	  foreign	  policy.	  Strong	  explained	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  Iraq	  to	  remain	  independent	  and	  would	  accept	  a	  non-­‐aligned	  foreign	  policy.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  Arab	  unity,	  Strong	  reiterated	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  of	  accepting	  whatever	  decision	  the	  regime	  made	  so	  long	  as	  it	  was	  voluntary.	  On	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Strong	  said	  the	  U.S.	  had	  a	  “deep	  interest”	  in	  Iraq’s	  efforts	  to	  combat	  communism	  and	  urged	  the	  regime	  to	  create	  conditions	  that	  would	  help	  reduce	  communism’s	  appeal.	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  conversation	  touched	  upon	  neither	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  nor	  the	  impending	  arms	  deal,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  Soviet	  threat.	  Clearly,	  both	  U.S.	  and	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  at	  this	  juncture	  viewed	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  more	  signiFicant.419	   The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  aggressive	  tactics	  toward	  Iraq	  led	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  press	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  approve	  a	  greatly	  expanded	  arms	  deal.	  On	  July	  10,	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Frank	  Sloan	  sent	  Komer	  a	  memo	  outlining	  the	  types	  of	  military	  assistance	  Defense	  was	  prepared	  to	  provide	  Iraq.	  Apparently,	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Defense	  had	  sent	  a	  survey	  team	  to	  Iraq	  to	  assess	  its	  military	  needs	  and	  identify	  areas	  where	  the	  U.S.	  could	  help.	  The	  team	  concluded	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  helicopters,	  M-­‐41	  light	  tanks,	  tank	  transporters,	  and	  trucks	  already	  on	  the	  table,	  Iraq	  was	  interested	  in	  purchasing	  six	  S-­‐61R	  Sikorsky	  helicopters,	  ten	  C-­‐119	  troop	  carrier	  aircrafts,	  twelve	  advanced	  jet	  trainers,	  two	  squadrons	  (36	  in	  total)	  of	  F-­‐104	  or	  F-­‐100	  Fighter	  aircrafts,	  and	  a	  complete	  set	  of	  early	  warning	  radars.	  As	  grant	  aid,	  the	  team	  recommended	  repairing	  Five	  F-­‐86	  aircraft	  and	  three	  U.S.-­‐made	  8”	  Howitzers	  from	  the	  monarchy	  period,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  would	  require	  training	  teams	  and	  at	  least	  5,000	  rounds	  of	  ammunition.	  In	  total,	  this	  arms	  package	  would	  cost	  approximately	  $55	  million.420	  Once	  again,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  expanding	  its	  support	  for	  Iraq	  in	  response	  to	  Soviet	  provocations.	   The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  attempts	  to	  subvert	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  through	  its	  support	  of	  the	  Kurds,	  its	  diplomatic	  offensive	  at	  the	  UN,	  and	  covert	  action	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Camp	  Rashid	  coup,	  helped	  convince	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  that	  Iraq	  was	  an	  important	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  This	  in	  turn	  translated	  into	  a	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  provided	  opportunities	  to	  provide	  Iraq	  with	  increased	  military	  assistance,	  as	  well	  as	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  intelligence	  on	  the	  advanced	  Soviet	  weaponry	  Moscow	  had	  provided	  the	  Qasim	  regime.	  While	  segments	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  were	  pleased	  about	  this	  potential	  intelligence	  bonanza,	  ofFicials	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  had	  grown	  disturbed	  about	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime’s	  brutal	  atrocities	  against	  its	  Kurdish	  population.
VI	   In	  mid-­‐July	  1963,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  shifted	  in	  response	  to	  concerns	  the	  State	  Department	  raised	  about	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime’s	  survival,	  its	  engaging	  in	  acts	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  genocide,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  inFluence	  the	  U.S.	  had	  over	  the	  Kurds.	  With	  the	  war	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control	  and	  the	  Soviets	  engaged	  in	  an	  aggressive	  overt	  and	  covert	  campaign	  against	  the	  regime,	  it	  was	  clear	  the	  traditional	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  had	  made	  advancing	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Iraq	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challenging.	  Recognizing	  this,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  adopted	  a	  proactive	  policy	  toward	  both	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  during	  the	  summer	  and	  early	  fall	  of	  1963,	  eventually	  leading	  it	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  short-­‐lived	  and	  unsuccessful	  initiative	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire.	   On	  July	  12,	  James	  Spain	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  drafted	  a	  memo	  arguing	  Iraq	  was	  moving	  toward	  the	  decisive	  stages	  of	  two	  separate	  but	  connected	  issues:	  a	  showdown	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  war	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  Spain	  saw	  Moscow’s	  interference	  in	  Iraq	  and	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  as	  troubling	  developments.	  With	  hostility	  between	  Baghdad	  and	  Moscow	  escalating,	  Spain	  was	  concerned	  the	  regime’s	  survival	  might	  depend	  on	  stronger	  U.S.	  support	  than	  “envisaged	  in	  the	  limits	  of	  [their]	  present	  policy.”	  Further,	  because	  Iraq’s	  “extreme	  policy”	  toward	  the	  Kurds	  resembled	  an	  act	  of	  genocide,	  it	  made	  it	  difFicult	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  build	  diplomatic	  support	  to	  block	  Soviet	  efforts	  in	  international	  forums.	  …[The]	  policy	  of	  the	  nationalist	  Arabs	  who	  dominate	  the	  Baghdad	  government	  does	  in	  fact	  come	  close	  to	  genocide.	  According	  to	  a	  senior	  Iraqi	  army	  ofFicer	  it	  consists	  of:	  taking	  only	  such	  Kurdish	  prisoners	  as	  may	  supply	  information	  and	  then	  shooting	  them,	  ultimately	  reducing	  the	  adult	  male	  Kurdish	  population	  to	  one-­‐tenth	  of	  what	  it	  now	  is,	  letting	  the	  women	  and	  children	  fend	  for	  themselves,	  and	  repopulating	  the	  area	  with	  Arabs.A	  third	  problem	  was	  the	  U.S.	  “had	  little	  or	  no	  contact	  with	  [the	  Kurds]	  or	  opportunity	  to	  try	  to	  inFluence	  their	  attitudes.”	  While	  Kurds	  had	  always	  maintained	  contact	  with	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  never	  tried	  to	  cultivate	  inFluence.	  Spain	  felt	  this	  was	  a	  mistake	  and	  argued	  “future	  U.S.	  actions	  and	  initiatives	  [in	  Iraq]	  may	  have	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  [their]	  previous	  ‘stand	  by’	  policy”	  and	  proposed	  three	  policy	  alternatives:	  
(A) Development	  of	  a	  vigorous	  coordinated	  U.S.	  effort	  to	  encourage	  and	  facilitate	  a	  transition	  to	  greater	  reliance	  on	  Western	  sources	  of	  supply	  for	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  trade	  and	  development	  needs;
(B) A	  U.S.	  commitment	  in	  discreet	  but	  clearcut	  terms	  to	  support	  Iraq	  against	  Communist	  threats	  and	  pressures	  in	  the	  political	  and	  security	  Fields;	  and	  
(C) A	  frank	  representation	  to	  the	  Baghdad	  government	  that	  while,	  unlike	  the	  Soviets,	  we	  will	  not	  support	  the	  Kurds	  against	  it,	  we	  do	  disapprove	  of	  its	  unduly	  repressive	  policy	  toward	  them	  and	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cannot	  bring	  to	  bear	  the	  full	  power	  of	  our	  sympathy	  and	  support	  as	  long	  as	  this	  policy	  continues;	  in	  addition,	  that	  we	  are	  aware	  that	  in	  fact	  their	  military	  action	  against	  the	  Kurds	  is	  not	  succeeding	  as	  claimed.He	  also	  made	  two	  additional	  suggestions	  worth	  consideration.	  The	  First	  was	  the	  “establishment	  of	  a	  secret	  or	  semi-­‐ofFicial	  contact	  with	  [Barzani]	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  getting	  better	  information	  on	  his	  activities	  and	  intentions	  and,	  hopefully,	  of	  exerting	  some	  inFluence	  on	  him.”	  The	  second	  option	  was	  to	  promote	  third-­‐party	  “good	  ofFices”	  designed	  to	  reach	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  in	  the	  conFlict.421	  Spain’s	  proposals	  would	  have	  a	  considerable	  impact	  on	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  U.S.	  initiative	  aimed	  at	  bringing	  about	  a	  ceaseFire	  in	  the	  conFlict.	   On	  July	  18,	  the	  department	  sent	  out	  policy	  guidelines	  to	  all	  its	  posts	  in	  the	  region	  reFlecting	  Spain’s	  analysis.	  Citing	  “private	  admissions	  from	  Iraqi	  Army	  ofFicers,”	  it	  was	  clear	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  had	  stalemated.	  Given	  this,	  the	  department	  felt	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  mediated	  settlement	  were	  ideal.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  would	  continue	  to	  regard	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  as	  a	  “purely	  internal	  Iraqi	  question,	  in	  which	  U.S.	  [would]	  not	  intervene	  directly	  or	  indirectly,”	  it	  was	  also	  sympathetic	  to	  legitimate	  Kurdish	  claims.	  Nevertheless,	  interests	  dictated	  that	  maintaining	  good	  relations	  with	  Baghdad	  was	  a	  paramount	  consideration,	  since	  the	  U.S.	  had	  a	  “strong	  stake	  in	  [the]	  survival	  [of	  the]	  present	  [Iraqi	  regime]	  which	  [is]	  better	  for	  U.S.	  interests	  than	  any	  likely	  successor.”	  Given	  this	  dichotomy,	  U.S.	  policy	  had	  to	  encourage	  the	  regime	  to	  grant	  Kurds	  cultural	  autonomy	  and	  local	  administration;	  offer	  assistance	  for	  the	  reconstruction,	  development,	  and	  modernization	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  region;	  provide	  Iraq	  with	  food	  and	  work	  relief	  projects;	  and	  continue	  urging	  the	  regime	  of	  the	  “wisdom	  of	  moderation”	  in	  dealing	  with	  Kurdish	  civilians.	  At	  the	  UN,	  the	  department	  was	  inclined	  to	  step	  back	  from	  the	  genocide	  claim	  and	  encourage	  its	  Arab	  allies	  to	  lead	  in	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  charge.	  Taken	  together,	  the	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U.S.	  had	  decided	  to	  pressure	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  into	  settling	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  peacefully,	  while	  avoiding	  being	  dragged	  into	  the	  conFlict.422	   By	  chance,	  the	  same	  day	  State	  was	  issuing	  its	  guidance,	  Cyrus	  Habibi,	  a	  former	  local	  employee	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Consulate	  in	  Tabriz	  with	  close	  contacts	  with	  the	  Kurds,	  delivered	  a	  letter	  from	  Barzani	  asking	  President	  Kennedy	  to	  help	  mediate	  a	  ceaseFire.423	  The	  administration’s	  response	  to	  Barzani’s	  proposal	  highlighted	  the	  impact	  of	  Spain’s	  recommendations.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran,	  Julius	  Holmes,	  forwarded	  the	  letter	  to	  Washington,	  he	  recommended	  Tabriz	  reiterate	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.424	  But	  when	  the	  department	  passed	  both	  the	  letter	  and	  Holmes’	  recommendation	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  early	  August,	  it	  suggested	  the	  U.S.	  go	  “one	  step	  further	  …	  by	  having	  [their]	  Consul	  [in	  Tabriz]	  state	  …	  the	  message	  was	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Department	  and	  that	  the	  Consul	  is	  responding	  …	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Government.”	  State	  argued	  this	  acknowledgement	  would	  “demonstrate,	  if	  only	  symbolically,	  United	  States	  concern	  for	  and	  interests	  in	  the	  Kurds.”	  The	  NSC	  staff	  agreed,	  with	  Komer	  scribbling	  in	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  document:	  “Approve.	  I	  believe	  this	  [is]	  a	  sensible	  thing	  as	  our	  Consul	  [would]	  only	  be	  reiterating	  standard	  U.S.	  policy,	  which	  we	  have	  already	  told	  [the]	  Iraqis.”425	  This	  demonstrated	  a	  shift	  was	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government	  regarding	  the	  Kurds,	  even	  though	  the	  White	  House	  adopted	  a	  “favorable”	  arms	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  agreed	  to	  an	  extensive	  arms	  package.426	  Despite	  this,	  the	  new	  instructions	  were	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forwarded	  on	  to	  Tehran	  on	  August	  7	  and	  raised	  with	  Barzani’s	  intermediary	  on	  August	  12.427	  	   The	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  policy	  caught	  Barzani’s	  attention,	  leading	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  new	  channel	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  According	  to	  Carleton	  Coon,	  the	  U.S.	  Consul	  in	  Tabriz,	  on	  August	  16	  a	  prominent	  Kurd	  approached	  the	  consulate	  and	  asked	  the	  U.S.	  to	  “take	  [a]	  leading	  role	  in	  getting	  negotiations	  started	  and	  particularly	  in	  bringing	  about	  [a]	  truce	  or	  cease-­‐Fire.”428	  Unlike	  Barzani’s	  earlier	  letter	  to	  Kennedy,	  this	  was	  the	  First	  time	  that	  the	  Kurds	  had	  asked	  the	  U.S.	  to	  assume	  a	  direct	  role	  in	  mediating	  a	  ceaseFire,	  prompting	  the	  department	  to	  cable	  Baghdad	  to	  ascertain	  its	  views	  on	  the	  matter,	  while	  asking	  Tehran	  to	  await	  further	  guidance.429	  	   The	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  responded	  positively	  on	  August	  20,	  arguing	  a	  Barzani-­‐initiated	  ceaseFire	  held	  promise	  since	  it	  would	  allow	  the	  regime	  to	  sell	  it	  to	  its	  people	  as	  a	  victory	  and	  let	  it	  save	  face.	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  chance	  the	  regime	  would	  interpret	  the	  proposal	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  weakness	  or	  a	  clever	  ploy	  to	  undermine	  its	  credibility.	  Even	  so,	  the	  embassy	  felt	  it	  was	  worthwhile	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  act	  as	  a	  messenger	  between	  Barzani	  and	  Baghdad	  but	  advised	  against	  a	  mediating	  role.	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  embassy	  urged	  the	  department	  to	  act	  immediately,	  since	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  stood	  little	  chance	  of	  holding	  out	  against	  the	  Kurd	  during	  the	  oncoming	  winter.430	  Another	  reason	  for	  urgency	  was	  fear	  that	  word	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Barzani	  contacts	  could	  be	  leaked	  before	  a	  decision	  about	  how	  to	  respond	  had	  been	  reached.	  The	  basis	  of	  this	  concern	  stemmed	  from	  the	  Cold	  War.	  After	  all,	  the	  entire	  approach	  could	  have	  been	  a	  Soviet	  plot	  aimed	  at	  driving	  a	  wedge	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iraq.431	   These	  concerns	  were	  addressed	  in	  a	  cable	  to	  Baghdad,	  Tehran,	  and	  London	  on	  August	  23.	  Because	  of	  the	  matter’s	  urgency,	  the	  department	  recommended	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Baghdad	  “promptly	  and	  unilaterally	  inform	  [the]	  Iraqi	  Government	  in	  conFidence	  that	  Barzani	  claims	  to	  desire	  [a]	  cease	  Fire”	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  transmit	  a	  response.	  Tehran	  was	  advised	  to	  inform	  the	  Iranians	  of	  Barzani’s	  approach,	  though	  on	  the	  condition	  it	  be	  held	  in	  the	  strictest	  of	  conFidence.	  The	  department	  endorsed	  Baghdad’s	  recommendation	  that	  the	  U.S.	  “act	  alone	  as	  messenger	  rather	  than	  in	  concert	  with	  Iran.”	  The	  department	  also	  ordered	  Tabriz	  to	  inform	  Barzani’s	  intermediary	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  would	  be	  told	  of	  the	  request	  for	  negotiations	  and	  was	  to	  “stress	  [their]	  role	  as	  solely	  [a]	  messenger,	  and	  that	  [the]	  USG	  [could	  not]	  …	  become	  [an]	  intermediary.”	  Finally,	  the	  department	  believed	  that	  the	  British	  needed	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  approach.432	  When	  Strong	  informed	  al-­‐Bakr	  of	  Barzani’s	  proposal	  and	  U.S.	  willingness	  to	  pass	  a	  response	  on	  August	  25,	  he	  “expressed	  astonishment”	  at	  America’s	  involvement	  and	  questioned	  why	  Barzani	  had	  not	  sent	  the	  message	  through	  the	  Soviets,	  who	  appeared	  to	  be	  his	  ally.	  Strong	  emphasized	  he	  was	  only	  passing	  along	  information	  and	  was	  not	  dealing	  with	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  problem.433	  When	  Holmes	  informed	  Iran’s	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Abbas	  Aram,	  on	  August	  26,	  he	  told	  Washington	  the	  conversation	  “was	  inconclusive	  and	  produced	  nothing	  worth	  reporting.”434	  The	  next	  day,	  Coon	  reported	  from	  Tabriz	  that	  the	  message	  to	  Barzani	  had	  been	  passed	  to	  the	  intermediary.435	  	   On	  September	  12,	  Benjamin	  Read,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  new	  executive	  secretary,	  sent	  Bundy	  a	  memo	  detailing	  Barzani’s	  letters	  to	  Kennedy,	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  administration’s	  response,	  and	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  Tabriz.	  After	  reviewing	  the	  documents,	  Komer	  recommended	  Bundy	  apprise	  Kennedy	  on	  this	  matter,	  if	  only	  to	  better	  prepare	  him	  in	  the	  “off	  chance	  someone	  may	  ask	  [the	  President]	  if	  he’s	  heard	  from	  [the]	  Kurds.”	  Komer	  emphasized	  the	  political	  sensitivity	  of	  this	  issue,	  pointing	  out	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  proven	  highly	  sensitive	  about	  the	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impending	  arrival	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  delegation	  to	  New	  York	  for	  the	  upcoming	  General	  Assembly	  meeting	  and	  had	  tried	  unsuccessfully	  to	  lobby	  the	  U.S.	  to	  bar	  the	  Kurds	  entry.436	  	   In	  mid-­‐September,	  it	  became	  clear	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  using	  the	  U.S.	  channel	  to	  Barzani,	  leading	  Strong	  to	  advise	  the	  department	  to	  “avoid	  any	  further	  action	  with	  either	  Barzani	  or	  [the]	  Iraqi	  government	  unless	  one	  or	  both	  of	  them	  shows	  initiative.”437	  Unexpectedly,	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  abandon	  the	  Barzani	  channel	  led	  the	  Iranians	  to	  try	  to	  revive	  it.	  On	  September	  16,	  Major	  General	  Hassan	  Pakravan,	  the	  head	  of	  SAVAK,	  visited	  Holmes	  to	  discuss	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  Apparently,	  a	  few	  days	  earlier	  the	  Shah	  had	  met	  with	  Barzani,	  who	  had	  complained	  about	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  ceaseFire	  effort.	  Pakvaran	  said	  the	  Shah	  wanted	  the	  U.S.	  to	  know	  Five	  things	  about	  Barzani:	  he	  was	  not	  a	  communist;	  understood	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  would	  be	  “sheer	  foolishness”;	  was	  pushing	  for	  only	  a	  minimal	  degree	  of	  autonomy;	  and	  wanted	  to	  stop	  Fighting	  and	  return	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table.	  But	  most	  importantly,	  Barzani	  needed	  external	  guarantees	  that	  his	  people	  would	  not	  be	  “delivered	  to	  the	  tender	  mercies	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  government.”	  The	  Shah	  felt	  these	  were	  reasonable	  points	  and	  wanted	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  continue	  pressuring	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  to	  end	  the	  Fighting.	  The	  Shah	  also	  was	  “perplexed	  as	  to	  what	  to	  do	  next”	  and	  wanted	  to	  know	  where	  the	  U.S.	  stood	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  question.	  Holmes	  explained	  the	  present	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  was	  the	  best	  it	  could	  hope	  for;	  agreed	  a	  ceaseFire	  was	  the	  best	  option;	  and	  expressed	  hope	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iran	  could	  work	  together	  to	  achieve	  this.	  However,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  showed	  a	  “general	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm”	  toward	  earlier	  efforts	  to	  mediate	  a	  ceaseFire.438	  	   Pakvaran’s	  approach	  made	  clear	  Iran’s	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  Kurds.	  Certainly,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  known	  since	  mid-­‐1962	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  assisting	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  Iran	  had	  never	  before	  conducted	  diplomacy	  on	  Barzani’s	  behalf.	  While	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  would	  continue	  to	  resist	  Iranian	  pressure,	  the	  Shah’s	  identiFication	  with	  Barzani	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  accept	  that	  he	  was	  neither	  pro-­‐communist	  nor	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beholden	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  This	  was	  important	  given	  the	  Kurdish	  War’s	  growing	  relevance	  to	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   In	  mid-­‐September,	  the	  Soviet	  diplomatic	  offensive	  against	  Iraq	  at	  the	  UN	  Fizzled	  out.	  Due	  to	  opposition	  from	  the	  Arab	  states,	  on	  September	  16	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  ordered	  the	  Outer	  Mongolia	  delegation	  to	  drop	  the	  Kurdish	  genocide	  question	  from	  the	  UNGA’s	  agenda.	  It	  is	  open	  to	  speculation	  why	  the	  Soviets	  allowed	  the	  item	  to	  be	  removed.	  One	  explanation,	  according	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  was	  the	  Mongolians	  had	  found	  insufFicient	  support	  for	  the	  item	  to	  inscribe	  it.439	  Another	  explanation	  was	  the	  Soviets	  had	  ordered	  Mongolia	  to	  retract	  the	  item	  as	  a	  gesture	  of	  goodwill	  toward	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  as	  step	  toward	  political	  rapprochement.440	  Either	  way,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  genocide	  charge	  effectively	  undermined	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  delegation	  to	  the	  UNGA	  and	  provided	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  with	  a	  much-­‐needed	  political	  victory.	   While	  at	  the	  UNGA,	  on	  October	  1	  Secretary	  Rusk	  met	  with	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  Minister	  Shabib	  and	  Iraq’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Adnan	  Pachachi.	  During	  the	  talks,	  Rusk	  expressed	  overall	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  state	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  emphasized	  the	  U.S.	  had	  no	  ambitions	  in	  Iraq	  and	  only	  wanted	  the	  “maintenance	  and	  advancement	  of	  [its]	  independence,	  prosperity	  and	  security.”	  On	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  Rusk	  asked	  Shabib	  what	  the	  prospects	  were	  for	  peace.	  Shabib	  replied	  that	  “Barzani	  [was]	  defeated,”	  the	  war	  was	  “practically	  over,”	  and	  “military	  operations	  should	  be	  completed”	  before	  winter	  set	  in.	  Rusk	  pressed	  about	  a	  “political	  peace	  as	  distinct	  from	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Fighting,”	  to	  which	  Shabib	  said	  “development	  and	  decentralization”	  in	  Kurdistan	  “[could]	  only	  be	  accomplished	  after	  the	  armed	  threat	  [was]	  ended.”	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  this	  conversation	  that	  the	  regime	  was	  still	  convinced	  the	  use	  of	  force	  was	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  problem.441	   After	  months	  of	  heavy	  Fighting,	  by	  October	  it	  was	  evident	  both	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  Kurds	  were	  growing	  short	  on	  supplies.	  On	  the	  Iraqi	  side,	  the	  Soviet	  embargo	  had	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deprived	  it	  of	  ordinance	  lost	  during	  the	  Fighting.	  In	  early	  October,	  the	  Ba’th	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  Cairo	  to	  persuade	  Nasser	  to	  supply	  it	  with	  enough	  arms	  and	  ammunition	  to	  allow	  the	  war	  to	  continue.	  Unfortunately,	  details	  about	  Nasser’s	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  request	  are	  unavailable.442 	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  CIA	  learned	  Iran	  had	  “recently	  arranged	  transportation	  from	  Tehran	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  border	  of	  several	  shipments	  of	  bazookas,	  as	  well	  as	  additional	  small	  arms	  purchased	  in	  Europe.”443	  The	  Kurds	  had	  also	  purchased	  a	  radio	  transmitter	  in	  Europe,	  which	  was	  being	  smuggled	  into	  Iraq	  through	  Iran.444	  	   By	  the	  fall	  of	  1963,	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  Iraq	  had	  shifted	  away	  from	  its	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  toward	  that	  of	  engagement.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  American	  concerns	  that	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime’s	  deteriorating	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  and	  its	  ineffective	  war	  with	  the	  Kurds	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  survival.	  From	  a	  U.S.	  perspective,	  the	  only	  solution	  was	  for	  a	  negotiated	  peace.	  But	  just	  as	  the	  shift	  in	  thinking	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  Washington,	  Barzani	  provided	  the	  U.S.	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  help	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire,	  while	  establishing	  a	  direct	  line	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  leadership.	  But	  Baghdad’s	  less-­‐than-­‐enthusiastic	  response	  led	  to	  the	  initiative’s	  collapse.	  SigniFicantly,	  it	  was	  at	  this	  point	  that	  Iran’s	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  U.S.-­‐Kurdish	  opening	  became	  evident.	  This	  would,	  in	  turn,	  reinforce	  the	  perception	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  that	  Barzani	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  but	  an	  opportunist	  who	  would	  accept	  Soviet	  or	  Iranian	  support	  if	  it	  helped	  advance	  his	  strategic	  goals.	  
VII	   In	  the	  fall	  of	  1963,	  a	  power	  struggle	  emerged	  within	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  over	  the	  question	  of	  Arab	  uniFication.	  The	  struggle	  pitted	  the	  moderate,	  military	  wing	  of	  the	  party	  led	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  President	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  (who	  was	  not	  himself	  a	  Ba’thist)	  against	  the	  extremist,	  civilian	  wing,	  embodied	  by	  Ali	  Salih	  al-­‐Sa’di,	  who	  was	  a	  former	  premier	  and	  interior	  minister.	  As	  Tripp	  describes	  him,	  “al-­‐Sa’di	  was	  the	  most	  inFluential	  and	  powerful	  member	  of	  the	  three	  at	  the	  time,	  although	  his	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authority	  did	  not	  go	  uncontested.”	  The	  source	  of	  al-­‐Sa’di’s	  inFluence	  came	  from	  his	  position	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  regional	  command,	  which	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  wing	  of	  the	  party.	  But	  it	  was	  his	  role	  as	  head	  of	  the	  militant	  National	  Guard	  that	  concerned	  Iraq’s	  military	  the	  most.	  Earlier,	  the	  military	  had	  tried	  and	  failed	  to	  have	  the	  National	  Guard	  dissolved,	  but	  in	  early	  September,	  when	  al-­‐Sa’di	  declared	  his	  support	  for	  Marxism,	  his	  opponents	  opted	  to	  take	  matters	  into	  their	  own	  hands.445	  According	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad,	  the	  plan	  was	  for	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  Arif,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  military,	  to	  remove	  al-­‐Sa’di	  and	  the	  Ba’th	  from	  the	  machinery	  of	  power,	  seize	  control	  of	  the	  government,	  settle	  the	  Kurdish	  problem,	  and	  resume	  unity	  talks	  with	  Cairo,	  which	  had	  collapsed	  earlier	  that	  year.	  The	  embassy	  believed	  this	  would	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  cabinet	  reshufFle	  that	  would	  remove	  hard-­‐line	  Ba’thist	  ofFicials	  from	  power,	  see	  al-­‐Sa’di	  arrested	  and	  sent	  abroad	  as	  an	  ambassador,	  and	  have	  the	  military	  neutralize	  the	  National	  Guard.446 	  While	  this	  was	  what	  would	  eventually	  happen,	  unforeseen	  circumstances	  delayed	  the	  plan’s	  implementation	  until	  mid-­‐November.	   During	  October,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  moving	  forward	  with	  plans	  to	  unify	  Iraq	  with	  Syria,	  which	  had	  undergone	  a	  similar	  Ba’thist	  coup	  in	  March.	  On	  October	  7	  the	  Ba’th	  announced	  a	  cabinet	  shufFle	  which	  replaced	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐Ba’th	  ministers	  with	  Ba’thist	  stalwarts,	  a	  move	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  called	  the	  “Ba’thization”	  of	  the	  cabinet.	  This,	  of	  course,	  complicated	  matters	  for	  the	  al-­‐Bakr-­‐Arif	  plot.447	  The	  next	  day,	  Arif	  announced	  the	  uniFication	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria’s	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  joint	  military	  council,	  made	  up	  of	  three	  representatives	  from	  each	  state.	  The	  Egyptians	  had	  declined	  joining	  the	  union.448	  Throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  October,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  held	  its	  Sixth	  National	  Congress	  in	  Damascus	  to	  work	  out	  a	  framework	  for	  full	  uniFication.449	  According	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  after	  a	  plebiscite	  was	  held	  in	  both	  countries,	  within	  two	  months	  a	  new	  country,	  called	  the	  Arab	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Democratic	  People’s	  Republic,	  would	  be	  formed,	  and	  Baghdad	  would	  be	  the	  new	  capital.450 	  	   While	  Iraq	  moved	  closer	  toward	  uniFication	  with	  Syria,	  signiFicant	  political	  developments	  were	  taking	  place	  behind	  the	  scenes	  in	  Baghdad.	  In	  early	  October,	  al-­‐Sa’di	  outFlanked	  his	  opponents	  in	  the	  military	  when	  he	  put	  forward	  a	  resolution	  calling	  for	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  National	  Guard.	  He	  also	  managed	  to	  have	  two	  moderate	  ministers,	  Interior	  Minister	  Hazim	  Jawad	  and	  Foreign	  Minister	  Talib	  Shabib,	  dropped	  from	  the	  Ba’th	  National	  Command,	  the	  party’s	  main	  governing	  body.	  In	  effect,	  these	  moves	  consolidated	  the	  power	  of	  al-­‐Sa’di’s	  faction	  while	  weakening	  the	  moderates	  in	  both	  the	  government	  and	  military.	  This	  also	  convinced	  al-­‐Sad’i’s	  opponents	  that	  they	  had	  to	  take	  matters	  into	  their	  own	  hands.451 	  	   At	  the	  start	  of	  November,	  the	  struggle	  between	  the	  moderate	  and	  radical	  wings	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  burst	  into	  the	  open.	  On	  November	  1,	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  National	  Guard,	  Mundhir	  al-­‐Wandawi,	  was	  dismissed	  from	  his	  post	  but	  he	  refused	  to	  step	  down,	  underscoring	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  state	  and	  encouraging	  the	  military	  to	  Finally	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’th.452	  However,	  before	  they	  could	  act,	  another	  group	  led	  by	  Jawad	  and	  Shabib	  moved	  First.	  On	  November	  11,	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Regional	  (Iraq)	  Command	  convened	  in	  Baghdad.	  At	  the	  meeting,	  Jawad	  and	  Shabib	  ambushed	  al-­‐Sa’di	  and	  his	  supporters	  by	  accusing	  them	  of	  taking	  “unauthorized	  actions	  contrary	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  party.”	  The	  congress	  voted	  to	  uphold	  the	  charges	  and	  al-­‐Sa’di	  and	  his	  cohorts	  were	  escorted	  to	  a	  waiting	  plane	  and	  then	  Flown	  into	  exile	  in	  Spain.	  In	  a	  matter	  of	  hours	  the	  extremist	  wing	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  eliminated	  from	  power.	  However,	  as	  word	  of	  al-­‐Sa’di’s	  ousting	  spread,	  the	  National	  Guard	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  occupying	  key	  positions	  as	  sporadic	  skirmishes	  broke	  out	  throughout	  the	  city.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Ba’th	  National	  Command	  dispatched	  a	  Syrian	  delegation	  led	  by	  Michel	  AFlaq,	  the	  Ba’th	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Party’s	  founding	  father	  and	  political	  ideologue,	  to	  Baghdad.453	  It	  appeared	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  was	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control.	   The	  move	  against	  al-­‐Sa’di	  caught	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  completely	  off	  guard.	  While	  the	  embassy	  knew	  of	  plotting	  against	  al-­‐Sa’di	  since	  September,	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  coup	  it	  had	  sent	  an	  assessment	  to	  Washington	  that	  concluded,	  “[the]	  regime	  probably	  has	  some	  time,	  perhaps	  [a]	  year	  or	  two,	  before	  it	  is	  really	  challenged.”454	  Even	  the	  next	  day	  the	  embassy	  was	  uncertain	  about	  what	  had	  happened:	  “several	  sources	  indicate	  that	  Saadi	  …	  [was]	  exiled	  sometime	  during	  [the]	  day	  rather	  than	  last	  night.”455	  In	  short,	  neither	  the	  embassy	  nor	  the	  State	  Department	  knew	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  morning	  of	  November	  13	  that	  the	  White	  House	  Situation	  Room	  informed	  Kennedy	  a	  coup	  might	  have	  taken	  place.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “unable	  to	  determine	  [its]	  extent”	  because	  the	  reports	  coming	  out	  of	  Baghdad	  were	  “sketchy.”456	  Even	  by	  November	  15,	  the	  White	  House	  was	  having	  difFiculty	  ascertaining	  what	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  Iraq.	  That	  day,	  Komer	  sent	  a	  memo	  to	  Bundy	  explaining	  that	  it	  was	  difFicult	  to	  keep	  the	  Oval	  ofFice	  apprised	  of	  what	  had	  been	  happening	  because	  the	  situation	  was	  “still	  too	  confused	  for	  conFident	  assessment.”457	  	   Meanwhile,	  events	  in	  Baghdad	  escalated	  on	  November	  13	  when	  the	  National	  Guard	  held	  demonstrations	  in	  downtown	  Baghdad	  demanding	  Jawad’s	  dismissal.	  Soon	  thereafter,	  it	  attacked	  and	  occupied	  a	  police	  station	  in	  a	  main	  square,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  other	  locations.	  Then	  another	  mob	  formed	  and	  tried	  to	  occupy	  a	  key	  radio	  station,	  but	  was	  forced	  away	  by	  a	  loyal	  tank	  battalion.	  Events	  took	  a	  turn	  for	  the	  worse	  shortly	  after	  9	  a.m.	  when	  an	  Iraqi	  Air	  Force	  jet	  Flown	  by	  al-­‐Wandawi	  strafed	  the	  Presidential	  Palace	  with	  both	  rockets	  and	  machine	  gun	  Fire,	  and	  managing	  to	  drop	  a	  bomb	  in	  the	  same	  room	  as	  President	  Arif,	  who	  escaped	  uninjured.	  Eventually	  loyalist	  aircraft	  were	  able	  to	  force	  Wandawi’s	  plane	  down,	  but	  he	  managed	  to	  escape	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to	  Syria.458	  With	  the	  excesses	  of	  the	  extremist	  elements	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  and	  National	  Guard	  evident,	  al-­‐Bakr	  ordered	  the	  army	  to	  occupy	  all	  strategic	  points	  in	  Baghdad,	  imposed	  a	  curfew,	  and	  dispersed	  all	  trafFic	  from	  the	  streets.459	  SigniFicantly,	  when	  al-­‐Bakr	  ordered	  the	  National	  Guards’	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  commander	  to	  return	  the	  paramilitary	  force	  to	  its	  barracks,	  it	  refused,	  which	  only	  infuriated	  members	  of	  Iraq’s	  military	  further.460	  Later	  that	  evening	  al-­‐Bakr	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Regional	  (Iraq)	  Command	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  before	  the	  arrival	  of	  AFlaq	  and	  the	  National	  Command.	  According	  to	  the	  CIA,	  al-­‐Bakr	  decided	  that	  Jawad	  and	  Shabib	  had	  to	  go	  into	  exile	  immediately,	  but	  when	  AFlaq	  arrived	  and	  learned	  of	  this	  decision	  he	  was	  furious	  that	  he	  had	  not	  been	  consulted.461	   For	  the	  next	  few	  days,	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  continued	  to	  escalate	  and	  eventually	  forced	  the	  military	  to	  take	  action.	  On	  November	  15,	  the	  National	  Command	  announced	  it	  would	  assume	  control	  of	  Iraq	  while	  the	  Regional	  (Iraq)	  Command	  resolved	  its	  internal	  squabbles,	  but	  for	  proud	  Iraqi	  nationalists,	  Syria’s	  apparent	  usurpation	  of	  power	  was	  simply	  too	  much.	  As	  Penrose	  observed:[The	  decision]	  not	  only	  enraged	  what	  there	  was	  of	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  country,	  it	  also	  Finally	  alienated	  the	  leading	  military	  ofFicers,	  Ba’athist	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐Ba’athist.	  Their	  patience	  had	  already	  been	  stretched	  to	  the	  limit	  by	  the	  National	  Guard’s	  open	  challenge	  to	  the	  army	  and	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  public	  order.	  OfFicers	  as	  well	  as	  others	  asked	  whether	  the	  country	  was	  to	  be	  taken	  over	  by	  a	  youth	  movement.Throughout	  November	  16	  and	  17,	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  regime,	  including	  Arif,	  al-­‐Bakr,	  and	  General	  Saleh	  Mehdi	  Ammash,	  a	  high	  ranking	  Ba’thist	  military	  ofFicer,	  called	  in	  the	  senior	  commanders	  of	  the	  military	  and	  devised	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  to	  oust	  not	  only	  the	  Syrians,	  but	  the	  National	  Guard	  as	  well.462	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  November	  18,	  President	  Arif	  ordered	  the	  military	  to	  crush	  the	  Ba’th	  and	  the	  National	  Guard.463	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By	  early	  morning,	  the	  National	  Guard	  was	  ordered	  to	  return	  to	  its	  barracks	  and	  give	  up	  their	  arms	  or	  else	  it	  would	  be	  crushed	  by	  force.464	  Military	  personnel	  supported	  the	  coup	  overwhelmingly	  and	  by	  noon	  Arif	  was	  in	  full	  control	  of	  the	  country.	  A	  few	  days	  later	  on	  November	  21,	  the	  White	  House	  learned	  it	  did	  not	  need	  to	  consider	  extending	  diplomatic	  recognition	  to	  the	  new	  regime,	  since	  Arif	  remained	  the	  head	  of	  state.465	  The	  next	  day,	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  was	  assassinated	  in	  Dallas,	  bringing	  his	  presidency	  to	  an	  abrupt	  halt.
Conclusion
	   Iraq	  between	  February	  and	  November	  1963	  was	  effectively	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  The	  February	  1963	  coup	  was	  certainly	  “a	  net	  gain”	  for	  America	  in	  its	  Cold	  War	  contest	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.466	  After	  all,	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Qasim	  regime	  was	  replaced	  by	  an	  anti-­‐communist,	  Arab	  nationalist	  one	  and	  the	  Ba’th	  regime	  had	  initiated	  a	  brutal	  campaign	  against	  Iraq’s	  communists.	  Despite	  assertions	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  behind	  the	  coup	  and	  later	  provided	  death	  squads	  with	  lists	  of	  communists,	  there	  exists	  enough	  evidence	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  whether	  this	  happened.	  Regardless,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  coup	  and	  sought	  to	  cultivate	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  through	  military,	  economic	  and	  social	  assistance.	  	   The	  overall	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  achieve	  internal	  stability,	  but	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  regime’s	  determination	  to	  crush	  them	  militarily	  undermined	  this.	  Fearing	  its	  survival,	  throughout	  the	  spring	  of	  1963	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  pressed	  the	  Ba’th	  to	  make	  reasonable	  concessions	  without	  success.	  Unfortunately,	  Iraq’s	  request	  in	  April	  1963	  to	  purchase	  American	  arms	  put	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position.	  While	  it	  wanted	  Iraq	  to	  resolve	  the	  Kurdish	  conFlict	  peacefully,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  agreed	  “in	  principle”	  to	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sell	  the	  arms	  out	  of	  Cold	  War	  considerations.	  It	  believed	  the	  deal	  could	  draw	  Iraq	  further	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  and	  build	  Western	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad.	  When	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  resumed	  in	  June	  1963	  it	  took	  on	  Cold	  War	  dimensions	  rapidly.	  Whereas	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  ceased	  military	  shipments	  to	  Iraq,	  supported	  Kurdish	  demands	  for	  autonomy,	  and	  accused	  the	  regime	  of	  committing	  genocide,	  the	  U.S.	  approved	  a	  $55	  million	  arms	  deal	  for	  Iraq,	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  Iraq’s	  numerous	  atrocities,	  and	  urged	  its	  Arab	  allies	  to	  rally	  diplomatic	  support	  against	  the	  genocide	  charge	  at	  the	  UN.	  	   The	  height	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  intrigue	  occurred	  in	  early-­‐July	  when	  a	  Moscow-­‐backed	  coup	  failed	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’th.	  This	  led	  the	  U.S.	  to	  examine	  further	  options,	  including	  further	  arms	  sales.	  But	  Iraq’s	  atrocities	  against	  the	  Kurds	  eventually	  convinced	  members	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  try	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire.	  Interestingly,	  when	  the	  initiative	  collapsed	  in	  September,	  Iran’s	  hand	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  Kurdish	  démarche	  became	  clear	  and	  underscored	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  Kurdish-­‐Iranian	  relationship.	  Even	  so,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  provision	  of	  arms	  and	  its	  initiative	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire	  demonstrated	  the	  importance	  the	  U.S.	  attached	  to	  the	  regime’s	  survival	  and	  its	  importance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   The	  U.S.	  was	  again	  caught	  off	  guard	  when	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  imploded	  in	  November	  1963.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  regime’s	  internal	  rivalries	  and	  divisions	  over	  the	  question	  of	  uniFication	  with	  Syria,	  the	  ousting	  of	  al-­‐Sa’di	  came	  as	  a	  surprise.	  As	  pitched	  battles	  erupted	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  the	  Syrian	  Ba’th	  sought	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  Iraq,	  all	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  could	  do	  was	  monitor	  events	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  military,	  led	  by	  President	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif,	  ousted	  the	  Ba’th,	  neutralized	  the	  National	  Guard,	  and	  took	  control	  of	  the	  country.	  Because	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  confused	  about	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Baghdad,	  they	  had	  no	  way	  to	  inFluence	  events.	  	   The	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  is	  explained	  by	  its	  belief	  that	  Iraq	  was	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  Whenever	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  increased	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  U.S.	  responded	  by	  backing	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  further.	  Washington	  even	  tried	  to	  rob	  Moscow	  of	  its	  Kurdish	  card	  by	  trying	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Douglas	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  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime’s	  signiFicance	  as	  an	  episode	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation	  has	  been	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  in	  the	  broader	  historiography	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.
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Chapter	  4:	  Johnson	  and	  the	  Arab	  NationalistsNovember	  1963—January	  1969
	   This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  during	  the	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  administration.	  Throughout	  Johnson’s	  term	  in	  ofFice,	  Iraq	  experienced	  an	  unprecedented	  period	  of	  stability	  during	  the	  presidencies	  of	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  and	  his	  brother	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif,	  following	  his	  untimely	  death	  in	  April	  1966.	  The	  brothers	  were	  Arab	  nationalist	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  domestically,	  but	  not	  opposed	  to	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Moscow	  internationally.	  This	  represents	  a	  foreign	  policy	  known	  as	  “positive	  neutrality,”	  which	  balanced	  the	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  blocs	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.467	  The	  Johnson	  administration	  accepted	  this	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  Iraq	  did	  not	  adopt	  broader	  policies	  aligned	  with	  Moscow.	  During	  the	  First	  Arif	  regime,	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  remained	  friendly	  but	  never	  like	  under	  the	  Ba’th	  Party.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  unexpected	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif	  in	  1966	  led	  to	  a	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  Ultimately,	  this	  relationship	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  American	  belief	  that	  the	  Arif	  brothers	  were	  considered	  anti-­‐communist.	   Despite	  the	  friendly	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relationship,	  throughout	  the	  Johnson	  years	  America’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  three	  of	  its	  closest	  regional	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  tried	  to	  cultivate	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  its	  allies	  were	  giving	  military	  and	  economic	  support	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  a	  move	  that	  sought	  to	  destabilize	  the	  pro-­‐Nasser	  Arif	  regimes.	  However,	  outside	  aid	  was	  curtailed	  after	  the	  Kurds	  defeated	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Mount	  Handren	  in	  May	  1966	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  issued	  a	  declaration	  promising	  the	  Kurds	  a	  signiFicant	  measure	  of	  autonomy.	  Thereafter,	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  blossomed,	  culminating	  in	  the	  visit	  of	  Five	  Iraqi	  generals	  to	  the	  Oval	  ofFice	  in	  January	  1967.	  Unfortunately,	  any	  progress	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  had	  achieved	  under	  the	  Arif	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brothers	  was	  lost	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  in	  June	  1967,	  prompting	  Iraq	  to	  break	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  America.	  The	  political	  instability	  following	  Israel’s	  stunning	  victory	  provided	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  with	  another	  opportunity	  to	  seize	  power	  in	  July	  1968.	  With	  relations	  severed	  and	  the	  Ba’th	  back	  in	  power,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  helpless	  as	  the	  new	  Ba’thist	  regime	  drew	  Iraq	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  orbit.	   The	  number	  of	  works	  detailing	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  is	  limited,	  with	  only	  Hahn	  providing	  a	  short	  account.	  He	  argued	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  under	  Johnson	  was	  designed	  to	  secure	  the	  Arif	  regimes	  in	  power	  and	  build	  friendly	  relations.468	  Unfortunately,	  Hahn	  leaves	  out	  signiFicant	  details,	  like	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  split	  over	  Iraq	  in	  1964-­‐65.	  It	  is	  instructive	  to	  note	  a	  similar	  divide	  over	  Anglo-­‐American	  policies	  toward	  the	  Yemeni	  Civil	  War	  at	  this	  point.469 	  SigniFicantly,	  Little	  claims	  the	  CIA	  urged	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds.470	  While	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  scholarship	  on	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,471 	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  the	  U.S.	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  prior	  to	  1972.	  While	  Iran’s	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  have	  been	  documented	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  during	  this	  period	  Israel	  became	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  Kurds	  as	  part	  of	  an	  Israeli	  strategy	  known	  as	  the	  “peripheral	  doctrine.”	  This	  doctrine,	  according	  to	  Parsi,	  was	  conceived	  by	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  and	  “held	  that	  the	  improbability	  of	  achieving	  peace	  with	  the	  surrounding	  Arab	  states	  forced	  Israel	  to	  build	  alliances	  with	  the	  non-­‐Arab	  states	  of	  the	  periphery—primarily	  Iran,	  Turkey,	  and	  Ethiopia—as	  well	  as	  with	  non-­‐Arab	  minorities	  such	  as	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  Lebanese	  Christians.”472	  Thus,	  by	  contrast	  to	  America’s	  non-­‐intervention	  policy,	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  onwards	  both	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  supporting	  and	  training	  the	  Kurds.	  	   The	  one	  area	  where	  U.S.	  regional	  policy	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  detail	  is	  its	  response	  to	  Britain’s	  announcement	  in	  1968	  that	  it	  would	  withdraw	  from	  the	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region.	  In	  particular,	  scholars	  have	  focused	  on	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  build	  up	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  as	  ‘twin	  pillars’	  to	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  Filling	  the	  power	  vacuum	  left	  behind.473	  Finally,	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  U.S.	  reaction	  to	  the	  second	  Ba’thist	  coup	  is	  limited,	  with	  Hahn	  arguing	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  initial	  favourable	  assessment	  waned	  rapidly	  as	  the	  regime	  consolidated	  power	  using	  brutal	  force.474	  This	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  provide	  further	  information	  on	  each	  of	  these	  challenges	  to	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  the	  Kurds,	  and	  the	  Gulf	  region.	  
I	   At	  the	  time	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy’s	  assassination,	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  establishment	  was	  busy	  assessing	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  just	  four	  days	  earlier	  by	  an	  Arab	  nationalist	  regime	  with	  strong	  military	  connections.	  While	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  proven	  itself	  anti-­‐communist	  and	  somewhat	  pro-­‐Western,	  the	  level	  of	  brutality	  it	  inFlicted	  on	  Iraq’s	  population	  and	  the	  violent	  way	  in	  which	  it	  had	  imploded	  disturbed	  many	  U.S.	  ofFicials.	  As	  one	  intelligence	  ofFicer	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  observed,	  “given	  the	  Iraqi	  Ba’th's	  particularly	  radical	  ideology	  (and	  bloodbath	  back	  in	  1963),	  there	  was	  no	  interest	  in	  Washington	  in	  having	  that	  gang	  take	  power	  again.”475	  While	  the	  new	  regime	  was	  Arab	  nationalist,	  pro-­‐Nasser,	  and	  seemed	  likely	  to	  balance	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  more	  than	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  it	  would	  maintain	  its	  domestic	  anti-­‐communist	  policies.	  Given	  this,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  inclined	  to	  revert	  back	  to	  a	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  friendly	  relations,	  while	  countering	  any	  Soviet	  bids	  for	  increased	  inFluence.	  	   On	  November	  23,	  1963,	  Phillips	  Talbot,	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  NEA,	  sent,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Rusk	  a	  memo	  summarizing	  the	  status	  of	  the	  region.	  On	  Iraq,	  Talbot	  said	  it	  was	  “too	  early	  to	  be	  sure”	  how	  the	  coup	  would	  affect	  U.S.	  interests,	  but	  “the	  new	  regime	  …	  seem[ed]	  to	  have	  established	  itself	  as	  an	  Iraqi	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nationalist-­‐cum-­‐moderate	  Ba’thist	  government	  relying	  heavily	  on	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Army.”476	  In	  early	  December,	  Robert	  Strong,	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq,	  sent	  Komer	  a	  personal	  letter	  outlining	  the	  steps	  the	  embassy	  had	  taken	  since	  the	  coup	  and	  his	  assessment	  of	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  policy.	  Strong	  reminded	  Robert	  Komer,	  Johnson’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  advisor,	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  President,	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  Egyptian	  President	  Gamal	  Abd	  al-­‐Nasser.	  Strong	  described	  Arif	  as	  pro-­‐union,	  moderate,	  anti-­‐communist,	  and	  had	  the	  strong	  backing	  from	  Iraq’s	  military,	  which	  was	  crucial	  to	  maintaining	  stability.	  Even	  so,	  the	  situation	  remained	  uncertain:There	  are	  too	  many	  unknown	  factors	  at	  present	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  draw	  conclusions,	  including	  the	  behavior	  of	  certain	  key	  people	  under	  varying	  circumstances,	  or	  even	  what	  support	  they	  can	  muster	  from	  where,	  but	  we	  shall	  be	  keeping	  a	  close	  eye	  on	  all	  indicators	  no	  matter	  how	  small.	  Nevertheless,	  Strong	  was	  convinced	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  regime	  maintained	  its	  anti-­‐communist	  stance,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  Find	  areas	  of	  common	  ground.477	  	   Despite	  Iraq’s	  anti-­‐communist	  domestic	  stance,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  concerned	  about	  where	  the	  new	  regime	  stood	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  On	  December	  9,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Research	  (INR)	  circulated	  a	  research	  memo	  assessing	  the	  future	  of	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  The	  report	  concluded	  that	  while	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Iraqi	  communists	  had	  conspired	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime,	  “neither	  played	  a	  detectable	  role	  in	  the	  coup	  …	  thereby	  demonstrating	  their	  inability	  to	  inFluence	  developments	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.”	  After	  the	  coup,	  the	  Soviets	  approached	  the	  new	  regime	  cautiously,	  while	  they	  assessed	  Arif’s	  stability	  and	  political	  orientation.	  The	  INR	  believe	  the	  Soviets	  would	  continue	  to	  press	  for	  a	  Kurdish	  settlement,	  seek	  to	  undermine	  the	  remaining	  Ba’thists	  in	  the	  regime,	  and	  encourage	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  National	  Front	  government	  along	  with	  the	  KDP	  and	  ICP	  by	  offering	  increased	  military	  and	  economic	  assistance	  programs.	  However,	  because	  the	  new	  regime	  unlikely	  to	  make	  concessions	  towards	  the	  Kurds	  or	  align	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itself	  with	  the	  communists,	  the	  INR	  concluded,	  “Soviet	  forbearance	  may	  be	  short-­‐lived.”478	  	   Given	  the	  positive	  assessments	  coming	  from	  diplomats	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Baghdad,	  senior	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington,	  and	  the	  INR,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  concluded	  Iraq	  had	  Finally	  formed	  a	  government	  capable	  of	  stabilizing	  the	  country	  and	  lead	  it	  on	  a	  path	  toward	  development.	  	   But	  before	  this	  could	  happen,	  Arif	  and	  his	  allies	  in	  the	  military	  needed	  to	  consolidate	  power.	  This	  occurred	  in	  two	  steps.	  First,	  on	  January	  5,	  Arif	  removed	  the	  former	  Ba’thist	  prime	  minister,	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr,	  from	  his	  new	  post	  as	  vice	  president	  and	  sent	  him	  into	  exile	  as	  an	  ambassador.	  This	  was	  signiFicant	  because	  al-­‐Bakr	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  few	  inFluential	  holdovers	  from	  the	  previous	  Ba’thist	  regime	  and	  his	  removal	  cut	  the	  Ba’th	  off	  from	  the	  levers	  of	  power.479	  Next,	  Arif	  turned	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  and	  offered	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  Barzani	  recognition	  of	  Kurdish	  national	  rights	  within	  a	  uniFied	  Iraq,	  to	  release	  of	  prisoners,	  reinstate	  government	  administration,	  lift	  the	  economic	  blockade	  against	  Kurdistan,	  and	  rehabilitate	  the	  north	  economically.	  These	  assurances	  were	  formalized	  in	  a	  ceaseFire	  announcement	  on	  February	  10,	  1964.	  While	  clearly	  a	  positive	  step,	  the	  agreement	  proved	  to	  be	  divisive	  within	  the	  Kurdish	  ranks,	  leading	  two	  senior	  KDP	  ofFicials,	  Jalal	  Talabani	  and	  Ibrahim	  Ahmed,	  to	  denounce	  the	  agreement	  because	  provisions	  for	  local	  self-­‐administration	  had	  been	  excluded,	  eventually	  splitting	  the	  party	  into	  two	  competing	  factions	  from	  the	  agreement.480	  	   The	  U.S.	  viewed	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  the	  Arif	  regime	  as	  a	  positive	  development	  because	  of	  its	  anti-­‐communist	  outlook,	  its	  support	  from	  Iraq’s	  military,	  and	  potential	  capability	  to	  achieve	  stability.	  The	  removal	  of	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  the	  truce	  with	  Barzani	  allowed	  Arif	  to	  restore	  stability	  and	  bring	  about	  Iraq’s	  uniFication	  with	  Egypt.	  However,	  the	  prospect	  of	  Nasser	  taking	  control	  of	  Iraq	  and	  establishing	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Egyptian	  inFluence	  in	  the	  Gulf	  region	  caused	  concern	  among	  America’s	  closest	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.
II	   Throughout	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1964,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  at	  clear	  odds	  with	  the	  policies	  of	  its	  closest	  regional	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  While	  the	  differences	  with	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  were	  superFicial	  and	  mostly	  related	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  and	  Nasser’s	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad,	  America’s	  differences	  with	  Britain	  over	  Iraq—much	  like	  the	  conFlict	  in	  Yemen—reFlected	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  ‘special	  relationship’	  between	  August	  and	  October	  1964.481	  The	  break	  was	  so	  apparent	  that	  Strong	  felt	  compelled	  to	  write	  both	  Talbot	  and	  Komer	  “informal”	  letters	  warning	  them	  of	  the	  duplicitous	  nature	  of	  British	  policy.482	  One	  aspect	  of	  particular	  concern	  was	  Britain’s	  interest—along	  with	  Iran	  and	  later	  Israel—in	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  in	  their	  war	  with	  Baghdad.	  It	  seems	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  three	  parties	  coalesced	  around	  two	  central	  points:	  a	  mutual	  hatred	  of	  Nasser,	  who	  by	  this	  point	  had	  considerable	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad	  as	  the	  two	  countries	  made	  moves	  toward	  unity,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Kurds	  a	  useful	  coercive	  tool	  to	  be	  used	  either	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Arif	  regime,	  destabilize	  it	  to	  the	  point	  that	  Nasser	  would	  lose	  interest	  in	  unity,	  or	  tie	  down	  Iraq’s	  military	  inside	  the	  country	  so	  it	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  threaten	  British	  or	  Iranian	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf	  or	  in	  a	  war	  against	  Israel.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  not	  blind	  to	  the	  danger	  posed	  by	  Nasser’s	  potential	  domination	  of	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Gulf,	  but	  it	  saw	  the	  Arif	  regime	  as	  the	  best	  possible	  government	  in	  Iraq.	  This	  suggests	  that	  during	  1964-­‐65	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  reFlected	  a	  realist	  assessment	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  while	  its	  closest	  allies	  viewed	  Iraq	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  regional	  interests.
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   At	  some	  point	  in	  August	  1964,	  a	  British	  ofFicial—likely	  the	  MI6	  station	  chief—approached	  the	  CIA	  station	  chief	  at	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad.	  According	  to	  a	  memo	  detailing	  the	  encounter,	  the	  British	  ofFicial	  was	  “seeking	  on	  a	  personal	  basis	  to	  enlist	  US	  support	  in	  a	  campaign	  against	  Nasser	  and	  [Egyptian]-­‐Iraqi	  unity.”	  Britain’s	  Conservative	  government,	  led	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Alec	  Douglas-­‐Home,	  faced	  a	  general	  election	  in	  mid-­‐October,	  and	  had	  decided	  it	  “could	  not	  live	  with	  Nasser	  and	  must	  do	  something	  about	  him,	  and	  they	  could	  not	  stand	  [Egyptian]-­‐Iraqi	  unity	  because	  of	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf.”	  To	  prevent	  this,	  the	  ofFicial	  revealed,	  the	  British	  “intended	  to	  work	  with	  Iran	  against	  Nasser	  and	  the	  Aref	  regime.”	  The	  memo	  indicated	  a	  similar	  approach	  had	  been	  made	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Washington,	  though	  details	  are	  not	  available.	  The	  station	  chief	  gave	  “a	  strong	  negative	  answer”	  to	  the	  British	  proposal,	  arguing	  it	  was	  a	  “wrong”	  approach	  and	  that	  neither	  the	  British	  nor	  the	  Iranians	  had	  the	  assets	  to	  execute	  this	  operation	  successfully.483	  Also	  in	  August,	  the	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  learned	  the	  British	  Embassy’s	  First	  Secretary,	  Stephen	  Egerton,	  had	  met	  with	  a	  group	  of	  Kurds	  and	  urged	  them	  to	  renew	  the	  military	  conFlict	  with	  Baghdad,	  take	  a	  “strong	  anti-­‐Nasser	  line,”	  and	  promised	  British	  support	  through	  Iran.484	  Finally,	  Egerton	  took	  a	  similar	  line	  with	  a	  pro-­‐Barzani	  Kurd	  named	  Shaqat	  Aqrawi	  during	  a	  meeting	  held	  at	  the	  Baghdad	  home	  of	  a	  U.S.	  ofFicial,	  Jim	  Atkins,	  though	  Egerton’s	  promises	  of	  British	  aid	  not	  raised.485	  Taken	  together,	  these	  incidents	  suggest	  that	  British	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  were	  seeking	  Kurdish	  support	  to	  destabilize	  the	  Arif	  regime	  in	  August	  1964.	  Further,	  it	  also	  indicates	  that	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  had	  opposed	  these	  efforts.	   Given	  the	  scale	  of	  British	  plotting	  at	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  foiled	  a	  Ba’thist	  plot	  in	  early	  September	  aimed	  at	  returning	  to	  power.	  Though	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  evidence	  implicating	  them,	  Britain’s	  connection	  to	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  went	  back	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  the	  June	  1962	  coup	  plot	  against	  Qasim.	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Nevertheless,	  Iraqi	  news	  reports	  connected	  former	  Ba’thist	  premier	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr	  to	  the	  plot.486	  But	  regardless	  of	  who	  was	  behind	  it,	  the	  plot	  allowed	  Arif	  to	  order	  a	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  leading	  to	  the	  arrest	  of	  over	  a	  thousand	  people.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Nasser’s	  fortunes	  in	  Iraq	  increased	  when	  he	  dispatched	  Egyptian	  troops	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  help	  bolster	  the	  regime.	  As	  a	  reward,	  Arif	  appointed	  Nasserist	  elements	  to	  seats	  in	  his	  cabinet.	  The	  failed	  coup	  allowed	  Arif	  to	  strengthen	  his	  grip	  on	  power	  and	  raise	  Iraqi-­‐Egyptian	  relations	  to	  a	  new	  high.	  It	  would	  also	  lead	  to	  increased	  pressure	  on	  both	  Arif	  and	  Nasser	  for	  uniFication,	  but,	  as	  Tripp	  points	  out,	  both	  held	  private	  reservations.487	  	   The	  rise	  in	  Nasser’s	  fortunes	  following	  the	  failed	  coup	  in	  Iraq	  was	  viewed	  by	  London,	  Tehran,	  and	  Tel	  Aviv	  as	  a	  highly	  negative	  development	  and	  led	  to	  increased	  pressure	  on	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  Fighting.	  Consequently,	  in	  October	  Barzani	  deFied	  the	  regime	  openly	  by	  establishing	  a	  forty-­‐three	  member	  legislature,	  a	  revolutionary	  council	  to	  direct	  the	  war,	  and	  an	  executive	  committee	  with	  eleven	  members	  that	  Barzani	  would	  chair.488	  In	  addition,	  he	  sent	  Arif	  a	  public	  letter	  on	  October	  11	  accusing	  the	  government	  of	  failing	  to	  implement	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  February	  ceaseFire.	  Barzani’s	  public	  slap	  at	  the	  Arif	  regime	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  escalation	  of	  tension.	  Refusing	  to	  acknowledge	  Barzani’s	  demands,	  Baghdad	  insisted	  the	  Kurds	  withdraw	  the	  Kurdish	  military—known	  as	  the	  Peshmerga	  or	  “those	  who	  seek	  death”—from	  major	  roads,	  cease	  military	  activities,	  return	  captured	  weapons	  to	  the	  army,	  and	  permit	  the	  central	  government	  to	  administer	  the	  region.	  The	  regime’s	  uncompromising	  response	  to	  Barzani’s	  letter	  perplexed	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad,	  who	  argued	  it	  was	  because	  of	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  security	  after	  a	  year	  without	  war.	  Apparently,	  as	  one	  analyst	  noted,	  Iraq’s	  generals	  had	  forgotten	  how	  calamitous	  their	  previous	  efforts	  at	  using	  military	  force	  against	  the	  Kurds	  had	  been.489	   Not	  long	  after	  the	  foiled	  coup,	  U.S.	  and	  British	  ofFicials	  met	  in	  Washington	  in	  order	  to	  realign	  their	  regional	  policies.	  Representing	  the	  U.S.	  was	  Rodger	  Davies,	  the	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director	  of	  the	  NEA,	  and	  on	  the	  British	  side	  was	  John	  Killick,	  the	  British	  Embassy	  to	  Washington’s	  Counselor.	  Davies	  opened	  by	  pointing	  out	  both	  sides	  had	  the	  same	  overall	  objectives	  in	  the	  Near	  East:	  they	  wished	  to	  prevent	  Egypt	  from	  imposing	  itself	  on	  the	  area	  or	  Egyptian-­‐dominated	  Arab	  solidarity.	  The	  point	  of	  departure,	  however,	  was	  on	  the	  methods	  needed	  to	  attain	  these	  objectives.	  Davies	  admitted	  “some	  courses	  of	  action	  proposed	  by	  London	  [had]	  caused	  concern	  [in	  Washington]	  since	  they	  could	  only	  lead	  to	  a	  confrontation	  with	  [Egypt]	  and	  Arab	  nationalism	  in	  situations	  where	  it	  [was]	  doubtful	  that	  the	  West	  had	  the	  capabilities	  to	  come	  out	  on	  top.”	  On	  Iraq,	  Killick	  said	  his	  government	  feared	  increasing	  instability	  because	  the	  Arif	  regime	  lacked	  the	  means	  to	  implement	  the	  socialized	  state	  it	  was	  seeking.	  Turning	  to	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Davies	  pointed	  to	  a	  recent	  intelligence	  estimate	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  objectives	  in	  the	  region:	  The	  estimate	  concluded	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  based	  on	  an	  assessment	  that	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  Cairo	  would	  always	  have	  more	  inFluence	  than	  Moscow,	  that	  any	  losses	  to	  [their]	  position	  throughout	  the	  area	  occasioned	  by	  Nasser's	  Arab	  nationalist	  drive	  would	  be	  essentially	  peripheral	  …	  and	  that	  [their]	  basic	  interests	  in	  the	  Near	  East	  would	  be	  maintained.	  Davies	  argued	  that	  forcing	  a	  confrontation	  with	  Nasser	  over	  the	  Arab	  world	  would	  inevitably	  threaten	  Western	  interests	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  establishment	  of	  a	  “true	  Communist	  puppet	  state”	  in	  the	  area,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  problem	  of	  a	  “much	  greater	  magnitude.”	  Given	  this	  assessment,	  Davies	  suggested	  the	  best	  track	  to	  proceed	  would	  be	  to	  “improve	  [their]	  capability	  to	  inFluence	  trends	  in	  [Egypt]	  …	  by	  increasing	  [their]	  aid	  to	  that	  country.”	  Killick	  responded	  with	  agreement	  of	  the	  U.S.	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation,	  but	  there	  was	  a	  “great	  deal	  of	  emotionalism”	  in	  London	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  election	  over	  issues	  concerning	  the	  Middle	  East.	  That	  said,	  he	  felt	  it	  best	  that	  both	  countries	  to	  delay	  confrontation	  over	  their	  policies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  until	  after	  the	  American	  and	  British	  general	  elections	  that	  fall.	  Even	  so,	  Davies	  closed	  the	  discussion	  by	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  U.S.	  recognized	  that	  Nasser	  aspired	  to	  dominate	  the	  Arab	  world,	  but	  did	  believe	  he	  had	  the	  capability	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  the	  Arabs	  …	  will	  be	  the	  ones	  able	  to	  give	  check	  to	  Nasser	  if	  we	  do	  not	  unnecessarily	  interpose	  ourselves	  between	  them	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in	  their	  disputes	  and	  give	  free	  rein	  to	  the	  divergent	  and	  divisive	  forces	  among	  them.	  Western	  intervention	  could	  only	  consolidate	  the	  Arabs.This	  conversation,	  while	  seeking	  to	  reconcile	  the	  two	  side’s	  differences,	  ended	  up	  emphasizing	  the	  gulf	  between	  them.	  The	  fact	  was	  the	  British	  saw	  matters	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  regional	  interests	  and	  their	  confrontation	  with	  Nasser,	  while	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  perceived	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  America’s	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Soviets.490	  	   By	  mid-­‐October	  it	  was	  clear	  whatever	  progress	  might	  have	  resulted	  from	  the	  Washington	  talks	  had	  been	  for	  naught.	  At	  this	  point	  Strong,	  who	  had	  been	  present	  during	  the	  Washington	  talks,	  wrote	  to	  Talbot	  and	  Komer	  to	  question	  the	  integrity	  of	  British	  policy.	  While	  noting	  that	  British	  Embassy	  ofFicials	  had	  been	  “busily	  reassuring”	  the	  embassy	  of	  their	  agreement	  with	  U.S.	  policy,	  Strong	  was	  not	  convinced	  of	  sincerity.	  In	  his	  letter	  to	  Talbot	  on	  October	  15	  he	  concluded	  British	  “games	  [were]	  going	  on.”491	  Two	  days	  later,	  he	  wrote	  to	  Komer	  that	  he	  “deeply	  doubted”	  the	  British	  Embassy’s	  sincerity	  about	  how	  “in	  tune”	  Anglo-­‐American	  policies	  toward	  Iraq	  were,	  because	  there	  were	  “too	  many	  indicators	  otherwise.”	  Indeed,	  Strong	  was	  convinced	  Britain	  was	  engaged	  in	  a	  “fully	  covert”	  program,	  possibly	  in	  concert	  with	  Iran	  and	  Israel,	  “with	  one	  policy	  being	  followed	  on	  the	  surface	  and	  the	  other	  through	  the	  clandestine	  mechanism,”	  comparing	  it	  to	  Britain’s	  similar	  actions	  in	  Yemen.492	   In	  a	  separate	  document,	  Strong	  raised	  concerns	  about	  British-­‐Iranian	  collusion	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  After	  recounting	  Britain’s	  efforts	  in	  August	  to	  seek	  U.S.	  assistance,	  Strong	  pointed	  out	  that	  for	  two	  weeks	  in	  August	  the	  head	  of	  Iranian	  intelligence,	  Major	  General	  Hassan	  Pakravan,	  travelled	  to	  London	  to	  meet	  with	  British	  ofFicials.	  Though	  he	  had	  no	  information	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  visit,	  Strong	  felt	  it	  was	  noteworthy.493 	  Recall	  that	  Pakravan	  had	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  Kurds	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  Kurdish-­‐Ba’thist	  ceaseFire	  in	  August	  1963.	  Since	  mid-­‐1962,	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the	  Shah	  had	  viewed	  the	  Kurds	  as	  a	  useful	  coercive	  tool	  to	  increase	  pressure	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  tie	  it	  down	  militarily,	  and	  make	  a	  union	  with	  Egypt	  more	  challenging.	  Up	  to	  this	  point,	  his	  tactics	  had	  worked.	  	   Perhaps	  of	  greatest	  signiFicance,	  Strong’s	  memo	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  Israeli	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  for	  the	  First	  time:	  Israel	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Iran	  and	  is	  known	  to	  be	  supporting	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurds.	  Britain	  shares	  with	  Israel	  and	  the	  Shah	  a	  deep	  antipathy	  for	  Nasser….	  It	  requires	  little	  imagination	  to	  conceive	  that,	  given	  the	  depth	  of	  [British]	  hostility	  to	  Nasser	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Gulf	  to	  the	  UK,	  the	  British	  may	  well	  engage	  in	  covert	  cooperation	  with	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  against	  a	  Nasserist	  dominated	  Iraqi	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  against	  Nasser	  elsewhere.494According	  to	  Eliezer	  Tsafrir,	  the	  head	  of	  Mossad’s	  operations	  inside	  Iraq	  during	  the	  1960s,	  in	  1964	  Barzani’s	  representative	  in	  Paris,	  Amir	  Badr-­‐Khan	  Kamuran,	  approached	  the	  Israeli	  Embassy	  and	  made	  an	  appeal	  for	  help.	  Immediately,	  the	  Israelis	  were	  seduced	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  having	  a	  strategic	  ally	  inside	  Iraq.	  The	  request	  was	  forwarded	  on	  to	  Tel-­‐Aviv	  and	  soon	  made	  its	  way	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  Israeli	  government	  where	  the	  “matter	  was	  discussed	  and	  decided	  positively	  by	  David	  Ben	  Gurion,	  who	  appointed	  the	  Mossad	  to	  be	  in	  charge.”	  Soon	  thereafter,	  Badr-­‐Khan	  was	  invited	  to	  visit	  Israel.495 	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  Kurdish-­‐Israeli	  alliance	  was	  a	  perfect	  marriage	  of	  convenience.	  In	  return	  for	  access	  to	  Israel’s	  considerable	  military	  experience,	  advanced	  weaponry,	  and	  intelligence	  tactics,	  the	  Kurds	  would	  maintain	  a	  near-­‐constant	  state	  of	  revolt	  tying	  down	  the	  Iraqi	  military	  inside	  Iraq	  and	  rendering	  it	  incapable	  of	  being	  used	  in	  a	  wider	  Arab	  war	  with	  Israel.	  	   The	  growing	  international	  involvement	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.	  For	  instance,	  when	  Secretary	  Rusk	  met	  with	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Naji	  Talib,	  on	  December	  10	  at	  the	  annual	  UNGA	  meeting,	  he	  complained	  about	  the	  Kurds	  receiving	  assistance	  from	  “unidentiFied	  forces.”	  Describing	  the	  Kurds	  as	  “poor	  people,”	  he	  asked	  where	  they	  were	  “getting	  money	  from	  to	  buy	  staple	  foods,	  arms,	  and	  equipment	  ...	  who	  these	  mysterious	  forces	  [were	  and]	  what	  [did]	  they	  want[?]”	  Rusk	  assured	  Talib	  the	  U.S.	  was	  “not	  directly	  or	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indirectly	  supporting	  the	  Kurdish	  movement”	  and	  had	  “no	  other	  interest	  in	  Iraq	  affairs”	  other	  than	  maintaining	  its	  independence,	  integrity,	  and	  prosperity.	  Thanking	  him,	  Talib	  asked	  if	  Rusk	  could	  look	  into	  who	  was	  helping	  the	  Kurds	  and	  what	  their	  motivations	  were.496	  This	  exchange	  indicated	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  aware	  external	  forces—likely	  Iran—were	  plotting	  against	  it,	  though	  Talib	  was	  treading	  carefully	  with	  Rusk	  to	  prevent	  any	  suggestion	  that	  the	  U.S.	  were	  also	  complicit.	  	   A	  few	  days	  later,	  a	  group	  of	  Barzani	  Kurds	  informed	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  that	  Iran	  was	  urging	  them	  to	  resume	  Fighting	  and	  had	  asked	  them	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  plot	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Arif	  regime.497	  When	  word	  of	  this	  reached	  Washington,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  rejected	  involvement	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  “any	  scheme	  to	  overthrow	  [the]	  Iraq	  government	  would	  not	  guarantee	  [the]	  establishment	  [of	  a]	  regime	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  Kurdish	  aspirations.”	  It	  reasoned	  that	  the	  plot	  was	  “bound	  to	  be	  uncovered	  sooner	  or	  later”	  and	  when	  that	  happened	  the	  “Kurds	  would	  have	  exposed	  themselves	  as	  willing	  collaborators	  with	  Iranian	  intrigue	  against	  [the]	  government	  [of]	  Iraq	  thus	  earning	  deepened	  Arab	  suspicion	  and	  resentment	  of	  Kurdish	  ambitions.”	  Further,	  the	  U.S.	  felt	  there	  was	  “good	  reason	  to	  believe	  [Iraq	  was]	  already	  privy	  to	  Iranian	  subversive	  activity,”	  a	  clear	  reference	  to	  Rusk’s	  talk	  at	  the	  UN.498	  Once	  again,	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  reaction	  to	  this	  plot	  reFlected	  a	  clear	  break	  from	  its	  allies	  over	  the	  question	  of	  Iraq.	  	   By	  the	  start	  of	  1965,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel	  were	  pressing	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  with	  Baghdad.	  But	  just	  as	  tensions	  mounted,	  Barzani	  shocked	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  mid-­‐January	  1965	  when	  he	  sent	  the	  regime	  a	  letter	  admitting	  his	  previous	  demands	  had	  “been	  excessive”	  and	  presented	  a	  “minimum”	  offer	  for	  autonomy,	  effectively	  dropping	  all	  his	  previous	  demands	  except	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  2-­‐3,000-­‐man	  Peshmerga	  force.	  Aware	  of	  the	  level	  of	  pressure	  on	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  the	  war,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  described	  Barzani’s	  letter	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  startling	  development[s]	  of	  the	  entire	  revolt.”	  After	  all,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  Barzani	  was	  weak,	  since	  he	  had	  held	  out	  against	  the	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government’s	  vicious	  assaults	  for	  years.	  This	  led	  the	  embassy	  to	  suspect	  the	  letter	  was	  part	  of	  a	  psychological	  campaign	  to	  goad	  the	  regime	  attacking	  First,	  allowing	  Barzani	  to	  claim	  a	  moral	  victory.	  Intended	  or	  not,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  reported,	  the	  letter	  had	  convinced	  the	  regime’s	  Barzani	  was	  weak,	  leading	  it	  to	  begin	  preparations	  for	  war.499	  	   As	  the	  situation	  deteriorated,	  Nasser	  became	  concerned	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  would	  threaten	  his	  strong	  position	  in	  Iraq	  and	  disrupt	  plans	  for	  uniFication.	  Indeed,	  in	  October	  1964	  he	  had	  informed	  Arif	  that	  uniFication	  was	  contingent	  on	  settling	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  through	  political	  and	  not	  military	  means.500	  As	  Iraqi	  preparations	  for	  war	  increased,	  Nasser	  sent	  Barzani	  an	  ineffective	  letter	  on	  February	  22	  urging	  him	  to	  surrender.	  According	  to	  O’Ballance,	  on	  April	  3	  Iraqi	  Prime	  Minister	  Tahir	  Yahya	  informed	  Nasser	  the	  regime	  was	  about	  to	  launch	  an	  offensive.	  Nasser	  responded	  with	  a	  furious	  tirade,	  warning	  Yahya	  force	  was	  doomed	  to	  fail	  and	  diplomacy	  needed	  to	  be	  given	  another	  chance.	  The	  regime	  ignored	  these	  warnings	  and	  on	  April	  5	  launched	  a	  three-­‐prong	  offensive	  against	  the	  Kurds	  using	  40,000	  troops.501	   The	  period	  between	  August	  1964	  and	  April	  1965	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  sharp	  contrast	  between	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  that	  of	  its	  close	  regional	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  wished	  to	  maintain	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Arif	  regime,	  it	  was	  willing	  to	  overlook	  its	  relationship	  with	  Nasser,	  whose	  popular,	  pan-­‐Arabist	  ideology	  was	  assessed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  as	  potential	  ideological	  bulwark	  to	  communism.	  In	  short,	  U.S.	  interest	  in	  the	  Arif	  regime	  stemmed	  from	  its	  desire	  to	  keep	  Iraq	  out	  of	  the	  Soviet	  camp.	  But	  America’s	  allies	  viewed	  the	  Arif	  regime	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  Nasser	  in	  a	  much	  different	  light.	  Britain’s	  loathing	  of	  Nasser	  and	  longstanding	  strategic	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf	  trumped	  Cold	  War	  considerations	  when	  assessing	  its	  national	  interests	  in	  Iraq.	  For	  similar	  reasons,	  the	  Shah	  wanted	  to	  limit	  Nasser’s	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Gulf,	  since	  he	  had	  his	  own	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imperial	  designs	  for	  the	  region.	  He	  also	  saw	  the	  Kurds	  as	  a	  useful	  means	  of	  coercing	  Iraq	  into	  territorial	  concessions	  he	  had	  long	  coveted.	  The	  Israelis,	  however,	  saw	  Iraq	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  wider	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  struggle,	  believing	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  would	  tie	  down	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  inside	  Iraq	  and	  limit	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  major	  Arab-­‐Israel	  war.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  policies	  of	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel	  were	  all	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  of	  the	  U.S.	  with	  respect	  to	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  
III	   The	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  put	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  overriding	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  to	  maintain	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Arif	  regime	  and	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  Iraq’s	  sovereignty.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  war’s	  renewal	  guaranteed	  that	  two	  of	  America’s	  closest	  regional	  allies,	  Iran	  and	  Israel,	  would	  increase	  their	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Eventually,	  the	  Iraqis	  urged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  convince	  Iran	  to	  cease	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  America’s	  entreaties	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  So	  long	  as	  Arif	  maintained	  close	  relations	  with	  Nasser,	  the	  Shah	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  abandoning	  his	  “Kurdish	  card,”	  unless,	  of	  course,	  Iraq	  was	  willing	  to	  make	  territorial	  concessions	  over	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway—which	  his	  father	  had	  conceded	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  monarchy	  in	  1937.	  This,	  however,	  was	  unlikely	  because	  no	  Iraqi	  government	  could	  ever	  concede	  Arab	  territory	  to	  the	  Persians.	  	   Just	  after	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  Secretary	  Rusk	  traveled	  to	  Tehran	  for	  a	  CENTO	  meeting.	  On	  April	  7,	  he	  met	  with	  the	  Shah	  and	  discussed	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq.	  During	  the	  conversation	  the	  Shah	  admitted	  to	  helping	  the	  Kurds,	  indicating	  he	  was	  using	  them	  as	  “a	  trump	  card”	  against	  Iraq,	  which	  he	  would	  not	  relinquish	  so	  long	  as	  Arif	  remained	  in	  league	  with	  Nasser.	  Even	  so,	  the	  Shah	  denied	  he	  was	  encouraging	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  hostilities	  with	  Baghdad,	  while	  making	  it	  perfectly	  clear	  he	  had	  every	  intention	  of	  abandoning	  the	  Kurds	  if	  “a	  national	  government	  [was]	  established	  in	  Baghdad.”502	  This	  acknowledgement	  is	  signiFicant	  since	  it	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foreshadowed	  the	  Shah’s	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Kurds	  almost	  a	  decade	  later,	  in	  March	  1975.503	   At	  the	  end	  of	  April,	  Iraq’s	  growing	  frustration	  with	  Iranian	  interference	  in	  the	  war	  became	  evident	  when	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  Minister	  Talib	  cornered	  Strong	  at	  a	  reception	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  accused	  Iran	  directly	  of	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  for	  the	  First	  time.	  He	  was	  convinced	  the	  Kurdish	  campaign’s	  failure	  was	  because	  of	  Iran,	  telling	  Strong	  he	  had	  learned	  that	  “several	  loads	  of	  unidentiFied	  equipment”	  had	  been	  “transported	  onto	  Iraqi	  soil	  in	  jeeps	  without	  license	  plates”	  from	  Iran.	  Given	  this,	  he	  asked	  that	  the	  U.S.	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  Shah	  to	  change	  his	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  Talib	  also	  demanded	  to	  know	  what	  was	  discussed	  at	  the	  recent	  CENTO	  meeting	  in	  Tehran.	  Strong	  denied	  the	  Kurds	  were	  a	  topic	  of	  discussion,	  reminded	  him	  Turkey	  had	  long	  been	  cooperative	  with	  Iraq	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  pointed	  out	  Pakistan	  had	  sought	  to	  mediate	  a	  rapprochement	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  argued	  that	  aiding	  the	  Kurds	  was	  not	  in	  CENTO’s	  interests.	  Strong	  reiterated	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  and	  said	  he	  would	  report	  the	  conversation	  to	  Washington.	  When	  Strong	  requested	  guidance	  from	  State	  on	  April	  30,	  he	  complained	  that	  he	  had	  “about	  run	  out	  of	  arguments	  on	  Kurds-­‐Iran-­‐Iraq	  triangle	  except	  possibly	  point[ing]	  out	  Arab	  interference	  in	  Khuzistan	  [could	  not]	  be	  ignored	  by	  [the]	  Shah	  …	  [and	  it]	  seem[ed]	  useless	  any	  longer	  [to]	  try	  [to]	  pretend	  Iran	  [was]	  not	  helping	  [the]	  Kurds.”	  The	  department	  responded	  on	  May	  4	  stating,	  “it	  was	  unlikely	  that	  further	  arguments	  could	  erase	  the	  Foreign	  Minister's	  suspicions,	  but	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  should	  continue	  to	  reiterate	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  line.”	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  CENTO	  meeting,	  the	  department	  advised	  Strong	  to	  “tell	  Talib	  that	  Secretary	  Rusk	  had	  not	  brought	  any	  new	  element	  into	  his	  discussion	  of	  Iranian	  security	  with	  the	  Shah.”504	  	   In	  May	  1965,	  Israel’s	  involvement	  with	  the	  Kurds	  escalated	  when	  David	  Kimche,	  an	  experienced	  Mossad	  operative,	  who	  was	  later	  Mossad’s	  deputy	  chief	  and	  director	  general	  of	  the	  foreign	  ministry,	  traveled	  secretly	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  meet	  with	  Barzani.	  According	  to	  Trita	  Parsi,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  meeting	  was	  to	  “check	  if	  the	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situation	  permit[ed]	  a	  permanent	  presence	  of	  Mossad	  operatives	  [in	  Iraq].”	  Kimche	  was	  impressed	  by	  his	  visit	  to	  Kurdistan	  and	  believed	  an	  operation	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  Fight	  Baghdad	  was	  crucial	  to	  Israeli	  security.	  However,	  for	  the	  Israelis	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds,	  they	  needed	  either	  Iranian	  acquiescence	  or	  involvement	  in	  the	  operation.	  Fortunately,	  this	  was	  easy	  given	  the	  Shah’s	  existing	  program,	  but	  the	  Iranians	  insisted	  any	  operation	  be	  coordinated	  with	  SAVAK.505 	  Eliezer	  Tsafrir	  conFirmed	  this	  account	  and	  indicated	  Israel	  agreed	  to	  exchange	  information	  with	  the	  Kurds	  on	  common	  interests	  (i.e.,	  intelligence	  on	  Iraq);	  supply	  them	  arms,	  ammunition,	  and	  technicians;	  offer	  courses	  in	  military	  training,	  conducted	  in	  Kurdistan,	  Israel,	  and	  Iran;	  and	  help	  with	  political	  lobbying	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe.506	  	   The	  impact	  of	  Israel’s	  involvement	  was	  apparent	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  immediately.	  For	  instance,	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  May	  the	  embassy	  noticed	  a	  marked	  improvement	  in	  the	  Kurds’	  tactics.	  In	  the	  past	  the	  Kurds	  had	  shown	  “little	  aptitude	  for	  guerrilla	  warfare”	  and	  had	  only	  been	  victorious	  due	  to	  the	  “gross	  incompetence”	  of	  Iraq’s	  military,	  but	  since	  the	  February	  1964	  ceaseFire	  the	  Kurds	  had	  improved	  tactically.	  Unlike	  before,	  they	  now	  “refused	  to	  defend	  Flat	  areas,	  [had]	  let	  the	  government	  move	  into	  the	  mountains	  albeit	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  some	  casualties,	  [had]	  attacked	  army	  supply	  lines	  and	  [were]	  now	  apparently	  attacking	  bivouac	  areas.”	  This	  led	  the	  embassy	  to	  the	  conclusion,	  “it	  now	  seem[ed]	  clear	  …	  that	  the	  Kurds	  [were]	  getting	  some	  assistance,	  possibly	  even	  training,	  from	  Israel.”507	  	   In	  early	  August,	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  summoned	  J.	  Wesley	  Adams,	  the	  U.S.	  Chargé	  d’Affairs	  in	  Baghdad,	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  to	  ask	  “in	  the	  strongest	  terms”	  that	  the	  U.S.	  urge	  Iran	  to	  cease	  arming	  the	  Kurds.	  In	  his	  report	  to	  Washington,	  Adams	  indicated,	  “Iraq	  now	  has	  fairly	  accurate	  information	  [on	  the]	  nature	  and	  extent	  [of]	  Iranian	  assistance,”	  which	  put	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  very	  difFicult	  position	  since	  Iraq’s	  “request	  for	  support	  [in]	  efforts	  [to]	  halt	  [the]	  Flow	  of	  arms	  from	  Iran	  to	  dissident	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  [could	  not]	  reasonably	  be	  refused.”	  Given	  this,	  he	  asked	  for	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  proceed.	  In	  response,	  the	  department	  advised	  Tehran	  to	  inform	  the	  Iranian	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government	  of	  Iraq’s	  request	  and	  to	  express	  America’s	  “concern	  over	  pressures	  by	  Iraqis	  arising	  out	  of	  Iranian	  assistance	  to	  Kurds.”	  When	  this	  was	  done	  on	  August	  13,	  Iranian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Abbas	  Aram	  appeared	  “distressed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  matter”	  and	  insisted	  that	  “Iran	  was	  not	  aiding	  the	  Kurds,”	  arguing	  instead	  that	  Iraq	  was	  “following	  a	  studied	  policy	  of	  annoying	  Iran.”508	  Aram’s	  denial,	  of	  course,	  was	  in	  direct	  contradiction	  of	  what	  the	  Shah	  had	  told	  Rusk	  a	  few	  months	  earlier	  at	  the	  CENTO	  meeting,	  not	  to	  mention	  a	  large	  body	  of	  evidence	  suggesting	  otherwise.	  Even	  so,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  U.S.	  raised	  this	  matter	  with	  the	  Iranian	  government	  shows	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  shared	  Iraq’s	  concern	  about	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  and	  the	  interference	  of	  its	  allies.	   The	  Johnson	  administration’s	  friendly	  attitude	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  only	  reinforced	  in	  August	  after	  a	  failed	  coup	  by	  newly	  appointed	  Prime	  Minister	  Aref	  Abdul	  Razzak,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  al-­‐Bazzaz,	  Western	  oriented	  lawyer	  and	  academic	  with	  virtually	  no	  links	  to	  any	  political	  party	  or	  the	  military.	  SigniFicantly,	  Bazzaz	  was	  the	  First	  civilian	  to	  lead	  Iraq	  since	  the	  1958	  revolution.	  The	  attempted	  coup	  also	  gave	  Arif	  a	  reason	  to	  break	  with	  the	  Nasserist	  elements	  in	  Iraq	  and	  assert	  his	  own	  personal	  rule,	  something	  he	  had	  been	  longing	  for	  since	  seizing	  power	  in	  1963.509	   The	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  put	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position.	  While	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  America’s	  allies	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  had	  escalated	  their	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Consequently,	  it	  could	  not	  reasonably	  reject	  Iraqi	  requests	  to	  urge	  Iran	  to	  cease	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  But	  with	  two	  U.S.	  allies,	  Iran	  and	  Israel,	  now	  backing	  the	  Kurds	  against	  Iraq,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  had	  clearly	  transitioned	  from	  being	  a	  Cold	  War	  conFlict	  to	  a	  regional	  one.	  
IV	   The	  Johnson	  administration	  viewed	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  civilian	  leadership	  in	  Iraq	  as	  a	  positive	  development,	  especially	  since	  they	  were	  pressing	  to	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limit	  the	  military’s	  inFluence	  over	  Iraqi	  politics.	  Unfortunately,	  Iran’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  continued	  to	  mire	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  However,	  two	  unanticipated	  events	  would	  forever	  change	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  question:	  the	  unexpected	  death	  of	  Iraq’s	  president	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  in	  April	  1966	  and	  the	  decimation	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  by	  Barzani’s	  forces—who	  were	  commanded	  by	  Israeli	  special	  forces—at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Mount	  Handren	  in	  May	  1966.	  In	  the	  aftermath,	  the	  Bazzaz	  government	  sought	  peace	  with	  the	  Kurds	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  dramatic	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	   The	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  pleased	  with	  Bazzaz’s	  appointment	  and	  Iraq’s	  return	  to	  civilian	  rule.	  Indeed,	  when	  Bazzaz	  arrived	  in	  New	  York	  for	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  October	  1965	  not	  only	  Secretary	  Rusk	  but	  also	  Vice	  President	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  greeted	  him.510 	  During	  both	  meetings	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  loomed	  large,	  but	  so	  too	  did	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  Barzani.	  Bazzaz	  told	  Rusk	  he	  wanted	  the	  Iranians	  to	  understand	  they	  “were	  creating	  future	  trouble	  for	  themselves	  by	  continuing	  clandestine	  assistance	  to	  the	  Iraqi-­‐Kurdish	  insurgents.”	  He	  then	  repeated	  previous	  requests	  that	  the	  U.S.	  urge	  the	  Shah	  to	  consider	  the	  “inadvisability	  of	  his	  policy.”	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  stressed	  that	  he	  was	  not	  asking	  the	  United	  States	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  Iran	  but	  only	  to	  advise	  ...	  that	  the	  Shah	  not	  use	  arms	  supplied	  to	  him	  by	  the	  United	  States	  for	  smuggling	  into	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan.Bazzaz	  cited	  America’s	  relationship	  with	  Iran	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  CENTO	  “as	  giving	  [them]	  a	  legitimate	  right	  to	  make	  such	  a	  request.”511	  This	  meeting	  made	  clear	  a	  number	  of	  things.	  First,	  it	  showed	  Bazzaz	  viewed	  solving	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  as	  a	  chief	  priority.	  Second,	  it	  was	  signiFicant	  that	  this	  was	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  contact	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  since	  the	  1958	  revolution	  and	  underscored	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  interest	  in	  improving	  relations	  with	  Iraq.
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   In	  late	  October,	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  drafted	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  competing	  interests	  and	  motivations	  of	  various	  parties	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  War.512	  An	  annex	  to	  the	  analysis	  broke	  down	  U.S.,	  Soviet,	  British,	  and	  Iranian	  policy	  objectives	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  U.S.	  objectives	  were	  preventing	  Soviet	  inFluence	  over	  the	  Kurds	  or	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  used	  to	  disrupt	  the	  Middle	  East;	  avoiding	  the	  establishment	  of	  full	  autonomy	  or	  independence	  for	  the	  Kurds;	  keeping	  the	  Kurds	  living	  peacefully	  within	  Iraq	  and	  participating	  fully	  in	  national	  life;	  avoiding	  stirring	  up	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  within	  Turkey	  and	  Iran;	  and	  Finally,	  preventing	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  from	  affecting	  adversely	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Iraq.513	  Given	  these	  objectives,	  the	  embassy	  believed,	  “the	  current	  United	  States	  policy	  stance	  seems	  the	  most	  suitable—that	  the	  problem	  is	  an	  internal	  Iraqi	  one	  for	  which	  a	  negotiated	  political	  solution	  is	  desirable.”514	  The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  objectives	  consisted	  of	  gaining	  inFluence	  over	  the	  Kurds	  through	  support	  short	  of	  material	  aid;	  eventually	  developing	  strong	  inFluence	  over	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  which	  would	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  indigenous	  efforts;	  utilizing	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  to	  advance	  Soviet	  aims	  in	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  and	  the	  Gulf;	  and	  avoiding	  severely	  antagonizing	  the	  Arabs.	  The	  annex	  identiFied	  British	  objectives	  in	  Iraq	  as	  preventing	  an	  Iraqi-­‐Egyptian	  union;	  keeping	  Iraq	  internally	  divided	  and	  weak;	  protecting	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf	  from	  Iraqi	  inFluence;	  and	  keeping	  oil	  Flowing	  from	  the	  region.	  Likewise,	  Iran	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  the	  Kurds	  from	  creating	  problems	  with	  its	  own	  Kurdish	  minority;	  assist	  Barzani	  in	  bringing	  about	  a	  change	  in	  government	  in	  Iraq	  more	  suitable	  to	  Iran;	  keep	  Iraq	  weak,	  divided,	  and	  separate	  from	  Egypt;	  advance	  Iranian	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf;	  and	  stress	  racial	  and	  cultural	  links	  between	  Kurds	  and	  Persians	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  Iranian	  annexation	  of	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan.515 	  Though	  the	  annex	  does	  not	  address	  Israel’s	  interests	  and	  objectives,	  they	  have	  already	  been	  covered	  in	  detail	  above.	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   Remarkably,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  1963	  Kurdish	  War,	  by	  1965	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  was	  not	  that	  different	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s,	  albeit	  barring	  the	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan.	  As	  the	  report	  observed:	  [While]	  the	  United	  States,	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  [Egyptian]	  postures	  advocating	  a	  peaceful,	  negotiated	  settlement	  are	  superFicially	  parallel,	  the	  positions	  are	  differently	  motivated	  and,	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  cases,	  based	  on	  different	  assumptions	  as	  to	  probable	  results.But	  the	  divergence	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  was	  very	  apparent.[The]	  Iranians	  and	  Israelis—and	  perhaps	  the	  British—appear	  for	  varying	  motivations	  to	  favor	  continuation	  of	  the	  conFlict	  for	  its	  debilitating	  effect	  on	  Iraq.	  Continued	  Iranian/Israeli	  intervention	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  position	  in	  Iraq	  but,	  unfortunately,	  neither	  country	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  heedful	  of	  United	  States	  interests	  in	  this	  matter.	  This	  makes	  clear	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  faced	  a	  conundrum,	  whereby	  its	  closest	  allies	  were	  supporting	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  wanted	  a	  peaceful	  settlement.	  In	  short,	  this	  was	  a	  catch-­‐22:The	  central	  conclusion	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  that	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  or	  independence	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  would	  be	  disruptive	  of	  area	  stability	  and	  inimical	  to	  our	  interests	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Neither	  is	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Fighting	  in	  United	  States	  interests,	  although	  the	  consequences	  do	  not,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  warrant	  a	  major	  initiative	  by	  the	  United	  States….	  For	  the	  immediate	  future,	  neither	  the	  Kurds	  [nor]	  the	  GOI	  appear	  able	  to	  force	  a	  military	  solution.	  Similarly	  even	  a	  negotiated	  solution	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  permanent.	  The	  Kurdish	  problem	  is	  long-­‐term.516This	  report	  makes	  clear	  that	  by	  late-­‐1965,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  both	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurds	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  its	  closest	  allies.	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  became	  quite	  overt.	  In	  November,	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  Iranian	  forces	  had	  assisted	  the	  Kurds	  in	  a	  hit-­‐and-­‐run	  attack	  against	  Iraqi	  positions	  near	  the	  Iranian	  border.	  On	  December	  7,	  “Iraqi	  irregulars	  shot	  up	  some	  Iranians	  on	  the	  Iranian	  side	  of	  the	  border,”	  leading	  Iran	  to	  mobilize	  its	  forces	  along	  the	  border.	  Tensions	  escalated	  further	  on	  December	  21,	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when	  Iraqi	  MiG	  jets	  attacked	  an	  Iranian	  border	  post.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  December,	  Iraqi	  forces	  launched	  a	  surprise	  offensive	  against	  a	  Kurdish	  stronghold,	  capturing	  it	  with	  only	  light	  resistance.517	  After	  regrouping,	  the	  Kurds	  counterattacked	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Iranian	  forces,	  which	  provided	  artillery	  support	  that	  forced	  Iraqi	  commanders	  to	  withdraw.	  As	  Kenneth	  Pollack	  observed,	  Iraq’s	  unsuccessful	  winter	  offensive	  revealed	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  Kurds’	  supply	  lines	  to	  Iran	  and	  convinced	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  that	  sealing	  the	  Iranian	  border	  was	  crucial	  to	  defeat	  the	  Kurds.518	   Meanwhile,	  as	  the	  Fighting	  raged	  in	  the	  north,	  Iran	  informed	  Iraq	  it	  was	  “prepared	  to	  discuss	  pending	  difFiculties,	  including	  the	  Shatt-­‐al-­‐Arab	  [waterway],”	  which	  led	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tehran	  to	  conclude	  Iran	  was	  trying	  to	  exploit	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  “to	  force	  Iraq	  to	  negotiate	  over	  another	  long-­‐standing	  issue	  between	  the	  two	  countries.”	  The	  Shah’s	  scheme	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  Bazzaz,	  who	  sought	  to	  defuse	  the	  crisis	  by	  admitting	  Iraq’s	  border	  violations	  and	  inviting	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  Amir	  Abbas	  Hoveyda	  to	  come	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  discuss	  the	  matter.	  But	  just	  as	  tensions	  were	  easing,	  hardliners	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  scuttled	  the	  proposal	  by	  demanding	  Iran	  cease	  its	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds	  before	  further	  discussions	  could	  take	  place.519	   On	  January	  20,	  1966,	  the	  Shah	  met	  with	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador,	  Armin	  Meyer,	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation.	  Remarkably,	  the	  Shah	  hinted	  to	  Meyer	  that	  his	  long	  term	  strategy	  was	  to	  “exploit	  tension	  with	  Iraq	  to	  force	  [the]	  solution	  of	  [the]	  Shatt	  [al-­‐Arab]	  issue,”	  but	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  “wait	  a	  few	  more	  years”,	  since	  this	  “question	  ha[d]	  [a]	  history	  of	  many	  decades”.	  The	  Shah	  said	  time	  was	  on	  Iran’s	  side,	  especially	  with	  the	  development	  of	  Iran’s	  Gulf	  ports	  and	  Kharg	  Island,	  which	  would	  eventually	  handle	  up	  to	  98%	  of	  Iran’s	  oil	  exports.520 	  This,	  in	  turn,	  would	  reduce	  Iraq’s	  income	  from	  the	  waterway.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Shah	  believed	  Iraq	  “[would]	  come	  to	  Iran	  in	  hope	  of	  sharing	  [the	  Financial]	  burden	  [of	  maintaining	  the	  waterway],	  and	  dividing	  [the]	  Shatt	  between	  them.”	  On	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  Shah	  explained	  he	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  antagonizing	  his	  own	  Kurdish	  population	  by	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colluding	  with	  Iraq	  against	  Barzani,	  which	  he	  saw	  as	  an	  internal	  Iraqi	  problem	  that	  could	  not	  be	  solved	  by	  “butchering”	  them.521	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Shah	  linked	  these	  two	  problems	  together	  for	  the	  First	  time	  is	  signiFicant	  since	  it	  foreshadowed	  precisely	  what	  would	  happen	  a	  decade	  later	  under	  nearly	  identical	  circumstances.	   In	  early	  March,	  Barzani’s	  liaison	  to	  SAVAK,	  Shamsuddin	  Mofti,	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran	  with	  a	  letter	  addressed	  to	  President	  Johnson.	  As	  usual,	  the	  letter	  appealed	  to	  the	  U.S.	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  people	  by	  preventing	  Iraq’s	  acquisition	  of	  arms,	  supporting	  the	  Kurdish	  people,	  and	  using	  its	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  help	  solve	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  peacefully.	  In	  the	  forwarding	  letter,	  the	  embassy	  recommended	  that	  it	  reiterate	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  and	  urge	  the	  Kurds	  to	  seek	  accommodation	  with	  the	  regime	  through	  peaceful	  negotiations.	  The	  department	  approved	  this	  approach.522	   Notably,	  as	  the	  spring	  Fighting	  season	  approached,	  Bazzaz	  sought	  to	  stave	  off	  war	  by	  reaching	  out	  to	  Barzani	  at	  the	  eleventh	  hour—indicating	  he	  had	  been	  drafting	  a	  decentralization	  law,	  was	  prepared	  to	  engage	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  projects	  in	  the	  north,	  and	  to	  recognize	  the	  Kurdish	  national	  identity	  in	  cultural	  spheres.	  Unfortunately,	  his	  efforts	  were	  in	  vain.	  According	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad,	  both	  Arif	  and	  Iraq’s	  Defense	  Minister,	  General	  Abd	  al-­‐Aziz	  al-­‐Uqaili,	  were	  determined	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  an	  offensive,	  albeit	  engaging	  in	  secret	  talks.523 	  By	  late	  March	  the	  talks	  had	  broken	  down,	  with	  Uqaili	  denying	  reports	  while	  saying	  “military	  operations	  [would]	  continue	  until	  the	  [Kurds	  were]	  defeated.”524	  However,	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  April	  13,	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif	  was	  Flying	  to	  Basra	  when	  his	  plane	  crashed,	  killing	  all	  on	  board.525	  When	  word	  of	  Arif’s	  death	  reached	  the	  U.S.	  on	  April	  14,	  the	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White	  House	  sent	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  a	  letter	  conveying	  Johnson’s	  “sincerest	  condolences.”526	   After	  a	  few	  days	  of	  internal	  debate,	  on	  April	  17	  Arif’s	  brother,	  General	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif,	  emerged	  unexpectedly	  as	  Iraq’s	  new	  president—apparently	  as	  a	  compromise	  among	  the	  regime’s	  vying	  factions.527	  Upon	  coming	  to	  ofFice,	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif	  took	  steps	  to	  consolidate	  his	  position,	  replacing	  Uqaili	  with	  a	  moderate	  as	  defense	  minister	  and	  kept	  Bazzaz	  on	  as	  prime	  minister,	  despite	  the	  problems	  this	  created	  with	  his	  generals,	  who	  wanted	  war.528	  Even	  so,	  the	  generals	  won	  the	  debate	  over	  war	  and	  launched	  its	  fourth	  offensive	  against	  the	  Kurds	  on	  May	  2,	  using	  40,000	  troops	  against	  Barzani’s	  meager	  force	  of	  only	  3,500	  Peshmerga.529	   The	  1966	  campaign	  was	  signiFicant	  because	  of	  Israel’s	  role	  in	  defeating	  the	  Iraqi	  army.	  After	  pushing	  its	  way	  through	  the	  Rawanduz	  Gorge	  and	  capturing	  part	  of	  two	  large	  mountains,	  Mount	  Handren	  to	  the	  south	  and	  Mount	  Zozik	  to	  the	  north,	  of	  an	  important	  road	  running	  to	  the	  Iranian	  border.530 	  According	  to	  Zuri	  Sagy,	  an	  Israeli	  Defense	  Force	  (IDF)	  military	  ofFicer	  sent	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  advise	  Barzani,	  for	  many	  months	  the	  IDF	  had	  been	  training	  Peshmerga	  at	  bases	  inside	  Iran.	  In	  an	  interview,	  Sagy	  explained	  that	  Iraq’s	  forces	  had	  made	  a	  crucial	  error	  when	  it	  set	  up	  camp	  in	  the	  valley	  below	  the	  two	  mountains	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  May	  10,	  by	  leaving	  the	  surrounding	  heights	  undefended.	  Upon	  learning	  this,	  Sagy	  convinced	  Barzani	  to	  attack	  immediately.	  In	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  May	  11,	  Sagy	  ordered	  a	  group	  of	  Kurds	  holding	  the	  front	  line	  to	  retreat,	  leaving	  open	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  lines.	  Thinking	  they	  had	  made	  a	  major	  breakthrough,	  the	  Iraqis	  poured	  hundreds	  of	  troops	  through	  the	  gap	  and	  consolidating	  their	  apparent	  gains.	  But	  the	  Iraqis	  fell	  right	  into	  Sagy’s	  trap.	  Like	  earlier	  that	  night,	  the	  Iraqis	  failed	  to	  secure	  the	  heights	  above,	  where	  unknown	  to	  them,	  hundreds	  of	  Kurds	  laid	  in	  wait.	  Before	  long,	  Sagy	  and	  the	  Kurds	  fell	  upon	  several	  battalions	  from	  the	  heights	  above,	  leading	  to	  a	  bloodbath.531 	  After	  just	  two	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days	  of	  Fighting,	  between	  1,400	  and	  2,000	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  had	  been	  killed,	  and	  hundreds	  more	  captured	  at	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Battle	  of	  Mount	  Handren.532	  Barzani’s	  defeat	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  underscored	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  solving	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  through	  force,	  discredited	  the	  hardline	  elements	  in	  the	  regime,	  and	  Finally	  gave	  Bazzaz	  the	  mandate	  he	  needed	  to	  negotiate	  peace	  with	  Barzani,	  who	  immediately	  agreed	  to	  talks.533	  	   After	  a	  few	  weeks	  of	  negotiations,	  Bazzaz	  announced	  a	  Twelve	  Point	  Plan	  for	  peace	  with	  the	  Kurds	  on	  June	  29,	  consisting	  of:
1. Recognition	  of	  Kurdish	  national	  rights;
2. Administrative	  decentralization	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  these	  rights;
3. Recognition	  of	  Kurdish	  as	  an	  ofFicial	  language;
4. Kurdish	  representation	  in	  parliament;
5. Kurdish	  share	  of	  ofFicial	  positions;
6. Scholarships	  for	  Kurds	  and	  a	  Baghdad	  University	  branch	  in	  the	  North;	  
7. Kurdish	  local	  government	  ofFicials;
8. Kurdish	  political	  organizations;
9. Amnesty	  for	  Kurds;
10. Return	  of	  Kurdish	  guerrillas	  to	  previous	  posts	  and	  maintenance	  by	  some	  in	  an	  approved	  organization	  (i.e.,	  Peshmerga);
11. Relief	  and	  economic	  assistance;	  [and]
12. Resettlement	  of	  Kurds	  and	  others	  in	  their	  traditional	  locales.534After	  Five	  years	  of	  failed	  offensives,	  countless	  deaths,	  and	  considerable	  expense,	  an	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  Finally	  prepared	  to	  meet	  the	  Kurds’	  demands.	  While	  the	  deal	  was	  a	  major	  breakthrough,	  it	  was	  not	  without	  its	  detractors.	  As	  Tripp	  observed,	  many	  Iraqi	  military	  ofFicers	  feared	  Bazzaz	  would	  use	  the	  peace	  deal	  as	  justiFication	  to	  slash	  their	  budget	  and	  reign	  in	  their	  lavish	  perks.535	  Consequently,	  on	  June	  30,	  a	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group	  of	  prominent	  Nasserists	  tried	  to	  seize	  power.536	  Fortunately,	  forces	  loyal	  to	  the	  president	  had	  inFiltrated	  the	  plot	  and	  caught	  the	  coup’s	  leaders	  “redhanded.”537	  	   The	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  pleased	  with	  both	  the	  Bazzaz	  peace	  plan	  and	  the	  successful	  thwarting	  of	  the	  coup.	  It	  issued	  a	  public	  statement	  on	  July	  8	  congratulating	  both	  Arif	  and	  Bazzaz.538	  Throughout	  July,	  Bazzaz	  took	  steps	  to	  implement	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  by	  approving	  a	  massive	  rehabilitation	  program,	  lifting	  the	  economic	  blockade,	  releasing	  hundreds	  of	  Kurdish	  prisoners,	  removing	  Arab	  tribes	  from	  former	  Kurdish	  lands,	  and	  passing	  a	  general	  amnesty	  law.539 	  But	  in	  the	  background,	  the	  military	  pressured	  Arif	  to	  dismiss	  Bazzaz,	  who	  eventually	  conceded	  on	  August	  6,	  bringing	  Iraq’s	  brief	  experimentation	  with	  civilian	  government	  to	  an	  end.	  On	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  even	  though	  talks	  with	  Barzani	  were	  suspended	  by	  the	  new	  regime,	  somehow	  an	  unstable	  peace	  managed	  to	  endure	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  Johnson’s	  presidency.	   The	  Johnson	  administration	  viewed	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  civilians	  in	  Iraq	  as	  a	  positive	  step.	  While	  seeking	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  the	  U.S.	  found	  its	  policy	  of	  urging	  a	  peaceful	  settlement	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  become	  more	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  than	  with	  its	  allies,	  Iran	  and	  Israel.	  When	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  renewed	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  1965-­‐66,	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  involvement	  became	  much	  more	  pronounced,	  culminating	  in	  Israel’s	  signiFicant	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Mount	  Handren,	  which	  forced	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  sue	  for	  peace.	  This	  account	  is	  supported	  by	  Randal	  and	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Hahn’s	  explanation	  that	  U.S.	  diplomats	  had	  encouraged	  Arif	  and	  Barzani	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  1966	  ceaseFire.540	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V	   The	  year	  between	  the	  June	  1966	  peace	  plan	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  in	  June	  1967	  saw	  a	  remarkable	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  Iraq’s	  new	  president	  was	  well	  disposed	  toward	  the	  United	  States.	  Remarkably,	  Johnson	  and	  Arif	  managed	  to	  cultivate	  a	  friendly	  personal	  relationship,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  visit	  of	  Five	  Iraqi	  generals	  to	  the	  Oval	  OfFice	  in	  January	  1967.	  Unfortunately,	  any	  progress	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  was	  cut	  short	  in	  June	  1967	  when	  Israel	  launched	  its	  preemptive	  war	  against	  Egypt,	  seizing	  the	  Sinai	  Peninsula,	  Gaza	  Strip,	  West	  Bank,	  and	  Golan	  Heights.	  Outraged	  by	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  backing	  of	  Israel,	  Arif	  was	  forced	  to	  sever	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States.	   Upon	  Arif’s	  coming	  to	  ofFice,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  noticed	  a	  marked	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  This	  was	  facilitated	  by	  two	  factors.	  First,	  prior	  to	  his	  brother’s	  death,	  Arif	  had	  become	  friends	  with	  Ambassador	  Strong	  and	  told	  him	  he	  preferred	  to	  discuss	  matters	  “as	  friend	  to	  friend	  rather	  than	  President	  to	  Ambassador.”	  Second,	  Arif	  was	  already	  well	  disposed	  toward	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  had	  to	  be	  cautious	  due	  to	  Iraq’s	  anti-­‐Western	  political	  environment.541 	  Consequently,	  throughout	  1966	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  observed	  a	  steady	  succession	  of	  friendly	  gestures	  from	  Iraq,	  albeit	  in	  private.542 	  	   The	  high	  mark	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  occurred	  in	  January	  1967,	  when	  Johnson	  met	  with	  Five	  Iraqi	  generals	  at	  the	  White	  House.	  Before	  agreeing	  to	  the	  meeting,	  Rusk	  sent	  Johnson	  a	  memo	  requesting	  the	  meeting	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Iraq	  was	  “entering	  a	  critical	  decision	  period”	  about	  what	  direction	  its	  future	  would	  take.	  There	  was	  evidence	  that	  Arif	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  “forces	  of	  moderation”	  by	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charting	  an	  “Iraq-­‐First”	  policy.	  Because	  of	  this,	  Rusk	  felt	  receiving	  the	  generals	  would:…	  continue	  to	  stiffen	  President	  Arif’s	  morale,	  and	  that	  any	  such	  personal	  recognition	  by	  [Johnson]	  of	  his	  special	  emissary	  would	  serve	  this	  purpose	  by	  strengthening	  the	  cordial	  ties	  already	  established	  by	  past	  messages	  exchanged	  between	  [him]	  and	  President	  Arif	  through	  diplomatic	  channels.543Johnson’s	  national	  security	  advisor,	  Walt	  Rostow,	  agreed	  that	  this	  proposal,	  while	  “rather	  unusual,”	  warranted	  “serious	  consideration.”	  Building	  on	  Rusk’s	  argument,	  Rostow	  reminded	  Johnson	  the	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  “to	  encourage	  governments	  like	  Aref’s	  to	  stand	  on	  their	  own—and	  not	  get	  sucked	  into	  the	  more	  radical	  Arab	  nationalist	  movements	  that	  cause	  [them]	  (and	  Israel)	  so	  much	  trouble.”	  He	  said	  the	  NSC	  had	  even	  considered	  inviting	  Arif	  to	  Washington	  on	  a	  state	  visit,	  but	  rejected	  it	  because	  of	  his	  tenuous	  grip	  on	  power.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  that	  Arif	  was	  sending	  a	  delegation	  suggested	  he	  was	  “reaching	  out”	  and	  wished	  to	  “strengthen	  his	  relationship”	  with	  Johnson,	  which	  was	  “unexpectedly	  encouraging.”544	  The	  White	  House	  agreed	  and	  Johnson	  met	  with	  the	  Five	  generals	  and	  Iraq’s	  Ambassador	  to	  Washington,	  Nasir	  Hani,	  on	  January	  25,	  where	  he	  presented	  the	  generals	  with	  a	  gift	  and	  a	  personal	  message	  for	  Arif	  conveying	  his	  “desire	  to	  build	  an	  ever	  closer	  relationship	  between	  [the]	  two	  governments.”545	   It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  series	  of	  exchanges	  that	  between	  mid-­‐1966	  and	  June	  1967	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  established	  a	  friendly	  relationship	  with	  Arif,	  who	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  anti-­‐communist,	  Iraqi	  nationalist,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  few	  forces	  of	  moderation	  within	  his	  country.	  Unfortunately,	  Arif	  was	  also	  weak	  politically	  and	  increasingly	  beholden	  to	  the	  more	  hardliner	  tendencies	  of	  Iraq’s	  powerful	  military.	  This	  was	  evident	  in	  his	  removal	  of	  Bazzaz	  in	  1966.	  But	  Arif’s	  weakness	  was	  also	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evident	  in	  how	  Iraq	  responded	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  with	  Israel	  and	  the	  frontline	  Arab	  states,	  Egypt,	  Syria,	  and	  Jordan,	  in	  June	  1967.	   When	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  began	  on	  June	  5,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  incapable	  of	  assisting	  the	  frontline	  Arab	  states	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  Israel’s	  rapid	  defeat	  of	  Jordan—where	  Iraq’s	  Third	  Armoured	  Division	  was	  stationed—meant	  the	  battle	  was	  already	  over	  by	  the	  time	  Iraq	  could	  muster	  its	  forces.	  Secondly,	  the	  Iraqi	  army’s	  morale	  was	  already	  at	  an	  all	  time	  low	  following	  its	  defeat	  at	  Mount	  Handren	  in	  May	  1966.	  Finally,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  cautious	  about	  diverting	  its	  forces	  away	  from	  Kurdistan	  in	  the	  event	  that	  Barzani	  took	  advantage	  of	  its	  preoccupation	  with	  Israel	  and	  counterattacked.546	  This	  fear,	  it	  turns	  out,	  was	  well	  grounded.	  According	  to	  the	  INR,	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  war,	  “an	  Israeli	  agent	  …	  visited	  Mullah	  Mustafa	  to	  arrange,	  if	  possible,	  some	  Kurdish	  action	  to	  tie	  down	  the	  Iraqi	  army.”	  While	  Israel	  “did	  not	  succeed,”	  this	  option	  would	  be	  raised	  again	  during	  the	  October	  War	  of	  1973.547	  The	  speed	  of	  Israel’s	  victory,	  the	  low	  morale	  of	  Iraq’s	  army,	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  threat	  meant	  Iraq’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  was	  modest,	  mostly	  limited	  to	  air	  operations.	   Iraq’s	  response	  to	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Israel,	  however,	  was	  much	  more	  aggressive.	  On	  June	  7,	  the	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  Ministry	  informed	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  that	  Iraq	  had	  broken	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  for	  its	  “alleged	  air	  and	  other	  aid	  to	  Israel.”	  The	  U.S.	  Chargé	  d’Affairs,	  Enoch	  Duncan,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  while	  Ambassador	  Strong	  was	  on	  leave	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  the	  embassy	  staff	  were	  given	  a	  “reasonable	  period”	  of	  Five	  days	  to	  wind	  up	  affairs,	  collect	  their	  belongings,	  and	  leave	  the	  country,	  presumably	  to	  Iran.548	  Other	  measures	  taken	  by	  Iraq	  as	  part	  of	  its	  break	  in	  relations	  included	  suspending	  oil	  shipments,	  refusing	  the	  U.S.	  over	  Flight	  permission,	  and	  a	  boycott	  of	  U.S.	  goods.	  Before	  leaving	  Baghdad	  on	  June	  10,549	  Duncan	  managed	  to	  cable	  Washington	  to	  report	  the	  moderates,	  who	  at	  First	  seemed	  “in	  the	  saddle,”	  had	  been	  eclipsed	  by	  radical	  elements,	  which	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  make	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concessions	  to	  “extremists	  in	  [the]	  name	  of	  national	  unity[,]	  such	  as	  [the]	  release	  [of]	  notorious	  plotters,”	  including	  Arif	  Abd	  al-­‐Razzaq.550	  With	  radicals	  hijacking	  the	  moderate	  Arif	  regime,	  there	  is	  no	  question	  Israel’s	  preemptive	  war	  destroyed	  the	  budding	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relationship.	   Following	  the	  break,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iraq	  agreed	  to	  establish	  “Interests	  Sections”	  in	  each	  other’s	  capitals,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  entrusting	  its	  interests	  to	  Belgium	  and,	  similarly,	  Iraq	  having	  India	  represent	  its	  interests	  in	  Washington.	  Initially,	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  send	  several	  ofFicers	  to	  Baghdad,	  but	  the	  Iraqis	  objected	  to	  the	  numbers,	  preferring	  only	  a	  single	  junior	  ofFicer	  and	  an	  administrative	  assistant.	  This	  was	  untenable	  and	  so	  the	  State	  Department	  decided	  against	  sending	  representative	  altogether,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  work	  through	  the	  Belgians	  who	  inherited	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy’s	  staff	  of	  local	  employees.551 	  From	  this	  point	  until	  the	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  ofFicers	  to	  Baghdad	  in	  early	  1972,	  contacts	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  became	  rare.552	   There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iraq	  had	  undergone	  an	  unprecedented	  period	  of	  growth	  in	  their	  relationship.	  The	  regular,	  friendly	  exchanges	  between	  Johnson	  and	  Arif	  and	  the	  welcome	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  generals	  in	  Washington	  make	  clear	  that	  both	  sides	  were	  interested	  in	  improving	  relations.	  But	  the	  breaking	  of	  relations	  following	  the	  war	  destroyed	  any	  chance	  at	  further	  improvement	  and	  crippled	  the	  Arif	  regime,	  which	  would	  collapse	  before	  long.
VI	   For	  the	  remainder	  of	  Johnson’s	  term	  as	  president,	  his	  administration	  appeared	  to	  be	  jumping	  from	  crisis	  to	  crisis,	  all	  while	  the	  Vietnam	  War—particularly	  after	  the	  Tet	  offensive	  in	  January	  1968—demanded	  his	  undivided	  attention.	  Eventually	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  Johnson’s	  decision	  not	  to	  seek	  reelection.	  But	  in	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January	  1968,	  just	  as	  his	  administration	  was	  completing	  a	  review	  of	  its	  Near	  East	  policy,553	  the	  British	  government	  stunned	  the	  U.S.	  when	  it	  announced	  it	  would	  withdraw	  its	  military	  forces	  from	  “East	  of	  Suez”	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1971,	  including	  from	  the	  Gulf.554	  While	  the	  British	  decision	  had	  been	  debated	  internally	  for	  years,555	  the	  catalysts	  for	  the	  decision	  were	  the	  resulting	  Financial	  difFiculties	  after	  Egypt	  closed	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  following	  the	  Six	  Day	  War,	  the	  subsequent	  devaluation	  of	  Sterling	  in	  November,	  and	  currency	  speculation	  following	  thereafter.556 	  A	  Final	  factor,	  as	  David	  McCourt	  observed,	  was	  that	  “by	  1968	  …	  it	  was	  clearly	  no	  longer	  in	  Britain’s	  interests	  to	  expend	  such	  effort—material	  and	  Financial—in	  an	  area	  where	  its	  immediate	  security	  was	  not	  endangered.”557	  In	  short,	  Britain	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  its	  empire.	  But	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  British	  decision,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  made	  a	  series	  of	  moves	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  which	  were	  soon	  followed	  by	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Arif	  regime	  in	  July	  1968.	  All	  of	  these	  events	  combined	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  had	  virtually	  no	  ability	  to	  inFluence	  the	  series	  of	  crises	  engulFing	  the	  region.	  	   Despite	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  lobbying	  to	  convince	  the	  British	  government	  to	  delay	  announcing	  its	  decision,	  London	  never	  budged.	  In	  one	  notable	  encounter	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  announcement,	  Secretary	  Rusk	  gave	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary	  George	  Brown	  what	  the	  State	  Department’s	  administrative	  history	  described	  as,	  an	  “eloquent	  presentation”	  on	  why	  it	  should	  not	  announce	  the	  decision,	  but	  this	  was	  hardly	  the	  case.558	  In	  a	  heated	  exchange,	  Rusk	  stressed	  the	  importance	  the	  U.S.	  attached	  to	  the	  British	  presence	  in	  the	  region,	  argued	  an	  early	  announcement	  would	  “have	  a	  particularly	  unsettling	  effect,”	  and	  raised	  U.S.	  fears	  that	  the	  Soviets	  could	  attempt	  to	  Fill	  the	  power	  vacuum	  created	  by	  their	  departure.	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He	  recognized	  the	  Financial	  strain	  Britain	  faced,	  and	  said	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  assisted	  Financially	  had	  Congress	  not	  “sharply	  curtailed”	  its	  own	  resources	  in	  response	  to	  Vietnam.	  But	  total	  withdrawal	  was	  an	  “irreversible	  decision”	  that	  could	  preferably	  be	  offset	  instead	  by	  a	  gradual	  reduction	  of	  its	  forces.559	  Then,	  when	  Brown	  replied	  that	  the	  decision	  had	  already	  been	  made	  and	  would	  not	  be	  reversed,	  Rusk	  lashed	  out,	  “for	  God’s	  sake,	  act	  like	  Britain!”	  and	  said	  he	  resented	  the	  “acrid	  aroma	  of	  the	  fait	  accompli.”560	   Amid	  the	  ensuing	  instability	  following	  the	  British	  decision,	  Iran	  began	  to	  exercise	  its	  strength	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  while	  the	  British	  tried	  to	  craft	  the	  lower	  Gulf	  Arab	  states	  into	  a	  union	  (later	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates).	  While	  Anglo-­‐American	  consultations	  over	  the	  withdrawal	  plan	  continued,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  furious	  about	  Britain’s	  perceived	  abdication	  of	  its	  regional	  responsibilities.	  The	  central	  problem	  was	  that	  there	  was	  “no	  politically	  feasible	  way	  for	  the	  U.S.	  or	  other	  Western	  power	  to	  step	  in”	  and	  Fill	  the	  power	  vacuum	  “with	  an	  equally	  effective	  presence	  once	  the	  British	  [were]	  gone.”	  Worse	  yet,	  the	  best	  possible	  contender	  for	  inFluence,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  had	  already	  been	  making	  inroads	  in	  the	  region	  following	  the	  Six	  Day	  War.561	  In	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  Cold	  War	  strategy,	  the	  British	  announcement	  had	  dealt	  the	  U.S.	  a	  tremendous	  blow.	   To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  two	  weeks	  later	  the	  Vietcong	  launched	  the	  Tet	  Offensive	  against	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  Vietnam,	  which	  eventually	  led	  Johnson	  to	  announce	  on	  March	  31	  that	  he	  would	  not	  seek	  reelection.562	  As	  Roham	  Alvandi	  notes,	  from	  this	  point	  onward,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  sought	  to	  establish	  a	  regional	  security	  arrangement	  focusing	  on	  bolstering	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ’twin	  pillar’	  policy.	  By	  building	  up	  the	  two	  largest	  Gulf	  powers,	  which	  were	  both	  pro-­‐Western,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  believed	  it	  could	  avoid	  the	  logistical	  and	  Financial	  difFiculties	  of	  policing	  the	  Gulf.	  This	  policy	  would	  remain	  in	  place	  until	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Richard	  Nixon	  modiFied	  it	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  by	  putting	  more	  emphasis	  on	  shoring	  up	  Iran	  as	  opposed	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia.563	   Within	  weeks	  of	  the	  British	  announcement,	  American	  fears	  of	  Soviet	  encroachment	  in	  the	  region	  were	  realized	  when	  Moscow	  moved	  to	  shore	  up	  its	  inFluence	  inside	  Iraq.	  On	  April	  2,	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  Soviets	  had	  signed	  a	  major	  oil	  deal	  with	  Iraq,	  which	  included	  technical	  assistance	  in	  both	  oil	  exploration	  and	  marketing.	  While	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  recognized	  the	  deal	  did	  not	  give	  the	  Soviets	  leverage	  over	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  it	  was	  still	  perceived	  as	  a	  “real	  danger”	  to	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  Iraq.564	  Another	  move	  occurred	  in	  late	  April,	  when	  Iraq	  announced	  that	  Soviet	  naval	  vessels	  planned	  to	  visit	  Iraqi	  ports	  in	  May.	  When	  this	  occurred	  on	  May	  11,	  it	  was	  the	  First	  time	  a	  Russian	  naval	  vessel	  had	  entered	  the	  Gulf	  since	  1903.565	  While	  some	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  viewed	  these	  developments	  with	  concern,	  the	  CIA	  was	  more	  sanguine,	  concluding	  Moscow	  still	  did	  not	  have	  any	  inFluence	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  policy	  decisions.566	  Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  clear	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  the	  Soviets	  saw	  the	  British	  announcement	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  their	  inFluence	  in	  the	  region.	  	   The	  Israelis	  and	  Iranians	  were	  not	  blind	  to	  the	  developments	  in	  Iraq	  and	  decided	  to	  reactivate	  their	  Kurdish	  connection.	  According	  to	  Tsafrir,	  with	  SAVAK’s	  blessing,	  Barzani,	  Dr.	  Mahmud	  Othman,	  and	  an	  Iranian	  liaison	  traveled	  surreptitiously	  to	  Israel	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1968	  via	  an	  Israeli	  Air	  Force	  plane	  (which	  had	  just	  delivered	  weapons	  to	  the	  Kurds)	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  with	  high-­‐level	  Israeli	  ofFicials,	  including	  Israel’s	  president,	  prime	  minister,	  and	  the	  ministers	  of	  defense	  and	  foreign	  affairs,	  among	  many	  others.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  meetings	  were	  ceremonial	  in	  nature,	  Barzani’s	  talks	  with	  Mossad	  focused	  on	  how	  Israel	  could	  strengthen	  their	  relationship	  and	  the	  scale	  of	  its	  support.	  The	  Kurdish	  leader	  was	  also	  taken	  on	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  Sinai	  to	  see	  personally	  the	  scale	  of	  Israel’s	  victory	  over	  the	  Arabs.	  Israel’s	  generosity,	  courtesy,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  support	  impressed	  Barzani.567	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Almost	  immediately	  after	  the	  trip,	  Supreme	  Court	  Justice	  William	  Douglas,	  a	  longtime	  sympathizer	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  cause,	  asked	  the	  White	  House	  to	  meet	  with	  one	  of	  Barzani’s	  emissaries,	  ShawFiq	  Qazzaz.	  The	  task	  fell	  to	  Harold	  Saunders,	  a	  Middle	  East	  expert	  that	  had	  replaced	  Komer	  on	  the	  NSC	  staff.568	  	   When	  Qazzaz	  met	  with	  Saunders	  on	  March	  12,	  he	  complained	  the	  regime	  had	  not	  fulFilled	  the	  promises	  made	  in	  1966	  and	  humanitarian	  aid	  was	  only	  reaching	  pro-­‐government	  Kurds.	  In	  response,	  Saunders	  pointed	  out	  there	  was	  little	  U.S.	  could	  legally	  do	  and	  suggested	  he	  contact	  the	  Red	  Cross	  directly.569	  The	  next	  day,	  Saunders	  drafted	  a	  memo	  to	  the	  president’s	  special	  assistant	  that	  pointed	  out	  that	  since	  Iraq	  severed	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  “the	  [Kurdish]	  problem	  [was	  not]	  so	  ticklish,”	  though	  “for	  the	  moment,	  [their]	  hands	  [were]	  tied	  unless	  [they]	  want[ed]	  to	  begin	  clandestine	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  and	  [they	  had	  not]	  so	  far	  seen	  much	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  that.”	  To	  this	  end,	  he	  advocated	  sticking	  “to	  [their]	  general	  approach	  until	  there	  seem[ed]	  good	  reason	  to	  change	  it.”570	  Quite	  clearly,	  a	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  thinking	  toward	  the	  Kurds	  had	  occurred,	  a	  shift	  that	  was	  facilitated	  by	  Iran	  and	  Israel’s	  hidden	  hand.	  	   But	  just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  was	  growing	  concerned	  about	  rising	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq,	  Arif	  regime’s	  survival	  was	  becoming	  uncertain.	  On	  May	  22,	  the	  CIA	  produced	  a	  pessimistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  after	  ten	  years,	  suitably	  titled,	  “The	  Stagnant	  Revolution,”	  which	  described	  the	  Arif	  regime	  as	  “ineffective	  and	  fumbling.”	  The	  CIA	  conFirmed	  the	  regime’s	  radical	  elements	  from	  the	  military	  had	  overtaken	  the	  moderates.	  The	  analysis	  stated,	  “the	  balance	  of	  forces	  is	  such	  that	  no	  group	  feels	  power	  enough	  to	  take	  decisive	  steps;	  the	  result	  is	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  many	  important	  political	  and	  economic	  matters	  are	  simply	  ignored,”	  like	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  peace	  agreement.	  While	  neither	  side	  appeared	  to	  want	  to	  resume	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  CIA	  felt	  there	  was	  plenty	  of	  room	  for	  “miscalculation”	  and	  noted	  an	  increase	  in	  plotting	  against	  the	  regime,	  particularly	  by	  the	  Ba’th	  and	  Arab	  nationalist	  groups.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  deadlock	  between	  the	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competing	  factions	  and	  the	  increased	  plotting	  against	  the	  regime	  led	  the	  CIA	  to	  fear	  for	  the	  regime’s	  survival.571	   In	  June	  1968,	  the	  U.S.	  passed	  word	  to	  Iraq	  through	  the	  Belgians	  that	  it	  was	  interested	  in	  resuming	  diplomatic	  relations.	  The	  U.S.	  set	  out	  three	  conditions:	  1)	  Iraq	  agree	  to	  compensate	  the	  U.S.	  for	  damages	  to	  its	  embassy	  and	  consulates;	  2)	  the	  U.S.	  could	  have	  unimpeded	  access	  to	  its	  properties	  in	  Iraq;	  and	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  boycott	  of	  U.S.	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  overFlights	  be	  lifted.	  The	  Belgians	  agreed	  to	  pass	  these	  points	  to	  Iraq,	  but	  commented	  that	  the	  Iraqis	  would	  likely	  Find	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  boycott	  unacceptable.572	  This	  account	  contrasts	  with	  Hahn’s	  assertion	  that	  Iraq	  sought	  to	  renew	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  in	  June	  1968.	   Before	  long,	  American	  fears	  about	  the	  Arif	  regime	  were	  realized	  when,	  in	  the	  pre-­‐dawn	  hours	  of	  July	  17,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party,	  working	  with	  radical	  elements	  of	  the	  army,	  overthrew	  it	  in	  a	  bloodless	  coup.573	  It	  was	  evident	  from	  the	  start	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  apprehensive	  about	  how	  radical	  the	  new	  regime	  would	  be,	  though	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  seemed	  certain	  it	  would	  be	  “more	  difFicult	  than	  their	  predecessors.”574	  The	  regime	  consisted	  of	  a	  triumvirate	  of	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  al-­‐Dawud	  as	  Defense	  Minister,	  and	  Abd	  al-­‐Razzaq	  al-­‐Nayif	  as	  Interior	  Minister.	  But,	  as	  Tripp	  pointed	  out,	  this	  would	  not	  last	  long,	  since	  neither	  the	  Ba’thist	  nor	  non-­‐Ba’thist	  elements	  wanted	  to	  share	  power.	  Having	  learned	  hard	  lessons	  in	  1963,	  al-­‐Bakr	  moved	  swiftly	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power.	  On	  July	  30,	  while	  al-­‐Dawud	  was	  visiting	  Jordan,	  al-­‐Bakr	  ordered	  an	  armoured	  brigade	  to	  seize	  all	  of	  the	  strategic	  buildings	  in	  Baghdad,	  arrest	  al-­‐Nayif,	  and	  send	  him	  into	  
 169
571 “The Stagnant Revolution,” May 22, 1968, Op.Cit., pp.1-15.
572 Brussels 7128 to State, June 7, 1968 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.198). 
573 For details of the coup, see DoS, Hughes to Rusk, “Iraqi Ba’this Take Over Government; Get Feet Wet 
Again,” IN–561, July 17, 1968 (NARA/RG59/SN/1967-69/Box 2221/“POL 15-Iraq 1/1/67”), p.1; and DoS, 
draft telegram, “Iraqi coup,” July 17, 1968 (NARA/RG59/Records Relating to Iraq/1966-72/Box3/
POL-23), pp.1-4. While Roger Morris claimed the U.S. were behind the coup, there is no available 
evidence to support this. In fact, an initial U.S. response to the coup, shows considerable confusion over 
what had happened, see White House, Memorandum, Foster to Rostow, “The Iraqi Coup,” July 17, 1968 
(JPL/NSF/HSF/Box16/Iraq 4/1/66-1/20/69/doc.3), p.1. Finally, a CIA official, who at the time was in 
charge of “denied area operations”, said “I do not know how the rumor got started that we were involved in 
the Bathist coup.We weren’t.” In fact, the prevailing view at the time was that Arif “was the best of the lot.” 
Email correspondence with CIA official, March 1, 2012.
574 “The Iraqi Coup,” July 17, 1968, Op.Cit., p.1.
exile.575	  Following	  the	  second	  coup,	  Iraq’s	  new	  supreme	  ruling	  body,	  the	  Revolutionary	  Command	  Council	  (RCC),	  dismissed	  al-­‐Nayif’s	  cabinet	  and	  named	  al-­‐Bakr	  as	  Iraq’s	  President	  and	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces.576	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  had	  managed	  to	  Finally	  seize	  power	  for	  a	  second	  time,	  a	  grip	  they	  would	  not	  relinquish	  until	  the	  U.S.	  invaded	  in	  March	  2003.
VII	   The	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  seizure	  of	  power	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July	  1968	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  insecurity.	  The	  regime	  moved	  quickly	  to	  improve	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  while	  blaming	  all	  of	  its	  domestic	  shortcomings	  on	  Israeli	  subversion.	  Viewed	  from	  Washington,	  Iraq’s	  actions	  would	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  how	  Johnson’s	  successor,	  Richard	  Nixon,	  would	  view	  it,	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  wider	  Cold	  War	  but	  also	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict.	  	   On	  August	  2,	  Iraq’s	  new	  foreign	  minister,	  Abdul	  Karim	  Sheikhli,	  announced	  Iraq	  would	  work	  to	  strengthen	  its	  relations	  “with	  the	  socialist	  camp,	  particularly	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Republic.”	  This,	  however,	  did	  not	  come	  as	  a	  complete	  surprise	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  light	  of	  the	  large-­‐scale	  military	  and	  economic	  agreements	  the	  previous	  regime	  had	  just	  signed	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  Baghdad	  sought	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  Moscow	  provided	  a	  First	  glimpse	  at	  a	  strategic	  alliance	  that	  would	  soon	  emerge.577	   In	  late	  November,	  not	  long	  after	  Republican	  presidential	  candidate	  Richard	  Nixon	  defeated	  his	  two	  rivals,	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  and	  George	  Wallace,	  in	  the	  U.S.	  general	  election,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Beirut	  drafted	  a	  report	  on	  the	  First	  hundred	  days	  of	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  report	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  submitted	  to	  Soviet	  pressure	  and	  released	  a	  large	  number	  of	  left	  wing	  and	  communist	  political	  prisoners,	  however,	  “there	  [was]	  no	  indication	  that	  Marxists	  and	  communists	  [had]	  been	  given	  any	  major	  role	  in	  the	  regime.”	  In	  short,	  the	  regime	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appeared	  willing	  to	  accept	  Soviet	  arms	  and	  would	  accommodate	  their	  wishes	  so	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  involve	  sharing	  power	  with	  anyone,	  including	  the	  communists.578	  	   In	  early	  December,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  made	  international	  headlines	  when	  its	  forces	  in	  Jordan	  shelled	  Israeli	  settlers	  in	  the	  Jordan	  Valley,	  prompting	  a	  Fierce	  retaliation	  by	  the	  IAF	  that	  left	  a	  number	  of	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  dead.	  According	  to	  an	  INR	  report,	  “Iraq:	  Internal	  Stresses	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Bogeyman,”	  the	  attack	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  regime’s	  insecurity.	  In	  the	  seven	  months	  since	  seizing	  power	  the	  regime	  had	  alienated	  “virtually	  every	  signiFicant	  political	  and	  ethnic	  group	  in	  Iraq”	  through	  “inept	  leadership,	  factionalism,	  duplicity,	  and	  repression.”	  The	  regime	  was	  engaged	  in	  a	  “classic	  ploy	  of	  psychological	  mobilization	  against	  an	  external	  threat,”	  namely	  Israel	  and	  the	  U.S.	  (Iran	  was	  quickly	  soon	  added	  to	  the	  list).579	  This	  view	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  speech	  al-­‐Bakr	  gave	  the	  day	  after	  the	  battle,	  claiming	  “while	  Iraq	  was	  facing	  the	  enemy	  on	  the	  Arab-­‐Israel	  front,	  a	  Fifth	  column	  of	  agents	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  striking	  from	  behind.”580	  	   Then	  on	  December	  14,	  the	  regime	  announced	  it	  had	  broken	  up	  “an	  Israeli	  spy	  network”	  seeking	  to	  “bring	  about	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.”581	  Based	  on	  two	  confessions,	  Iraq	  claimed	  an	  Israeli	  spy	  network	  had	  been	  gathering	  information	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  military	  and	  conducting	  sabotage	  training	  for	  Jewish	  youths.	  While	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  acknowledged	  Israel	  likely	  had	  “covert	  assets	  in	  Iraq,”	  they	  were	  skeptical	  the	  Israelis	  would	  recruit	  Iraqi	  Jews	  who,	  “with	  their	  movements	  restricted	  and	  under	  constant	  surveillance,	  would	  make	  poor	  recruits	  for	  any	  Israeli	  espionage	  or	  sabotage	  net.”	  The	  second	  claim	  lumped	  together	  all	  of	  the	  regime’s	  enemies	  into	  a	  single	  conspiracy	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  obtaining	  military	  and	  political	  intelligence	  on	  Iraq,	  while	  also	  seeking	  the	  regime’s	  overthrow,	  establishing	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  and	  forming	  a	  U.S.-­‐backed	  government	  with	  both	  Arabs	  and	  Kurds.582 	  Though	  U.S.	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ofFicials	  acknowledge	  this	  would	  be	  an	  ideal	  outcome,	  the	  real	  purpose	  was	  to	  stoke	  nationalist	  fervor	  against	  Israel	  by	  targeting	  local	  Iraqi	  Jews.	  In	  total,	  the	  regime	  arrested	  eighty-­‐six	  people	  and	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐one	  that	  were	  put	  on	  trial	  immediately,	  nine	  were	  Jews.	  Upon	  learning	  of	  the	  arrests,	  the	  State	  Department	  sought	  to	  intervene	  through	  the	  Indian	  Embassy	  in	  Washington	  but	  to	  no	  avail.583	   In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Ba’th	  escalated	  tensions	  with	  Barzani	  by	  lending	  support	  to	  Talabani’s	  “progressive”	  Kurdish	  movement	  as	  part	  of	  “a	  rather	  crude	  divide-­‐and-­‐rule	  campaign	  designed	  to	  undermine	  Barzani,	  who	  reacted	  strongly	  to	  the	  regime’s	  duplicity.”	  When	  Fighting	  broke	  out	  between	  the	  two	  factions	  in	  late	  November,	  Barzani	  emerged	  victorious,	  inFlicting	  considerable	  losses	  on	  Talabani’s	  followers,	  despite	  indirect	  support	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  army.584 	  In	  the	  aftermath,	  the	  RCC	  ordered	  an	  offensive	  against	  Barzani	  that	  was	  launched	  on	  January	  3	  and	  modeled	  on	  the	  disastrous	  1966	  campaign,	  which,	  as	  Pollack	  observed,	  was	  strategically	  sound	  though	  poorly	  executed.585 	  After	  three	  weeks	  of	  Fighting,	  severe	  winter	  weather	  forced	  the	  offensive	  to	  a	  halt.586	  Similarly,	  like	  in	  1965,	  Iraq’s	  offensive	  prompted	  the	  Shah	  to	  once	  again	  order	  an	  increase	  support	  for	  Barzani,	  while	  pressing	  Iraq	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway.587 	  	   In	  short,	  just	  as	  Johnson	  was	  departing	  the	  White	  House,	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  had	  reached	  a	  point	  of	  acute	  crisis.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Iraq	  had	  rounded	  up	  a	  number	  of	  Iraqi	  Jews	  and	  was	  putting	  them	  on	  show	  trials	  in	  a	  vain	  effort	  to	  obtain	  support	  from	  both	  the	  Arab	  and	  Iraqi	  street.	  Unsurprisingly,	  this	  was	  bound	  to	  antagonize	  Israel	  and	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  retaliatory	  strikes	  against	  Iraq’s	  forces	  in	  Jordan.	  The	  Johnson	  administration	  felt	  this	  would	  play	  right	  into	  the	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  hand,	  by	  proving	  it	  was	  a	  front-­‐line	  Arab	  state	  and	  establishing	  its	  anti-­‐Israeli	  bona	  Lides,	  and	  urged	  Israel	  to	  back	  off.588	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Iranians	  heightened	  their	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military	  pressure	  on	  Iraq	  via	  the	  Kurds,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  pressing	  Iraq	  for	  concessions	  on	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.	  While	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  was	  not	  supportive	  of	  Iran’s	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  new	  administration	  of	  Richard	  Nixon	  would	  take	  a	  much	  different	  view.	  
Conclusion
	   Throughout	  the	  Johnson	  administration,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  at	  direct	  odds	  with	  that	  of	  its	  closest	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  stemmed	  from	  the	  perception	  each	  of	  these	  states	  had	  of	  Iraq.	  When	  Johnson	  assumed	  the	  presidency,	  military	  ofFicers	  in	  Iraq,	  led	  by	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif,	  had	  just	  seized	  power	  in	  response	  to	  the	  violent	  conFlict	  within	  the	  ruling	  Ba’th	  Party,	  which	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Syrian	  takeover.	  Whereas	  Britain,	  Israel,	  and	  Iran	  all	  saw	  the	  new	  Arif	  regime	  as	  too	  cozy	  with	  Nasser,	  whom	  each	  despised	  for	  their	  own	  reasons,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  content	  with	  Arif’s	  friendly	  relationship	  with	  Nasser,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  maintained	  a	  neutralist	  stance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  was	  anti-­‐communist	  domestically.	  	   The	  question	  of	  an	  Arab	  union	  was	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies.	  Since	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  supported	  Arab	  unity,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  remained	  anti-­‐communist	  and	  was	  not	  brought	  about	  by	  coercion.	  But	  the	  British	  opposed	  uniFication	  out	  of	  distrust	  of	  Nasser’s	  intentions	  and	  a	  need	  to	  protect	  its	  considerable	  economic	  and	  military	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  At	  the	  time,	  Britain	  and	  Egypt	  were	  also	  engaged	  in	  a	  proxy	  war	  in	  Yemen.	  Iran’s	  motivation	  for	  opposing	  uniFication	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  British.	  The	  Shah	  did	  not	  trust	  Nasser	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  him	  established	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  where	  he	  had	  his	  own	  ambitions.	  Furthermore,	  Iraq,	  with	  its	  considerable	  oil	  wealth,	  was	  the	  only	  regional	  state	  that	  could	  potentially	  challenge	  Iran’s	  long-­‐term	  objectives.	  Therefore,	  the	  Shah	  wanted	  to	  keep	  it	  disunited	  and	  weak.	  Finally,	  Israel	  also	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  Nasser	  from	  controlling	  Iraq	  and	  its	  considerable	  oil	  wealth,	  and	  to	  keep	  Iraq	  divided	  and	  weak	  to	  limit	  its	  participation	  in	  a	  renewed	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war.	  For	  these	  disparate	  reasons,	  all	  three	  parties	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  providing	  military	  and	  economic	  aid	  to	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the	  Kurds	  and	  urging	  them	  to	  renew	  the	  war	  would	  weaken	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  make	  it	  an	  unattractive	  partner	  for	  Nasser.	  This	  contrasted	  with	  America’s	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  and	  its	  passive	  support	  for	  uniFication.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  from	  the	  start	  of	  1964	  through	  to	  June	  1966,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  at	  clear	  odds	  with	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  	   In	  the	  year	  between	  Abd	  al’Salim	  Arif’s	  death	  in	  April	  1966	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  in	  June	  1967,	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  saw	  a	  rapid	  improvement.	  This	  was	  fostered	  by	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  the	  moderate,	  pro-­‐Western	  regime	  of	  Abd	  ar-­‐Rahman	  Arif,	  the	  Kurd’s	  defeat	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  at	  Mount	  Handren,	  and	  the	  Bazzaz	  government’s	  subsequent	  peace	  plan.	  This	  relationship	  culminated	  in	  the	  visit	  of	  Five	  Iraqi	  generals	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  January	  1967.	  Unfortunately,	  whatever	  progress	  may	  have	  been	  achieved	  was	  destroyed	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  government’s	  subsequent	  decision	  to	  sever	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  would	  have	  a	  tremendous	  impact	  on	  America’s	  ability	  to	  monitor	  events	  taking	  place	  inside	  Iraq.	  	   When	  the	  British	  government	  announced	  in	  January	  1968	  its	  intention	  to	  withdraw	  its	  military	  forces	  from	  East	  of	  Suez,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  concerned	  this	  move	  would	  upset	  the	  regional	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  potentially	  provide	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  an	  avenue	  into	  the	  region.	  The	  Soviets	  had	  already	  beneFited	  from	  the	  decline	  in	  Western	  inFluence	  following	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  incapable	  of	  taking	  Britain’s	  place	  because	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  Ultimately,	  after	  extended	  negotiations,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  decided	  on	  a	  strategy	  that	  would	  see	  the	  buildup	  and	  improvement	  of	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  military	  capabilities,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ‘twin	  pillar’	  policy.	  Given	  America’s	  international	  commitments	  at	  the	  time,	  this	  policy	  was	  a	  logical	  response	  to	  the	  conundrum	  the	  British	  announcement	  created.	  	   The	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  coming	  to	  power	  in	  July	  1968	  posed	  signiFicant	  new	  challenges	  to	  U.S.	  policy.	  Whereas	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  welcomed	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  in	  1963,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  quickly	  viewed	  it	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  After	  all,	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  overthrown	  a	  moderate,	  anti-­‐communist	  regime	  and	  soon	  adopted	  militant	  policies	  toward	  Israel	  and	  the	  Kurds,	  and	  then	  tacked	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toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  military	  and	  economic	  assistance.	  These	  activities	  convinced	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  that	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  becoming	  a	  vehicle	  for	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  Iraq’s	  sovereignty.
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Chapter	  5:	  Nixon	  and	  the	  Second	  Ba’thist	  RegimeJanuary	  1969—July	  1972
	   This	  chapter	  examines	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  period	  between	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  inauguration	  in	  January	  1969	  and	  his	  decision	  to	  approve	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  August	  1972.	  As	  with	  earlier	  chapters,	  it	  seeks	  to	  examine	  U.S.	  perceptions	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  understand	  how	  these	  perceptions	  inFluenced	  policy.	  Recall	  that	  Nixon	  came	  to	  ofFice	  in	  January	  1969	  with	  previous	  knowledge	  relating	  to	  Iraq,	  having	  served	  on	  the	  NSC	  as	  Eisenhower’s	  Vice	  President	  during	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  in	  1958	  and	  the	  resulting	  crisis.	  Certainly,	  this	  experience	  affected	  his	  perception	  of	  Iraq	  but	  also	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  when	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  move	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviets	  in	  1972.	  In	  examining	  the	  available	  primary	  information,	  it	  seems	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  concern	  about	  Soviet	  encroachment	  in	  Iraq	  evolved	  gradually	  throughout	  1969-­‐71.	  Meanwhile	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  like	  Iran	  and	  Israel,	  warned	  the	  U.S.	  throughout	  1970-­‐71	  that	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  in	  Iraq	  was	  a	  “stalking-­‐horse”	  for	  Soviet	  ambitions	  and	  a	  source	  of	  subversion	  in	  the	  Gulf.589	  But	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  rejected	  these	  arguments,	  pointing	  instead	  to	  mountain	  of	  evidence	  that	  showed	  Iraqi-­‐Soviet	  relations	  were	  deteriorating.	  Fain,	  Little	  and	  Hahn	  all	  note	  that	  prior	  to	  1972	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  disinterested	  in	  Gulf	  affairs.590	  But	  this	  changed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1971	  when	  Britain	  withdrew	  from	  the	  region	  and	  Iraq	  suddenly	  improved	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  culminating	  in	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  April	  1972.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  treaty	  was	  problematic	  for	  the	  U.S.,	  since	  it	  coincided	  with	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  détente	  at	  the	  Moscow	  Summit	  held	  in	  May.591	  The	  U.S.,	  however,	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  allow	  Moscow’s	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move	  to	  go	  unchecked,	  leading	  Nixon	  to	  approve	  a	  risky	  covert	  operation	  to	  provide	  the	  Kurds	  with	  military	  and	  Financial	  assistance	  on	  August	  1,	  1972.	  The	  available	  record	  shows	  that	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  approve	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  driven	  primarily	  by	  Cold	  War	  concerns	  relating	  to	  Iraq’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	   Until	  recently,	  the	  historiography	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  during	  the	  1969-­‐71	  has	  been	  limited.	  Even	  Kissinger’s	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  his	  1999	  memoir	  avoids	  a	  discussion	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  prior	  to	  1972.592	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  according	  to	  Peter	  Hahn	  and	  Douglas	  Little,	  was	  that	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  focused	  on	  more	  important	  matters	  elsewhere	  and	  generally	  disregarded	  Iraq.593 	  Indeed,	  throughout	  Nixon’s	  First	  term	  he	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  “farm	  out”	  regional	  policy	  to	  both	  the	  State	  Department,	  run	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  P.	  Rogers,	  and	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  like	  Iran,	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine.	  This	  was	  particularly	  evident	  during	  the	  Shatt	  crisis	  in	  1969,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  1969	  and	  its	  subsequent	  ceaseFire	  1970,	  and	  Iraq’s	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists	  during	  1970-­‐71.594	  Some	  aspects	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  these	  events	  have	  been	  raised	  by	  scholars	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  region.	  For	  instance,	  Roham	  Alvandi,	  a	  scholar	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iranian	  relations,	  published	  an	  article	  in	  Diplomatic	  History	  that	  argued	  the	  Shah	  used	  the	  Shatt	  crisis	  to	  convince	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  to	  support	  his	  ambition	  to	  become	  the	  ‘regional	  policeman’.595	  Similarly,	  W.	  Taylor	  Fain	  and	  Greg	  Gause,	  who	  are	  both	  analysts	  of	  America’s	  Gulf	  policies,	  support	  Alvandi’s	  argument.596	  However,	  this	  thesis	  contends	  that	  by	  emphasizing	  America’s	  strategic	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  these	  scholars	  tend	  to	  overlook	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  on	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  decisions	  toward	  Iraq.	   There	  is	  a	  similar	  divide	  among	  scholars	  about	  why	  Nixon	  chose	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  in	  1972.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  scholars	  explain	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  as	  a	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response	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  treaty.597	  Little,	  for	  example,	  argues	  it	  was	  based	  on	  “Cold	  War	  logic”.598 	  However,	  the	  Gulf-­‐centric	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  Shah	  played	  the	  “superpower	  rivalry	  card”	  and	  manipulated	  Nixon	  into	  building	  up	  Iran	  as	  the	  regional	  hegemon,	  while	  tying	  down	  Iraq—his	  only	  challenger	  in	  the	  Gulf—by	  aiding	  the	  Kurds.599	  As	  Alvandi	  observed,	  “Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  were	  seeing	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Gulf	  through	  the	  Shah’s	  eyes.”600	  This	  argument	  is	  also	  presented	  in	  a	  leaked	  congressional	  report,	  known	  as	  the	  Pike	  Report,	  which	  argued	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds	  was	  “a	  favor”	  to	  the	  Shah,	  “who	  had	  come	  to	  feel	  menaced	  by	  his	  neighbor	  [Iraq].”601	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds	  was	  driven	  by	  America’s	  concern	  about	  Iraq’s	  increasing	  importance	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  while	  placating	  the	  Shah’s	  desire	  to	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  the	  Gulf.
I	  
	   Within	  days	  of	  Richard	  Nixon	  entering	  the	  White	  House,	  Iraq	  thrust	  itself	  into	  the	  headlines.	  On	  January	  26,	  1969,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  an	  Iraqi	  court	  had	  sentenced	  sixteen	  people	  to	  death,	  ten	  of	  whom	  were	  Jews,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  spy	  conspiracy	  exposed	  the	  previous	  month.	  But	  there	  was	  little	  the	  U.S.	  could	  actually	  do;	  by	  the	  time	  word	  of	  the	  verdict	  reached	  America	  the	  accused	  were	  already	  dead.602	  The	  State	  Department	  later	  conFirmed	  nine	  Jews	  had	  been	  hanged.603	  Recognizing	  the	  delicacy	  of	  the	  situation,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  worried	  Israel	  might	  retaliate	  against	  Iraqi	  forces	  in	  Jordan	  and	  spark	  another	  Middle	  Eastern	  war,	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which	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  was	  what	  the	  Iraqis	  wanted.604	  Consequently,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  forced	  to	  urge	  restraint	  on	  Israel.605	  	   The	  Nixon	  administration	  also	  condemned	  Iraq’s	  actions	  publicly	  and	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Nixon’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Rogers	  described	  the	  public	  executions	  as	  “a	  matter	  of	  deep	  concern”	  that	  was	  “repugnant	  to	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  world.”	  He	  also	  instructed	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Charles	  Yost,	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  with	  the	  Security	  Council.	  While	  acknowledging	  Iraq’s	  legal	  right	  to	  administer	  justice	  to	  its	  citizens,	  Yost	  argued:	  …	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  executions	  and	  the	  trials	  that	  preceded	  them	  were	  conducted	  scarcely	  conforms	  to	  normally	  accepted	  standards	  of	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  human	  dignity….	  Moreover,	  the	  spectacular	  way	  in	  which	  they	  were	  carried	  out	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  arouse	  emotions	  and	  to	  intensify	  the	  very	  explosive	  atmosphere	  of	  suspicion	  and	  hostility	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.606The	  U.S.	  also	  tried	  to	  work	  through	  its	  allies	  that	  had	  good	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  like	  France,	  Spain,	  and	  India,	  but	  the	  Iraqis	  responded,	  “in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  [its]	  domestic	  affairs.”	  Finally,	  the	  U.S.	  approached	  UN	  Secretary	  General,	  U	  Thant,	  but	  his	  efforts	  also	  failed.	  Ultimately,	  despite	  considerable	  effort,	  there	  was	  nothing	  more	  that	  could	  be	  done.607	   Iraq’s	  execution	  of	  the	  nine	  Jews	  in	  January	  1969	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  attitude	  toward	  Iraq.	  Unfortunately,	  because	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  have	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  there	  was	  little	  it	  could	  do	  to	  prevent	  the	  killings.	  As	  Fain	  observed,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  did	  not	  view	  Iraq	  or	  the	  Gulf	  region	  as	  a	  priority	  and	  preferred	  to	  defer	  matters	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  or	  regional	  allies.608 	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  fortunate	  to	  have	  Nixon’s	  old	  friend,	  the	  Shah,	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  action.	  Consequently,	  throughout	  much	  of	  1969	  Iran	  took	  aggressive	  measures	  against	  Iraq,	  urging	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  Fighting,	  manufacturing	  a	  crisis	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along	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway,	  and	  seeking	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime’s	  overthrow	  in	  January	  1970.	  This	  kept	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  preoccupied	  politically	  and	  militarily	  during	  the	  crucial	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  British	  departure	  from	  the	  region	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1971.	   Despite	  the	  Iraq	  crisis,	  throughout	  Nixon’s	  First	  term	  the	  White	  House	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  Gulf	  region—let	  alone	  Iraq.	  Indeed,	  when	  the	  NSC’s	  Interdepartmental	  Group	  for	  the	  Near	  East	  region	  First	  met	  on	  June	  5,	  1970,	  the	  meeting	  lasted	  for	  barely	  twenty	  minutes	  and	  failed	  to	  discuss	  a	  single	  military	  issue.	  This,	  as	  W.	  Taylor	  Fain	  noted,	  underscored	  the	  “low	  priority”	  Nixon’s	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  and	  the	  White	  House	  “attached	  to	  Persian	  Gulf	  issues.”609	  This	  was	  because	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  had	  greater	  priorities	  at	  this	  time:	  the	  escalating	  war	  in	  Vietnam,	  opening	  up	  to	  China,	  and	  achieving	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  Furthermore,	  as	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad	  observed:Nixon	  viewed	  the	  Third	  World	  First	  and	  foremost	  as	  a	  source	  of	  disorder	  in	  international	  relations,	  which	  only	  counted	  to	  the	  superpowers	  if	  its	  internal	  squabbles	  were	  made	  use	  of	  by	  one	  superpower	  to	  threatened	  the	  key	  interests	  of	  the	  other,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  access	  to	  raw	  materials	  [like	  oil].610Consequently,	  between	  1969	  and	  1971	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  preferred	  to	  “farm	  out”	  as	  much	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  regional	  matters	  to	  the	  State	  Department.611	  It	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine.	  Announced	  in	  July	  1969,	  this	  policy	  called	  on	  the	  U.S.	  to	  assist	  its	  regional	  allies	  in	  taking	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  defending	  themselves.612	  These	  trends	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  U.S.	  relationship	  with	  the	  Shah,	  who	  Nixon	  wanted	  to	  establish	  as	  the	  regional	  hegemon	  following	  Britain’s	  withdrawal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1971.	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II	   Throughout	  1969	  the	  Iranian	  government	  capitalized	  on	  Iraq’s	  internal	  and	  external	  weaknesses	  to	  force	  it	  to	  make	  concessions	  along	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway.	  In	  1937,	  Iraq	  was	  given	  legal	  sovereignty	  over	  this	  waterway,	  barring	  the	  approaches	  to	  two	  key	  Iranian	  ports.613 	  However,	  since	  Iraq’s	  1958	  revolution	  the	  Shah	  had	  sought	  to	  wrest	  partial	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  waterway	  using	  coercive	  measures.	  Until	  recently	  the	  Shatt	  crisis	  had	  received	  little	  scholarly	  attention;	  however,	  Alvandi’s	  article	  on	  U.S.-­‐Iranian	  relations	  provides	  new	  details.	  SigniFicantly,	  Alvandi	  describes	  the	  crisis	  as	  “a	  harbinger	  of	  the	  role	  Iran	  could	  play	  under	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine,”614	  an	  argument	  that	  holds	  ground.	  The	  Shah	  used	  the	  Shatt	  crisis	  to	  convince	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  of	  his	  importance	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  regional	  strategy,	  by	  punishing	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  for	  executing	  the	  Jews,	  while	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  seek	  long-­‐coveted	  concessions	  from	  Iraq.	  Either	  way,	  his	  actions	  found	  an	  appreciative	  audience	  in	  both	  Washington	  and	  Tel	  Aviv.	  	   The	  Shah’s	  opening	  move	  against	  Iraq	  began	  on	  March	  1,	  when	  he	  ordered	  the	  Kurds	  to	  attack	  the	  IPC’s	  installations	  around	  Kirkuk	  and	  Mosul.	  According	  to	  Asadollah	  Alam,	  the	  Shah’s	  Minister	  of	  Court	  and	  close	  conFidant,	  the	  Shah	  hoped	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  pipelines	  would	  reveal	  Iraq’s	  poor	  security	  and	  undermine	  its	  credibility	  with	  the	  oil	  companies,	  who	  would	  then	  switch	  their	  production	  targets	  to	  Iran.615 	  The	  bombing	  caused	  $5	  million	  in	  damage	  and	  reduced	  Iraq’s	  oil	  pumping	  capacity	  by	  70%	  for	  about	  ten	  days.616	  The	  attack	  also	  set	  off	  a	  new	  round	  of	  Fighting	  between	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  that	  ended	  in	  April,	  when	  the	  army	  withdrew	  from	  the	  mountains.	  This,	  however,	  was	  not	  because	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  tactical	  victory,	  but	  because	  Iraq	  faced	  a	  much	  more	  menacing	  threat	  from	  Iran	  in	  the	  south.617	   Throughout	  March	  and	  April	  the	  Shah	  escalated	  tensions	  with	  Iraq	  along	  the	  Shatt,	  after	  Iraq	  demanded	  that	  Iranian	  vessels	  Fly	  the	  Iraqi	  Flag	  while	  in	  the	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waterway.618	  The	  crisis	  was	  signiFicant	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  reckless	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Shah	  went	  about	  seeking	  concessions	  from	  Iraq	  over	  the	  waterway	  nearly	  ended	  in	  war.	  For	  instance,	  following	  an	  Iraqi	  threat	  to	  use	  force	  to	  ensure	  its	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  waterway,	  Iran	  abrogated	  the	  1937	  border	  treaty	  unilaterally	  and	  put	  the	  Iranian	  army	  on	  red	  alert.	  When	  Alam	  and	  the	  head	  of	  SAVAK,	  General	  Nemattollah	  Nassiri,	  learned	  of	  this,	  they	  were	  outraged.	  That	  night,	  Alam	  wrote	  in	  his	  journal:	  “[Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Ardeshir]	  Zahedi	  has	  made	  a	  complete	  cock-­‐up	  and	  landed	  us	  on	  a	  war	  footing	  with	  Iraq….	  I	  had	  no	  idea	  of	  how	  far	  our	  relations	  had	  deteriorated	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  latest	  crisis	  comes	  as	  an	  appalling	  shock.”	  He	  later	  expressed	  his	  concern	  to	  the	  Shah:	  Is	  this	  really	  an	  appropriate	  moment	  for	  us	  to	  resort	  to	  force,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  vital	  negotiations	  with	  oil	  companies	  and	  just	  as	  we	  are	  approaching	  an	  understanding	  with	  the	  Arabs	  of	  the	  Gulf?	  It	  makes	  my	  blood	  boil….	  Never	  underestimate	  your	  opponents;	  even	  if	  the	  Iraqis	  avoid	  a	  war,	  they	  can	  still	  paralyze	  our	  economy	  by	  denying	  us	  use	  of	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.619This	  incident	  underscores	  the	  Shah’s	  increasingly	  autocratic	  and	  arbitrary	  style	  of	  conducting	  Iran’s	  foreign	  policy.	   Second,	  not	  unlike	  in	  1966,	  the	  Shatt	  crisis	  once	  again	  tied	  the	  waterway	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  Following	  the	  abrogation	  of	  the	  treaty,	  the	  Shah	  calculated	  Iraq	  would	  have	  to	  react,	  lest	  it	  look	  weak.	  He	  also	  knew	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraq’s	  forces—60,000	  troops—were	  deployed	  against	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  north,	  while	  another	  three	  brigades	  were	  stationed	  in	  Jordan.	  This	  left	  the	  regime	  with	  two	  options:	  back	  off	  from	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  north	  or	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  from	  Jordan,	  but	  neither	  option	  was	  politically	  feasible.620	  With	  the	  Iraqis	  cornered,	  like	  in	  1966,	  the	  Shah	  passed	  word	  to	  Baghdad	  that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  “break	  off	  supplies	  to	  the	  Kurds	  in	  return	  for	  concessions	  in	  the	  Shatt.”	  When	  the	  Iraqis	  rejected	  the	  proposal,	  the	  Shah	  encouraged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  reopen	  hostilities	  in	  the	  north	  and	  simultaneously	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escalated	  tensions	  along	  the	  Shatt.621	  By	  linking	  both	  events,	  the	  Shah	  sent	  Baghdad	  a	  clear	  message	  that	  Iran	  would	  be	  the	  dominant	  regional	  power	  once	  the	  British	  departed	  and	  if	  Iraq	  ever	  wanted	  relief	  from	  the	  Kurds	  it	  would	  have	  to	  give	  him	  what	  he	  wanted.	  Eventually,	  Iraq	  took	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Security	  Council,	  where	  it	  continued	  to	  joust	  rhetorically	  with	  Iran	  until	  the	  matter	  was	  dropped	  in	  June.622	   Having	  failed	  to	  coerce	  concessions	  from	  Iraq	  militarily,	  throughout	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1969	  Iran	  resorted	  to	  covert	  action	  to	  try	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  As	  with	  previous	  efforts,	  the	  Shah	  tried	  to	  bring	  together	  a	  collection	  of	  collaborators,	  including	  the	  Kurds.	  	   In	  mid-­‐June,	  Barzani’s	  Washington	  representative,	  ShawFiq	  Qazzaz,	  visited	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  request	  U.S.	  assistance.	  As	  with	  previous	  representations,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  politely	  refused,	  while	  accepting	  a	  letter	  from	  Barzani	  to	  Secretary	  Rogers.	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  also	  expressed	  sympathy	  for	  the	  Kurds’	  plight,	  said	  it	  had	  been	  a	  useful	  exchange,	  and	  indicated	  the	  department	  “would	  be	  pleased	  to	  talk	  to	  [Qazzaz]	  again	  at	  any	  time.”623	  Ultimately,	  the	  First	  interaction	  between	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  and	  the	  Kurds	  under	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  represented	  an	  improvement	  from	  the	  Johnson	  administration,	  which	  had	  been	  sensitive	  about	  Kurdish	  contacts.	   As	  tensions	  eased	  in	  the	  south,	  Iraq	  renewed	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  when	  it	  launched	  a	  major	  offensive	  in	  late-­‐August.624	  SigniFicantly,	  Iraq	  sought	  to	  implicate	  Iran,	  claiming	  “thirty	  Persian	  soldiers	  had	  been	  killed	  and	  fourteen	  others	  captured	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  Army	  while	  trying	  to	  re-­‐cross	  the	  frontier	  back	  to	  [Iran],	  in	  an	  area	  where	  the	  border	  was	  controlled	  by	  Kurdish	  rebels.”	  Iran	  denied	  any	  involvement,	  suggesting	  instead	  that	  “certain	  elements”	  of	  Iran’s	  population,	  which	  had	  been	  “the	  object	  of	  almost	  daily	  bombing	  and	  napalm	  attacks	  by	  Iraqi	  forces	  engaged	  against	  Mullah	  Mustafa’s	  troops,	  may	  have	  been	  driven	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Fight	  without	  
 183
621 FCO Research Department, Middle East Section, “The Shatt-al-Arab Dispute 1964-1969,” April 28, 
1969 (BNA/FCO.17/879/doc.64), p.2; and Alam (1991), p.54.
622 United Nations Security Council, April 29, 1969, S/9185. 
623 DoS, Memorandum of Conversation, “Kurdish/Assyrian Appeal for U.S. Assistance,” June 13, 1969 
(FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.259), pp.1-3. 
624 O’Ballance (1973), p.156.
the	  Persian	  Government’s	  knowledge.”625	  Nevertheless,	  Fighting	  continued	  until	  October	  when	  Iraqi	  forces	  halted	  for	  the	  winter.626	  	   Meanwhile,	  in	  mid-­‐October	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  of	  an	  Iranian	  plot	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  On	  October	  15,	  Talcott	  Seelye,	  the	  Iraq	  desk	  ofFicer	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  met	  with	  an	  Iraqi	  businessman,	  LoutFi	  Obeidi,	  who	  had	  returned	  from	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  region.	  According	  to	  Obeidi,	  a	  coalition	  of	  Iraqi	  exiles,	  Kurds,	  and	  Iranians	  were	  plotting	  to	  overthrow	  the	  regime.	  He	  claimed	  the	  Shah	  had	  offered	  the	  conspirators	  “Iran’s	  full	  support”	  and	  complained	  about	  “how	  poorly	  the	  Iranians	  had	  handled	  the	  operation.”	  When	  Obeidi	  asked	  if	  the	  U.S.	  was	  willing	  to	  support	  the	  plot,	  Seelye	  emphatically	  replied	  in	  the	  negative.627 	  Then,	  on	  December	  8,	  another	  Iraqi	  exile,	  Sa’ad	  Jabr,	  discussed	  the	  plot	  with	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  at	  the	  embassy	  in	  Beirut.	  Jabr	  predicted	  his	  “group”	  would	  establish	  a	  government	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  in	  the	  next	  six	  weeks	  and	  foment	  rebellion	  in	  the	  south.	  He	  asked	  for	  U.S.	  assistance	  in	  pressing	  the	  IPC	  to	  withhold	  payments	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  and	  provide	  medicine,	  food,	  and	  clothing.	  Embassy	  ofFicials	  said	  the	  U.S.	  could	  not	  make	  these	  commitments	  and	  was	  unwilling	  to	  involve	  itself.628	  When	  the	  State	  Department	  learned	  of	  these	  meetings	  it	  concurred	  with	  the	  inadvisability	  of	  providing	  aid,	  but	  asked	  the	  embassy	  in	  Beirut	  to	  inform	  Jabr	  the	  U.S.	  “would	  be	  prepared	  to	  consider	  prompt	  resumption	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  and	  would	  certainly	  be	  disposed	  to	  cooperate	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  existing	  legislation	  and	  [their]	  overall	  policy”	  if	  the	  “new	  government	  prove[d]	  to	  be	  moderate	  and	  friendly.”	  This	  response	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  involve	  itself	  in	  plotting	  against	  the	  regime,	  if	  a	  friendly	  regime	  came	  to	  power	  it	  would	  consider	  assistance.629	   Thanks	  to	  Iran’s	  aggressive	  posture	  over	  the	  Shatt,	  its	  continuous	  plotting	  against	  Iraq,	  and	  its	  backing	  of	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  war—which	  had	  cost	  nearly	  30%	  of	  Iraq’s	  total	  budget	  for	  1969—the	  Ba’th	  concluded	  in	  late-­‐1969	  that	  in	  order	  to	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survive	  it	  had	  to	  rob	  the	  Shah	  of	  his	  ‘Kurdish	  Card’	  and	  reach	  an	  accommodation	  with	  Barzani.630 	  In	  early	  December,	  Iraq’s	  president,	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  al-­‐Bakr,	  sent	  Faud	  Aref,	  a	  Kurd	  and	  former	  minister,	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  present	  Barzani	  with	  an	  offer	  of	  regional	  autonomy.	  In	  response,	  Barzani	  “insisted	  that	  any	  agreement	  reached	  with	  the	  Government	  must	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  UN	  to	  ensure	  implementation.”631	  When	  the	  government	  refused,	  Barzani	  broke	  off	  negotiations	  on	  December	  21,	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  sent	  his	  deputy,	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  who,	  in	  his	  dual	  roles	  as	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  RCC	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Assistant	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  the	  strongest	  personality	  in	  the	  regime,	  to	  the	  north	  for	  direct	  talks.	  For	  the	  next	  month,	  Saddam	  and	  Dr.	  Mahmoud	  Othman,	  Barzani’s	  personal	  physician	  and	  close	  conFidant,	  hammered	  out	  the	  details	  of	  an	  agreement.632	   Upon	  learning	  of	  these	  talks,	  the	  Shah	  was	  furious	  and	  escalated	  his	  plotting	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.	  According	  to	  a	  British	  diplomat,	  the	  Shah’s	  “immediate	  aim	  in	  mounting	  [a]	  coup	  [in	  Iraq]	  at	  this	  time	  was	  to	  forestall	  [an]	  agreement	  [with	  the	  Kurds].”	  After	  all,	  a	  deal	  would	  undercut	  the	  Shah’s	  efforts	  to	  win	  the	  Shatt.	  But	  unknown	  to	  the	  Iranians,	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  had	  inFiltrated	  the	  plot	  and	  had	  “complete	  recordings	  of	  most	  of	  the	  meetings	  and	  interviews	  that	  took	  place.”633	  Scheduled	  for	  the	  night	  of	  January	  20-­‐21,	  the	  conspirators	  fell	  right	  into	  the	  Iraqi	  trap.	  The	  next	  day	  the	  regime	  announced	  it	  had	  foiled	  the	  plot	  and	  broadcast	  the	  secret	  recordings,	  leading	  one	  diplomat	  to	  observe	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  “caught	  the	  Iranians	  with	  their	  pants	  well	  below	  their	  knees.”634	  The	  next	  morning	  Iran’s	  ambassador	  and	  four	  other	  diplomats	  were	  expelled	  from	  Iraq	  and	  by	  January	  23	  at	  least	  thirty-­‐three	  conspirators	  had	  been	  executed.635	  With	  this,	  Iran’s	  year-­‐long	  effort	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’th	  regime	  ended	  in	  failure.	  Ultimately,	  the	  Iranian	  plot	  gave	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  further	  impetus	  to	  solve	  the	  Kurdish	  question.	  On	  January	  24,	  the	  regime	  announced	  it	  would	  implement	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  1966	  Bazzaz	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declaration;	  declared	  a	  general	  amnesty;	  and	  invited	  a	  Kurdish	  delegation	  to	  Baghdad.636	   The	  Iranians	  and	  Israelis	  were	  determined	  to	  prevent	  a	  Kurdish-­‐Iraqi	  agreement.	  In	  early	  March,	  SAVAK	  contacted	  Barzani	  and	  asked	  him	  to	  send	  an	  envoy	  to	  Tehran	  for	  discussions.	  On	  March	  4,	  Mulla	  Mustafa’s	  son,	  Idris	  Barzani,	  arrived	  in	  Tehran	  to	  meet	  with	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  representatives.	  According	  to	  the	  CIA,	  the	  “Israelis	  pushed	  hard	  for	  resumption	  of	  hostilities	  in	  Northern	  Iraq”	  and	  promised	  the	  Kurds	  anti-­‐aircraft	  weapons,	  light	  artillery,	  armored	  cars,	  armored	  personnel	  carriers,	  and	  even	  tanks,	  if	  they	  could	  capture	  “at	  least	  two	  Iraqi	  tanks”.	  Then,	  on	  March	  6,	  Idris	  met	  with	  General	  Nassiri	  to	  discuss	  Iran’s	  concern	  over	  Barzani’s	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  and	  plans	  for	  further	  aid.	  Nassiri	  said,	  “Iran	  was	  fully	  behind	  the	  Israeli	  plan	  to	  renew	  the	  Fighting	  in	  Northern	  Iraq”	  and	  Barzani	  should	  “carefully	  note	  what	  the	  Israelis	  were	  suggesting.”	  Going	  further,	  he	  said	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  would	  increase	  their	  Financial	  assistance	  to	  the	  Kurds	  to	  more	  than	  $3	  million	  a	  month.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  two	  approaches	  conFirm	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  were	  worried	  about	  losing	  their	  ‘Kurdish	  card’	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  promise	  anything	  to	  prevent	  an	  agreement	  with	  Baghdad.	  When	  the	  CIA	  reported	  these	  talks	  to	  the	  White	  House	  it	  was	  the	  First	  time	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  had	  been	  raised	  with	  the	  Nixon	  administration.637	   Just	  as	  Idris	  was	  visiting	  Tehran,	  Saddam	  travelled	  north	  to	  Kurdistan	  and	  concluded	  an	  agreement	  with	  Mulla	  Mustafa.	  According	  to	  David	  McDowell,	  Saddam	  gave	  Barzani	  some	  blank	  pieces	  of	  paper	  and	  told	  him	  to	  write	  out	  his	  demands.638	  In	  the	  agreement,	  known	  as	  the	  March	  Accord,	  the	  regime	  agreed	  to	  recognize	  the	  bi-­‐national	  character	  of	  Iraq;	  reafFirm	  Kurdish	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  rights;	  provide	  economic	  rehabilitation	  and	  development	  of	  the	  devastated	  regions	  of	  Kurdistan;	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  allow	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  self-­‐governing	  region	  of	  Kurdistan.639	  Once	  the	  agreement	  was	  signed,	  Saddam	  returned	  to	  Baghdad	  and	  announced	  on	  March	  11	  that	  he	  had	  achieved	  a	  “total	  and	  Final”	  solution	  to	  the	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Kurdish	  problem	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  agreement	  was	  hailed	  internationally	  as	  a	  major	  step	  towards	  the	  national	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  Arab	  and	  Kurdish	  populations	  of	  Iraq,	  but	  whether	  the	  Ba’th	  would	  follow	  through	  with	  its	  promises	  remained	  uncertain.640 	  	   The	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  not	  optimistic	  about	  the	  peace	  settlement’s	  chances	  for	  success.	  On	  March	  14,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tehran	  cabled	  Washington	  to	  offer	  their	  assessment.	  In	  particular,	  the	  agreement	  left	  critical	  questions	  unanswered	  like	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  the	  Kurds	  would	  enjoy.	  Even	  so,	  while	  the	  document	  looked	  “more	  binding	  than	  anything	  developed	  heretofore,”	  the	  embassy	  questioned	  “whether	  it	  will	  hold	  for	  any	  substantial	  length	  of	  time.”	  The	  Shah,	  however,	  feared	  the	  agreement	  would	  free	  Iraq’s	  hand	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  but	  the	  embassy	  doubted	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  was	  secure	  enough	  to	  pose	  a	  threat	  elsewhere.	  After	  all,	  the	  agreement	  had	  not	  diminished	  the	  threat	  Barzani	  posed	  to	  the	  regime	  and	  so	  State	  believed	  it	  would	  not	  take	  long	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  agreement	  to	  “uncover	  serious	  if	  not	  fatal	  Flaws.”641	   During	  Nixon’s	  First	  year	  in	  ofFice	  Iraq	  was	  the	  center	  of	  a	  number	  of	  crises,	  but	  still	  never	  featured	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Certainly	  the	  killing	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Jews	  in	  January	  1969	  caught	  the	  administration’s	  attention,	  but	  once	  the	  crisis	  faded	  and	  Iraq	  was	  relegated	  into	  the	  back-­‐pages	  of	  newspapers,	  it	  ceased	  to	  be	  of	  interest.	  This	  did	  not,	  however,	  mean	  the	  U.S.	  was	  ignoring	  the	  escalating	  standoff	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq,	  but	  rather	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  did	  not	  view	  the	  Gulf	  as	  a	  priority.	  With	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine	  in	  July	  and	  Iran’s	  success	  at	  keeping	  Iraq	  in	  a	  state	  of	  perpetual	  crisis,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  content	  to	  let	  the	  Shah	  play	  his	  games,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  more	  important	  U.S.	  objectives	  at	  the	  time,	  like	  de-­‐escalating	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  budding	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Further,	  because	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  did	  not	  perceive	  Iraq	  as	  signiFicant	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  the	  Cold	  War	  or	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict,	  it	  did	  not	  require	  signiFicant	  attention	  from	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	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   The	  period	  between	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  1970	  March	  Accord	  and	  the	  spring	  of	  1972	  was	  confusing	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  peace	  agreement	  with	  the	  Kurds	  freed	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  to	  unleash	  a	  wave	  of	  terror	  against	  the	  communists,	  but	  this	  would	  be	  short-­‐lived.	  In	  late-­‐1971,	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  British	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  region,	  Iraq	  rekindled	  its	  relationship	  with	  Moscow,	  ended	  its	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists,	  and	  tried	  to	  solve	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  by	  trying	  to	  assassinate	  Barzani.	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  pressed	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  to	  reconsider	  its	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Kurds	  by	  pointing	  to	  Britain’s	  withdrawal	  and	  over-­‐stating	  the	  threat	  the	  Soviets	  posed	  to	  the	  region,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  convinced.	  This	  reFlects	  both	  a	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  disinterest	  in	  the	  region.	  	   Following	  the	  March	  Accord,	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  sought	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  that	  the	  agreement	  was	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  Soviet	  plan	  to	  replace	  the	  British	  as	  the	  dominant	  regional	  power.	  For	  example,	  on	  March	  12,	  Iranian	  Prime	  Minister	  Hoveyda	  told	  the	  new	  U.S.	  ambassador,	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  the	  agreement	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  conspiracy,	  would	  release	  about	  20,000	  Iraqi	  troops	  for	  deployment	  to	  the	  Gulf	  or	  against	  Israel,	  increased	  Iraqi	  resources	  and	  capability	  for	  subversion	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  and	  showed	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  was	  “very	  much	  under	  the	  inFluence	  of	  the	  Soviets	  because	  of	  its	  dependence	  on	  Soviet	  military	  and	  other	  aid	  for	  survival.”	  But	  the	  Fifth	  point	  was	  the	  most	  important.	  [The	  agreement]	  will	  prepare	  for	  [the]	  next	  step	  in	  [the]	  Soviet	  plan	  which	  is	  [the]	  eventual	  transformation	  of	  [the]	  autonomous	  Iraqi	  Kurdish	  province	  into	  [an]	  autonomous	  Kurdish	  state	  with	  [a]	  view	  to	  enlarging	  Kurdish	  state	  until	  it	  eventually	  has	  contiguous	  borders	  with	  [the]	  Soviet	  Union	  which	  will	  thus	  enable	  [the]	  Soviets	  to	  overcome	  [the]	  present	  Turkey-­‐Iran	  barrier	  to	  their	  direct	  penetration	  of	  [the]	  Middle	  East.	  Finally,	  Hoveyda	  said	  he	  was	  worried	  the	  Soviets	  would	  “begin	  to	  play	  on	  strong	  national	  sentiment	  of	  [the]	  Kurdish	  people	  to	  stir	  up	  Turkish	  and	  Iranian	  Kurds	  in	  subversive	  activities	  holding	  out	  bait	  of	  an	  enlarged	  independent	  Kurdish	  state.”	  For	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these	  reasons,	  he	  urged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  increase	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Iranian	  armed	  forces	  so	  it	  had	  the	  “minimum	  necessary	  deterrent	  strength”	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  withdrawal	  in	  December	  1971.	  Clearly	  Iran	  saw	  itself	  as	  the	  natural	  heir	  to	  the	  British	  and	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  this	  view	  with	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  following	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine.	  Responding,	  MacArthur	  agreed	  with	  the	  necessity	  of	  building	  up	  Iran’s	  military	  strength	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Britain’s	  impending	  withdrawal	  and	  saw	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  strong,	  stable	  Iran	  capable	  of	  making	  a	  major	  contribution	  to	  the	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  While	  the	  request	  Fitted	  with	  America’s	  ‘twin	  pillar’	  policy	  for	  the	  region,	  Iran	  was	  clearly	  amplifying	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  its	  own	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf.642	  	   The	  Iranians	  were	  not	  alone	  in	  trying	  to	  convince	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  that	  the	  March	  Accord	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  plot.	  On	  April	  10,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Israel’s	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  Gideon	  Rafael,	  told	  Secretary	  Rogers	  that	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  been	  “extremely	  reluctant”	  to	  seek	  peace	  with	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  the	  Soviets	  had	  insisted	  “they	  wanted	  peace	  in	  proximity	  of	  USSR’s	  borders.”	  According	  to	  Rafael,	  in	  exchange	  for	  peace	  Moscow	  had	  promised	  Baghdad,	  further	  arms	  assistance,	  cooperation	  on	  oil	  matters,	  and	  “support	  for	  [a]	  bigger	  Iraqi	  role	  in	  Persian	  Gulf	  affairs.”643	  Clearly	  the	  Iranians	  and	  Israelis	  were	  depicting	  the	  agreement	  as	  a	  Soviet	  plot	  to	  convince	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  of	  the	  Gulf’s	  importance	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  withdrawal.	   The	  Nixon	  administration	  did	  not	  accept	  this	  analysis.644	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  department	  described	  the	  Rogers-­‐Rafael	  talks	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  it	  observed,	  “we	  realize	  Israelis	  have	  good	  sources	  on	  Kurdish	  matters	  but	  believe	  Rafael	  has	  exaggerated	  [the]	  Soviet	  role	  in	  recent	  …	  agreement.”645	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  concerned	  about	  Soviet	  penetration	  in	  the	  region,	  it	  did	  not	  accept	  that	  the	  agreement	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  strategy.	  “We	  agree	  [the]	  Soviets	  have	  been	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encouraging	  Iraqi/Kurdish	  settlement	  but	  it	  [is]	  less	  clear	  what	  effect	  this	  actually	  had	  in	  bringing	  about	  [the]	  current	  settlement.”	  It	  noted	  the	  Soviet	  position	  on	  the	  Kurds	  had	  Fluctuated	  and	  was	  largely	  “subordinated	  to	  other	  …	  policy	  considerations	  in	  the	  area.”	  Indeed,	  “it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Soviets	  would	  want	  to	  risk	  damaging	  their	  carefully	  nurtured	  relations	  with	  Iran	  and	  Turkey”	  by	  embarking	  on	  a	  plan	  to	  create	  a	  “Kurdish	  corridor”	  along	  its	  border.	  This	  assessment	  reFlected	  a	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation.646	   Another	  U.S.	  ofFicial,	  Lee	  Dinsmore—a	  former	  Iraqi	  desk	  ofFicer	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  now	  the	  U.S.	  consul	  to	  Dhahran,	  Saudi	  Arabia—was	  amused	  by	  Iran’s	  sudden	  cry	  of	  “Soviets!”	  Dinsmore	  thought	  the	  Shah’s	  frustration	  over	  the	  settlement	  was	  amusing,	  since	  he	  was	  the	  one	  who	  had	  encouraged	  Barzani	  to	  sustain	  military	  pressure	  on	  Iraq,	  while	  being	  prepared	  to	  sell	  the	  Kurds	  out	  if	  the	  Iraqis	  conceded	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.	  In	  fact,	  Dinsmore	  argued	  it	  was	  Iran’s	  brinkmanship	  with	  Iraq	  that	  had	  pushed	  it	  to	  seek	  accommodation	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  Therefore,	  “if	  [the]	  Soviet	  Union	  [was]	  happy	  over	  [the]	  direction	  [the]	  Kurdish	  situation	  [was]	  taking	  in	  Iraq,	  it	  may	  have	  [America’s]	  friends	  to	  thank.	  It	  [was]	  doubtful	  [the]	  Kurds	  could	  have	  held	  out	  over	  [the]	  last	  ten	  years	  had	  they	  not	  had	  Iran's	  help.”647	  	   Bolstering	  the	  U.S.	  thesis,	  throughout	  much	  of	  1970-­‐71	  relations	  between	  Baghdad	  and	  Moscow	  underwent	  a	  deep	  chill.	  The	  Ba’th	  Party,	  having	  settled	  the	  Kurdish	  problem,	  saw	  the	  ICP	  as	  a	  threat.648	  On	  March	  23,	  the	  Ba’th	  commenced	  a	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists	  and,	  over	  the	  next	  few	  weeks,	  security	  forces	  rounded	  up	  communists	  and	  targeted	  the	  ICP’s	  leadership	  with	  assassinations.649	  From	  a	  U.S.	  perspective,	  Iraq’s	  repression	  of	  the	  communists	  was	  a	  positive	  development,	  but	  the	  absence	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  to	  improve	  relations	  like	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  had	  in	  1963.
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   By	  August	  the	  decline	  in	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  relations	  was	  apparent	  when	  Saddam	  Hussein	  visited	  Moscow	  from	  August	  4	  to	  12	  to	  seek	  deferment	  on	  payments	  for	  weapons	  and	  to	  obtain	  additional	  economic	  and	  military	  aid.	  Though	  little	  was	  known	  about	  the	  discussions,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  believed	  he	  received	  a	  “chilly”	  reception.	  A	  joint	  communiqué	  suggested	  the	  Soviets	  had	  not	  made	  any	  new	  commitments,	  stating	  both	  sides	  “exchanged	  views”	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  was	  “standard	  Soviet	  communiqué	  language	  for	  lack	  of	  any	  agreement.”650	  Then,	  on	  August	  24,	  the	  CIA	  sent	  Kissinger	  an	  intelligence	  summary	  that	  conFirmed	  the	  decline.	  According	  to	  the	  memo,	  a	  Soviet	  military	  attaché	  in	  Iraq	  conFided	  to	  a	  CIA	  ofFicer	  in	  July	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  was	  frustrated	  with	  the	  regime	  about	  Iraq’s	  failure	  to	  pay	  for	  major	  weapons	  purchases	  and	  its	  repeated	  dismissal	  of	  Soviet	  requests	  to	  form	  a	  national	  unity	  government—or	  National	  Front—with	  the	  communists	  and	  Barzani’s	  DKP.	  There	  were	  also	  reports	  that	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  were	  monitoring	  the	  movements	  of	  Soviet	  ofFicials	  closely	  and	  often	  stopped	  and	  harassed	  ofFicial	  vehicles	  at	  checkpoints.651 	  Taken	  together,	  these	  reports	  refute	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  claims	  that	  the	  March	  agreement	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  strategy	  to	  dominate	  the	  Gulf.	  	   There	  were	  also	  indicators	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  becoming	  interested	  in	  Iraq.	  For	  instance,	  while	  Saddam	  was	  in	  Moscow,	  the	  CIA	  learned	  Barzani	  was	  strengthening	  his	  forces	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  confrontation	  with	  the	  regime	  and	  had	  begun	  to	  offer	  a	  safe	  haven	  to	  communists	  Fleeing	  Baghdad.652 	  Then,	  on	  August	  22,	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  disrupted	  a	  Nationalist	  coup	  and	  a	  few	  days’	  later	  Iraqi	  Shia	  dissidents	  informed	  the	  CIA	  of	  further	  plots	  against	  the	  regime.653	  The	  CIA	  was	  clearly	  developing	  an	  interest	  in	  Iraqi	  affairs	  at	  this	  time.	  	   This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  growing	  crisis	  in	  Jordan,	  where	  tension	  between	  King	  Hussein	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Fedayeen	  escalated	  into	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  September.	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Since	  the	  Six	  Day	  War,	  Jordanian	  authorities	  had	  tried	  repeatedly	  to	  bring	  the	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organization	  (PLO)	  under	  control	  with	  no	  success.654	  After	  a	  showdown	  between	  the	  Jordanian	  army	  and	  the	  PLO	  was	  averted	  in	  June	  1970,	  the	  situation	  escalated	  in	  late	  July	  following	  Jordan	  and	  Egypt’s	  acceptance	  of	  Secretary	  Rogers’	  peace	  plan.655	  As	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  confrontation	  increased	  in	  early	  September	  following	  the	  hijacking	  and	  dramatic	  destruction	  of	  three	  planes	  by	  the	  radical	  Popular	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	  (PFLP),656	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  became	  concerned	  that	  the	  25,000	  Iraqi	  troops	  stationed	  in	  Jordan	  since	  1967,657	  could	  intervene	  on	  the	  PLO’s	  behalf.658	  But	  when	  King	  Hussein	  unleashed	  the	  Jordanian	  military	  against	  the	  Palestinians	  on	  September	  17,	  the	  Iraqis,	  led	  by	  Iraq’s	  Defense	  Minister,	  Hardan	  al-­‐Tikriti,	  failed	  to	  come	  to	  their	  aid.	  According	  to	  Jack	  O’Connell,	  the	  CIA’s	  station	  chief	  in	  Amman,	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  an	  Iraqi	  defector	  named	  General	  Abud	  Hassan	  (who	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  and	  former	  roommate	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein),	  had	  tricked	  Iraqi	  ofFicials	  into	  believing	  the	  U.S.	  had	  planned	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  conFlict	  on	  Jordan’s	  behalf	  by	  leaking	  to	  them	  falsiFied	  NATO	  war	  plans.	  Fearing	  the	  capture	  of	  Iraq’s	  forces	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  U.S.	  intervention,	  Tikriti	  ordered	  his	  troops	  to	  positions	  near	  the	  Iraqi	  border,	  thereby	  cutting	  them	  off	  from	  operations	  in	  Amman.659	  Through	  this	  grand	  deception,	  the	  Jordanians	  effectively	  removed	  the	  Iraqi	  threat	  during	  the	  September	  crisis.660	  	   Iraq’s	  embarrassing	  actions	  during	  the	  Jordanian	  civil	  war	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  catalyst	  for	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  consolidation	  of	  power.	  Following	  the	  crisis,	  the	  PLO’s	  chairman,	  Yasir	  Arafat,	  sent	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  a	  message,	  saying,	  “History	  will	  not	  forgive	  those	  who	  failed	  [to]	  support	  [the]	  fedayeen	  being	  massacred	  by	  [the]	  Jordanian	  army.”	  This	  led	  the	  RCC,	  at	  Saddam’s	  request,	  to	  dismiss	  Tikriti	  from	  his	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civilian	  and	  military	  positions	  on	  October	  5.661	  With	  Tikriti	  removed,	  there	  were	  no	  more	  obstacles	  to	  prevent	  Saddam’s	  consolidation	  of	  power.	  	   Despite	  America’s	  renewed	  interest	  in	  Iraq,	  it	  took	  the	  State	  Department	  Five	  weeks	  to	  learn	  of	  Saddam’s	  consolidation	  of	  power.	  Upon	  learning	  this,	  the	  department	  cabled	  its	  embassy	  in	  Brussels	  seeking	  a	  current	  assessment	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  situation.662	  It	  found	  that	  the	  Belgian	  Embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  had	  been	  derelict	  in	  its	  reporting	  of	  political	  developments.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Brussels	  responded	  to	  the	  department’s	  request,	  it	  complained	  the	  Belgian	  Foreign	  OfFice	  had	  been	  “unable	  to	  provide	  [an]	  in	  depth	  assessment	  of	  current	  Iraqi	  situation.”	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  unimpressed	  with	  Belgium’s	  political	  reporting	  on	  Iraq,	  describing	  it	  as	  “short	  on	  facts	  and	  long	  on	  conjecture.”	  Further,	  the	  embassy	  complained,	  “as	  substitute	  [for]	  their	  assessment	  [the	  Foreign	  OfFice]	  ofFicials	  offered	  …	  copies	  [of	  the]	  last	  two	  dispatches	  from	  Belgian	  Embassy	  Baghdad.	  From	  [those	  they	  had]	  culled	  observations.”663	  Clearly,	  there	  was	  a	  problem	  with	  Belgium’s	  reporting.664	   In	  early	  December,	  tensions	  between	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  Kurds	  escalated	  following	  an	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Mulla	  Mustafa’s	  son	  and	  heir-­‐apparent,	  Idris.665	  The	  details	  of	  the	  attack	  notwithstanding,	  the	  attempt	  conFirmed	  to	  Barzani	  that	  the	  regime	  could	  not	  be	  trusted.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Ian	  McDowall,	  a	  Reuters’	  correspondent	  who	  happened	  to	  interview	  Mullah	  Mustafa	  a	  few	  days	  after	  the	  attack,	  Barzani	  was	  convinced	  the	  regime	  was	  behind	  the	  plot.666	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  INR	  uncovered	  credible	  evidence	  suggesting	  the	  Soviets	  had	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  attack.667 	  This	  was	  signiFicant	  because	  it	  suggested	  Moscow	  had	  turned	  against	  the	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Kurds	  and	  was	  seeking	  to	  cultivate	  relations	  with	  the	  Ba’th	  despite	  its	  repressive	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists.	  Further,	  the	  incident	  also	  convinced	  Barzani	  that	  he	  could	  trust	  neither	  the	  Ba’th	  nor	  the	  Soviets	  and	  led	  him	  to	  renew	  his	  alliance	  with	  Iran	  and	  Israel.	   On	  March	  15,	  1971,	  SAVAK	  ofFicials	  informed	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  that	  it	  had	  resumed	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  and	  asked	  the	  U.S.	  to	  reconsider	  its	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  Once	  again,	  the	  Iranians	  framed	  their	  request	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  warning,	  “if	  the	  present	  trend	  [toward	  the	  Soviet	  bloc]	  continued,	  Iraq	  would	  assume	  a	  status	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  East	  European	  satellites.”	  SAVAK	  asked	  the	  U.S.	  support	  Barzani	  to	  “forestall”	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  “preponderantly	  communist”	  National	  Front	  government	  and	  said	  any	  assistance	  could	  be	  channeled	  secretly	  through	  a	  third	  party—likely	  Jordan668—“with	  only	  al-­‐Barzani	  being	  aware.”	  Clearly	  SAVAK	  was	  trying	  to	  project	  the	  Kurdish	  conFlict	  with	  Baghdad	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  to	  become	  involved.669	  	   In	  early	  April,	  Talcott	  Seelye	  wrote	  to	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  the	  NEA,	  Joseph	  Sisco,	  to	  request	  that	  the	  department	  approve	  sending	  U.S.	  personnel	  to	  Baghdad.	  Seelye	  was	  clearly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  Belgians	  administration	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Interests	  Section	  (USINT),	  complaining	  it	  had	  “not	  received	  the	  close	  administrative	  supervision	  which	  it	  might	  otherwise	  have	  had	  if	  Americans	  had	  been	  assigned	  there.”	  As	  a	  glaring	  example,	  the	  section’s	  senior	  accountant	  had	  just	  been	  caught	  embezzling	  $106,000,	  leading	  him	  to	  conclude,	  “if	  American	  ofFicers	  had	  been	  in	  Baghdad	  this	  embezzlement	  might	  not	  have	  occurred.”	  But	  more	  practically,	  Seelye	  felt	  having	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad	  would	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  to	  “follow	  a	  little	  more	  closely	  and	  authoritatively	  developments	  in	  Iraq	  [since]	  the	  Belgians,	  with	  little	  background	  or	  experience	  in	  the	  area,	  [had]	  not	  been	  able	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  reporting.”670	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   Unfortunately,	  just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  was	  contemplating	  sending	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  announced	  on	  May	  15	  that	  it	  would	  expropriate	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  central	  Baghdad.	  After	  a	  week	  of	  tension,	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  surrounded	  the	  embassy	  on	  May	  23	  and	  demanded	  the	  Belgian	  Ambassador,	  Marcel	  Van	  Kerchove,	  hand	  over	  the	  keys.	  Certainly,	  the	  seizing	  of	  the	  embassy	  grounds	  hardened	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  attitude	  toward	  the	  Iraqi	  regime,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  there	  was	  little	  that	  could	  be	  done	  beyond	  issuing	  a	  strong	  note	  of	  protest.671	  This	  also	  meant	  sending	  U.S.	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad	  was	  postponed.672	   On	  July	  8,	  Zayid	  Othman,673	  a	  senior	  KDP	  ofFicial	  and	  one	  of	  Barzani’s	  emissaries,	  approached	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Beirut	  to	  seek	  U.S.	  Financial	  assistance.	  SigniFicantly,	  Othman	  revealed	  Jordanian	  and	  Saudi	  interest	  in	  helping	  the	  Kurds,	  when	  he	  said	  funds	  could	  be	  transferred	  “via	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Jordan,	  or	  Iran.”	  Othman	  explained	  King	  Faisal	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  had	  “endorsed	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  Iraqi	  revolt	  in	  principle,”	  but	  wanted	  more	  information	  before	  proceeding	  further.	  Since	  the	  Jordanian	  crisis,	  King	  Hussein	  had	  been	  interested	  in	  using	  the	  Kurds	  to	  tie	  down	  Iraq	  and	  would	  later	  play	  a	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  On	  Iran,	  Othman	  acknowledged	  the	  receipt	  of	  aid,	  but	  complained	  about	  the	  Shah’s	  “heavy-­‐handed	  control	  over	  Kurdish	  activities.”	  He	  also	  indicated	  Barzani	  wanted	  to	  establish	  secret	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  suggesting	  the	  CIA	  could	  send	  a	  representative	  to	  Barzani’s	  headquarters	  in	  Haji	  Omran,	  Barzani	  could	  visit	  Washington	  personally	  for	  consultations,	  or	  he	  could	  send	  a	  delegation.	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  the	  U.S.	  ofFicial	  stressed	  America’s	  non-­‐intervention	  policy,	  but	  said	  he	  would	  report	  the	  conversation	  to	  Washington.674
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   Following	  its	  expropriation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy,	  Iraq’s	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  underwent	  a	  major	  thaw.	  In	  September,	  the	  Ba’th	  signed	  a	  secret	  arms	  deal	  with	  Moscow,	  bringing	  total	  Soviet	  military	  aid	  to	  Iraq	  above	  the	  $750	  billion	  level.675	  According	  to	  the	  CIA,	  the	  deal	  included	  $250	  million	  worth	  of	  anti-­‐aircraft	  guns,	  anti-­‐tank	  rockets,	  armored	  personnel	  carriers,	  and	  several	  Fighter	  aircrafts.676	  This	  suggested	  that	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  warnings	  of	  a	  Soviet	  strategy	  to	  build	  up	  Iraq	  as	  replacement	  for	  the	  departing	  British	  had	  been	  realized.	  Unfortunately,	  word	  of	  the	  Soviet	  deal	  did	  not	  reach	  Washington	  until	  January	  1972	  and	  by	  then	  British	  forces	  had	  already	  left	  the	  region.677	   As	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  arms	  deal,	  the	  Ba’th	  agreed	  to	  end	  its	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists	  and	  form	  a	  National	  Front	  government	  with	  the	  ICP	  and	  KDP,	  but	  Barzani	  refused	  to	  cooperate,	  leading	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  Soviets	  to	  try	  to	  eliminate	  him	  altogether.	  On	  September	  29,	  the	  Ba’th	  sent	  a	  delegation	  of	  nine	  religious	  Figures	  to	  Haji	  Omran	  to	  meet	  with	  Barzani	  and	  mediate	  a	  truce.	  Unknown	  to	  the	  delegation,	  Saddam	  had	  provided	  two	  of	  the	  delegates	  with	  audio	  recorders	  rigged	  with	  explosives	  and	  told	  them	  to	  record	  Barzani’s	  response.	  About	  Fifteen	  minutes	  into	  the	  meeting,	  one	  of	  the	  guests	  pressed	  the	  record	  button	  and	  detonated	  an	  explosion,	  killing	  most	  in	  the	  room	  except	  Barzani.678	  Afterward,	  the	  regime	  attempted	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  attack,	  but	  Barzani	  was	  convinced	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  was	  behind	  it.679	  	   In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  assassination	  attempt,	  the	  Kurds	  and	  Iranians	  began	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  to	  abandon	  its	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  In	  November,	  Habib	  Muhammad	  Karim,	  the	  KDP’s	  Secretary-­‐General,	  approached	  the	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U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Beirut	  to	  seek	  support	  to	  oust	  the	  Ba’th,	  but	  was	  refused	  politely,	  with	  embassy	  ofFicers	  arguing	  it	  would	  “serve	  no	  purpose”	  and	  could	  “engender	  false	  hopes	  and	  future	  misunderstandings.”680	  Then,	  in	  late	  November,	  SAVAK	  ofFicials	  contacted	  the	  CIA	  again	  to	  warn	  of	  Soviet	  efforts	  to	  convince	  the	  Kurds	  to	  join	  the	  National	  Front,	  arguing,	  “this	  government	  would	  include	  communists,	  Nasirists	  and	  Kurds	  subservient	  to	  the	  Ba'th	  …	  and	  would	  represent	  a	  situation	  antithetical	  to	  both	  Iranian	  and	  U.S.	  interests.”	  SAVAK	  gave	  a	  window	  of	  “three	  or	  four	  months”	  to	  convince	  the	  Kurds	  to	  reject	  the	  front,	  but	  Iran	  needed	  U.S.	  help,	  since	  Barzani	  did	  not	  trust	  the	  Shah.681	  But	  as	  Kissinger	  noted	  in	  his	  memoir,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  a	  blind	  faith	  in	  America	  and	  believed	  U.S.	  involvement	  would	  “inhibit	  [Iran]	  from	  abandoning	  the	  Kurds—a	  judgment	  which	  …	  proved	  too	  optimistic.”682	  Beyond	  the	  SAVAK	  approach,	  around	  this	  time	  the	  Shah	  appealed	  to	  Nixon	  directly,	  but	  was	  met	  with	  a	  polite	  refusal.683 	  Clearly	  Iran	  and	  the	  Kurds	  were	  ratcheting	  up	  their	  pressure	  on	  the	  U.S.	  to	  reconsider	  its	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  by	  presenting	  the	  Kurdish	  issue	  in	  Cold	  War	  terms.	  	   Meanwhile,	  on	  November	  30	  tensions	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Iran	  escalated	  when	  Iranian	  troops	  were	  deployed	  to	  three	  strategically	  situated	  islands	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  Abu	  Musa	  and	  the	  Greater	  and	  Lesser	  Tunbs.684	  The	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  outraged	  by	  Iran’s	  “invasion”	  and	  severed	  relations	  with	  both	  Iran	  and	  Britain,	  accusing	  the	  latter	  of	  complicity	  to	  Iran’s	  actions.685	  The	  Iraqis	  also	  retaliated	  by	  expelling	  60,000	  Iranian	  citizens	  from	  Iraq	  throughout	  December.	  Though	  the	  issue	  was	  bilateral	  between	  Iran	  and	  the	  newly	  formed	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  which	  claimed	  the	  islands,	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Baghdad’s	  harsh	  reaction	  clearly	  escalated	  ongoing	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  states.686	   It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Moscow	  took	  the	  provocative	  step	  of	  sending	  its	  Defense	  Minister,	  Marshall	  Andrei	  Grechko,	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  Finalize	  the	  September	  arms	  deal.687	  As	  expected,	  the	  Iranians	  portrayed	  Grechko’s	  visit	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  as	  conFirmation	  of	  Moscow’s	  intentions	  toward	  the	  Gulf,	  while	  warning	  a	  friendship	  treaty	  not	  unlike	  the	  ones	  Moscow	  had	  previously	  signed	  with	  Cairo	  and	  New	  Delhi,	  was	  in	  the	  works	  with	  Iraq.	  Again	  the	  U.S.	  was	  dismissive,	  arguing	  it	  did	  not	  have	  any	  intelligence	  to	  support	  this	  claim	  at	  this	  point:[While]	  we	  can	  understand	  Iranian	  concern	  in	  face	  of	  new	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  arms	  deal	  (basically	  because	  of	  Iraqi	  recklessness	  and	  ambitions	  in	  [the]	  Gulf),	  we	  do	  not	  think	  [the]	  Soviets	  have	  increased	  military	  aid	  to	  Iraq	  as	  part	  of	  aggressive	  policy	  in	  [the]	  Gulf	  aimed	  at	  Iran.	  Instead,	  the	  department	  believed	  Grechko’s	  visit	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  arms	  deal	  were	  designed	  to	  placate	  Baghdad	  not	  threaten	  Tehran.688 	  But	  what	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  realize	  was	  that	  it	  was	  Iraq	  that	  wanted	  to	  threaten	  Iran,	  not	  the	  Soviets.	  While	  U.S.	  intelligence	  on	  Soviet	  intentions	  was	  accurate,	  its	  assessment	  of	  Iraq’s	  designs	  was	  wrong.	  Fortunately,	  on	  January	  28,	  1972	  the	  State	  Department	  approved	  sending	  a	  mid-­‐level	  Foreign	  Service	  OfFicer	  to	  Baghdad.689	   ConFirming	  Iran’s	  fears,	  in	  mid-­‐February	  Saddam	  Hussein	  led	  another	  delegation	  to	  Moscow,	  where	  he	  negotiated	  a	  framework	  for	  a	  broadly	  based	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  agreement.690	  According	  to	  a	  joint	  communiqué,	  the	  two	  sides	  had	  reached	  a	  tentative	  agreement	  that	  exchanged	  Iraqi	  promises	  of	  a	  National	  Front	  government	  for	  access	  to	  Soviet	  military	  hardware,	  cooperation	  in	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defense	  matters,	  the	  delaying	  of	  Iraq’s	  outstanding	  balance	  of	  payments,	  and	  economic	  assistance	  for	  its	  oil	  industry.691	  	   Because	  the	  Soviets	  viewed	  Kurdish	  participation	  in	  the	  National	  Front	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  stability,	  they	  continued	  to	  press	  the	  regime	  to	  include	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  government.	  On	  February	  28	  Moscow	  sent	  a	  high-­‐level	  delegation	  to	  Barzani’s	  headquarters	  in	  Kurdistan	  including	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Central	  Committee,	  to	  urge	  Barzani	  to	  join	  the	  National	  Front	  in	  return	  for	  establishing	  a	  Soviet	  liaison	  to	  “protect”	  him	  and	  ensure	  Ba’thist	  cooperation.	  According	  to	  the	  NSC	  staff,	  while	  Barzani’s	  response	  was	  uncertain,	  Kurdish	  participation	  in	  the	  coalition	  would	  have	  “considerable	  geopolitical	  signiFicance”	  by	  freeing	  Iraq’s	  forces	  “for	  military-­‐political	  action”	  in	  the	  Gulf	  and	  against	  Israel.	  Worse,	  it	  meant	  communists	  would	  be	  in	  power	  in	  Iraq.692	   In	  the	  years	  since	  the	  March	  Accord,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  dismissed	  its	  closest	  allies'	  warnings	  about	  an	  Iraqi	  shift	  toward	  the	  Soviets	  as	  manipulative.	  The	  U.S.	  analysis	  was	  understandable.	  Even	  though	  it	  did	  not	  have	  diplomatic	  representation	  with	  Iraq,	  the	  evidence	  available	  pointed	  to	  the	  opposite	  conclusion.	  After	  all,	  in	  the	  twenty	  months	  since	  the	  March	  Accord,	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  had	  unleashed	  a	  wave	  of	  repression	  against	  the	  communists	  and	  harassed	  Soviet	  ofFicials	  regularly.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  had	  other	  priorities,	  like	  the	  escalating	  Vietnam	  War,	  opening	  to	  China,	  nuclear	  arms	  control,	  and	  building	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  But	  Iraq’s	  improvement	  in	  relations	  with	  Moscow,	  its	  about-­‐face	  toward	  the	  communists,	  and	  its	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Barzani	  in	  late-­‐1970	  suggested	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  warnings	  of	  a	  Soviet	  strategy	  to	  build	  up	  Iraq	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Britain’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  region	  in	  December	  1971	  were	  correct.	  Faced	  with	  this	  conclusion,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  forced	  to	  reconsider	  its	  hands-­‐off	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  since	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  once	  again.	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IV
	   The	  prospect	  of	  Iraq	  enshrining	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  a	  friendship	  treaty	  alarmed	  America’s	  regional	  allies.	  Before	  long,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  bombarded	  with	  secret	  approaches	  trying	  to	  convince	  it	  to	  reconsider	  its	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  be	  resistant	  to	  the	  idea.	  While	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  its	  allies,	  its	  over-­‐riding	  priority	  at	  this	  point	  was	  achieving	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  opening	  to	  China.	  Given	  this,	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  signed	  its	  friendship	  treaty	  with	  Iraq	  in	  April	  1972,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  barely	  acknowledged	  the	  deal,	  much	  to	  the	  frustration	  of	  its	  allies.	  Clearly	  wider	  Cold	  War	  considerations	  had	  trumped	  regional	  concerns,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  near	  term.	  	   Throughout	  March,	  Kurdish	  and	  Iranian	  ofFicials	  sought	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  to	  change	  its	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  First,	  a	  “reliable	  Agency	  source”	  reported	  Barzani	  was	  under	  pressure	  from	  the	  Soviets	  to	  reach	  an	  accommodation	  with	  the	  Ba’th	  and	  would	  “have	  to	  acquiesce	  unless	  he	  receive[d]	  help”.	  The	  source	  also	  said	  Barzani	  was	  sending	  an	  emissary	  to	  Washington	  to	  persuade	  the	  U.S.	  to	  reconsider	  its	  policy.693	  When	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  met	  with	  the	  emissary,	  he	  asked	  for	  ongoing	  political	  discussions,	  Financial	  assistance,	  a	  radio	  station,	  and	  that	  the	  CIA	  cooperate	  with	  Kurdish	  intelligence.694	  	   On	  March	  6,	  SAVAK	  ofFicials	  approached	  the	  CIA	  to	  plead	  for	  U.S.	  assistance	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  citing	  “Soviet	  pressures	  on	  al-­‐Barzani	  and	  the	  imminence	  of	  a	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  treaty”	  as	  reasonable	  justiFication	  for	  a	  joint	  CIA-­‐SAVAK	  operation	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  The	  SAVAK	  ofFicial	  …	  wished	  to	  know	  if	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  prepared	  to	  provide	  Financial	  and	  military	  support	  for	  the	  attempt	  and	  assist	  in	  drawing	  together	  Iraqi	  exiles	  who	  would	  comprise	  the	  nucleus	  of	  a	  separatist	  government	  initially	  harbored	  by	  al-­‐Barzani.695
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SigniFicantly,	  unlike	  past	  approaches,	  details	  of	  these	  démarches	  were	  passed	  to	  Kissinger,	  suggesting	  that	  U.S.	  policymakers	  were	  beginning	  to	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  to	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy.696	   The	  Kurdish-­‐SAVAK	  démarches	  in	  early	  March	  prompted	  an	  interagency	  review	  of	  the	  U.S.	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  At	  the	  outset,	  the	  State	  Department	  opposed	  any	  operation	  that	  could	  jeopardize	  future	  opportunities	  for	  rapprochement	  with	  Iraq	  or	  the	  sending	  of	  U.S.	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad.	  The	  department	  identiFied	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  not	  to	  support	  Barzani:	  1)	  it	  was	  unlikely	  a	  Kurdish-­‐led	  government	  in	  Baghdad	  could	  succeed;	  2)	  there	  was	  uncertainty	  about	  whether	  the	  Kurds	  had	  cut	  “the	  umbilical	  cord	  with	  Moscow”;	  3)	  an	  operation	  would	  be	  difFicult	  to	  conceal;	  4)	  if	  discovered,	  America’s	  Arab	  allies	  would	  be	  outraged	  and	  serve	  as	  further	  evidence	  of	  U.S.	  support	  for	  non-­‐Arabs	  states	  (Iran	  and	  Israel)	  against	  the	  Arabs;	  and	  5)	  it	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  state,	  which	  would	  represent	  “further	  fragmentation	  in	  an	  already	  fragmented	  area.”697	  Other	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  opposed	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  as	  well.	  For	  instance,	  one	  NEA	  ofFicial,	  Andrew	  Killgore,	  warned	  that	  helping	  the	  Kurds	  could	  upset	  the	  dispatch	  of	  U.S.	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad,698	  while	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran,	  Joseph	  Farland,	  argued	  that	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  generated	  far	  too	  much	  risk	  compared	  to	  the	  limited	  beneFit	  gained.699	  	   The	  CIA	  was	  also	  concerned,	  pointing	  out	  the	  odds	  of	  the	  Kurds	  successfully	  overthrowing	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  were	  slim,	  while	  warning	  American	  involvement	  in	  this	  plot	  could	  be	  “regarded	  by	  the	  Soviets	  as	  a	  move	  directed	  against	  them.”	  Finally,	  they	  questioned	  the	  need	  for	  U.S.	  involvement,	  arguing	  that	  any	  assistance	  Barzani	  needed	  was	  “within	  the	  capability	  of	  Iran	  or	  Israel	  to	  provide.”	  In	  fact,	  the	  only	  reason	  the	  CIA	  could	  identify	  for	  U.S.	  involvement	  was	  that	  both	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  
 201
696 “Kurdish Efforts to Recruit International Support…,” March 29, 1972, Op.Cit., p.1.
697 DoS, Memorandum from Seeyle, “Some Reasons Why We Should Not Support Barzani Against the 
Iraqi Government,” March 14, 1972 (NARA/RG59/Records Relating to Iraq/1973-1975/Box1/POL 13), p.
1.
698 DoS, Memorandum from Killgore, “Barzani Request for U.S. Assistance: Related Savak Request that 
USG Help Overthrow Present Iraqi Government with Aid of Barzani,” March 15, 1972 (NARA/RG59/
Records Relating to Iraq/1973-1975/Box1/POL 13), pp.1-2. 
699 Kissinger (1999), p.581. 
“want	  to	  involve	  [them],”	  but	  this	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  justify	  a	  risky	  operation.700	  Facing	  widespread	  opposition	  to	  the	  Kurdish-­‐SAVAK	  proposal,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  decided	  to	  continue	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.701	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  March,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  received	  two	  additional	  requests	  to	  reconsider	  its	  policy	  toward	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  First	  occurred	  on	  March	  28	  when	  King	  Hussein	  asked	  Nixon	  directly	  to	  reconsider	  his	  position.702	  The	  second	  occurred	  that	  same	  day	  when	  UN	  Assistant	  Secretary	  General	  Ismat	  Kittani,	  an	  Iraqi	  Kurd,	  contacted	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  to	  ask	  that	  he	  meet	  with	  Zayid	  Othman,	  who	  was	  going	  to	  be	  in	  New	  York.	  The	  next	  day,	  after	  obtaining	  approval	  from	  Washington,	  Bush	  met	  with	  Kittani,	  who,	  after	  stressing	  his	  call	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  his	  role	  at	  the	  UN,	  asked	  that	  Rogers	  or	  Kissinger	  meet	  with	  Othman.703	  When	  Bush	  passed	  word	  of	  his	  meeting	  to	  Washington	  and	  requested	  guidance,	  the	  department	  said	  it	  had	  “no	  objection	  to	  [Othman]	  being	  seen	  by	  USUN	  working	  levels	  and	  intend[ed]	  to	  follow	  [the]	  same	  procedure	  …	  when	  Othman	  arrives	  in	  Washington.”704	  King	  Hussein	  and	  Kittani's	  approaches	  helped	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  subtle	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  thinking	  toward	  the	  Kurds.	   On	  April	  3,	  when	  Othman	  met	  with	  the	  Iraq	  Desk	  ofFicer,	  Thomas	  Scotes,	  in	  Washington,	  he	  expressed	  concern	  about	  Saddam’s	  recent	  trip	  to	  Moscow	  and	  Soviet	  pressure	  on	  Barzani	  to	  join	  the	  National	  Front.	  He	  explained,	  “the	  Soviets’	  aim	  through	  their	  support	  of	  a	  national	  front	  stratagem	  [was]	  to	  establish	  and	  consolidate	  further	  their	  position	  in	  Iraq,	  particularly	  at	  a	  time	  when	  their	  position	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  seem[ed]	  to	  be	  unpredictable.”	  Further,	  the	  “Soviets	  intended	  to	  use	  Iraq	  for	  subversion	  not	  only	  in	  the	  Gulf	  but	  against	  Iran	  and	  Turkey	  as	  well”	  and	  “only	  the	  U.S.	  [could],	  by	  supporting	  Barzani	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  stem	  the	  
 202
700 “Supporting the Kurdish Rebellion,” March 27, 1972, Op.Cit., p.1. 
701 CIA, Memorandum, Waller to Helms, “Background to Current Efforts by Kurdish Leader Barzani to 
Gain U.S. Support,” June 12, 1972 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.315), p.2. 
702 Kissinger (1999), p.581. 
703 USUN 1132 to State, “Kurdish Emissary [sic.] Asks to Meet with Secretary and Kissinger,” March 28, 
1972 (NARA/RG59/SN/1970-1973/Box2382/ POL-13-3), p.1. 
704 State 54327 to U.S. Mission to the UN, “U.S. Visit of Barzani Emissary,” March 30, 1972 (NARA/
RG59/SN/1970-1973/Box2382/ POL-13-3), p.1.
Soviet	  tide	  in	  Iraq.”	  Ultimately,	  Othman	  warned	  this	  was	  America’s	  “last	  opportunity	  to	  thwart	  Soviet	  designs	  in	  Iraq”	  or	  else	  all	  “will	  have	  been	  lost.”705	   When	  Killgore	  reported	  Scotes’	  conversation	  to	  Sisco	  on	  April	  5,	  it	  was	  clear	  Othman’s	  talk	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  his	  perception	  of	  Iraq.	  After	  listing	  the	  NEA’s	  standard	  reasons	  for	  not	  wanting	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds,	  Killgore	  wrote:Despite	  the	  [negative]	  initial	  reaction,	  we	  have	  discussed	  this	  matter	  with	  [Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Alfred	  “Roy”	  Atherton]	  who	  agrees	  that	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  if	  we	  had	  an	  informal	  review	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  situation	  with	  [excised]	  of	  CIA	  before	  making	  any	  Final	  decision	  regarding	  the	  [Othman]	  appeal.	  CIA	  has	  also	  been	  getting	  through	  independent	  sources	  the	  same	  information	  and	  similar	  appeals.	  Such	  a	  review	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  your	  thoughts	  expressed	  to	  Tom	  Scotes	  …	  that	  we	  continue	  to	  update	  our	  assessments	  and	  not	  
be	  guided	  solely	  by	  conventional	  wisdom	  concerning	  such	  matters.Killgore	  then	  recommended	  Sisco	  brief	  Secretary	  Rogers	  on	  the	  approach	  and	  pass	  along	  Barzani’s	  letter.706	  Quite	  clearly	  a	  shift	  in	  thinking	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Kurds	  was	  occurring	  in	  early	  April	  1972.	  SigniFicantly,	  this	  shift	  occurred	  just	  as	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  Soviets	  were	  formalizing	  their	  relationship	  in	  a	  treaty.	  	   In	  early	  April,	  Soviet	  Prime	  Minister	  Alexei	  Kosygin	  travelled	  to	  Iraq	  and	  signed	  a	  Fifteen-­‐year	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  with	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  on	  April	  9.	  While	  the	  treaty’s	  wording	  was	  purposely	  vague,	  the	  CIA	  believed	  it	  would	  be	  speciFic	  in	  application.	  The	  CIA	  saw	  articles	  8-­‐10	  as	  signiFicant:	  Article	  8:	  In	  case	  of	  emergence	  of	  conditions	  that	  threaten	  violation	  of	  the	  peace,	  the	  two	  signatories	  will	  immediately	  hold	  contacts	  in	  order	  to	  coordinate	  their	  stands	  to	  eliminate	  the	  danger	  and	  restore	  the	  peace.Article	  9:	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  security	  of	  the	  two	  countries,	  the	  two	  signatories	  will	  continue	  to	  develop	  cooperation	  for	  consolidating	  the	  defense	  capability	  of	  each	  other.Article	  10:	  Each	  of	  the	  two	  signatories	  declares	  that	  it	  will	  not	  enter	  into	  pacts,	  or	  take	  part	  in	  any	  international	  groupings	  or	  any	  actions	  or	  measures	  aimed	  at	  the	  other	  signatory.	  Each	  of	  the	  two	  signatories	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also	  pledge	  not	  to	  allow	  the	  use	  of	  its	  territory	  in	  undertaking	  any	  action	  that	  would	  result	  in	  a	  military	  harm	  to	  the	  other.707It	  believed	  article	  8	  implied	  Soviet	  support	  for	  the	  Ba’th	  in	  the	  event	  of	  internal	  or	  external	  disturbances—a	  clear	  reference	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  Article	  9	  alluded	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Soviet	  naval	  base	  at	  Iraq’s	  only	  Gulf	  port,	  Umm	  Qasr—similar	  to	  the	  longstanding	  U.S.	  naval	  base	  in	  Bahrain—and	  provided	  Soviet	  access	  to	  Iraqi	  airFields	  and	  air	  transit	  rights.	  In	  both	  instances,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  strategic	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Gulf	  would	  improve	  signiFicantly.	  Finally,	  article	  10	  placed	  Iraq	  on	  the	  Soviet	  side	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  war.708	  In	  each	  instance,	  the	  treaty	  represented	  a	  major	  symbolic	  and	  psychological	  victory	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	   Remarkably,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  not	  perturbed	  with	  the	  treaty,	  with	  the	  NSC	  staff	  describing	  it	  as	  “nothing	  surprising	  or	  sudden	  but	  rather	  a	  culmination	  of	  existing	  relationships.”709	  But	  this	  mild	  assessment	  was	  not	  reFlective	  of	  U.S.	  concerns	  about	  Iraq	  rather	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  priorities.	  By	  April	  1972	  Nixon’s	  détente	  strategy	  was	  unfolding	  after	  his	  surprise	  visit	  to	  Beijing	  in	  February,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  his	  summit	  with	  Soviet	  Premier	  Leonid	  Brezhnev	  in	  Moscow	  in	  May.710	  In	  fact,	  ten	  days	  after	  the	  treaty	  was	  signed	  Kissinger	  arrived	  in	  Moscow	  for	  preliminary	  talks	  on	  the	  Moscow	  Summit,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Ballistic	  Missile	  (ABM)	  treaty	  and	  the	  Strategic	  Arms	  Limitations	  Treaty	  (SALT-­‐I).711	  Therefore,	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  subdued	  response	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  treaty	  was	  out	  of	  desire	  to	  avoid	  harming	  the	  success	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  initiatives	  at	  the	  Moscow	  Summit.712	  This	  did	  not,	  however,	  mean	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  were	  resigned	  to	  do	  nothing.
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V	  
	   In	  the	  summer	  of	  1972,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  underwent	  a	  major	  shift.	  Having	  achieved	  diplomatic	  success	  at	  the	  Moscow	  Summit,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  Flew	  to	  Tehran	  on	  May	  30	  for	  a	  two	  day	  visit	  with	  the	  Shah.	  It	  is	  widely	  believed	  that	  Nixon	  agreed	  to	  assist	  the	  Kurds	  in	  their	  Fight	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  during	  this	  time.713	  Even	  Kissinger	  claims	  this	  was	  the	  case.714	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  ever	  mentioning	  the	  Kurds	  let	  alone	  agreeing	  to	  a	  covert	  operation	  to	  support	  them.	  What	  is	  evident	  is	  that	  following	  Iraq’s	  nationalization	  of	  the	  IPC	  on	  June	  1,	  the	  Shah	  pressed	  Kissinger	  to	  reconsider	  America’s	  non-­‐intervention	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  and	  asked	  that	  he	  meet	  with	  Barzani’s	  emissaries.	  When	  CIA	  ofFicials	  met	  with	  the	  Kurds	  in	  late-­‐June,	  they	  concluded	  the	  need	  to	  disrupt	  Soviet	  plans	  in	  Iraq	  outweighed	  the	  risks	  of	  an	  operation.	  This	  view	  was	  reinforced	  further	  on	  July	  18	  when	  Soviet	  forces	  withdrew	  from	  Egypt,	  prompting	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  conclude	  Iraq’s	  importance	  to	  Soviet	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategy	  had	  been	  enhanced.	  Given	  these	  factors,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Nixon’s	  decision	  on	  August	  1	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  was	  driven	  by	  America’s	  regional	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  depriving	  the	  Soviets	  of	  an	  inFluential	  base,	  like	  Iraq.	   Prior	  to	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger’s	  arrival,	  the	  Shah	  had	  grown	  concerned	  about	  Iraq,	  viewing	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  treaty	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  his	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  Gulf	  after	  Britain’s	  withdrawal	  in	  December	  1971.715	  Similarly,	  the	  Shah	  feared	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Soviet-­‐backed,	  National	  Front	  government	  in	  Iraq	  that	  included	  the	  Kurds,	  believing	  it	  would	  bring	  stability	  and	  free	  up	  Iraq’s	  military	  to	  challenge	  his	  position	  in	  the	  Gulf.716 	  While	  Nixon	  was	  not	  as	  alarmed	  about	  Soviet	  plans	  for	  the	  region,	  he	  clearly	  recognized	  the	  need	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  allay	  the	  Shah’s	  fears.	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   During	  Nixon’s	  visit	  to	  Tehran	  from	  May	  30-­‐31	  he	  made	  a	  number	  of	  key	  decisions	  that	  would	  have	  considerable	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  on	  the	  region.	  First,	  Nixon	  told	  the	  Shah	  the	  U.S.	  would	  “not	  let	  down	  [their]	  friends”	  and	  agreed	  to	  furnish	  Iran	  with	  modern	  weaponry,	  including	  F-­‐14s	  and	  F-­‐15s,	  to	  balance	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  recent	  commitment	  to	  provide	  Iraq	  with	  the	  ultra	  modern	  Mig-­‐23	  jets.717	  This	  decision	  makes	  clear	  that	  Nixon	  intended	  for	  Iran	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  region	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine	  and	  was	  a	  marked	  departure	  from	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  ‘twin	  pillar’	  policy.	  Controversially,	  the	  Pentagon	  misinterpreted	  this	  decision	  and	  gave	  Iran	  unfettered	  access	  to	  all	  non-­‐nuclear	  U.S.	  weaponry,	  leading	  to	  massive	  arms	  sales.718	  	   The	  second,	  more	  controversial	  decision	  concerned	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurds.	  While	  numerous	  sources	  indicate	  Nixon	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  while	  in	  Tehran,719	  there	  is	  no	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  deciding	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds.	  According	  to	  Alam,	  Kissinger	  was	  concerned	  that	  “the	  Russians	  [had]	  gone	  too	  far	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  Iraq,	  adding	  that	  something	  would	  have	  to	  be	  done	  to	  stop	  the	  rot.”720	  Kissinger’s	  memoir	  suggests	  that	  during	  the	  visit	  the	  Shah	  had	  asked	  Nixon	  to	  reconsider	  the	  U.S.	  position	  on	  the	  Kurds,	  arguing,	  “without	  American	  support,	  the	  existing	  Kurdish	  uprising	  against	  the	  Baghdad	  government	  would	  collapse.”	  Nixon	  agreed,	  adding,	  “American	  participation	  in	  some	  form	  was	  needed	  to	  maintain	  the	  morale	  of	  such	  key	  allies	  as	  Iran	  and	  Jordan,	  disparate	  as	  their	  motives	  were,	  and	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  regional	  balance	  of	  power.”721	  But	  the	  memorandum	  of	  this	  conversation	  barely	  mentions	  the	  Kurds.	  It	  indicates	  the	  Shah	  had	  told	  Nixon	  he	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  Soviets	  could	  pull	  together	  a	  National	  Front	  in	  Iraq,	  including	  the	  communists	  and	  Kurds	  and	  if	  this	  happened,	  the	  Kurds,	  instead	  of	  being	  a	  thorn	  in	  Iraq’s	  side,	  could	  become	  a	  communist	  “asset”	  to	  be	  used	  against	  Iran	  and	  Turkey.	  When	  Kissinger	  asked	  what	  could	  be	  done,	  the	  Shah	  replied,	  “Iran	  can	  help	  with	  the	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Kurds.”	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  available	  record,	  Nixon	  never	  mentioned	  the	  Kurds	  once.722	  Despite	  numerous	  sources—including	  Kissinger—claiming	  Nixon	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  while	  in	  Tehran,	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  ofFicial	  record	  leaves	  room	  for	  doubt.	  	   On	  June	  1,	  the	  day	  after	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  left	  Tehran,	  Iraq’s	  longstanding	  dispute	  with	  the	  IPC	  boiled	  over	  when	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  announced	  its	  nationalization.	  After	  the	  Ba’th	  came	  to	  power,	  it	  signed	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Soviets	  to	  develop	  the	  oil-­‐rich	  North	  Rumaila	  oilFields.	  After	  Iraq	  began	  exporting	  oil	  from	  the	  oilFields	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  April	  1972,723	  the	  IPC	  retaliated	  by	  cutting	  production	  in	  the	  northern	  oilFields	  and	  limiting	  Baghdad’s	  royalty	  payments.	  In	  mid-­‐May	  the	  Ba’th	  threatened	  the	  IPC	  with	  conFiscatory	  legislation	  if	  it	  did	  not	  increase	  production.	  The	  IPC	  agreed	  on	  May	  31	  but	  insisted	  on	  compensation	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  North	  Rumaila.	  Outraged	  by	  this	  demand,	  the	  Ba’th	  decided	  that	  a	  dramatic	  move	  was	  needed	  and	  nationalized	  the	  company	  the	  next	  day.	  The	  IPC’s	  nationalization	  had	  serious	  implications	  on	  U.S.	  policy,	  since	  American	  Firms	  held	  a	  23.75%	  stake	  in	  the	  company.724	  It	  also	  destroyed	  any	  doubts	  within	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  that	  Iraq	  was	  fast	  becoming	  a	  Soviet	  satellite.	  As	  Randal	  observed,	  “[the]	  IPC	  nationalization	  was	  yet	  another	  reason	  for	  Iran	  …	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  justify	  [the	  Kurdish	  operation],	  for	  each	  had	  reason	  to	  fear	  the	  repercussions	  of	  this	  First	  Soviet	  penetration	  of	  a	  major	  oil	  producer	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”725	   In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  IPC	  nationalization,	  Kissinger’s	  Middle	  East	  advisor	  on	  the	  NSC	  staff,	  Harold	  Saunders,	  sent	  him	  a	  memo	  that	  analyzed	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  helping	  the	  Kurds.	  Saunders	  identiFied	  three	  arguments	  in	  support	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  operation—an	  additional	  reason	  remains	  classiFied.	  First,	  by	  encouraging	  or	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  to	  be	  a	  force	  of	  instability	  within	  Iraq,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  thwart	  Soviet	  efforts	  to	  promote	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  National	  Front	  government.	  Second,	  U.S.	  assistance	  to	  the	  Kurds	  could	  help	  tie	  down	  Iraqi	  forces	  and	  keep	  the	  regime	  focused	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on	  internal	  problems	  so	  it	  could	  not	  threaten	  Iran,	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  Kuwait,	  or	  the	  Gulf	  States.	  Finally,	  the	  Kurds	  could	  help	  facilitate	  U.S.	  contacts	  with	  Iraqi	  military	  ofFicers,	  who	  might	  seek	  the	  regime’s	  overthrow.	  Balancing	  this,	  Saunders	  identiFied	  four	  opposing	  arguments.	  First,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  committing	  itself	  to	  a	  major	  guerrilla	  effort	  and	  “[if]	  the	  battle	  turned	  against	  the	  Kurds,	  [they]	  would	  have	  neither	  the	  assets	  nor	  the	  interest	  to	  provide	  decisive	  support.”	  Second,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  had	  the	  Financial	  resources	  to	  assist	  the	  Kurds.	  Third,	  it	  made	  more	  sense	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  encourage	  a	  regional	  solution,	  rather	  than	  involve	  itself	  directly.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Moscow	  Summit	  and	  Soviet	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  National	  Front	  in	  Iraq,	  if	  a	  U.S.	  operation	  was	  discovered	  it	  could	  undermine	  détente.726	  Ultimately,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  needed	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation	  before	  it	  could	  proceed.	  	   On	  June	  5,	  the	  Shah	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  message	  proposing	  a	  meeting	  with	  Idris	  Barzani	  and	  Dr.	  Othman	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  U.S.	  could	  help	  the	  Kurds.	  Afterward,	  the	  message	  added,	  the	  Shah	  “expected”	  Kissinger	  to	  share	  his	  views	  on	  the	  matter.	  In	  a	  memo	  to	  Kissinger	  seeking	  approval	  for	  the	  meeting,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  raised	  objections	  around	  involving	  him	  personally	  because	  that	  would	  indicate	  Nixon’s	  endorsement,	  “at	  least	  by	  implication.”	  Instead,	  they	  suggested	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  Richard	  Helms,	  Harold	  Saunders,	  or	  General	  Alexander	  Haig,	  Jr.	  meet	  with	  the	  Kurds,	  even	  though	  the	  majority	  view	  “in	  town”	  (i.e.,	  Washington,	  D.C.)	  argued	  against	  involvement.727	  Even	  though	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  CIA	  continued	  to	  argue	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  was	  not	  essential,	  on	  June	  23	  Saunders	  told	  Haig	  there	  was	  “a	  certain	  attraction”	  to	  preventing	  the	  Soviets	  from	  helping	  the	  Ba’th	  consolidate	  its	  rule	  by	  assisting	  the	  Kurds.	  Kissinger	  agreed	  and	  green-­‐lighted	  the	  meeting.728	  He	  also	  dispatched	  former	  Treasury	  Secretary,	  John	  Connelly,	  to	  Tehran	  to	  inform	  the	  Shah	  of	  the	  decision.729	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   On	  June	  30,	  Director	  Helms,	  Colonel	  Richard	  Kennedy,	  and	  an	  unnamed	  CIA	  ofFicial	  met	  with	  Idris	  and	  Dr.	  Othman	  in	  the	  director’s	  ofFice	  in	  Langley,	  VA.	  The	  Kurds	  said	  Barzani	  wanted	  political,	  Financial,	  and	  military	  assistance	  to	  defend	  himself	  from	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Iraqis	  and	  make	  Kurdistan	  a	  “positive	  element”	  in	  advancing	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  those	  of	  its	  allies.	  Helms	  thanked	  the	  Kurds	  for	  coming	  and	  said	  Kissinger	  had	  authorized	  him	  to	  express	  America’s	  sympathy	  for	  their	  movement	  and	  assure	  them	  of	  his	  “readiness	  to	  consider	  their	  requests	  for	  assistance,”	  but	  cautioned	  them	  on	  the	  need	  for	  secrecy,	  pointing	  out	  that	  military	  equipment	  would	  have	  to	  be	  channeled	  through	  third	  parties,	  like	  Iran,	  Israel,	  or	  Jordan.730	  At	  a	  second	  meeting	  the	  Kurds	  described	  three	  escalating	  platforms	  of	  support:	  defensive,	  offensive,	  and	  revolutionary.	  The	  First	  involved	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  assistance	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  the	  status	  quo,	  while	  allowing	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resist	  the	  regime’s	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  pressure	  indeFinitely.	  The	  second	  called	  for	  increasing	  their	  Financial	  and	  military	  capabilities	  so	  the	  Kurds	  could	  tie	  down	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  so	  it	  could	  not	  pose	  a	  military	  or	  subversive	  threat	  to	  its	  neighbors	  and	  western	  interests.	  Finally,	  they	  required	  the	  U.S.	  to	  use	  Kurdistan	  as	  a	  “secure	  base”	  from	  which	  it	  could	  “promote	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Ba’thi	  regime	  in	  cooperation	  with	  other	  anti-­‐regime	  Iraqis.”731	   Even	  after	  the	  meeting,	  the	  CIA	  was	  uncertain	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  operation.	  In	  a	  memo	  outlining	  the	  meeting,	  the	  CIA	  said	  the	  Kurds	  had	  “unrealistic	  ideas	  about	  military	  actions	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  equipment	  which	  they	  could	  use.”	  For	  instance,	  while	  they	  wanted	  to	  expand	  the	  Peshmerga	  to	  60,000	  men,	  the	  logistics	  of	  this	  “would	  be	  of	  staggering	  dimensions.”	  They	  also	  talked	  of	  obtaining	  tanks	  and	  suggested	  engaging	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  in	  conventional	  warfare,	  but	  acknowledged	  the	  need	  for	  military	  advice.	  To	  this,	  the	  CIA	  urged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  avoid	  conventional	  warfare	  and	  stick	  to	  the	  mountains,	  where	  they	  could	  “engage	  in	  aggressive	  guerrilla	  tactics,	  hitting	  the	  Iraqis	  in	  many	  places	  and	  keeping	  them	  off	  balance.”	  The	  memo	  identiFied	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  with	  a	  Kurdish	  operation:	  1)	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the	  “deFinite	  possibility”	  of	  Soviet	  involvement	  should	  Fighting	  resume;	  2)	  Turkey	  was	  “acutely	  sensitive”	  to	  Kurdish	  nationalism	  and	  would	  be	  upset	  about	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Barzani;	  3)	  there	  were	  “deep	  factional	  cleavages	  rooted	  in	  tribal,	  political,	  and	  social	  conFlicts	  [that]	  divide[d]	  the	  Kurds	  into	  competing	  and	  mutually	  hostile	  groups”;	  4)	  Barzani’s	  age	  and	  lack	  of	  a	  successor;	  and	  5)	  the	  operation	  could	  disrupt	  the	  State	  Department’s	  plans	  to	  send	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad.	  The	  CIA	  concluded	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Iraqi	  threat	  to	  Western	  interests	  was	  justiFication	  for	  an	  assistance	  program	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Once	  again,	  this	  suggests	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds.732	   Another	  key	  factor	  behind	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  was	  the	  departure	  of	  some	  15,000	  Soviet	  military	  personnel	  from	  Egypt	  on	  July	  18,	  which,	  as	  Kissinger	  claimed,	  shattered	  the	  Middle	  East’s	  Cold	  War	  balance	  of	  power.733	  However,	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  challenged	  the	  concept	  of	  Egypt’s	  “expulsion	  of	  Soviet	  advisors”,	  pointing	  out	  that	  Soviet	  personnel	  were	  withdrawn	  by	  mutual	  consent	  and	  those	  that	  departed	  were	  actually	  the	  combat	  troops	  introduced	  during	  1969-­‐70	  War	  of	  Attrition,	  while	  genuine	  military	  advisors	  stayed	  in	  Egypt	  and	  helped	  prepare	  for	  the	  October	  1973	  war.734	  Regardless,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  seemed	  pleased	  with	  Moscow’s	  apparent	  “loss”	  of	  Egypt,735	  which	  Kissinger	  believed	  would	  enhance	  Iraq’s	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  Moscow’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategy	  and	  give	  it	  incentive	  to	  strengthen	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.736	  Indeed,	  for	  years	  the	  Soviets	  had	  focused	  on	  building	  up	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  militarily	  against	  Israel,	  while	  Iraq	  was	  never	  given	  much	  consideration.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  apparent	  shift	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  aid	  the	  Kurds.	  For	  instance,	  on	  July	  28,	  Haig	  suggested	  to	  Kissinger,	  “a	  case	  could	  be	  made	  that	  [supporting	  the	  Kurds]	  is	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  due	  to	  recent	  events	  in	  Egypt	  which	  will	  probably	  result	  in	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more	  intense	  Soviet	  efforts	  in	  Iraq.”737	  This	  indicates	  that	  while	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  treaty	  led	  the	  U.S.	  to	  initially	  consider	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  it	  was	  the	  departure	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  from	  Egypt	  and	  its	  perceived	  impact	  on	  the	  Cold	  War	  regional	  calculus	  that	  ensured	  Nixon’s	  approval	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	   On	  July	  28,	  Haig	  forwarded	  Helm’s	  proposal	  to	  Kissinger	  along	  with	  an	  action	  memo	  seeking	  the	  operation’s	  approval.738	  In	  total,	  Helms	  said	  it	  would	  require	  $18	  million	  to	  maintain	  the	  Kurds	  in	  an	  essentially	  defensive	  position	  and,	  of	  this	  Figure,	  Iran	  was	  willing	  to	  pay	  half	  and	  a	  further	  $6	  million	  would	  come	  from	  “other	  sources.”	  Helms	  proposed	  providing	  Barzani	  with	  a	  monthly	  subsidy	  of	  $250,000	  ($3	  million	  a	  year)	  through	  CIA	  channels,	  and	  $2	  million	  worth	  of	  ordinance.739	  Initial	  priority	  would	  be	  given	  to	  weapons	  and	  ammunition	  that	  the	  Kurds	  already	  had,	  while	  secondary	  priority	  would	  “be	  given	  to	  anti-­‐aircraft	  and	  anti-­‐tank	  weapons,	  including	  land	  mines	  and	  rockets,	  with	  emphasis	  on	  portability.”740	  All	  of	  the	  ordinance	  supplied	  would	  be	  “either	  non-­‐attributable,	  foreign	  manufacture	  or	  of	  U.S.	  manufacture	  normally	  stocked	  by	  Iraq	  or	  Iran,	  except	  for	  artillery	  (ground	  and	  anti-­‐aircraft)	  and	  tanks,	  which	  [the	  U.S.]	  should	  probably	  not	  in	  any	  event	  undertake	  to	  supply.”741	  Procedurally,	  Haig	  said	  the	  administration	  should	  present	  the	  operation	  to	  an	  interagency	  committee,	  known	  as	  the	  40	  Committee,	  for	  consideration	  before	  approval,	  though	  law	  does	  not	  required	  this.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  operation’s	  extreme	  sensitivity,	  he	  proposed	  two	  options:	  1)	  bypass	  the	  40	  Committee	  and	  inform	  Nixon	  directly,	  then	  deal	  solely	  with	  the	  OfFice	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  and	  Helms	  or	  2)	  avoid	  any	  paper	  trail	  and	  inform	  40	  Committee	  principals	  the	  President	  approved	  the	  operation.742	  Haig	  recommended	  the	  latter	  of	  these	  two	  options	  and	  Kissinger	  approved,	  scribbling,	  “get	  it	  done	  next	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week	  by	  handing	  my	  memo	  to	  principals.”	  On	  August	  1,	  Kissinger	  sent	  a	  one-­‐page	  memo	  indicating	  Nixon	  had	  approved	  the	  covert	  operation	  to	  assist	  the	  Kurds	  to	  the	  principals.743	   The	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  later	  criticized	  for	  “circumventing”	  the	  40	  Committee,	  with	  the	  Pike	  Report	  describing	  it	  as	  a	  “highly	  unusual	  security	  precaution”	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  keep	  the	  State	  Department	  in	  the	  dark.744	  The	  
Pike	  Report’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘circumvent’	  suggests	  that	  the	  White	  House	  was	  required	  to	  inform	  the	  40	  Committee	  of	  this	  operation.	  But	  according	  to	  the	  Church	  
Report,	  “Not	  all	  covert	  activities	  are	  approved	  by	  the	  40	  Committee.	  Projects	  not	  deemed	  politically	  risky	  or	  involving	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  can	  be	  approved	  within	  the	  CIA.	  By	  CIA	  statistics,	  only	  about	  one-­‐fourth	  of	  all	  covert	  action	  projects	  are	  considered	  by	  the	  40	  Committee.”745	  Given	  the	  State	  Department’s	  known	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposed	  operation	  and	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  concerns	  about	  damaging	  leaks,	  the	  logical	  solution	  was	  to	  avoid	  the	  40	  Committee’s	  review	  process	  and	  limit	  knowledge	  of	  the	  operation	  to	  a	  select	  group.	  This,	  however,	  would	  have	  considerable	  long-­‐term	  implications	  on	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  	   Despite	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  Shah	  manipulated	  the	  U.S.	  into	  helping	  the	  Kurds	  by	  overemphasizing	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  to	  Iraq,	  considerable	  evidence	  supports	  the	  opposite	  conclusion.	  Given	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  dismissal	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  manipulations	  about	  Iraq’s	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  during	  the	  1970-­‐71	  period,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  would	  change	  unless	  prompted	  by	  legitimate	  Cold	  War	  concerns.	  
Conclusion
	   During	  Nixon’s	  First	  term	  in	  ofFice,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  underwent	  a	  major	  shift.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  his	  term,	  Nixon	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  “farm	  out”	  regional	  policy	  to	  both	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  like	  Iran,	  under	  the	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Nixon	  Doctrine.	  With	  the	  impending	  British	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  region	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1971,	  the	  Shah	  sought	  to	  convince	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  of	  his	  value	  as	  an	  ally.	  Indeed,	  following	  Iraq’s	  killing	  of	  nine	  Jews	  in	  January	  1969,	  the	  Shah	  provoked	  the	  1969	  Shatt	  crisis,	  urged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  and	  tried	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  in	  January	  1970.	  Through	  these	  actions,	  the	  Shah	  sent	  a	  clear	  message	  to	  the	  Ba’th	  that	  its	  actions	  would	  not	  be	  tolerated,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  showing	  Iran	  was	  a	  capable	  successor	  to	  Britain	  as	  the	  ‘regional	  policeman’.	  This	  Fits	  with	  Alvandi’s	  observation	  that	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  happy	  to	  encourage	  the	  Shah’s	  ambitions.746	  But	  Iran’s	  actions	  during	  1969-­‐70	  also	  convinced	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  to	  settle	  its	  Kurdish	  problem,	  leading	  to	  the	  March	  Accord	  in	  1970.	  	   Once	  again,	  America’s	  views	  about	  Iraq	  differed	  from	  its	  regional	  allies,	  Iran	  and	  Israel,	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  March	  Accord	  and	  the	  British	  withdrawal	  in	  December	  1971.	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  that	  the	  March	  Accord	  was	  a	  Soviet	  plot	  to	  gain	  inFluence	  over	  Iraq.	  But	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  dismissed	  these	  warnings	  as	  manipulative	  and	  pointed	  to	  considerable	  evidence	  of	  a	  chill	  in	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  resulting	  from	  an	  Iraqi	  campaign	  against	  the	  ICP.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  Iraq	  began	  to	  pivot	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  November	  1971—just	  a	  month	  before	  the	  British	  withdrawal—that	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  began	  to	  reconsider	  Iraq’s	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  even	  then	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  hesitant.	   The	  major	  turning	  point	  was	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  April	  1972,	  which	  effectively	  aligned	  Iraq	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  provided	  the	  Soviets	  with	  a	  naval	  base	  on	  the	  Gulf.	  To	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  the	  treaty	  conFirmed	  longstanding	  suspicions	  about	  Moscow’s	  intentions,	  while	  underscoring	  the	  CIA’s	  poor	  intelligence	  on	  Iraq.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  treaty,	  the	  timing	  was	  problematic,	  since	  it	  came	  just	  as	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  Finalizing	  its	  preparations	  for	  the	  Moscow	  Summit	  with	  Soviet	  Premier	  Leonid	  Brezhnev	  in	  late-­‐May.	  However,	  once	  Nixon	  had	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secured	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviets,	  he	  was	  no	  longer	  constrained	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  Iraq,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  a	  CIA	  operation	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds.	  Clearly,	  between	  1969	  and	  1972	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  had	  undergone	  a	  major	  shift.	  	   There	  is	  disagreement	  among	  scholars	  about	  why	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  during	  Nixon’s	  visit	  to	  Iran	  in	  May	  1972.	  Some	  argue	  the	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  American	  concerns	  about	  Iraq,	  while	  others	  believe	  the	  Shah	  overinFlated	  the	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq	  to	  advance	  his	  own	  interests	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  Oddly	  enough,	  none	  have	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  actually	  agreeing	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  Tehran.	  The	  record	  does,	  however,	  show	  that	  Kissinger	  had	  shown	  concerned	  about	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relationship	  and	  agreed	  with	  the	  Shah	  that	  something	  needed	  to	  be	  done.	  In	  fact,	  the	  only	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  agreeing	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  Kissinger’s	  August	  1	  memorandum	  to	  the	  40	  Committee’s	  principals.	  While	  Nixon	  eventually	  approved	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  the	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  four	  factors:	  1)	  concerns	  about	  the	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  relations,	  especially	  after	  the	  departure	  of	  Soviet	  personnel	  from	  Egypt	  in	  July	  1972;	  2)	  a	  desire	  to	  build	  up	  the	  Shah	  of	  Iran	  as	  a	  regional	  power	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Britain’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  region	  in	  late	  1971	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  the	  region;	  3)	  U.S.	  concerns	  about	  Iraq’s	  nationalization	  of	  the	  IPC	  in	  June	  1972;	  and	  4)	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  Kurds	  could	  be	  a	  useful	  coercive	  tool	  to	  undermine	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  Quite	  clearly,	  in	  each	  of	  these	  instances	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  the	  common	  denominator.	  Therefore,	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  was	  not	  based	  on	  a	  naïve	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  manipulations,	  but	  a	  realist	  analysis	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  suggesting	  Iraq	  was	  becoming	  a	  Soviet	  satellite.
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Chapter	  6:	  Nixon	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  OperationAugust	  1972—October	  1973
	   This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  between	  Nixon’s	  approval	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  August	  1972	  and	  the	  October	  1973	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  War.	  It	  will	  show	  that	  after	  approving	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  proceeded	  along	  two	  separate	  and	  conFlicting	  tracks.	  As	  the	  CIA	  began	  funneling	  money	  and	  arms	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  State	  Department	  proceeded	  to	  send	  U.S.	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  set	  up	  an	  interests	  section.	  Meanwhile,	  Richard	  Helms,	  a	  career	  intelligence	  ofFicer	  and	  former	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  was	  sent	  to	  Tehran	  to	  act	  as	  Nixon’s	  regional	  “super	  ambassador”	  and	  run	  the	  secretive	  Kurdish	  operation.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  two	  tracks	  and	  the	  differing	  perspectives	  of	  U.S.	  diplomats	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  Tehran,	  conFlict	  between	  the	  State	  Department’s	  policy	  of	  cultivating	  friendly	  relations	  and	  the	  White	  House’s	  policy	  of	  undermining	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  was	  inevitable.	  	   While	  there	  are	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  works	  discussing	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  this	  period,	  Jonathan	  Randal,	  John	  Prados,	  and	  Douglas	  Little	  all	  agree	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	  weaken	  the	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Iraqi	  regime.747	  Indeed,	  Kissinger	  said	  this	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Randal	  in	  1992,	  where	  he	  explained	  U.S.	  Middle	  East	  strategy	  was	  to	  “weaken	  any	  country	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union”	  and	  because	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  just	  signed	  a	  military	  pact	  with	  Iraq,	  “we	  were	  very	  receptive	  to	  helping	  the	  Kurds.”748	  Prados	  argues	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  operation	  was	  to	  raise	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  conFlict	  for	  Baghdad,	  improve	  the	  Kurds’	  bargaining	  power,	  and	  convince	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  to	  meet	  their	  legitimate	  demands,	  while	  preventing	  Iraq’s	  military	  from	  being	  used	  against	  America’s	  regional	  allies,	  particularly	  Israel	  and	  oil-­‐rich	  Kuwait.749 	  This	  conclusion	  is	  reFlected	  in	  Kissinger’s	  memoir	  and	  
 215
747 Randal (1999), p.151; Prados (2006), p.392; and Little (2010), pp.78-79.
748 Randal (1999), p.151.
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documents.750	  Documents	  also	  support	  Little’s	  argument	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  fully	  comprehend	  what	  they	  were	  getting	  into,	  stating	  “Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  were	  playing	  with	  Fire.”751	  Indeed,	  Kissinger	  acknowledges	  as	  much	  in	  his	  memoir,	  lamenting,	  “we	  should	  have	  understood	  better	  that	  the	  Kurds	  might	  prove	  to	  be	  volatile	  partners,	  difFicult	  to	  Fit	  into	  any	  overall	  strategy.”752	  While	  all	  these	  works	  agree	  on	  the	  objectives	  of	  U.S.	  policy,	  none	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  fact	  that	  during	  1973	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  actually	  improved,	  with	  Iraq	  settling	  the	  IPC	  dispute	  amicably,	  giving	  public	  indications	  of	  its	  desire	  to	  improve	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  awarding	  important	  contracts	  to	  U.S.	  Firms,	  and	  refusing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Saudi-­‐led	  oil	  embargo	  following	  the	  October	  War.
I	   During	  the	  autumn	  of	  1972,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  adopted	  a	  two	  track	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  In	  July	  1972,	  just	  before	  Nixon	  approved	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  the	  State	  Department	  announced	  it	  was	  sending	  Arthur	  Lowrie	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  run	  the	  U.S.	  interests	  section	  (USINT).753	  In	  the	  following	  months,	  Lowrie	  consulted	  with	  all	  major	  interested	  parties	  in	  Iraq,	  including	  U.S.	  oil	  companies,	  banks,	  and	  associations,	  and	  met	  with	  diplomats	  in	  London,	  Brussels,	  Paris,	  and	  Beirut	  to	  gain	  further	  perspective.	  Lowrie’s	  job	  was	  to	  observe	  and	  report	  on	  events	  in	  Iraq,	  while	  seeking	  to	  cultivate	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  regime.754	  Lowrie	  arrived	  in	  Baghdad	  in	  early	  September	  and	  took	  ofFicial	  control	  of	  USINT	  on	  October	  1.	  He	  would	  stay	  until	  August	  1975.755	  In	  an	  interview	  in	  1999,	  Lowrie	  indicated	  he	  had	  his	  suspicions	  about	  a	  U.S.	  operation,	  but	  neither	  he	  nor	  his	  superior,	  Roy	  Atherton,	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.756	  Clearly	  the	  White	  House	  and	  State	  
 216
750 Kissinger (1999), p.589.
751 Little (2010), p.78.
752 Kissinger (1999), p.583.
753 Brussels 2897 to State, “REPIR: Iraqi Foreign Ministry’s Reaction to Department Spokesman’s 
Announcement on US Personnel for USINT,” August 3, 1972 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.323), p.1. 
754 DoS, Memorandum, Seelye to Leamon Hunt, “Consultations for Arthur L. Lowrie en route to Baghdad,” 
June 28, 1972 (NARA/RG59/Records Relating to Iraq/1966-1972/Box14/POL 17), p.1. 
755 See DoS, “A Guide To The United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, 
By Country, Since 1776: Iraq”. Available online: http://history.state.gov/countries/iraq.
756 Interview with Arthur Lowrie, December 23, 1989. Available online: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mfdip.
2004low08.
Department	  were	  working	  toward	  two	  different	  policy	  objectives	  when	  it	  came	  to	  Iraq.	  	   From	  July	  31	  to	  August	  2,	  the	  Shah	  met	  with	  King	  Hussein	  at	  his	  Caspian	  Sea	  palace	  to	  discuss	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  both	  monarchs	  welcomed	  U.S.	  aid	  and	  laid	  down	  “ground	  rules	  for	  the	  common	  effort.”	  During	  the	  discussions	  both	  agreed	  Barzani	  had	  to	  avoid	  any	  “dramatic	  moves	  that	  might	  trigger	  an	  all-­‐out	  Iraqi	  assault,	  such	  as	  declaring	  a	  separate	  Kurdish	  state.”	  They	  also	  agreed	  the	  emphasis	  of	  their	  support	  had	  to	  be	  on	  “strengthening	  Kurdish	  defensive	  capabilities	  to	  preserve	  the	  greatest	  measure	  of	  autonomy.”	  This	  Fit	  with	  U.S.	  perceptions	  on	  the	  matter.757	   It	  was	  clear	  by	  August	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  concerned	  about	  Barzani’s	  refusal	  to	  join	  the	  National	  Front.	  In	  late-­‐August,	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  of	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Politburo,	  Mikhail	  Suslov,	  traveling	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  urge	  Barzani	  to	  join	  the	  government.	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  attached	  great	  importance	  to	  Suslov’s	  visit.	  While	  in	  Kurdistan,	  Suslov	  apparently	  told	  Barzani	  that	  since	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  from	  Egypt,	  Moscow	  attached	  new	  meaning	  to	  its	  relations	  with	  Baghdad.	  This	  conFirmed	  U.S.	  assessments	  of	  Iraq’s	  importance	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  prompting	  Kissinger	  to	  conclude,	  “the	  stakes	  were	  obviously	  being	  raised.”758	   On	  October	  5,	  Kissinger	  sent	  Nixon	  a	  memo	  summarizing	  a	  CIA	  report	  from	  Director	  Helms	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  The	  economic	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  was	  deteriorating,	  because	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  short	  on	  funds	  due	  to	  the	  boycott	  of	  its	  oil	  following	  the	  IPC’s	  nationalization	  in	  June	  1972.759 	  Kissinger	  told	  Nixon	  the	  Soviets	  were	  “extremely	  concerned”	  about	  Barzani’s	  “independent	  course”	  and	  his	  refusal	  to	  join	  the	  National	  Front.	  But	  the	  CIA’s	  military	  and	  Financial	  pipeline	  to	  the	  Kurds	  was	  fully	  operational	  and	  the	  First	  shipments	  were	  delivered	  “without	  a	  hitch.”	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  “more	  money	  and	  arms	  [were]	  in	  the	  pipeline,	  not	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only	  from	  Agency	  stocks	  but	  also	  [excised]	  captured	  Fedayeen	  ordnance,”	  a	  likely	  reference	  to	  Jordan,	  which	  had	  captured	  Palestinian	  Fedayeen	  weaponry	  during	  its	  September	  1970	  crackdown.760 	  Barzani	  had	  also	  received	  the	  First	  two	  monthly	  cash	  payments	  as	  well	  as	  a	  planeload	  of	  arms	  and	  ammunition,	  including	  500	  Kalashnikov	  AK-­‐47	  assault	  riFles,	  500	  Soviet	  submachine	  guns	  and	  200,000	  rounds	  of	  ammunition.	  Finally,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  October	  Iran	  had	  received	  222,000	  pounds	  of	  arms	  and	  ammunition	  from	  CIA	  stocks	  for	  onward	  shipment	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  With	  this,	  the	  CIA	  believed	  the	  Kurds	  could	  tie	  down	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Iraq’s	  army	  and	  deprive	  it	  of	  “a	  secure	  base	  from	  which	  to	  launch	  sabotage	  and	  assassination	  teams	  against	  Iran.”761	  This	  letter	  is	  further	  proof	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  concern	  about	  Iraq’s	  place	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  in	  tying	  down	  Iraq’s	  army.	   On	  October	  21,	  Lowrie	  sent	  David	  Korn,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  regional	  director,	  a	  letter	  outlining	  the	  direction	  he	  felt	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  should	  take.	  Logically,	  Iraq’s	  “geographic	  location,	  its	  role	  as	  a	  major	  oil	  producer,	  and	  its	  political	  vulnerability”	  made	  it	  “of	  considerable	  interests	  to	  [the	  U.S.].”	  Unfortunately,	  America’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Shah,	  its	  support	  of	  the	  IPC,	  and	  the	  Ba’th’s	  belief	  that	  the	  U.S.	  sought	  to	  overthrow	  it	  in	  January	  1970,	  were	  obstacles	  to	  rapprochement.	  Lowrie	  recommended	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  needed	  to	  “disabuse	  …	  this	  erroneous	  impression,”	  but	  cautioned	  against	  seeking	  opportunities	  to	  improve	  relations,	  which	  he	  felt	  would	  raise	  suspicion.	  However,	  if	  Iraq	  made	  friendly	  gestures,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  “respond	  handsomely	  …	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  regardless	  of	  the	  importance.”	  In	  effect,	  Lowrie	  proposed	  adopting	  a	  policy	  similar	  to	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  “wait	  and	  see”	  policy	  of	  seeking	  friendly	  relations,	  while	  avoiding	  provocative	  actions.762	   In	  December,	  Lowrie	  sent	  the	  department	  a	  “very	  tentative	  assessment”	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  report	  conFirmed	  the	  value	  of	  having	  an	  American	  presence	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in	  Baghdad.	  Lowrie	  identiFied	  three	  domestic	  issues	  that	  dominated	  the	  regime’s	  attention:	  the	  ongoing	  conFlict	  with	  the	  IPC,	  which	  had	  cut	  production	  by	  half;	  the	  rebellious	  Kurds	  in	  the	  north;	  and	  the	  regime’s	  inability	  to	  form	  a	  National	  Front.	  Internationally,	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  be	  emerging	  from	  its	  self-­‐imposed	  isolation,	  improving	  relations	  with	  Algeria	  and	  Sudan	  and	  seeking	  rapprochement	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  While	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  remained	  Iraq’s	  closest	  ally,	  the	  regime	  had	  begun	  courting	  France	  openly.	  It	  offered	  special	  treatment	  to	  the	  French	  member	  of	  the	  IPC	  consortium	  and	  secured	  a	  major	  bilateral	  oil	  agreement	  that	  ensured	  France	  bought	  a	  quarter	  of	  Iraq’s	  production.763 	  But	  Lowrie	  did	  not	  underestimate	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  Iraq	  and	  felt	  it	  endangered	  U.S.	  interests:We	  should	  not	  be	  lulled	  into	  complacency	  …	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Arab	  states	  elsewhere	  have	  proved	  impervious	  to	  a	  dominant	  Russian	  presence.	  Iraq	  may	  be	  different.	  Few	  Arab	  countries	  are	  as	  culturally	  diverse	  and	  therefore	  capable	  of	  being	  controlled	  by	  a	  small,	  militant	  minority.	  For	  Russia,	  Iraq	  is	  geographically	  the	  closest	  Arab	  country.	  Its	  concrete	  interests	  here	  are	  substantial	  (oil,	  Indian	  Ocean,	  border	  security).	  The	  Soviets	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  gain	  direct	  control	  over	  the	  levers	  of	  power,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  discount	  this	  possibility.764Indeed,	  a	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  (NIE)	  on	  Iraq	  from	  December	  conFirmed	  this	  conclusion.	  SigniFicantly,	  it	  also	  warned	  Iran	  and	  Iraq’s	  continued	  rivalry—as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  dispute,	  Iran’s	  backing	  of	  the	  Kurds,	  and	  the	  growing	  competition	  for	  inFluence	  in	  the	  Gulf—could	  lead	  to	  an	  arms	  race,	  with	  Iraq	  turning	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Iran	  to	  America.	  In	  effect,	  this	  meant	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  rivalry	  was	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Fortunately,	  the	  CIA	  added,	  Iraq	  had	  “a	  healthy	  respect”	  for	  Iran’s	  military	  superiority	  and	  was	  “likely	  to	  refrain	  from	  escalating	  incidents”	  in	  the	  near	  term.765	   By	  the	  end	  of	  1972	  the	  dispatch	  of	  U.S.	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad	  was	  beginning	  to	  pay	  off.	  Thanks	  to	  Lowrie’s	  observations,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  clearly	  developing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  forces	  at	  play	  inside	  Iraq,	  including	  the	  cultivation	  of	  Franco-­‐
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Iraqi	  relations.	  This	  relationship	  would	  help	  balance	  Iraq’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  Soviets	  and	  continue	  well	  into	  the	  1980s.766	  While	  Lowrie’s	  deployment	  to	  Baghdad	  provided	  the	  State	  Department	  with	  an	  incredible	  asset,	  his	  unvarnished	  analyses	  would	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  Kissinger’s	  belief	  that	  Iraq	  was	  becoming	  Moscow’s	  “principal	  …	  ally	  in	  the	  area”.767
II
	   In	  the	  year	  between	  Nixon’s	  stunning	  electoral	  victory	  in	  the	  November	  1972	  general	  election	  and	  the	  October	  1973	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war,	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  underwent	  a	  remarkable	  thaw.	  The	  thaw	  was	  a	  byproduct	  of	  an	  internal	  power	  struggle	  within	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime,	  pitting	  a	  pragmatic	  wing	  led	  by	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  against	  hardline	  elements	  within	  the	  military.	  Whereas	  the	  pragmatists	  wanted	  to	  rid	  themselves	  of	  troublesome	  issues,	  like	  the	  IPC	  dispute	  and	  balance	  its	  relations	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  West,	  the	  hardliners	  were	  determined	  to	  project	  Iraqi	  power	  into	  the	  Gulf,	  as	  evidence	  by	  Iraq’s	  bombardment	  of	  Kuwait	  in	  March	  1973.	  Eventually,	  the	  pragmatists	  ousted	  their	  opponents	  following	  an	  attempted	  coup	  in	  June,	  leading	  to	  a	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  ignored	  Lowrie’s	  analyses	  and	  ordered	  an	  increase	  in	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  	   Richard	  Nixon’s	  reelection	  in	  1972	  led	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  establishment,	  as	  he	  swept	  out	  his	  top	  leadership	  and	  replaced	  them	  with	  individuals	  responsive	  to	  him.768 	  The	  most	  signiFicant	  change	  was	  the	  Firing	  of	  Richard	  Helms	  and	  his	  banishment	  to	  Iran	  as	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador.	  Helms	  was	  perfect	  for	  the	  role.	  In	  his	  former	  role	  as	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  Helms	  came	  from	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  had	  close	  connections	  with	  Kissinger,	  and	  was	  an	  experienced	  intelligence	  ofFicer.769	  SigniFicantly,	  he	  was	  also	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an	  old	  friend	  of	  the	  Shah,	  having	  attended	  the	  same	  college	  as	  him	  in	  Switzerland.	  Because	  of	  his	  senior	  position	  in	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  Nixon	  asked	  Helms	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  “super	  ambassador,”	  coordinating	  U.S.	  policy	  across	  the	  region.770 	  Helms	  would	  play	  a	  signiFicant	  role	  in	  directing	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  and	  use	  his	  personal	  connections	  to	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  Shah	  to	  cut	  the	  State	  Department	  out	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Iraq.	   During	  the	  spring	  of	  1973,	  two	  separate	  but	  related	  developments	  occurred	  with	  respect	  to	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  First,	  on	  February	  28,	  Iraq	  settled	  its	  dispute	  with	  the	  IPC	  by	  presenting	  the	  company	  with	  a	  generous	  offer.	  By	  settling	  the	  IPC	  dispute,	  Iraq	  removed	  the	  main	  legal	  obstacle	  preventing	  American	  companies	  from	  bidding	  for	  Iraqi	  commercial	  contracts.771	  This	  led	  to	  “a	  steady	  improvement	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  commercial	  relations	  between	  Iraq	  and	  the	  [U.S.]”	  in	  the	  months	  after	  the	  decision,	  a	  trend	  that	  continued	  even	  after	  the	  October	  War.772	  	   The	  struggle	  between	  the	  pragmatists	  and	  hardline	  elements	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  broke	  into	  the	  open	  on	  March	  20	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  attacked	  a	  Kuwaiti	  border	  post	  to	  the	  east	  of	  Umm	  Qasr,	  Iraq’s	  only	  port	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  and	  announced	  claims	  to	  two	  Kuwaiti	  islands.	  This	  was	  First	  major	  military	  provocation	  between	  Kuwait	  and	  Iraq	  since	  the	  crisis	  of	  1961.	  Worse,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  the	  “highest	  levels”	  of	  the	  regime	  had	  been	  planned	  the	  incident.773	  As	  Nadav	  Safran	  observed,	  if	  Iraq	  occupied	  these	  islands	  successfully,	  it	  “would	  not	  only	  enhance	  greatly	  the	  strategic	  position	  of	  [Umm	  Qasr]	  but	  perhaps	  even	  bring	  Iraqi	  troops	  within	  striking	  distance	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  oil	  region.”774	  Despite	  this,	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  response	  to	  Iraq’s	  attack	  on	  Kuwait	  was	  tepid,	  with	  the	  State	  Department	  indicating	  on	  March	  20	  that	  it	  was	  “watching	  the	  situation	  closely,”	  while	  advising	  U.S.	  ofFicials	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to	  avoid	  public	  statements	  because	  it	  could	  “complicate	  [the]	  problem	  for	  [Kuwait].”775	  With	  the	  British	  gone	  from	  the	  region,	  Kuwait	  turned	  to	  the	  U.S.	  for	  assistance	  against	  Iraq.	  The	  Nixon	  administration,	  however,	  was	  hesitant	  about	  introducing	  U.S.	  forces	  into	  a	  regional	  conFlict.	  Instead,	  it	  proposed	  Kuwait	  approach	  Iran,	  Jordan	  or	  Saudi	  Arabia	  for	  assistance,	  though	  each	  option	  had	  its	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.776	  Ultimately,	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  conFlict,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  operate	  through	  its	  regional	  allies.	  Consequently,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  sent	  15,000	  troops	  to	  Kuwait	  on	  March	  29	  to	  help	  protect	  it	  from	  further	  Iraqi	  encroachment.777	   Iraq’s	  unprovoked	  attack	  on	  Kuwait	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  with	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  On	  March	  22,	  Saddam	  was	  summoned	  to	  Moscow	  to	  explain	  both	  the	  IPC	  settlement	  and	  Iraq’s	  attack	  on	  Kuwait.	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Moscow	  believed	  the	  Soviets	  were	  furious	  about	  Iraq’s	  “ill	  timed	  and	  unhelpful”	  attack	  because	  it	  could	  potentially	  disrupt	  Moscow’s	  relations	  with	  Kuwait	  and	  Iran	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  British	  withdrawal.	  Worse	  yet,	  Prime	  Minister	  Kosygin	  had	  been	  in	  Tehran	  to	  sign	  a	  major	  commercial	  agreement	  with	  the	  Shah	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  attack,	  making	  Iraq’s	  move	  all	  the	  more	  embarrassing.778	   While	  America’s	  diplomatic	  options	  were	  limited,	  its	  covert	  options	  were	  not.	  On	  March	  29,	  Kissinger	  ordered	  the	  new	  DCI,	  James	  Schlesinger,	  to	  increase	  Barzani’s	  funding	  from	  $3	  million	  to	  around	  $5	  million	  annually.	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  this	  was	  because:	  Iraq	  had	  become	  the	  principal	  Soviet	  client	  in	  the	  Middle	  East;	  that	  the	  Ba’ath	  government	  under	  Saddam	  Hussein	  continued	  to	  Finance	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terrorist	  organizations	  …	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  “rejectionist	  front”	  seeking	  to	  block	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  initiatives.	  Correspondingly,	  the	  Shah	  increased	  his	  funding	  for	  the	  Kurds	  to	  $30	  million	  and	  began	  to	  help	  them	  with	  logistics	  and	  long-­‐range	  artillery	  support.	  However,	  Kissinger	  was	  also	  concerned	  that	  by	  increasing	  U.S.	  funds,	  the	  Kurds	  might	  escalate	  the	  military	  situation	  beyond	  their	  present	  “defensive	  posture”.	  In	  a	  memo	  to	  Nixon,	  he	  wrote:	  We	  may	  wish	  to	  …	  avoid	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  escalating	  commitment	  by	  telling	  Barzani	  that	  we	  will	  provide	  these	  additional	  funds	  for	  this	  year	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis	  but,	  in	  any	  event,	  would	  emphasize	  that	  we	  share	  the	  Shah’s	  view	  regarding	  maintenance	  of	  the	  defensive	  posture	  of	  the	  Kurds.779By	  increasing	  funds	  to	  the	  Kurds	  and	  warning	  Barzani	  against	  escalating	  the	  military	  situation,	  Kissinger	  sought	  to	  gain	  leverage	  over	  the	  Kurds	  and	  utilize	  them	  as	  a	  coercive	  tool	  against	  Baghdad.	   On	  March	  27	  Lowrie	  sent	  the	  State	  Department	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  By	  this	  point,	  it	  was	  clear	  a	  power	  struggle	  was	  underway	  between	  “extremist	  elements”	  controlling	  the	  party	  and	  security	  organs	  and	  a	  group	  of	  pragmatic,	  “constructive	  realistic	  elements,”	  which	  he	  called	  the	  “other	  Iraq.”	  Confronting	  or	  condemning	  Iraq’s	  aggressive	  actions,	  Lowrie	  argued,	  would	  be	  “morally	  confronting,”	  have	  “little	  chance	  of	  bringing	  about	  change	  for	  [the]	  better,”	  and	  “would	  probably	  strengthen	  [the]	  extremists	  since	  it	  would	  conFirm	  their	  view	  of	  U.S.	  as	  chief	  enemy.”	  Instead,	  Lowrie	  proposed	  supporting	  the	  pragmatists	  by	  “[seizing]	  every	  opportunity	  that	  may	  strengthen	  constructive	  elements,”	  establishing	  “direct	  ofFicial	  ties”	  wherever	  possible,	  encouraging	  private	  links,	  and	  to	  responding	  favourably	  to	  any	  requests	  from	  the	  “other	  Iraq”	  elements.	  In	  short,	  Lowrie	  urged,	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  “pursue	  a	  highly	  Flexible	  policy	  that	  attempt[ed]	  to	  deal	  with	  both	  Iraqs.”780	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   The	  State	  Department	  agreed	  with	  Lowrie’s	  analysis	  but	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran	  did	  not.781	  On	  April	  10,	  Helms,	  the	  new	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran,	  cabled	  Washington	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  analysis.	  Helms	  indicated	  he	  sympathized	  with	  Lowrie’s	  “commendable	  attempt	  …	  to	  advance	  ideas	  for	  handling	  the	  dilemma	  presented	  to	  USG	  by	  [the]	  current	  regime	  in	  Baghdad,”	  which	  he	  saw	  as	  “unremittingly	  extremist	  and	  relentlessly	  hostile	  to	  American	  interests.”	  He	  concluded:…	  [We]	  are	  frankly	  skeptical	  that	  in	  practice	  we	  could	  help	  the	  moderates	  without	  building	  up	  our	  extremist	  enemies,	  and	  we	  fear	  that	  our	  friends	  in	  the	  area	  would	  not	  take	  kindly	  to	  what	  appeared	  to	  them	  to	  be	  American	  courting	  [sic.]	  of	  [a]	  thoroughly	  irresponsible	  regime.Helms	  warned	  that	  the	  Shah	  could	  misinterpret	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  the	  “other	  Iraq”	  and	  “be	  calculatingly	  accepted	  by	  Baghdad	  and	  then	  pointed	  to,	  both	  internally	  and	  externally,	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  USG	  is	  not	  really	  very	  upset	  by	  recent	  incidents	  along	  the	  Iraqi-­‐Kuwaiti	  border.”	  Despite	  Helms’	  valid	  points,	  the	  department	  never	  rescinded	  its	  original	  approval	  of	  Lowrie’s	  approach.782	   In	  mid-­‐May,	  Lowrie	  learned	  of	  a	  secret	  Soviet	  effort	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  rapprochement.	  When	  word	  of	  this	  reached	  Washington,	  the	  State	  Department	  informed	  the	  White	  House	  immediately.	  Apparently,	  the	  talks	  focused	  on	  two	  issues:	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway.783	  The	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran	  later	  conFirmed	  this	  information.784	  According	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials,	  the	  secret	  talks	  took	  place	  in	  late	  May	  in	  Geneva	  and	  went	  nowhere.	  Apparently	  Iran	  sought	  a	  new	  treaty	  recognizing	  the	  de	  facto	  situation	  along	  the	  waterway,	  which	  the	  Iraqis	  rejected.785	  Even	  so,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  welcomed	  the	  Geneva	  talks	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  improving	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  relations.786	  In	  Baghdad,	  Lowrie	  argued	  the	  U.S.	  should	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press	  Iran	  into	  meeting	  Iraq’s	  “legitimate	  demands,”	  since	  “a	  loosing	  of	  ties,	  particularly	  military	  ties,	  with	  [the]	  USSR	  and	  further	  enhancement	  of	  Iraq’s	  independence”	  was	  in	  America’s	  interests.787	  	   On	  June	  2,	  two	  Soviet	  diplomats	  traveled	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  press	  Barzani	  once	  again	  into	  joining	  the	  National	  Front.	  Once	  again	  the	  Soviet	  efforts	  were	  fruitless,	  with	  Barzani	  pointing	  to	  the	  Ba’th’s	  “Arabization”	  program,	  its	  failure	  to	  establish	  borders	  for	  the	  Kurdish	  region,	  the	  lack	  of	  Kurdish	  participation	  in	  government,	  and	  the	  numerous	  assassination	  attempts	  against	  him	  and	  his	  family,	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  regime’s	  bad	  faith.	  In	  response,	  the	  Soviets	  warned	  Barzani	  of	  becoming	  too	  reliant	  on	  the	  Shah	  and	  informed	  him	  of	  the	  secret	  Geneva	  talks.	  Concerned,	  Barzani	  travelled	  to	  Tehran	  to	  seek	  the	  Shah’s	  advice.788	  Brushing	  aside	  concerns	  about	  an	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  rapprochement,	  the	  Shah	  suggested	  Barzani	  insist	  the	  regime	  hold	  free	  general	  elections	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  his	  joining	  the	  coalition,	  arguing	  this	  would	  placate	  the	  Soviets	  and	  make	  the	  Ba’th	  adopt	  an	  intransigent	  position,	  since	  it	  could	  never	  hold	  elections	  without	  being	  swept	  from	  power.789	  	   Meanwhile,	  on	  June	  7-­‐8	  Jim	  Hoagland,	  a	  Pulitzer	  Prize	  winning	  reporter	  for	  the	  Washington	  Post,	  traveled	  secretly	  to	  Kurdistan	  to	  interview	  Barzani.	  During	  their	  conversation,	  Barzani	  told	  Hoagland	  he	  intended	  to	  maintain	  the	  peace	  until	  March	  1974	  when	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  March	  Accord	  were	  to	  be	  implemented,	  but	  should	  the	  government	  not	  keep	  its	  word,	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  attack.790	  Barzani	  also	  requested	  U.S.	  support	  against	  Baghdad,791	  offering	  the	  U.S.	  access	  to	  the	  Kirkuk	  oilFields	  in	  return	  for	  sending	  troops	  to	  protect	  his	  people	  from	  the	  “wolves”	  in	  Baghdad.792	  Unsurprisingly,	  Barzani’s	  public	  call	  for	  American	  support	  provoked	  an	  aggressive	  response	  from	  Baghdad,	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  attacking	  the	  Kurds	  in	  late	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June,	  leaving	  eighteen	  killed.	  Iranian	  ofFicials	  attributed	  the	  violence	  to	  Hoagland’s	  article,	  pointing	  out	  Baghdad	  had	  “decided	  on	  a	  degree	  of	  violence	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  displeasure	  [with]	  Barzani.”793	  	   In	  late	  June,	  Alam	  told	  Helms	  that	  Iraq	  was	  about	  to	  receive	  four	  Tupolev	  TU-­‐22	  “Blinder”	  supersonic	  aircrafts,	  equipped	  with	  missiles	  with	  a	  range	  of	  up	  to	  100	  miles.	  The	  missiles	  concerned	  the	  Shah	  because	  they	  could	  hit	  important	  targets	  in	  Iran	  without	  approaching	  the	  border.	  But	  Helms	  was	  not	  convinced	  by	  the	  Shah’s	  assessment,	  concluding,	  “it	  [was]	  somewhat	  difFicult	  at	  [that]	  point	  to	  judge	  whether	  or	  not	  [the	  Shah	  was]	  worrie[d]	  about	  such	  an	  eventuality,	  really	  believe[d]	  it,	  or	  [was]	  bolstering	  his	  case	  for	  increased	  armaments.	  It	  [was]	  probably	  a	  bit	  of	  all	  three.”794	  Lowrie	  shared	  Helms’	  skepticism	  but	  conFirmed	  Italy	  and	  France	  had	  received	  similar	  reports.	  There	  is	  something	  of	  [a]	  self-­‐fulFilling	  prophecy	  to	  [the]	  Shah’s	  analysis	  that	  Iraq	  could	  become	  [a]	  Soviet	  satellite.	  If	  Iran	  resists	  Iraqi	  overtures	  for	  détente,	  continues	  to	  give	  military	  assistance	  to	  [the]	  Kurds,	  maintains	  [an]	  uncompromising	  position	  on	  [the]	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab,	  and	  intensiFies	  [its]	  anti-­‐Iraqi	  propaganda,	  [the]	  Baath	  regime	  will	  continue	  to	  strike	  out	  against	  Iran	  through	  subversion	  and	  propaganda	  and	  continue	  to	  rely	  on	  [the]	  USSR	  for	  arms	  and	  protection.Lowrie	  recommended	  the	  Shah	  meet	  Iraq	  “halfway	  or—as	  [the]	  stronger	  power—slightly	  more	  than	  halfway	  in	  order	  to	  test	  Iraqi	  seriousness	  about	  détente.”	  On	  the	  Kurds,	  he	  said	  Iraq	  needed	  to	  allow	  a	  degree	  of	  self-­‐autonomy	  but,	  because	  of	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  backing,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  been	  obstinate.	  Given	  this,	  Lowrie	  believed,	  “Kurdish	  resistance	  to	  compromise	  with	  [the]	  Baath	  would	  end	  if	  Iran	  stopped	  its	  assistance.”795	  Quite	  clearly,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  Tehran	  viewed	  matters	  in	  a	  different	  light.	  	   On	  July	  5,	  Helms	  met	  with	  the	  Shah	  and	  King	  Hussein	  at	  the	  Caspian	  Sea.	  According	  to	  Helms,	  King	  Hussein	  warned	  of	  an	  impending	  Arab	  military	  operation	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against	  Israel	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  retaking	  the	  Golan	  Heights,	  which	  “could	  occur	  at	  any	  time	  from	  now	  on.”	  Hussein	  said	  he	  had	  a	  “copy	  of	  [the]	  actual	  military	  plan	  which	  ha[d]	  been	  coordinated	  with	  [the]	  Egyptians.”	  This	  was	  a	  signiFicant	  revelation,	  particularly	  since	  Helms	  reported	  it	  to	  Kissinger	  directly,	  and	  proves	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  knew	  of	  the	  impending	  war	  at	  least	  three	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  October	  War.	  Worse	  yet,	  it	  shows	  Kissinger	  had	  ignored	  the	  warning.	  Months	  later	  after	  the	  war,	  Helms	  jotted	  a	  hand-­‐written	  note	  on	  the	  document	  claiming,	  “I’ll	  bet	  [Kissinger]	  and	  others	  wish	  they	  had	  paid	  attention	  to	  this.”	  This	  makes	  clear	  that	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  were	  aware	  of	  Egypt’s	  intent	  to	  attack	  Israel	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  October	  War,	  yet	  chose	  to	  do	  nothing.796On	  a	  historiographical	  note,	  Ashton’s	  biography	  of	  King	  Hussein	  and	  O’Connell’s	  memoirs	  both	  conFirm	  this	  account.797	  	   Meanwhile,	  on	  June	  30	  the	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  regime’s	  pragmatist	  and	  extremist	  elements	  broke	  into	  the	  open	  when	  Nazim	  Kazzar,	  the	  head	  of	  Iraq’s	  security	  forces,	  tried	  to	  seize	  control	  in	  Baghdad.	  While	  the	  regime	  emerged	  unscathed,	  according	  to	  Tripp,	  the	  incident	  allowed	  Saddam	  to	  dispose	  of	  potential	  opponents,	  with	  over	  thirty	  senior	  ofFicials	  executed,	  including	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Military	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Ba’th,	  and	  many	  more	  arrested.798	  Another	  step	  involved	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  National	  Front	  government	  with	  the	  communists	  on	  July	  6.	  The	  Kurds	  were	  excluded.799	  Recognizing	  Western	  fears	  about	  the	  inclusion	  of	  communists	  in	  the	  government,	  Saddam	  met	  with	  Western	  journalists	  in	  early	  July	  to	  tell	  them,	  “Iraq	  would	  welcome	  moves	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  [a]	  normalization	  of	  relations.”800	  This	  unexpected	  move	  led	  Lowrie	  to	  recommend	  that	  Nixon	  send	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  a	  “presidential	  message”	  on	  occasion	  of	  Iraq’s	  revolution’s	  anniversary,801	  but	  the	  State	  Department	  was	  cautious.	  On	  July	  9,	  it	  advised	  Lowrie	  it	  was	  “too	  early	  to	  determine	  exactly	  what	  changes	  and	  political	  orientation,	  if	  any,	  Iraqi	  regime	  [would]	  adopt”	  following	  the	  attempted	  coup.	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Further,	  “it	  would	  be	  inopportune	  for	  USG	  to	  take	  any	  immediate	  initiatives	  which	  could	  be	  misinterpreted	  by	  one	  or	  another	  faction	  of	  the	  [Ba’th	  Party].”	  However,	  the	  department	  recognized	  the	  progress	  Iraq	  had	  made	  on	  economic,	  commercial	  and	  cultural	  levels,	  and	  advised	  Lowrie	  to	  “remain	  as	  aloof	  as	  possible	  from	  Iraq’s	  internal	  political	  affairs.”Our	  basic	  position	  is	  that	  we	  would	  welcome	  an	  improvement	  in	  our	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  and	  would	  certainly	  welcome	  the	  resumption	  of	  diplomatic	  relations….	  We	  are	  considering	  what	  further	  signals	  we	  might	  give	  responsive	  to	  [the]	  Saddam	  Hussein	  interview….802Saddam’s	  consolidation	  of	  power	  following	  the	  Kazzer	  coup	  and	  his	  sudden	  willingness	  to	  improve	  ties	  with	  the	  U.S.	  signaled	  that	  the	  pragmatists	  had	  emerged	  victorious	  in	  the	  regime’s	  power	  struggle.	   Unsurprisingly,	  Saddam’s	  interview	  alarmed	  Barzani,	  who	  feared	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  U.S.	  support.	  On	  July	  27,	  ShawFiq	  Qazzaz	  arrived	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  spoke	  with	  Edward	  Djerejian,	  the	  Country	  OfFicer	  for	  Iraq.	  When	  Qazzaz	  inquired	  about	  the	  state	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  Djerejian	  replied	  relations	  had	  improved,	  pointing	  to	  the	  IPC	  settlement	  and	  Saddam’s	  apparent	  interest	  in	  improving	  relations.	  Worried,	  Qazzaz	  said	  Barzani	  was	  “watching	  very	  closely	  the	  status	  of	  U.S./Iraqi	  relations	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  he	  can	  expect	  or	  not	  expect	  from	  the	  U.S.	  in	  terms	  of	  support.”803	  In	  response	  to	  Qazzaz’s	  approach,	  Kissinger	  sent	  Helms	  a	  cable	  asking	  whether	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  should	  be	  increased	  further.	  In	  his	  response	  on	  August	  17,	  Helms	  recommended	  increasing	  the	  cash	  subsidy	  by	  50%	  and	  for	  the	  CIA	  to	  begin	  “stockpiling	  arms	  for	  contingency	  supply”	  in	  the	  event	  of	  renewed	  hostilities.	  Kissinger	  agreed.804	  Similarly,	  the	  Shah	  also	  increased	  his	  subsidy	  by	  “a	  little	  more”	  than	  Fifty	  per	  cent.805	  Meanwhile,	  on	  September	  22,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  followed	  up	  its	  interest	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  by	  awarding	  a	  U.S.	  Firm,	  Brown	  and	  Root	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(a	  subsidiary	  of	  Halliburton),	  a	  $122	  million	  contract	  to	  build	  an	  offshore,	  deep	  sea,	  oil	  terminal.	  This	  was	  the	  single	  largest	  business	  deal	  Iraq	  had	  ever	  signed.806 	  This	  shows	  that	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  sought	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  responded	  by	  increasing	  its	  support	  to	  the	  Kurds.	   In	  late	  August	  Nixon	  told	  Kissinger	  he	  was	  planning	  on	  nominating	  him	  to	  replace	  William	  Rogers	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  while	  keeping	  him	  on	  as	  national	  security	  advisor.	  Among	  the	  State	  Department’s	  top	  brass	  views	  were	  mixed,	  with	  some	  ofFicials	  uncertain	  if	  Kissinger	  could	  manage	  the	  department’s	  massive	  bureaucracy,	  while	  others	  welcomed	  the	  prospect	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  center	  of	  policymaking	  after	  years	  of	  being	  sidelined.807	  Ultimately,	  Kissinger’s	  appointment	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  provided	  him	  with	  unparalleled	  inFluence	  over	  the	  machinery	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  would	  prove	  important	  as	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  Watergate	  scandal	  began	  to	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  Nixon.	  
III
	   While	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  October	  War	  has	  been	  examined	  elsewhere,808	  the	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  response	  to	  the	  war,	  Israel’s	  attempt	  to	  convince	  the	  Kurds	  to	  attack	  Baghdad,	  and	  Kissinger’s	  personal	  effort	  to	  prevent	  the	  latter	  from	  happening,	  have	  not.	  Remarkably,	  the	  October	  1973	  War	  actually	  led	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  Egyptians,	  Syrians,	  and	  Soviets	  had	  not	  consulted	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  prior	  to	  the	  war.	  In	  retaliation,	  Iraq	  renewed	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Iran,	  West	  Germany,	  and	  Britain;	  awarded	  a	  U.S.	  Firm	  with	  a	  major	  contract;	  and	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Saudi-­‐led	  oil	  boycott.	  This	  again	  reFlected	  Iraq’s	  pragmatism.	  	   Two	  weeks	  before	  the	  war,	  Lowrie	  conFirmed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  sending	  Iraq	  two	  hundred	  helicopters	  and	  fourteen	  TU-­‐22	  “Blinder”	  supersonic	  bombers.809 	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The	  planes	  arrived	  the	  next	  day.810 	  About	  a	  week	  later,	  the	  Shah	  raised	  the	  bombers	  with	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  and	  demanded	  “a	  Firm	  commitment”	  from	  the	  U.S.	  about	  the	  purchase	  of	  F-­‐14/15s	  to	  balance	  Iraq’s	  new	  weaponry.811	  Days	  before	  the	  war,	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  William	  Clements	  leaked	  details	  of	  Iraq’s	  receipt	  of	  the	  bombers,812 	  prompting	  Helms	  to	  press	  Kissinger	  into	  reasserting	  the	  State	  Department’s	  “traditional	  right	  to	  clear	  beforehand	  [all]	  Pentagon	  speeches	  having	  foreign	  affairs	  content.”813	  Kissinger	  agreed	  and	  drafted	  a	  new	  presidential	  directive	  requiring	  all	  cabinet	  ofFicers	  clear	  statements	  on	  foreign	  policy	  matters	  with	  the	  White	  House.814	  	   Unknown	  to	  Iraq	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  TU-­‐22s	  was	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  on	  October	  6.	  When	  the	  war	  began,	  Baghdad	  was	  caught	  off	  guard	  because	  Cairo,	  Damascus,	  and	  Moscow	  had	  not	  consulted	  with	  it	  beforehand.815	  Even	  though	  the	  regime	  capitalized	  on	  the	  war	  to	  achieve	  a	  number	  of	  its	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  objectives,	  Iraq’s	  retaliatory	  measures	  against	  the	  U.S.	  for	  supporting	  Israel	  were	  restrained.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  regime	  announced	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  U.S.	  shares	  of	  the	  Basra	  Petroleum	  Company	  (BPC)	  it	  also	  offered	  the	  company’s	  owners	  reasonable	  compensation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  INOC	  astonished	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  by	  awarding	  a	  $15	  million	  contract	  to	  U.S.	  Steel	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  four	  oil-­‐drilling	  rigs.816	  Iraq	  also	  requested	  to	  re-­‐establish	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Iran	  on	  October	  7,817	  which	  was	  aimed	  at	  neutralizing	  its	  eastern	  borders	  so	  it	  could	  turn	  its	  attention	  on	  Israel.	  Even	  though	  Iran	  accepted,	  Iraq	  was	  still	  only	  able	  to	  dispatch	  a	  single	  armored	  brigade	  to	  Syria.818	  Finally,	  the	  Iraqis	  also	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refused	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Saudi-­‐led	  oil	  embargo,	  arguing	  that	  production	  cuts	  would	  only	  hurt	  Europe	  more	  than	  the	  United	  States.819	  Taken	  together,	  the	  BPC’s	  nationalization,	  the	  awarding	  of	  a	  contract	  to	  U.S.	  Steel,	  the	  resumption	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Iran,	  its	  dispatch	  of	  only	  a	  token	  force	  to	  Syria,	  and	  its	  refusal	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  oil	  embargo,	  all	  suggests	  the	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  response	  to	  the	  war	  was	  pragmatic	  and	  aimed	  at	  advancing	  its	  own	  interests,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  views	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	   On	  the	  ninth	  day	  of	  the	  war,	  Barzani	  sent	  Kissinger	  an	  urgent	  message	  asking	  for	  advice	  about	  an	  Israeli	  proposal	  to	  launch	  an	  offensive	  against	  Baghdad.	  The	  message	  read:	  The	  [Israelis]	  suggest	  we	  try	  to	  gain	  territories	  in	  Kurdistan	  while	  it	  is	  busy	  with	  the	  war.	  They	  promised	  that	  they	  will	  study	  helping	  us	  with	  arms	  with	  Iran.	  No	  troops	  have	  been	  withdrawn	  from	  our	  area	  and	  we	  have	  no	  such	  offensive	  weapons.	  We	  [would]	  like	  to	  know	  your	  opinion	  on	  this.820Kissinger	  stated	  in	  his	  memoir	  that	  the	  proposal	  originated	  from	  an	  Israeli	  liaison	  ofFicer	  “eager	  to	  burnish	  [his]	  credentials	  at	  home.”	  But	  from	  the	  outset,	  there	  were	  Flaws	  in	  the	  plan:	  The	  Kurds	  possessed	  very	  few	  heavy	  weapons;	  such	  artillery	  as	  they	  had	  was	  manned	  by	  Iranians	  who	  never	  ventured	  far	  from	  the	  Iranian	  border.	  The	  Kurds	  were	  capable	  of	  defending	  their	  mountainous	  homeland	  where	  Iraqi	  tanks	  and	  aircraft	  found	  it	  difFicult	  to	  operate.	  But	  their	  lightly	  armed	  forces	  did	  not	  stand	  a	  chance	  in	  the	  Flat	  terrain	  beyond	  their	  homeland	  against	  a	  large	  Iraqi	  army	  equipped	  with	  advanced	  Soviet	  heavy	  weapons	  and	  hundreds	  of	  tanks.	  An	  offensive	  beyond	  the	  redoubt	  would	  have	  guaranteed	  the	  complete	  destruction	  of	  Kurdish	  military	  forces.Consequently,	  Kissinger	  asked	  Helms	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  Shah,	  who	  agreed	  the	  proposal	  was	  suicidal,	  since	  the	  Kurds	  were	  not	  equipped	  for	  offensive	  operations.821 	  Kissinger	  agreed	  and	  had	  Helms	  inform	  Barzani	  it	  was	  not	  “advisable	  for	  you	  to	  undertake	  the	  offensive	  military	  action	  that	  the	  Israelis	  have	  suggested	  to	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Petropolitics in 1973–1974,” Diplomatic History, 36/1 (2012), p.194. 
820 [excised] to Director, October 15, 1973 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), p.1. 
821 Kissinger (1999), pp.586-87. 
you.”	  Barzani	  received	  the	  message	  on	  October	  19.822 	  Frankly,	  Kissinger	  saw	  no	  advantage	  of	  sending	  the	  Kurds	  to	  their	  death,	  since	  he	  knew	  Iraq	  was	  already	  irrelevant	  in	  the	  overall	  scope	  of	  the	  war.	  	   The	  1973	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  Kissinger’s	  career.	  In	  his	  dual	  roles	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  national	  security	  advisor,	  he	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  powerful	  man	  in	  Washington,	  surpassing	  even	  that	  of	  Nixon,	  who	  was	  consumed	  by	  the	  near-­‐daily	  revelations	  about	  the	  Watergate	  scandal,	  his	  eroding	  domestic	  standing,	  and	  calls	  for	  his	  impeachment.	  While	  Nixon	  would	  cling	  to	  ofFice	  for	  nearly	  a	  year,	  the	  pressure	  from	  Watergate	  would	  incapacitate	  him.	  From	  the	  1973	  war	  onward	  Kissinger	  assumed	  control	  of	  the	  conduct	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  Iraq.823
Conclusion
	   In	  the	  year	  between	  Nixon’s	  approval	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  and	  the	  1973	  war,	  the	  U.S.	  saw	  a	  remarkable	  thaw	  in	  its	  relations	  with	  Iraq.	  The	  change	  was	  due	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	  as	  the	  dominant	  force	  within	  the	  regime.	  With	  the	  support	  of	  President	  al-­‐Bakr,	  Saddam	  sought	  to	  improve	  Iraq’s	  international	  standing	  by	  settling	  the	  IPC	  dispute,	  stabilizing	  domestic	  politics	  by	  forming	  a	  National	  Front	  government,	  and	  awarding	  U.S.	  Firms	  with	  important	  contracts.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  prevented	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  from	  seizing	  this	  opportunity.	  In	  Baghdad,	  Lowrie	  urged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  bolster	  the	  practical,	  moderate,	  technocratic	  “other”	  Iraq,	  but	  the	  White	  House	  responded	  by	  calming	  Barzani’s	  fears	  through	  increasing	  its	  aid.	  Indeed,	  Iraq’s	  response	  to	  the	  October	  1973	  war	  further	  underscored	  its	  moderating	  trend	  with	  the	  regime	  resuming	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  West	  Germany;	  awarding	  further	  contracts	  to	  U.S.	  Firms	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  war—a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  more	  moderate	  Arif	  regime’s	  severing	  of	  relations	  in	  1967;	  and	  refusing	  to	  
 232
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Kissinger (1999), p.587. 
823 See Dallek (2007), pp.520-33. 
participate	  in	  the	  Saudi-­‐led	  oil	  embargo.	  Iraq	  also	  seemed	  to	  pull	  itself	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  French.	  Even	  so,	  the	  White	  House,	  with	  Nixon	  consumed	  by	  the	  Watergate	  scandal,	  missed	  these	  signals,	  perhaps	  purposely.	  Following	  the	  war,	  Kissinger	  ordered	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  improved	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  This	  would	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  in	  the	  coming	  year,	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  renewed	  its	  war	  against	  the	  Kurds,	  dragging	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iraq’s	  Soviet	  patron	  deeper	  into	  the	  Kurdish	  conFlict.
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Chapter	  7:	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  WarOctober	  1973—March	  1975
	   This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  between	  the	  October	  War	  in	  1973	  and	  the	  Algiers	  Accord	  in	  March	  1975.	  It	  will	  show	  that	  during	  this	  period,	  President	  Nixon’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  national	  security	  advisor,	  Henry	  Kissinger	  and	  his	  deputy,	  Brent	  Scowcroft,	  took	  on	  a	  signiFicant	  role	  in	  directing	  the	  CIA’s	  Kurdish	  operation.824	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  Kissinger	  showed	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  ignored	  the	  CIA’s	  numerous	  warnings	  about	  the	  operation,	  and	  ordered	  further	  U.S.	  assistance,	  including	  Finding	  ways	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  Kurds	  Soviet-­‐made	  arms	  captured	  by	  the	  Israelis	  during	  the	  October	  War.	  As	  with	  Nixon,	  Kissinger	  rarely	  consulted	  with	  the	  President	  Ford,	  keeping	  him	  apprised	  on	  a	  ‘need-­‐to-­‐know’	  basis.825	  He	  also	  kept	  details	  of	  the	  operation	  hidden	  from	  the	  State	  Department,	  which	  was	  hoping	  to	  build	  upon	  Iraq’s	  positive	  gestures	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  during	  1973.826	  This	  meant	  that	  a	  small	  group	  of	  U.S.	  ofFicials—Kissinger,	  Helms,	  the	  CIA	  station	  chief	  in	  Tehran	  (Arthur	  Callahan),	  and	  his	  deputy	  station	  chief—ran	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  When	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  resumed	  in	  March	  1974	  there	  were	  three	  separate	  dynamics—the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict,	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  rivalry,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War—that	  coalesced	  to	  ensure	  it	  would	  have	  a	  violent	  conclusion.	  Of	  these,	  the	  Ford	  administration’s	  policy	  continued	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  Cold	  War	  thinking.	  After	  all,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  backing	  the	  Kurds	  in	  a	  war	  against	  the	  Soviet-­‐supported	  Iraqi	  regime.	  As	  with	  1963,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  once	  again	  took	  on	  Cold	  War	  dimensions,	  only	  this	  time	  the	  superpowers	  had	  switch	  sides.
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   Like	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  highly	  controversial	  and	  tragic	  end	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  March	  1975	  has	  been	  the	  product	  of	  much	  discussion.	  This	  was	  because	  when	  the	  Shah	  terminated	  his	  support	  to	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israeli	  operations	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  also	  came	  to	  an	  abrupt	  halt. The	  dominant	  argument	  is	  the	  U.S.	  abandoned	  the	  Kurds	  without	  warning,	  ignored	  Barzani’s	  heartfelt	  pleas	  to	  assistance,	  and	  failed	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  assistance	  in	  the	  aftermath.	  The	  leading	  proponent	  of	  this	  view	  is	  Representative	  Otis	  Pike,	  who	  led	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Intelligence,	  which	  was	  charge	  with	  investigating	  the	  Financial	  side	  of	  covert	  action.	  Pike,	  it	  seems,	  was	  determined	  to	  show	  that	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  illegal	  because	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  had	  bypassed	  the	  40	  Committee.827	  While	  the	  report	  provides	  valuable	  information	  on	  aspects	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  newly	  available	  documents	  reveal	  the	  report	  was	  quite	  subjective.	  According	  to	  Gerald	  Haines,	  Pike	  had	  once	  admitted	  privately	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  use	  the	  report	  to	  expose	  the	  CIA	  as	  an	  out	  of	  control	  “rouge	  elephant.”828	  Kissinger	  modestly	  believed	  that	  Pike	  wanted	  “to	  show	  that	  [he	  was	  an]	  evil	  genius.”829	  To	  a	  degree	  he	  was	  right.	  In	  January	  1976,	  when	  Congress	  voted	  to	  keep	  the	  Pike	  Report	  secret,	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  leaked	  the	  report	  to	  the	  press.	  830	  On	  February	  4,	  William	  SaFire	  published	  an	  article	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  that	  accused	  the	  Ford	  administration	  of	  selling	  out	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  accusations	  in	  the	  article,	  “Mr.	  Ford’s	  Secret	  Sellout,”	  clearly	  reFlect	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  Pike	  
Report.831	  Even	  though	  the	  State	  Department	  dismissed	  SaFire’s	  article	  as	  “a	  collection	  of	  distortions	  and	  untruths	  unsupported	  by	  any	  documents	  or	  the	  record,”832	  a	  full	  copy	  of	  the	  Pike	  Report	  was	  published	  in	  the	  Village	  Voice	  on	  February	  16.833	  
 235
827 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, October 31, 1975 (DNSA/KT01821), p.2.
828 Gerald Haines, “Looking for a Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” 
Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-99), pp.1-2.
829 Memorandum of Conversation, October 31, 1975, Op.Cit., p.2.
830 The Village Voice, “The Report on the CIA That President Ford Doesn’t Want You to Read,” 16 February 
1976.
831 Pike Report, pp.195-98, 211-17; and Safire (1976), p.26. 
832 New York Times, “Column by Safire on Kurds Assailed,” February 6, 1976, p.8.
833 The Village Voice, “The Report on the CIA That President Ford Doesn’t Want You to Read,” 16 February 
1976.
	   Unsurprisingly,	  much	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  end	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  uses	  the	  Pike	  Report	  and	  repeat	  Pike	  and	  SaFire’s	  arguments.834 	  The	  one	  exception	  is	  Douglas	  Little’s	  detailed	  account	  of	  U.S.-­‐Kurdish	  relations,	  which	  is	  based	  largely	  on	  archival	  materials.	  He	  explains	  that	  by	  January	  1975	  the	  CIA’s	  arms	  pipeline	  was	  “running	  dry,”	  suggesting	  the	  U.S.	  only	  had	  a	  limited	  capacity	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  further.	  While	  he	  places	  the	  onus	  of	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  Shah,	  he	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Ford	  administration,	  accusing	  it	  of	  responding	  with	  “not	  only	  with	  a	  blind	  eye	  but	  also	  with	  deaf	  ears.”835	  	   This	  chapter	  chronicles	  the	  formulation	  and	  execution	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  during	  the	  1974-­‐75	  Kurdish	  War	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  Ford	  administration’s	  actions	  were	  reFlective	  of	  a	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  its	  overt	  and	  covert	  capabilities.	  When	  the	  Shah	  decided	  to	  cut	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  it	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  With	  neither	  Iran	  nor	  Turkey	  willing	  to	  let	  the	  U.S.	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  from	  their	  territory,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Israelis	  were	  left	  with	  no	  other	  option	  but	  to	  end	  their	  operations.
I
	   In	  the	  Five	  months	  between	  the	  October	  War	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  tried	  to	  realign	  its	  policy	  toward	  the	  West,	  improving	  its	  relations	  with	  France	  in	  particular.	  Correspondingly,	  Iraq’s	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  underwent	  a	  chill	  due	  to	  Moscow’s	  failure	  to	  consult	  with	  Baghdad	  prior	  to	  the	  October	  War	  as	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  had	  required.836	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  commercial	  relations	  also	  improved	  when	  the	  regime	  rewarded	  U.S.	  Firms	  with	  important	  contracts.	  But	  just	  after	  Kissinger	  secured	  the	  Egyptian-­‐Israeli	  disengagement	  agreement	  in	  January	  1974,	  he	  asked	  the	  Shah	  to	  escalate	  tensions	  with	  along	  the	  Iraqi	  border	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  Iraqi	  forces	  away	  from	  Syria.	  This	  tactic	  was	  aimed	  at	  securing	  an	  Israeli	  withdrawal	  from	  Syria,	  which	  Kissinger	  achieved	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later	  in	  May.	  The	  Shah	  agreed	  to	  Kissinger’s	  request,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  sharp	  escalation	  of	  relations	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  	   Following	  the	  October	  War,	  Iraq’s	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  underwent	  a	  major	  decline.	  On	  November	  27,	  Moscow	  sent	  a	  high	  level	  delegation	  to	  Baghdad	  to	  soften	  the	  impact	  of	  “policy	  differences”	  resulting	  from	  the	  war.837	  But	  Iraq	  rejected	  Soviet	  efforts	  to	  ease	  tensions	  and	  retaliated	  by	  restoring	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Britain	  in	  December.	  This	  move	  shocked	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad.838 	  Iraq	  also	  expanded	  its	  relations	  with	  France,	  by	  signing	  lucrative	  oil	  and	  arms	  deals	  and	  receiving	  high-­‐level	  delegations,	  which	  culminated	  in	  a	  state	  visit	  by	  France’s	  Prime	  Minister	  Jacque	  Chirac	  in	  late-­‐1974.839	  Iraq	  also	  improved	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  rewarding	  U.S.	  Firms	  with	  lucrative	  contracts,	  including	  the	  Deep	  Sea	  Terminal	  project	  with	  Root	  and	  Brown	  and	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  Fleet	  of	  Boeing	  passenger	  jets.	  This	  led	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  advise	  Washington	  that	  Iraq	  wanted	  to	  “keep	  lines	  to	  [the]	  U.S.	  open.”840	  Clearly	  Iraq’s	  sudden	  tack	  away	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  toward	  the	  West	  was	  a	  positive	  development	  in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  how	  the	  White	  House	  conducted	  its	  foreign	  policy.	  	   Coinciding	  with	  Iraq’s	  opening	  to	  the	  West,	  Kissinger	  engaged	  in	  shuttle	  diplomacy	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  Israel’s	  withdrawal	  from	  Egypt	  and	  Syria.841	  On	  the	  Egyptian	  front,	  Kissinger	  managed	  to	  achieve	  some	  success,	  securing	  a	  disengagement	  agreement	  in	  January	  1974.	  But	  the	  Syrian	  front	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  challenging.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  in	  Syria.	  Initially,	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  withdrawn	  its	  forces	  from	  Syria,	  but	  had	  been	  persuaded	  to	  return	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them	  by	  Algeria	  and	  Libya	  in	  November	  1973.842	  This	  led	  Sadat	  and	  Kissinger	  to	  hatch	  a	  scheme	  whereby	  Iran	  would	  stir	  up	  trouble	  along	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  border	  in	  order	  to	  force	  Iraq	  to	  withdraw	  its	  forces.	  Though	  not	  discussed	  in	  secondary	  materials,	  primary	  evidence	  supports	  this	  claim.	  According	  to	  Henry	  Precht,	  a	  U.S.	  diplomat	  in	  Iran	  at	  the	  time,	  “Kissinger	  wanted	  to	  divert	  Iraq's	  attention	  away	  from	  Arab-­‐Israel	  issues	  as	  he	  went	  through	  negotiations	  with	  Egypt	  and	  Syria”	  and	  thought	  the	  easiest	  way	  to	  convince	  Iraq	  to	  withdraw	  was	  to	  stir	  up	  trouble	  in	  Kurdistan.843	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  Kissinger	  told	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	  Golda	  Meir,	  “the	  Egyptians	  [had]	  asked	  [him]	  to	  ask	  the	  Shah	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  Iraq	  so	  Iraqi	  troops	  all	  leave	  Syria….	  That	  [was]	  why	  there	  was	  trouble	  in	  February	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Iran.”844	   Fighting	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  broke	  out	  on	  December	  24	  after	  an	  “Iranian	  incursion”	  into	  Iraq.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  skirmishes	  on	  February	  4,	  1974	  and	  a	  large	  battle	  involving	  artillery	  exchanges	  and	  armoured	  vehicles	  on	  February	  10.845	  Eventually,	  Iraq	  took	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Security	  Council,	  demanding	  it	  condemn	  Iran’s	  aggression.846	  Throughout	  February,	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  engaged	  in	  a	  rhetorical	  “slinging	  match”	  at	  the	  Security	  Council,847	  with	  the	  Iraqis	  demanding	  the	  Security	  Council	  pass	  a	  resolution	  or	  consensus	  statement	  condemning	  Iran’s	  actions.	  This	  put	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  difFicult	  position.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	  Kissinger	  who	  asked	  the	  Shah	  to	  start	  all	  this.	  With	  Iran	  about	  to	  be	  condemned,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  worried	  the	  Iranians	  might	  ask	  it	  to	  use	  its	  veto	  to	  block	  a	  resolution.848	  Obviously	  this	  was	  unacceptable,	  so	  Kissinger	  pressured	  the	  Shah	  to	  accept	  a	  watered	  down	  consensus	  statement,	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passed	  on	  February	  28.849	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  Security	  Council	  called	  for	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  appoint	  a	  special	  representative	  to	  investigate	  the	  event	  and	  report	  back.850	  Irrespective,	  the	  Iranians	  ignored	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  continued	  to	  escalate	  tensions	  with	  Iraq	  into	  March.851	   This	  crisis	  clearly	  suggests	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  escalation	  of	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  tensions	  during	  the	  spring	  of	  1974.	  Kissinger	  conspired	  with	  Sadat	  and	  the	  Shah	  to	  force	  Iraq	  to	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  from	  Syria	  by	  creating	  a	  diversion	  on	  the	  Iranian	  border.	  The	  effort	  was	  a	  success	  and	  contributed	  to	  Kissinger	  securing	  Israel’s	  withdrawal	  from	  Syria	  in	  May	  1974.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  escalation	  of	  tensions	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  March	  1974.	  
II	   In	  spite	  of	  Iraq’s	  steps	  toward	  pragmatism	  following	  the	  October	  War,	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  Iran	  and	  the	  Kurds	  overshadowed	  any	  desire	  to	  capitalize	  on	  these	  opportunities.	  While	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Baghdad	  wanted	  to	  reinforce	  and	  encourage	  this	  trend,	  the	  White	  House	  ignored	  their	  advice	  and	  increased	  its	  Financial	  and	  military	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Consequently,	  key	  opportunities	  to	  improve	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  were	  missed	  because	  top	  U.S.	  policymakers,	  like	  Kissinger,	  saw	  greater	  importance	  in	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  Shah—who	  helped	  advance	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  terms	  of	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East—than	  in	  cultivating	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq.	  This	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  more	  balanced	  approaches	  of	  all	  previous	  U.S.	  administrations	  examined.	  This	  situation	  was	  exacerbated	  in	  March	  1974	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  passed	  an	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autonomy	  law	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  what	  had	  it	  had	  promised	  the	  Kurds	  in	  1970.852	  Before	  long,	  the	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Iraqi	  army	  launched	  an	  offensive	  against	  the	  U.S.-­‐backed	  Kurds,	  drawing	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  deeper	  into	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   When	  Iraq	  announced	  its	  autonomy	  law	  on	  March	  11	  it	  gave	  Barzani	  Fifteen	  days	  to	  accept.853 	  Clashes	  soon	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  north	  and	  rumours	  began	  circulating	  in	  Baghdad	  that	  the	  Peshmerga	  had	  been	  called	  to	  arms.854	  Correspondingly,	  Iran	  escalated	  tensions	  along	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  border,	  signaling	  in	  clear	  terms	  that	  it	  supported	  the	  Kurds.855	  In	  the	  two	  week	  period	  before	  the	  deadline,	  Barzani	  sought	  reassurance	  from	  his	  allies	  of	  their	  support.	  On	  March	  18,	  he	  asked	  the	  Shah	  for	  increased	  economic,	  Financial	  and	  military	  support	  and	  to	  intercede	  with	  the	  Turkish	  government	  about	  reopening	  its	  border,	  which	  was	  sealed	  after	  Iraq’s	  announcement.	  Barzani	  also	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  unilaterally	  declaring	  autonomy	  from	  Baghdad;	  presented	  the	  Shah	  with	  a	  $180	  million	  budget	  proposal,	  which	  covered	  administration,	  defense,	  education,	  and	  public	  health;	  and	  asked	  for	  Iranian	  recognition	  and	  diplomatic	  support	  at	  the	  UN.	  The	  Shah	  told	  Barzani	  he	  would	  raise	  his	  Financial	  subsidy	  and	  look	  into	  providing	  him	  with	  better	  weaponry,	  but	  in	  the	  interim	  would	  need	  to	  consult	  his	  advisors	  on	  the	  autonomy	  question.	  The	  next	  day	  Barzani	  met	  with	  the	  CIA	  station	  chief,	  Arthur	  Callahan,	  at	  a	  SAVAK	  guesthouse	  in	  Tehran.	  After	  the	  meeting,	  Helms	  cabled	  Kissinger’s	  new	  deputy,	  Brent	  Scowcroft,	  and	  suggested	  Iran	  was	  better	  positioned	  to	  intercede	  with	  the	  Turks	  and	  that	  level	  of	  U.S.	  diplomatic	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  at	  international	  forums,	  like	  the	  UN,	  would	  “depend	  on	  whether	  the	  Iraqis	  actually	  engage[d]	  in	  [a]	  genocidal	  war	  against	  the	  Kurds.”856	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   Because	  the	  law	  withheld	  longstanding	  principal	  demands,	  like	  a	  proportional	  share	  of	  oil	  revenue,	  and	  gave	  the	  regime	  a	  veto	  over	  any	  Kurdish	  legislation,	  Barzani	  and	  the	  Kurds	  could	  never	  have	  accepted	  it.	  This	  point	  was	  overlooked	  in	  the	  Pike	  Report,	  which	  claims	  that	  the	  U.S.	  prodded	  Barzani	  into	  reject	  the	  regime’s	  autonomy	  plan,	  when	  the	  Kurds	  could	  have	  gained	  “at	  least	  a	  measure	  of	  autonomy	  [and	  avoid]	  further	  bloodshed.”857	  This	  claim,	  however,	  is	  misleading.	  When	  Barzani’s	  request	  to	  declare	  autonomy	  reached	  Washington	  it	  “triggered	  a	  Flood	  of	  communication”.858	  Discussions	  focused	  on	  two	  elements:	  1)	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  would	  support	  a	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  autonomy;	  and	  2)	  the	  level	  of	  support	  the	  U.S.	  was	  willing	  to	  give.	  Certainly	  Barzani’s	  request	  for	  $180	  million	  was	  far	  beyond	  what	  the	  U.S.	  could	  provide	  while	  maintaining	  plausible	  deniability.	  On	  March	  21,	  the	  new	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  William	  Colby,	  wrote	  to	  Kissinger,	  cautioning	  against	  any	  increase	  in	  U.S.	  aid.859	  Kissinger	  rejected	  his	  caution,	  commenting	  later,	  “Colby’s	  reluctance	  was	  as	  unrealistic	  as	  Barzani’s	  enthusiasm.”	  Instead,	  he	  pushed	  the	  NSC	  staff	  to	  submit	  a	  proposal,	  leading	  to	  intensive	  discussions	  between	  the	  NSC	  staff,	  CIA,	  and	  Helms	  in	  Tehran.860	  On	  March	  22,	  the	  CIA	  sent	  the	  White	  House	  a	  memo	  arguing	  against	  increasing	  funds,	  citing	  the	  operation’s	  objective	  was	  to	  stalemate	  the	  conFlict,	  not	  support	  an	  autonomous	  Kurdish	  government.861	  The	  NSC	  staff	  was	  worried	  that	  Barzani’s	  proposal	  went	  “well	  beyond”	  the	  CIA’s	  covert	  capabilities	  and,	  if	  the	  U.S.	  agreed,	  the	  operation	  risked	  being	  exposed,	  which	  would	  create	  problems	  with	  the	  USSR,	  Turkey,	  and	  certain	  Arab	  states.	  “All	  of	  this	  was	  …	  pointed	  out	  to	  Mulla	  Mustafa	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  [our]	  relationship.”	  Additionally,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  questioned	  the	  beneFit	  of	  establishing	  a	  “kind	  of	  rump	  government”	  in	  Kurdistan,	  inquiring,	  “would	  it	  …	  even	  be	  to	  Mullah	  Mustafa’s	  advantage	  …	  to	  formalize	  and	  symbolize	  his	  autonomy”?	  Indeed,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  believed	  a	  declaration	  of	  autonomy	  “would	  give	  Iraq	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  launch	  a	  major	  attack	  against	  Kurdistan	  if	  it	  [was]	  to	  protect	  its	  national	  integrity.”	  Finally,	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the	  NSC	  staff	  wondered	  if	  Barzani	  could	  even	  form	  a	  government,	  and	  if	  he	  did,	  “would	  the	  Shah	  look	  with	  favor	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  formalized	  autonomous	  government?”	  Instead,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  preferred	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  stalemate	  situation	  that	  weakened	  the	  Iraqi	  regime.	  It	  concluded:Up	  to	  now	  neither	  the	  Shah	  nor	  [the	  U.S.]	  ha[d]	  wished	  to	  see	  the	  matter	  resolved	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other….	  For	  Mullah	  Mustafa	  to	  attempt	  to	  form	  a	  government	  in	  [his]	  safe-­‐haven	  would	  be	  to	  narrow	  his	  own	  options	  to	  a	  dangerous	  point	  and	  gratuitously	  provoke	  Iraq	  (with	  strong	  Soviet	  and	  possibly	  even	  Turkish	  support)	  [into	  war].	  Recognizing	  the	  difFicult	  conundrum	  the	  Kurds	  faced,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  proposed	  providing	  Barzani	  with	  a	  “token	  amount”	  of	  $500,000	  to	  $750,000	  in	  refugee	  aid	  and	  900,000	  pounds	  of	  non-­‐attributable	  small	  arms	  and	  ammunition.	  Through	  these	  gestures,	  the	  NSC	  staff	  believed	  would	  signal	  Barzani	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  still	  sympathetic	  and	  friendly	  to	  his	  predicament,	  was	  prepared	  to	  continue	  to	  help	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  could	  be	  kept	  covert,	  but	  could	  not	  “play	  a	  prime	  role	  in	  the	  new	  ballgame.”862	  	   When	  Kissinger	  returned	  to	  Washington	  from	  a	  trip	  to	  Europe	  on	  March	  28,	  Scowcroft	  presented	  him	  with	  the	  NSC	  staff’s	  proposal	  on	  the	  Kurds.	  According	  to	  Kissinger’s	  memoir,	  it	  was	  clear	  “the	  existing	  program	  was	  inadequate	  even	  for	  defense.”863	  Consequently,	  Kissinger	  ordered	  Helms	  to	  tell	  the	  Shah	  he	  was	  prepared	  to:	  1)	  offer	  refugee	  relief	  in	  amounts	  up	  to	  $1	  million,	  in	  addition	  to	  continuing	  the	  subsidy;	  2)	  provide	  900,000	  pounds	  of	  non-­‐attributable	  small	  arms	  and	  ammunition;	  and	  3)	  increase	  America’s	  Financial	  contribution	  to	  $8	  million.	  Kissinger	  also	  told	  Helms	  to	  emphasize	  to	  the	  Shah	  that	  an	  early	  Kurdish	  promulgation	  of	  autonomy	  would	  not	  serve	  anyone’s	  interests,	  which	  at	  this	  juncture	  were:	  (a)	  to	  give	  [the]	  Kurds	  capacity	  to	  maintain	  [a]	  reasonable	  base	  for	  negotiating	  recognition	  of	  rights	  by	  Baghdad,	  (b)	  to	  keep	  present	  Iraqi	  government	  tied	  down,	  but	  (c)	  not	  to	  divide	  Iraq	  permanently	  because	  an	  independent	  Kurdish	  area	  would	  not	  be	  economically	  viable	  and	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U.S.	  and	  Iran	  [had]	  no	  interest	  in	  closing	  [the]	  door	  on	  good	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  under	  moderate	  leadership.	  Secondly,	  Helms	  was	  to	  convey	  to	  Barzani	  that	  U.S.	  support	  for	  a	  Kurdish	  government	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  basis	  was	  not	  possible	  because	  it	  could	  not	  be	  kept	  covert.	  These	  decisions	  were	  conveyed	  to	  the	  Shah	  and	  then	  passed	  to	  the	  Kurds.864On	  March	  26,	  Barzani	  let	  Saddam’s	  deadline	  pass	  and	  continued	  to	  prepare	  for	  war.865	   This	  account	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Pike	  Report’s	  claims.	  First,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  the	  U.S.	  “prodded”	  Barzani	  into	  rejecting	  the	  Iraqi	  offer,	  rather	  it	  advised	  him	  that	  declaring	  autonomy	  would	  lead	  to	  war.	  Second,	  the	  Pike	  Report	  left	  out	  inconvenient	  truths,	  like	  its	  claim	  that	  the	  U.S.	  “refused	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  assistance,”	  which	  was	  not	  true.866	  Further,	  the	  Pike	  Report	  manipulated	  sentences	  to	  suit	  is	  agenda,	  altering	  the	  NSC	  staff’s	  question	  “would	  the	  Shah	  look	  with	  favor	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  formalized	  autonomous	  government?”	  to	  read,	  “We	  would	  think	  that	  [our	  ally]	  would	  not	  look	  with	  favor	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  formalized	  autonomous	  government.”867	  These	  misrepresentations	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  
Pike	  Report’s	  objectivity.	  	   Throughout	  late-­‐March	  and	  early-­‐April	  Barzani	  consolidated	  his	  position	  and	  prepared	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  offensive.868	  The	  regime	  responded	  on	  April	  6	  by	  calling	  up	  its	  reserves,	  imposing	  an	  economic	  blockade,	  unleashing	  its	  air	  force	  against	  Kurdish	  positions,	  and	  launching	  a	  few	  probing	  assaults,	  while	  holding	  off	  a	  major	  ground	  offensive.869	  Buoyed	  by	  his	  success,	  Barzani	  ignored	  U.S.	  advice	  and	  announced	  his	  plan	  for	  Kurdish	  autonomy	  on	  April	  16.870	  As	  expected,	  Baghdad	  saw	  this	  as	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tantamount	  to	  a	  declaration	  of	  independence,871	  escalated	  its	  bombing	  campaign,872	  and	  Finally	  launched	  a	  major	  offensive	  in	  late	  April.	  As	  Pollock	  observed,	  the	  campaign	  would	  barely	  resemble	  previous	  wars	  thanks	  to	  important	  changes	  in	  Iraq’s	  tactics.873	   In	  early	  May,	  Kissinger	  met	  with	  Golda	  Meir	  as	  part	  of	  his	  shuttle	  diplomacy	  to	  achieve	  an	  Israeli-­‐Syrian	  disengagement	  agreement,	  which	  was	  signed	  on	  May	  31.	  During	  the	  conversation,	  Meir	  passed	  Kissinger	  an	  Israeli	  report	  recommending	  Kurds	  be	  provided	  with	  anti-­‐aircraft	  and	  anti-­‐tank	  weapons.	  The	  report	  stated:If	  Fighting	  continue[d]	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  Kurds	  [would]	  Find	  it	  difFicult	  to	  hold	  out	  against	  the	  Soviet	  backed	  Iraqi	  army	  …	  and	  to	  defend	  their	  traditional	  strongholds	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Kurdistan.	  However,	  the	  Kurds	  [stood]	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  holding	  out	  in	  the	  mountainous	  area	  provided	  that	  they	  [had]	  sufFicient	  artillery	  and	  adequate	  supplies	  of	  [anti-­‐aircraft]	  and	  [anti-­‐tank]	  ammunition.Kissinger	  agreed	  that	  the	  situation	  looked	  worse	  than	  previous	  wars	  and	  promised	  to	  look	  into	  the	  matter.874	  This	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  a	  major	  arms	  deal	  that	  provided	  the	  Kurds	  with	  captured	  Soviet	  weaponry	  from	  the	  October	  War.	   Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  on	  May	  20	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  issued	  an	  inconclusive	  report	  on	  the	  February	  skirmishes	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.	  The	  only	  positive	  outcome	  was	  that	  both	  had	  agreed	  to	  a	  ceaseFire,	  withdraw	  from	  the	  border,	  and	  create	  an	  atmosphere	  conducive	  to	  achieving	  peace.	  In	  addition,	  they	  agreed	  to	  resume	  bilateral	  talks	  to	  achieve	  “a	  comprehensive	  settlement”	  of	  outstanding	  issues.875	  These	  points	  were	  enshrined	  in	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  348	  on	  May	  28.876	  SigniFicantly,	  the	  resolution	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  increased	  contacts	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  and	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  Algiers	  Accord	  in	  March	  1975.	  
 244
871 “…Iranian Inputs,” June 9, 1974, Op.Cit., p.1.
872 Baghdad 259 to State, “Kurdish Conflict,” April 25, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp.1-2. 
See also Ankara 3279 to State, “Kurdish Conflict in Iraq; Accidental Attack on Turk Border Village,” April 
30, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p.1.
873 Pollack (2002), p.178.
874 Situation in Kurdistan,” May 7, 1974, Op.Cit., p.2. See also Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger 
and Golda Meir, May 7, 1974, Op.Cit., pp.14-15; and Kissinger (1999), p.588. 
875 United Nations Security Council, May 20, 1974, S/11291, pp.1-2; annex, pp.1-7. 
876 United Nations Security Council Resolution 348, May 28, 1974. 
	   In	  late	  May,	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  showed	  further	  signs	  of	  wanting	  to	  improve	  its	  relations	  with	  America.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  between	  May	  26-­‐28,	  foreign	  ministry	  ofFicials	  indicated	  that	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  wife	  needed	  to	  visit	  Washington	  D.C.	  for	  medical	  treatment	  at	  John	  Hopkins	  Medical	  Centre	  and	  wanted	  U.S.	  approval.	  The	  Iraqis	  were	  also	  pleased	  with	  the	  State	  Department’s	  apparent	  refusal	  to	  meet	  with	  Kurdish	  representatives	  visiting	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  approach	  immediately	  caught	  the	  State	  Department’s	  attention	  and	  was	  forwarded	  to	  the	  White	  House.877 	  On	  June	  8,	  Kissinger	  responded,	  indicating	  this	  was	  an	  “interesting	  and	  encouraging	  development,”	  since	  it	  was	  the	  First	  time	  since	  1967	  that	  Iraq—on	  an	  ofFicial	  level—had	  broached	  the	  subject	  of	  improving	  political	  relations	  with	  America.	  He	  did,	  however,	  warn	  the	  USINT’s	  interim	  Chief	  Principal	  OfFicer,	  John	  Gatch,	  who	  was	  manning	  the	  outpost	  while	  Lowrie	  was	  away,	  to	  “proceed	  cautiously”	  and	  leave	  the	  initiative	  to	  the	  Iraqis,	  but	  if	  raised	  again	  tell	  the	  Iraqis	  it	  had	  been	  “brought	  to	  [the]	  attention	  of	  senior	  levels	  of	  [the]	  Department	  where	  it	  was	  received	  with	  interest.”	  Gatch	  was	  to	  also	  reiterate	  Washington’s	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  Kurds	  and	  its	  hope	  that	  it	  could	  be	  resolved	  peacefully.878	  When	  Gatch	  conveyed	  Kissinger’s	  message	  to	  the	  Iraqis	  on	  June	  22,	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  said	  his	  message	  would	  be	  raised	  with	  Iraq’s	  new	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Shathil	  Taqa,	  who	  said	  “patience	  would	  be	  required	  before	  obstacles	  [in	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations]	  could	  be	  overcome.”879	  Therefore,	  by	  late	  June	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Iraq	  were	  making	  tentative	  moves	  toward	  normalizing	  relations.	   Also	  that	  month,	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  had	  mended	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  because	  it	  needed	  arms	  resupply.	  On	  June	  19,	  a	  group	  of	  Kurds	  met	  with	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  at	  the	  UN,	  where	  they	  discussed	  Kurdish	  efforts	  to	  have	  Iraq’s	  “genocide”	  once	  again	  put	  on	  the	  General	  Assembly’s	  agenda,	  like	  in	  1963.	  During	  the	  conversation,	  the	  Kurds	  claimed	  a	  Soviet	  ofFicer	  named	  Alexander	  Vasilef	  was	  in	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charge	  of	  IAF	  bombing	  operations.880	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Shah	  told	  Callahan	  that	  SAVAK	  had	  learned	  the	  Soviets	  were	  preparing	  to	  deliver	  SCUD	  missiles	  to	  Iraq,	  while	  noting	  the	  “partial	  easing	  of	  strains”	  with	  Iraq	  was	  “more	  cosmetic	  than	  real.”	  Agreeing,	  Callahan	  informed	  Kissinger	  the	  Shah’s	  “continued	  heavy	  support	  to	  the	  Kurds	  [was	  a]	  better	  indicator	  of	  his	  real	  attitude	  than	  the	  reestablishment	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  and	  the	  cessation	  of	  direct	  military	  confrontation	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Iranian	  forces	  in	  the	  border	  areas.”	  Given	  this,	  Callahan	  was	  convinced	  that	  despite	  the	  easing	  of	  tensions,	  both	  saw	  each	  other	  as	  enemies.881	  	   By	  late	  June,	  the	  IAF’s	  relentless	  bombing	  campaign	  against	  civilian	  targets	  had	  begun	  to	  take	  a	  toll	  on	  Kurdish	  civilians,	  as	  women	  and	  children	  Fled	  to	  Iran	  to	  seek	  safe-­‐haven.	  On	  June	  26,	  SAVAK	  ofFicials	  told	  the	  U.S.	  Consul	  to	  Tabriz,	  Ronald	  Neumann,	  it	  had	  established	  a	  number	  of	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  for	  some	  25,000	  refugees	  and	  warned	  the	  numbers	  would	  continue	  to	  grow.882 	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  the	  Shah	  conFirmed	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  camps,	  but	  said	  refugees	  had	  grown	  to	  42,000	  and	  would	  increase	  as	  Iraqi	  planes	  and	  armour	  continued	  to	  batter	  Kurdish	  villages.	  Reporting	  these	  details	  to	  Kissinger,	  Helms	  observed	  the	  war	  resembled	  an	  act	  of	  genocide:The	  genocidal	  war	  which	  the	  Ba’th	  regime	  is	  waging	  against	  the	  Kurds	  has	  taken	  a	  heavy	  toll	  of	  civilian	  non-­‐combatants.	  Unable	  to	  engage	  the	  [Peshmerga]	  on	  favorable	  terms,	  the	  Iraqis	  have	  resorted	  to	  day	  and	  night	  terror-­‐bombing	  of	  Kurdish	  towns	  and	  villages,	  using	  high-­‐altitude	  TU-­‐16	  and	  TU-­‐22	  bombers	  and	  employing	  heavy	  bombs	  and	  napalm.Helms	  said	  the	  Kurds	  were	  virtually	  defenseless,	  having	  “no	  anti-­‐aircraft	  weapons	  capable	  of	  reaching	  the	  Iraqi	  planes”	  and	  the	  situation	  was	  growing	  worse,	  as	  250,000	  Kurds	  had	  Fled	  to	  the	  north	  from	  Baghdad	  and	  the	  Arab	  south.	  Given	  these	  staggering	  numbers,	  the	  CIA	  felt	  its	  Financial	  contribution	  for	  medical	  aid	  should	  be	  increased	  from	  $10,000	  to	  $30,000	  monthly,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  $1	  million	  in	  refugee	  relief	  provided	  earlier	  that	  summer.	  The	  Shah	  also	  increased	  his	  total	  funding	  of	  the	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Kurds	  to	  around	  $74	  million	  and	  had	  begun	  a	  propaganda	  campaign	  to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  Iraq’s	  “genocidal	  war.”	  Helms	  revealed	  the	  CIA	  was	  “discreetly	  supporting”	  the	  Kurds	  “in	  the	  media	  Field.”	  Finally,	  the	  Shah	  raised	  the	  prospect	  of	  action	  at	  the	  UN,	  but	  Helms	  was	  pessimistic	  whether	  this	  would	  work.	  He	  argued	  the	  safest	  option	  was	  to	  continue	  supplying	  the	  Kurds,	  since	  the	  U.S.	  had	  “reached	  the	  upper	  limits	  of	  concealable	  assistance”	  for	  the	  refugees.	  If	  the	  CIA	  provided	  any	  more,	  Helms	  observed,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  come	  “through	  voluntary	  agencies	  or	  some	  acknowledgeable	  government	  assistance	  program.”	  He	  advised	  Kissinger	  to	  assign	  a	  member	  of	  his	  staff	  to	  study	  the	  problem	  “because	  it	  [would]	  predictably	  be	  coming	  [their]	  way	  before	  too	  long.”883	  Helms	  was	  correct.	  On	  July	  24	  the	  Shah	  forwarded	  an	  urgent	  plea	  for	  additional	  assistance.	  While	  the	  details	  of	  Barzani’s	  request	  remain	  classiFied,	  Kissinger	  indicated	  the	  Shah	  attached	  “a	  warning	  of	  his	  own	  regarding	  the	  grave	  consequences—for	  Iran	  and	  the	  entire	  Gulf—should	  Kurdish	  resistance	  collapse.”884	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  Assadollah	  Alam,	  the	  Shah’s	  Minister	  of	  Court,	  summoned	  Helms’	  deputy,	  Jack	  Miklos,	  to	  ask	  about	  Iraq’s	  loosening	  of	  ties	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  efforts	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  other	  Arab	  countries	  and	  the	  West.	  Alam	  said	  both	  the	  Shah	  and	  King	  Hussein	  wanted	  to	  know	  Kissinger’s	  views	  on	  this	  trend.885	  Having	  received	  the	  message	  in	  Baghdad,	  Lowrie	  offered	  his	  assessment	  on	  August	  2:	  [The]	  Trend	  toward	  better	  relations	  with	  [the]	  Arabs	  is	  not	  [an]	  isolated	  event	  but	  [a]	  continuation	  of	  Iraqi	  policy	  since	  [the]	  IPC	  settlement	  of	  [February]	  1973….	  [This]	  policy	  has	  resulted	  in	  Iraq’s	  political	  rapprochement	  with	  Western	  Europe	  (e.g.,	  resumption	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  West	  Germany	  and	  Great	  Britain)	  and	  [a]	  dramatic	  shift	  toward	  [the]	  West	  for	  new	  major	  economic	  projects.He	  said	  the	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Bloc	  countries	  were	  “disturbed”	  and	  “complained	  bitterly”	  about	  Iraq’s	  current	  policy,	  concluding,	  “while	  there	  is	  certainly	  cause	  for	  Iranian	  and	  Jordanian	  suspicion	  of	  this	  regime,	  [the]	  thrust	  of	  [its]	  policy	  toward	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non-­‐alignment,	  pragmatism	  and	  concentration	  on	  economic	  development	  [was]	  unmistakably	  clear.”886	  The	  department	  agreed	  with	  Lowrie’s	  observations,	  stating	  it	  understood	  Iran’s	  suspicions	  of	  Iraq,	  but	  there	  was	  some	  divergence	  in	  Iran	  and	  Jordan’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  their	  own.	  Concluding,	  the	  department	  said	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  be	  “genuinely	  interested	  in	  improving	  its	  relations	  with	  other	  Arab	  States,	  and	  with	  [the]	  West	  as	  well.”	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  felt	  Iraq’s	  drift	  toward	  non-­‐alignment	  was	  in	  America’s	  interests,	  though	  the	  “time	  span	  of	  this	  development	  [was]	  too	  brief	  to	  draw	  hard	  and	  fast	  conclusions.”887	   On	  August	  9,	  the	  Watergate	  scandal	  that	  had	  plagued	  and	  ultimately	  destroyed	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  presidency	  ended	  with	  his	  resignation	  in	  disgrace.	  Replacing	  Nixon	  as	  president	  was	  Gerald	  Ford,	  who	  had	  been	  appointed	  Vice	  President	  on	  December	  6,	  1973,	  after	  former	  Vice	  President	  Spiro	  Agnew	  was	  forced	  to	  resign	  amid	  criminal	  corruption	  charges	  that	  October.	  While	  Nixon’s	  resignation	  was	  a	  devastating	  blow	  to	  America’s	  prestige	  worldwide,	  Ford’s	  retention	  of	  Kissinger	  in	  his	  dual	  roles	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  national	  security	  advisor	  ensured	  a	  continuity	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  SigniFicantly,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  Kissinger	  opted	  to	  keep	  Ford—like	  Nixon—apprised	  on	  a	  need-­‐to-­‐know	  basis,	  consulting	  with	  him	  only	  when	  major	  decisions	  required	  presidential	  approval.	  Therefore,	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  continued	  to	  rest	  in	  Kissinger’s	  hands.888	   In	  the	  period	  between	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  March	  and	  Nixon’s	  resignation	  in	  August,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  responded	  by	  increasing	  its	  support	  for	  Barzani	  and	  cautioning	  against	  declaring	  autonomy.	  As	  the	  Fighting	  escalated,	  Kissinger	  ordered	  the	  CIA	  to	  increase	  aid	  further,	  including	  the	  secret	  provision	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  for	  refugees	  inside	  Iran.	  While	  the	  war	  forced	  Iraq	  to	  mend	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  to	  obtain	  resupply,	  the	  regime	  was	  clearly	  interested	  in	  improving	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Despite	  Iraq’s	  apparent	  desire	  to	  balance	  its	  relations	  more	  evenly	  with	  the	  West,	  Kissinger	  continued	  to	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increase	  American	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Therefore,	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  contributing	  to	  America’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategy	  by	  checking	  Soviet	  inFluence	  in	  the	  region	  and	  tying	  down	  Iraq’s	  military.	  The	  Israelis	  had	  also	  beneFited	  considerably,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  disengagement	  from	  Syria.	  Unfortunately	  the	  Shah’s	  longstanding	  desire	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  waterway	  had	  gone	  unfulFilled.	  The	  imbalance	  in	  the	  beneFits	  gained	  from	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  would	  lead	  the	  Shah	  to	  escalate	  the	  war	  to	  unprecedented	  levels	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1974	  as	  he	  pressed	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  harder	  to	  make	  concessions.	  
III	   The	  period	  between	  Nixon’s	  resignation	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  saw	  a	  major	  escalation	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  Iranian	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  became	  overt,	  culminating	  in	  the	  downing	  of	  two	  Iraqi	  jets	  in	  December.	  Meanwhile,	  Kissinger	  worked	  closely	  with	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  to	  arrange	  for	  the	  Kurds	  a	  large	  shipment	  of	  weapons,	  including	  anti-­‐aircraft	  and	  anti-­‐tank	  missiles.	  The	  introduction	  of	  these	  weapons	  had	  a	  considerable	  impact	  on	  the	  Fighting,	  but	  Iraq’s	  improved	  tactics—thanks	  to	  Soviet	  military	  advisors—meant	  Kurdish	  victories	  became	  less	  and	  less	  common	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  their	  situation	  appeared	  dire.	  But	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  this	  escalation,	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  continued	  to	  meet	  periodically—as	  required	  by	  the	  UN—to	  seek	  ways	  to	  resolve	  outstanding	  disputes	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  provided	  an	  avenue	  for	  a	  future	  rapprochement,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Kurds.	  	   The	  war	  escalated	  sharply	  in	  August.	  On	  August	  6,	  Iraq	  launched	  a	  major	  offensive	  against	  the	  Kurds.889	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  soon	  realized	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  changed	  tactics,	  leading	  to	  the	  capture	  of	  key	  Kurdish	  strongholds,	  the	  cutting	  off	  a	  major	  supply	  line	  from	  Iran,	  and	  a	  strategic	  mountain	  pass	  leading	  to	  Barzani’s	  headquarters	  by	  late	  August.890 	  The	  Iranians	  responded	  to	  Iraq’s	  offensive	  by	  initiating	  clashes	  along	  the	  border	  and	  authorizing	  its	  forces	  “to	  return	  Fire	  and	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shoot	  to	  kill	  instead	  of	  Firing	  warning	  shots	  when	  border	  raids	  occur[ed].”891	  Over	  the	  next	  week	  tensions	  escalated	  further,	  with	  Iraq	  killing	  two	  Iranian	  children	  during	  a	  bombing	  raid,	  artillery	  exchanges,	  and	  Finally	  a	  Five-­‐hour	  pitched	  battle	  on	  August	  23.892	  Relations	  were	  clearly	  deteriorating.	  	   In	  this	  context,	  Barzani	  requested	  another	  increase	  in	  American	  assistance.	  The	  request	  prompted	  Scowcroft	  to	  write	  Helms	  on	  August	  22,	  warning	  little	  more	  could	  be	  done	  without	  disclosing	  U.S.	  support.	  Scowcroft	  indicated	  the	  U.S.	  had	  arranged	  the	  delivery	  of	  AK-­‐47s	  and	  had	  made	  $1	  million	  available	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  anti-­‐tank	  weapons,	  which	  the	  CIA	  was	  helping	  the	  Iranians	  purchase.	  But	  the	  anti-­‐aircraft	  weaponry	  Barzani	  needed	  “to	  meet	  the	  threat	  of	  high-­‐Flying	  bomber	  aircraft	  simply	  [was]	  just	  too	  big	  (would	  require	  prime	  movers	  to	  transport),	  too	  complicated	  and	  too	  expensive	  to	  pursue.”	  Unfortunately	  all	  the	  Ford	  administration	  could	  do	  was	  urge	  humanitarian	  aid	  groups	  to	  help	  Iran	  with	  the	  refugee	  problem.893	  While	  the	  U.S.	  could	  not	  increase	  its	  direct	  funding	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  it	  was	  making	  clear	  efforts	  to	  assist	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  war.	  	   Two	  days	  later,	  Helms	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  message	  inquiring	  about	  using	  Iranian	  troops	  inside	  Iraq.894	  Kissinger	  responded	  that	  day	  stating,	  “this	  must	  be	  basically	  an	  Iranian	  decision	  [and	  the	  U.S.	  would]	  understand	  whatever	  they	  decide[d]	  to	  do.”	  Kissinger	  also	  addressed	  Israel’s	  interest	  in	  providing	  the	  Kurds	  with	  anti-­‐tank	  missiles.895	  On	  the	  question	  of	  having	  the	  Israelis	  transfer	  Soviet-­‐made	  anti-­‐tank	  missiles	  captured	  from	  Egypt	  and	  the	  U.S.	  reimburse	  them	  with	  American-­‐made	  anti-­‐tank	  missiles,	  Helms	  told	  Kissinger	  he	  had	  raised	  the	  matter	  with	  SAVAK	  chief,	  General	  Nassiri,	  who	  agreed	  it	  was	  the	  best	  option.896	  Despite	  this,	  Helms	  warned	  Kissinger	  that	  U.S.	  involvement	  was	  unnecessary	  since	  the	  Israelis	  had	  a	  working	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logistics	  pipeline	  to	  the	  Kurds	  and	  were	  about	  to	  deliver	  300	  tons	  of	  ordnance.897	  Despite	  this,	  Kissinger	  still	  wanted	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  arms	  transfer,	  but	  was	  required	  to	  inform	  President	  Ford.	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  the	  meeting	  took	  place	  on	  August	  26,	  where	  Ford	  gave	  him	  carte	  blanche	  to	  pursue	  the	  matter	  as	  he	  saw	  Fit	  on	  August	  26.898	  Soon	  thereafter,	  Kissinger	  cabled	  Helms	  to	  inform	  him	  of	  Ford’s	  approval	  of	  the	  Israeli	  proposal.899	   After	  three	  weeks	  of	  negotiations	  in	  Istanbul,	  on	  August	  31	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  issued	  a	  joint	  communiqué	  stating	  that	  talks	  would	  continue	  at	  the	  foreign	  minister	  level	  during	  the	  upcoming	  General	  Assembly	  in	  October.	  According	  to	  Lowrie,	  during	  the	  talks	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  “swallowed	  some	  of	  their	  pride”	  and	  appeared	  determined	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement,	  but	  the	  Iranians	  remained	  belligerent.900	  On	  September	  6,	  Iran	  complained	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  that	  four	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  had	  crossed	  its	  border	  and	  were	  forced	  back	  with	  anti-­‐aircraft	  Fire.	  According	  to	  the	  Iranian	  complaint,	  two	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  dropped	  bombs	  on	  an	  Iranian	  village,	  killing	  Fifteen	  inhabitants	  (nine	  of	  whom	  were	  children).	  The	  Iranians	  said	  they	  had	  “pieces	  of	  these	  bombs”	  showing	  foreign	  markings.901	  Therefore,	  just	  as	  political	  progress	  was	  being	  made,	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  continued	  to	  undermine	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  relations.	  	   The	  next	  day,	  Barzani	  requested	  U.S.	  advise	  on	  whether	  he	  should	  attack	  the	  Kirkuk	  oil	  Fields,	  which	  could	  starve	  the	  regime	  of	  much-­‐needed	  oil	  revenue	  and	  increase	  pressure	  to	  seek	  accommodation.	  Kissinger	  responded	  on	  September	  18,	  indicating	  his	  concerns	  that	  doing	  so	  could	  “compound	  the	  already	  grave	  energy	  crisis	  by	  triggering	  a	  cycle	  of	  violence	  against	  Middle	  East	  oil	  installations.”	  He	  also	  feared	  this	  would	  strengthen	  the	  hand	  of	  opponents	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  within	  the	  U.S.	  “by	  allowing	  them	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  Kurds	  must	  be	  possessing	  sufFicient	  resources	  to	  defend	  their	  redoubt,	  if	  they	  were	  pressing	  for	  additional	  weapons	  so	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that	  they	  could	  conduct	  a	  major	  offensive.”	  For	  these	  reasons,	  he	  rejected	  Barzani’s	  proposal.902	   In	  early	  October,	  Iran	  and	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  ministers,	  Abbas	  Ali	  Khalatbari	  and	  Shathil	  Taqa,	  respectively,	  met	  in	  New	  York	  to	  build	  upon	  the	  Istanbul	  talks.	  According	  to	  Khalatbari,	  talks	  were	  “tough,	  and	  certainly	  not	  smooth,”	  because	  “neither	  side	  [could]	  afford	  to	  make	  concessions.”	  Nevertheless,	  progress	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  made.903	  Unfortunately,	  tragedy	  struck	  on	  October	  20	  when	  Taqa	  died	  unexpectedly	  of	  a	  heart	  attack	  while	  in	  Rabat,	  Morocco	  during	  a	  stopover	  on	  his	  way	  home.	  Taqa’s	  death	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  because	  he	  had	  increased	  USINT’s	  access	  to	  the	  foreign	  ministry.	  With	  his	  death,	  Lowrie	  concluded,	  “this	  link	  has	  now	  been	  cut”.904	  	   The	  day	  before	  Taqa’s	  death,	  the	  Israelis	  provided	  Kissinger	  with	  a	  list	  of	  arms	  it	  could	  give	  the	  Kurds	  and	  requested	  funds	  to	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  procurement—roughly	  $24	  million.905	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  Director	  Colby	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  memo	  cautioning	  “against	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  [U.S.]	  support”	  because	  it	  risked	  jeopardizing	  operational	  secrecy.	  He	  stated:Our	  assistance	  to	  Barzani	  for	  FY	  1973,	  1974	  and	  1975	  totals	  almost	  $20	  million	  and	  has	  included	  over	  1,250	  tons	  of	  ordnance….	  The	  Iranians	  are	  able	  to	  give	  all	  of	  the	  assistance	  the	  Kurds	  need,	  and	  the	  Agency	  recommends	  that	  further	  increases	  in	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds	  be	  left	  up	  to	  the	  Iranians.Kissinger	  did	  not	  accept	  Colby’s	  argument,	  replying,	  “as	  if	  secrecy	  were	  more	  important	  than	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Kurds”	  and	  questioning	  the	  logic	  of	  leaving	  support	  up	  to	  the	  Shah:	  …	  if	  the	  Shah	  went	  much	  beyond	  the	  $75	  million	  in	  assistance	  he	  was	  already	  supplying,	  he	  would	  face	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  Israel.	  Unless	  we	  supplied	  replacement	  weapons	  he	  would	  be	  weakening	  his	  own	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armed	  forces.	  But	  if	  we	  did	  so,	  we	  would	  Find	  ourselves	  in	  a	  hopeless	  congressional	  battle.906Given	  this,	  Kissinger	  was	  determined	  to	  continue	  helping	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  did	  not	  weaken	  Iran	  or	  Israel’s	  defenses.	  He	  informed	  the	  Israelis	  that	  he	  would	  raise	  the	  matter	  with	  the	  Shah	  and	  report	  back.907	  	   On	  October	  31,	  Scowcroft	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  memo	  outlining	  Barzani’s	  recent	  approach	  to	  the	  Shah	  and	  a	  letter	  he	  had	  sent	  to	  Kissinger.	  In	  both	  instances,	  Barzani	  wanted	  the	  U.S.	  to	  intercede	  with	  the	  Turks	  to	  allow	  non-­‐combatants	  to	  take	  refuge	  across	  the	  border.	  He	  presented	  the	  Israeli	  list	  of	  weapons	  and	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  anti-­‐tank	  and	  anti-­‐aircraft	  weapons.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  already	  moving	  on	  this.	  Finally,	  Barzani	  said	  he	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  impending	  winter	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  400,000	  refugees	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  and	  another	  100,000	  in	  Iran.	  According	  to	  Scowcroft,	  “Barzani	  and	  the	  Shah	  want[ed]	  the	  USG	  to	  use	  its	  inFluence	  …	  to	  get	  American	  and	  international	  relief	  organizations	  to	  help	  Iran	  care	  for	  the	  Kurdish	  victims	  of	  the	  genocidal	  Iraqi	  campaign.”	  Unfortunately,	  it	  was	  longstanding	  U.S.	  policy	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  independence	  of	  aid	  organizations.908	  	   As	  Iraqi	  forces	  continued	  to	  make	  gains	  against	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  Shah	  responded	  by	  increasing	  his	  military	  support	  to	  include	  artillery.909	  On	  November	  12,	  the	  Shah	  told	  Callahan,	  Iranian	  artillery	  support	  was	  “very	  effective”	  and	  the	  Kurds	  were	  “no	  longer	  withdrawing	  but	  were	  Fighting	  tenaciously”.	  He	  said	  his	  support	  would	  continue,	  but	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  had	  shifted	  to	  tactics	  and	  appeared	  to	  be	  determined	  to	  hold	  ground	  in	  the	  coming	  winter.	  On	  Barzani’s	  recent	  appeal,	  Callahan	  told	  the	  Shah	  that	  Kissinger	  had	  received	  a	  letter	  and	  was	  following	  up	  on	  it,	  but	  added	  the	  CIA	  “had	  exhausted	  its	  budget	  for	  this	  operation	  for	  this	  Fiscal	  year.”	  When	  Callahan	  reported	  the	  conversation	  to	  Kissinger,	  he	  added,	  “the	  Iraqis	  and	  Soviets	  surely	  know	  the	  Iranians	  have	  been	  providing	  this	  Fire	  support	  but	  neither	  have	  said	  anything	  yet.”	  Clearly	  Iraq’s	  determination	  to	  hold	  its	  lines	  during	  the	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winter,	  the	  Shah’s	  increasing	  frustration	  with	  the	  Kurds’	  Fighting	  ability,	  and	  the	  CIA’s	  growing	  opposition	  raised	  questions	  about	  the	  operation’s	  viability.910	   When	  Kissinger	  met	  with	  the	  Shah	  in	  early	  November	  they	  agreed	  to	  ‘green	  light’	  the	  arms	  transfer.	  On	  November	  7,	  the	  new	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister,	  Yitzak	  Rabin,	  informed	  Kissinger	  the	  Kurds	  had	  “destroyed	  several	  Iraqi	  tanks”	  thanks	  to	  the	  recently	  received	  Sagger	  (AT-­‐3)	  and	  Strela	  missiles	  (SA-­‐7).911	  Even	  so,	  the	  Israelis	  continued	  to	  complain	  about	  delays	  on	  reimbursement,	  raising	  the	  issue	  with	  Kissinger	  on	  November	  16.	  Kissinger	  told	  Israel’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  Simcha	  Dinitz,	  and	  his	  deputy,	  Mordechai	  Shalev,	  that	  the	  Shah	  had	  approved	  the	  arms	  deal,	  but	  some	  items	  still	  had	  to	  be	  procured	  in	  Europe.	  Paying	  for	  these	  items	  was	  an	  issue.	  The	  Israelis	  said	  they	  needed	  cash,	  while	  Kissinger	  preferred	  equipment,	  since	  coming	  up	  with	  $20	  million	  was	  challenging.	  Ultimately,	  Kissinger	  told	  the	  Israelis	  to	  begin	  transferring	  the	  weapons	  to	  the	  Kurds.912	  	   By	  December	  the	  Iraqi	  offensive	  had	  “sputtered,	  Flared	  and	  Finally	  [went]	  out”	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  winter.	  While	  Barzani’s	  headquarters	  at	  Haji	  Omran	  and	  the	  main	  Iranian	  supply	  line	  remained	  secure,	  the	  Iranians	  had	  recently	  built	  a	  new	  supply	  road	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  border	  to	  establish	  a	  second	  supply	  line	  to	  Kurdish	  forces.	  Thanks	  to	  Iranian	  artillery	  Fire,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  also	  forced	  Iraqi	  units	  to	  withdraw	  to	  the	  valleys.	  But	  the	  winter	  of	  1974-­‐75	  was	  quite	  mild,	  allowing	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  to	  continue	  pounding	  Kurdish	  positions.	  According	  to	  Neumann,	  the	  most	  serious	  Fighting	  was	  in	  the	  mountains	  near	  Rawanduz,	  where	  “British	  radar	  technicians	  ...	  observed	  regular	  and	  heavy	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  activity	  …	  for	  several	  weeks.”	  However,	  the	  Kurds’	  acquisition	  of	  anti-­‐tank	  and	  anti-­‐aircraft	  weapons	  had	  prevented	  Iraqi	  advances.913	  	   But	  just	  as	  U.S.	  assistance	  was	  having	  a	  clear	  impact,	  Helms	  became	  concerned	  about	  the	  Shah’s	  views	  on	  the	  war.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  meeting	  on	  December	  4,	  the	  Shah	  mused	  aloud,	  “I	  wonder	  why	  the	  Iraqis	  do	  not	  simply	  settle	  with	  us”	  on	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab?	  “After	  all,	  the	  issues	  are	  minor	  as	  far	  as	  they	  are	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concerned.”	  Later,	  Helms	  learned	  King	  Hussein	  was	  working	  as	  a	  secret	  intermediary	  between	  the	  Iranians	  and	  Iraqis.	  He	  raised	  this	  matter	  with	  Alam	  on	  December	  10,	  who	  explained	  that	  the	  Shah	  had	  received	  a	  message	  from	  King	  Hussein	  about	  an	  Iraqi	  approach,	  but	  did	  not	  elaborate	  on	  his	  response.	  When	  Helms	  reported	  this	  to	  Kissinger,914	  he	  commented	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  agreement	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq:Anything	  short	  of	  [an]	  Iraqi	  agreement	  to	  Iranian	  positions	  on	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  and	  other	  border	  questions	  will	  get	  nowhere	  with	  Iran.	  Basically	  the	  Shah	  holds	  Firmly	  to	  his	  view	  that	  a	  different,	  ‘decent’	  government	  is	  necessary	  in	  Baghdad.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  he	  militarily	  supports	  the	  Kurds.	  But	  an	  Iraqi	  agreement	  to	  settle	  with	  Iran	  might	  be	  tempting	  right	  now	  since	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  expensive	  and	  increasingly	  hazardous	  [sic.]	  from	  the	  Iranian	  point	  of	  view.915King	  Hussein’s	  sudden	  involvement	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Iran	  was	  a	  puzzling	  development,	  particularly	  given	  King	  Hussein’s	  leading	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  First	  place.	   Not	  long	  after	  King	  Hussein’s	  démarche,	  the	  Shah	  decided	  to	  test	  Iraq’s	  resolve	  and	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  by	  sharply	  escalating	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  Separately,	  on	  December	  14	  and	  15,	  Iranian	  forces	  shot	  down	  an	  Iraqi	  TU-­‐16	  Badgers	  over	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  (two	  in	  total).	  Afterward,	  Iran	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  conceal	  responsibility,	  claiming	  Iraq’s	  jets	  had	  been	  hit	  over	  Iranian	  airspace	  and	  had	  “limped	  back	  to	  Iraq”	  where	  they	  crashed.916	  Following	  the	  incident,	  the	  Iraqis	  appeared	  determined	  to	  drag	  the	  U.S.	  into	  the	  controversy,	  claiming	  the	  jets	  were	  shot	  down	  by	  “American	  Hawk	  Missiles,”	  while	  warning	  Iran	  and	  its	  backers	  that	  they	  will	  “bear	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  acts.”917	  In	  a	  message	  to	  Washington,	  Helms	  denied	  the	  report,	  pointing	  out	  that	  Hawk	  missiles	  had	  not	  yet	  arrived	  in	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Iran.918 	  The	  missiles,	  in	  fact,	  were	  British-­‐made	  Rapiers.919	  Nevertheless,	  through	  this	  provocative	  act,	  the	  Shah	  had	  sent	  Iraq	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  Iran	  was	  the	  dominant	  regional	  power	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  avoid	  further	  escalation	  was	  to	  concede	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.	  	   Iran’s	  actions	  prompted	  Lowrie	  to	  draft	  a	  position	  paper	  on	  December	  23	  that	  called	  on	  the	  department	  to	  make	  the	  “strongest	  possible	  démarche”	  to	  the	  Shah	  to	  end	  the	  escalating	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  conFlict.	  Lowrie	  argued	  this	  was	  not	  only	  in	  Iran’s	  interests	  but	  the	  entire	  region.	  Viewed	  from	  Baghdad,	  he	  felt	  the	  Kurds	  were	  “Fighting	  a	  hopeless	  battle”	  and	  “no	  interested	  party	  want[ed]	  to	  see	  them	  succeed.”	  Indeed,	  “even	  the	  Iranians	  [said]	  they	  [would]	  not	  give	  them	  enough	  assistance	  to	  take	  [the]	  offensive.	  Their	  sole	  hope	  …	  appear[ed]	  to	  be	  [the]	  overthrow	  of	  [the]	  Baghdad	  regime.”	  But	  worse	  yet,	  British	  Ambassador	  John	  Graham	  had	  told	  him	  that	  the	  Shah	  planned	  to	  escalate	  the	  war	  in	  the	  spring	  by	  increasing	  his	  arms	  supply	  to	  Barzani.	  “If	  this	  represents	  [the]	  Shah’s	  thinking,”	  Lowrie	  warned,	  “then	  we	  are	  almost	  certainly	  heading	  for	  [a]	  large	  scale	  regional	  conFlict.”	  He	  urged	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  approach	  the	  Shah	  and	  urge	  him	  to	  “test	  the	  seriousness	  of	  Iraqi	  desires	  for	  rapprochement	  rather	  than	  inFlexibly	  maintaining	  that	  [the]	  Baath	  regime	  is	  incorrigibly	  hostile	  to	  it.”920	  	   U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tehran	  met	  Lowrie’s	  recommendations	  with	  hostility.	  Jack	  Miklos,	  Helms’	  deputy,	  cabled	  Washington	  on	  December	  30	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Shah	  saw	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  as	  a	  “bunch	  of	  thugs	  and	  murderers,”	  who	  were	  “implacably	  hostile	  to	  him,”	  was	  unconvinced	  of	  its	  efforts	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  the	  West,	  and	  did	  not	  think	  the	  Kurds	  were	  Fighting	  “a	  hopeless	  battle.”	  Miklos	  also	  dismissed	  Lowrie’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  conFlict	  was	  heading	  toward	  a	  regional	  war,	  concluding:Baghdad	  must	  realize	  that	  if	  it	  launched	  a	  direct	  overt	  attack	  on	  Iran,	  the	  Soviets,	  with	  high	  stakes	  in	  Iran	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Iraq,	  would	  likely	  stand	  aside	  and	  Iran	  could	  inFlict	  serious	  damage	  on	  Iraq	  in	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retaliation.	  As	  far	  as	  Iran	  is	  concerned,	  it	  has	  evidenced	  no	  desire	  to	  go	  beyond	  ensuring	  Kurdish	  survivability	  and	  frustrating	  Baghdad’s	  attempts	  to	  crush	  the	  Kurds	  once	  and	  for	  all.	  In	  fact,	  Miklos	  saw	  great	  value	  in	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  pointing	  out	  that	  they	  tied	  down	  80%	  of	  Iraq’s	  military,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  used	  against	  Israel,	  Kuwait,	  or	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  Therefore,	  Miklos	  argued,	  Lowrie’s	  suggestion	  was	  “inadvisable	  because	  it	  would	  be	  unheeded,	  unwise	  because	  the	  premise	  on	  which	  it	  is	  proposed	  is	  unsound	  (or	  at	  least	  unconvincing),	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  it	  would	  not	  serve	  overall	  U.S.	  interests.”	  The	  department	  agreed.921	   In	  late	  December	  and	  again	  in	  early	  January,	  the	  Israelis	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  the	  arms	  transfer	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  On	  December	  23,	  Dinitz	  told	  Kissinger	  of	  difFiculty	  “getting	  [their]	  agreed	  program	  translated	  into	  effect.”	  He	  said	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  missiles	  had	  gone	  up	  to	  $28	  million	  and	  the	  NSC	  staff	  had	  not	  found	  a	  way	  to	  Finalize	  the	  deal.	  Dinitz	  was	  worried	  that	  if	  the	  arms	  were	  not	  delivered	  before	  the	  spring	  melt,	  the	  Kurds	  would	  have	  difFiculty	  holding	  off	  the	  Iraqis	  offensive.	  Kissinger	  promised	  Dinitz	  he	  would	  “Find	  a	  way.”922	  The	  Israelis	  raised	  the	  matter	  again	  on	  January	  16,	  1975,	  with	  Yigal	  Allon,	  Israel’s	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  emphasizing	  to	  Kissinger	  the	  need	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  transfer.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  managed	  to	  hold	  their	  positions	  in	  the	  mountains	  for	  the	  First	  time	  ever.	  Kissinger	  said,	  “there	  is	  no	  disagreement	  about	  it.	  We’re	  giving	  you	  the	  weapons.”	  To	  overcome	  the	  bureaucratic	  obstacles,	  Kissinger	  suggested	  the	  U.S.	  would	  simply	  “add	  $28	  million”	  to	  Israel’s	  next	  major	  arms	  purchase.	  SigniFicantly,	  Allon	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  Shah’s	  intentions,	  commenting	  that	  while	  he	  was	  “doing	  more	  than	  his	  share,”	  the	  Shah	  appeared	  to	  be	  playing	  “his	  own	  game.”	  In	  the	  end,	  Allon	  gave	  Kissinger	  an	  ominous	  warning,	  “to	  abandon	  the	  Kurds	  [would	  be]	  a	  crime.”923	   By	  the	  start	  of	  1975,	  it	  was	  clear	  the	  U.S.,	  Iranians,	  and	  Israelis	  were	  moving	  forward	  with	  a	  large	  arms	  deal	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  While	  in	  the	  past	  the	  Kurds	  had	  always	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managed	  to	  use	  the	  winter	  to	  push	  back	  Iraqi	  forces	  from	  their	  hard	  fought	  gains,	  this	  time	  the	  situation	  was	  entirely	  different.	  Soviet	  inFluence	  on	  Iraq’s	  tactics	  had	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  the	  army’s	  ability	  to	  take	  and	  hold	  positions,	  leading	  the	  Iranian	  military	  to	  take	  on	  a	  more	  overt	  role	  in	  the	  conFlict.	  King	  Hussein’s	  unexpected	  role	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  seemed	  to	  convince	  the	  Shah	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  at	  its	  breaking	  point,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  downing	  of	  the	  two	  Iraqi	  jets	  in	  December.	  While	  this	  caused	  great	  concern	  to	  Lowrie	  in	  Baghdad,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tehran	  dismissed	  the	  recommendation	  that	  the	  State	  Department	  press	  the	  Shah	  into	  reconsidering	  his	  position	  on	  the	  Kurds.	  But	  there	  were	  also	  signs	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  already	  reconsidering	  his	  position,	  which	  was	  evident	  in	  Helms’	  observations	  and	  Allon’s	  ominous	  warning	  to	  Kissinger.	  With	  the	  war	  reaching	  a	  boiling	  point,	  both	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  faced	  a	  decision:	  they	  could	  continue	  to	  escalate	  the	  war	  or	  decide	  to	  negotiate	  with	  one	  another.	  For	  years	  the	  Shah	  had	  made	  known	  to	  Baghdad	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  was	  designed	  to	  force	  Iraq	  to	  concede	  partial	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab,	  but	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  always	  rejected	  this.	  In	  short,	  the	  Shah	  had	  escalated	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  to	  such	  a	  level	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  had	  to	  choose	  between	  giving	  up	  partial	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  waterway	  or	  losing	  the	  north	  of	  the	  country.	  Even	  so,	  Kissinger’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  made	  clear	  that	  Cold	  War	  considerations	  still	  dominated	  U.S.	  thinking.	  
IV	   Throughout	  early	  1975,	  secret	  negotiations	  took	  place	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  Algiers	  Accord	  in	  early	  March	  and	  would	  cut	  off	  all	  American	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Kissinger	  was	  against	  this	  decision,	  believing	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  was	  untrustworthy	  and	  the	  border	  concession	  offered	  was	  minimal	  compared	  to	  the	  strategic	  value	  gained	  from	  the	  operation.	  After	  all,	  Kissinger	  knew	  Iran’s	  development	  of	  its	  Gulf	  ports,	  particularly	  its	  oil	  export	  terminal	  on	  Kharg	  Island,	  meant	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab	  was	  not	  vital	  for	  the	  exportation	  of	  Iranian	  oil.	  He	  also	  felt	  the	  deal	  would	  empower	  a	  regime	  with	  close	  links	  to	  the	  Soviets	  and	  help	  Iraqi	  communists	  consolidate	  power.	  In	  short,	  he	  believed	  this	  deal	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would	  undermine	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy	  in	  both	  the	  Gulf	  and	  the	  wider	  Middle	  East	  region.	  	   By	  mid-­‐January,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  realized	  that	  Iraqi	  policy	  was	  shifting.	  On	  January	  15,	  Lowrie	  learned	  President	  al-­‐Bakr	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  had	  accepted	  an	  invitation	  from	  King	  Hussein	  to	  visit	  Jordan.924	  The	  next	  day,	  when	  Iran	  and	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  ministers	  met	  in	  Istanbul	  for	  further	  talks,	  the	  Iraqis	  complained	  the	  Kurds	  would	  have	  been	  defeated	  if	  not	  for	  Iran’s	  support.925	  While	  the	  Istanbul	  talks	  were	  again	  fruitless,	  the	  two	  sides	  agreed	  in	  principle	  to	  a	  basic	  outline	  of	  an	  agreement.926	  However,	  their	  terms	  were	  very	  different:Iran’s	  approach	  was	  that	  once	  its	  demands	  on	  [the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab]	  were	  satisFied,	  [the]	  parties	  could	  then	  turn	  to	  resolving	  [the]	  Kurdish	  problem.	  Iraq,	  conversely,	  wanted	  to	  settle	  [the]	  Kurdish	  problem	  First	  and	  then	  deal	  with	  [the]	  Shatt-­‐al-­‐Arab.	  Furthermore,	  while	  Iraq	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  grant	  various	  unspeciFied	  ‘facilities’	  to	  Iran	  in	  [the]	  disputed	  region,	  it	  was	  unwilling	  to	  consider	  agreeing	  to	  Iranian	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  waters	  involved.In	  short,	  all	  that	  needed	  to	  happen	  at	  this	  stage	  was	  for	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  budge.927	  With	  an	  agreement	  drawing	  near,	  Iraq’s	  new	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Saadoun	  Hammadi,	  toured	  the	  region	  and	  urged	  other	  Arab	  states	  to	  pressure	  Iran	  to	  accept	  a	  deal.	  The	  stage	  appeared	  to	  be	  set	  for	  an	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  agreement.928	   On	  January	  22,	  Barzani	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  long	  letter	  analyzing	  the	  political	  and	  military	  situation	  in	  Kurdistan	  and	  asked	  for	  increased	  military	  support.	  He	  also	  asked	  Kissinger	  if	  he	  could	  send	  an	  emissary	  to	  Washington	  to	  give	  “a	  personal	  and	  more	  detailed	  presentation”	  of	  the	  issues	  he	  outlined.	  Though	  this	  last	  passage	  was	  somewhat	  vague,	  the	  CIA	  and	  NSC	  staff	  believed	  Barzani	  wanted	  to	  visit	  Washington	  personally.929	  On	  February	  5,	  Kissinger’s	  special	  assistant,	  Peter	  Rodman,	  sent	  him	  a	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memo	  outlining	  the	  CIA’s	  concerns	  about	  the	  implication	  of	  Barzani’s	  request	  to	  send	  a	  delegate	  to	  Washington,	  stating:	  Colby	  advises	  against	  a	  visit	  (a)	  because	  its	  main	  purpose	  would	  be	  to	  importune	  you	  for	  more	  aid,	  which	  we	  can’t	  afford,	  and	  (b)	  because	  of	  the	  security	  risks.	  A	  visit	  by	  Barzani	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  done	  securely;	  Colby	  does	  feel	  that	  a	  visit	  by	  an	  emissary,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  could	  be	  kept	  secret,	  at	  least	  at	  this	  end.	  Even	  so,	  while	  Rodman	  felt	  this	  kind	  of	  visit	  would	  “serve	  no	  purpose	  except	  as	  a	  handholder,”	  Barzani’s	  “valiant	  and	  important	  effort”	  necessitated	  a	  positive	  response,	  like	  informing	  him	  of	  the	  secret	  Israeli	  arms	  deal.930	  Once	  again,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Colby’s	  opposition,	  the	  White	  House	  continued	  to	  view	  the	  Kurds	  as	  an	  important	  asset.	  	   By	  the	  start	  of	  February	  the	  anticipated	  Kurdish	  winter	  counter-­‐offensive	  had	  failed	  to	  materialize.931	  The	  Kurds’	  failure	  to	  dislodge	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  during	  the	  winter	  of	  1974-­‐75	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  war’s	  outcome.	  According	  to	  Neumann:The	  Kurds,	  for	  all	  their	  skill	  as	  defensive	  Fighters,	  showed	  no	  appetite	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  attacks	  necessary	  to	  storm	  through	  wire	  and	  machine	  guns	  to	  take	  fortiFied	  positions,	  even	  when	  cloud	  cover	  prevented	  the	  Iraqi	  air	  force	  from	  operating.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  as	  the	  winter	  was	  drawing	  to	  a	  close	  the	  Kurds	  had	  taken	  back	  very	  little	  if	  anything	  and	  were	  going	  to	  have	  to	  start	  Fighting	  from	  positions	  into	  which	  they	  had	  been	  pushed	  the	  previous	  fall.932This	  meant	  the	  Kurds	  would	  be	  even	  more	  dependent	  on	  Iranian	  military	  assistance	  and	  would	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  Shah’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  war.933	  	   On	  February	  18,	  the	  Shah	  blindsided	  Kissinger	  during	  a	  meeting	  in	  Geneva	  when	  he	  said	  he	  was	  considering	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Iraqis	  to	  abandon	  the	  Kurds	  for	  a	  concession	  on	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.	  The	  Shah	  said	  the	  Kurds	  had	  “no	  guts	  left”	  and	  was	  worried	  a	  Kurdish	  defeat	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  “autonomous	  Kurdish	  state	  which	  would	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be	  under	  the	  dominance	  of	  a	  Communist	  Iraqi	  central	  government.”	  He	  was	  also	  concerned	  that	  Iraq	  could	  stimulate	  incidents	  along	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  border	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  internationalization	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  and	  be	  brought	  before	  the	  Security	  Council.	  According	  to	  Kissinger’s	  report	  of	  the	  meeting	  to	  Ford,	  “In	  short,	  he	  seems	  tempted	  to	  try	  to	  move	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  some	  understanding	  with	  Iraq	  regarding	  the	  Kurds,	  but	  is	  understandably	  skeptical	  that	  much	  is	  possible.”	  Therefore,	  the	  Shah	  was	  considering	  meeting	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  at	  an	  upcoming	  meeting	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  the	  Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  (OPEC)	  held	  in	  Algiers	  in	  March.934	  According	  to	  Kissinger’s	  memoir,	  he	  responded	  negatively	  to	  this	  proposal,	  reminding	  the	  Shah	  of	  his	  “own	  repeated	  warnings	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Kurds	  would	  destabilize	  the	  entire	  area.”	  He	  also	  said:Any	  assurances	  by	  Saddam	  regarding	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  area	  …	  would	  be	  worthless.	  And	  since	  the	  Soviets	  would	  view	  Iran’s	  retreat	  as	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  growing	  weakness	  of	  the	  West,	  their	  adventurism	  was	  likely	  to	  increase	  even	  on	  that	  front.	  He	  felt	  an	  agreement	  with	  Iraq	  was	  a	  “bad	  idea—particularly	  the	  idea	  that	  he	  believed	  the	  [Iraqi	  regime’s]	  assurances	  that	  no	  Communist	  would	  be	  put	  in	  [charge	  of	  the	  autonomous	  Kurdish	  zone].”	  When	  the	  conversation	  ended,	  the	  Shah	  had	  given	  Kissinger	  assurances	  that	  he	  would	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  Kissinger	  warned	  the	  Israelis	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  “afraid	  the	  Kurds	  have	  had	  it.	  He	  may	  begin	  a	  negotiation	  with	  the	  Iraqis	  if	  they	  meet	  at	  OPEC,	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  veto	  over	  whom	  they	  put	  in	  if	  Barzani	  gets	  driven	  out.”	  Clearly	  Kissinger	  was	  worried	  about	  losing	  his	  Kurdish	  card.935	   With	  the	  Shah’s	  assurances,	  on	  February	  20	  Kissinger	  responded	  to	  Barzani’s	  message	  from	  January.	  An	  unusually	  personal	  letter,	  reFlected	  Kissinger’s	  concern:	  I	  want	  you	  to	  know	  of	  our	  admiration	  for	  you	  and	  your	  people	  and	  for	  the	  valiant	  effort	  you	  are	  making.	  The	  difFiculties	  you	  have	  faced	  are	  formidable.	  I	  very	  much	  appreciated	  reading	  your	  assessment	  of	  the	  military	  and	  political	  situation.	  You	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  your	  messages	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receive	  the	  most	  serious	  attention	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  we	  attach	  to	  them.On	  the	  proposed	  visit,	  Kissinger	  suggested	  Barzani	  send	  an	  emissary	  in	  secret	  instead:	  I	  am	  convinced	  that	  secrecy	  has	  been	  of	  paramount	  importance	  in	  maintaining	  our	  ability	  to	  do	  what	  we	  have	  done;	  it	  is	  only	  for	  this	  reason—plus	  our	  concern	  for	  your	  personal	  safety—that	  I	  hesitate	  to	  suggest	  a	  personal	  meeting	  here	  with	  you.936	  The	  fact	  that	  Kissinger	  responded	  positively	  to	  Barzani’s	  request	  to	  send	  an	  emissary	  suggested	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  Shah	  had	  been	  dissuaded	  from	  dropping	  the	  Kurds.	  This	  message	  was	  passed	  to	  Barzani	  on	  February	  22.937 	  	   It	  is	  also	  clear	  Barzani	  had	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  intentions.	  In	  late	  February,	  he	  sent	  the	  Shah	  a	  message	  asking	  for	  more	  sophisticated	  weaponry	  and	  increased	  Iranian	  military	  support.	  According	  to	  the	  Shah,	  Barzani	  complained,	  “it	  was	  becoming	  impossible	  …	  to	  carry	  on	  Fighting	  under	  [the]	  existing	  circumstances”	  and	  asked	  to	  declare	  independence,	  as	  Cyprus	  had	  recently.	  Given	  the	  Shah’s	  existing	  uncertainty,	  Barzani’s	  request	  for	  increased	  aid	  and	  permission	  to	  declare	  independence	  was	  discomforting.	  This	  led	  the	  Shah	  to	  begin	  questioning	  how	  he	  could	  increase	  his	  military	  commitment	  to	  the	  Kurds	  without	  the	  conFlict	  turning	  into	  a	  regional	  war	  with	  Iraq.	  It	  seems	  Barzani’s	  request	  pushed	  the	  Shah	  toward	  his	  breaking	  point.	  But	  it	  was	  a	  meeting	  the	  Shah	  had	  on	  March	  2	  with	  Ashraf	  Marwan,	  a	  key	  advisor	  of	  Egyptian	  President	  Anwar	  Sadat	  and	  Gamal	  Abd	  al-­‐Nasser’s	  son-­‐in-­‐law,	  that	  sealed	  the	  Kurds’	  fate.	  According	  to	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  in	  Tehran,	  during	  the	  meeting:Marwan	  repeated	  the	  message	  that	  [he]	  had	  received	  through	  others,	  i.e.	  that	  Saddam	  Hussein	  was	  ready	  to	  pull	  Iraq	  out	  of	  the	  Soviet	  orbit	  if	  Iran	  would	  remove	  the	  military	  pressure	  which	  was	  forcing	  Iraq	  into	  the	  arms	  of	  the	  Soviets.	  Marwan	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  it	  was	  almost	  certain	  that	  Saddam	  would	  pull	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets	  as	  promised.
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Therefore,	  the	  Kurds’	  failure	  to	  launch	  a	  winter	  counteroffensive,	  Barzani’s	  demand	  for	  better	  weapons,	  and	  his	  desire	  to	  declare	  independence,	  when	  coupled	  with	  high-­‐level	  assurances	  of	  Saddam’s	  desire	  to	  seek	  a	  compromise,	  led	  the	  Shah	  to	  decide	  to	  cut	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  abandon	  the	  Kurds.938	  	   The	  next	  day	  the	  Shah	  Flew	  to	  Algiers,	  Algeria,	  for	  the	  OPEC	  meeting.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  two	  days	  of	  intensive	  negotiations	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  he	  would	  determine	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  Shah	  described	  the	  negotiations	  in	  a	  message	  to	  Kissinger	  on	  March	  10:	  Regarding	  the	  Kurds,	  I	  got	  two	  promises	  from	  Saddam:	  the	  First,	  that	  Barzani	  and	  his	  people	  would	  have	  one	  week	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  wanted	  to	  stay	  in	  Iraq	  or	  withdraw	  without	  bloodshed	  into	  Iran	  where	  they	  would	  Find	  a	  haven	  and	  a	  decent	  life.	  They	  will	  be	  given	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  [on	  the	  Iranian	  calendar	  March	  20	  is	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month]	  for	  their	  withdrawal….	  The	  second	  promise	  was	  that	  the	  security	  services	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  would	  work	  together,	  brieFing	  each	  other	  on	  which	  Kurds	  were	  good	  and	  which	  were	  bad	  (read	  communist).	  This	  will,	  I	  hope,	  prevent	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  communist	  Kurdish	  community	  in	  Barzani’s	  territory.939	  The	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  were	  simple:	  1)	  Demarcation	  of	  the	  river	  frontier	  according	  to	  the	  thalweg	  or	  median	  line;2)	  Demarcation	  of	  land	  frontiers	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  1913	  Constantinople	  Protocol	  and	  minutes	  of	  1914	  Frontier	  Demarcation	  Commission;	  3)	  Strict	  and	  effective	  control	  along	  borders	  to	  end	  all	  subversive	  inFiltration	  from	  either	  side;	  and4)	  The	  above	  three	  arrangements	  are	  indivisible	  elements	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  settlement.In	  addition,	  both	  parties	  agreed	  to	  remain	  in	  constant	  contact	  with	  Algerian	  leader	  Houari	  Boumédiène	  while	  the	  accord	  was	  implemented	  and	  that	  the	  foreign	  ministers	  would	  meet	  to	  establish	  a	  commission	  to	  implement	  the	  agreement.940
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   As	  it	  turned	  out,	  on	  March	  5,	  the	  day	  before	  the	  agreement	  was	  announced,	  the	  Shah	  contacted	  General	  Nassiri	  and	  ordered	  him	  to	  tell	  Barzani	  that	  Iran	  would	  cease	  its	  support	  immediately,	  likely	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  good	  faith.	  When	  Nassiri	  visited	  Barzani,	  who	  was	  in	  Tehran	  at	  the	  time,	  he	  said,	  “in	  bluntest	  imaginable	  terms:”(a)	  [the]	  border	  was	  being	  closed	  to	  all	  ...	  movement,	  (b)	  [the]	  Kurds	  could	  expect	  no	  more	  assistance	  from	  Iran,	  (c)	  Barzani	  should	  settle	  with	  Iraq	  on	  whatever	  terms	  he	  could	  get,	  and	  (d)	  Pesh	  Merga	  units	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  take	  refuge	  in	  Iran	  only	  in	  small	  groups	  and	  only	  if	  they	  surrendered	  their	  arms	  to	  [the]	  Iranian	  army.	  While	  Barzani	  “acted	  stoically”	  to	  Nassiri’s	  remarks,	  the	  unfortunate	  reality	  was	  that	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  was	  Finished.941 	  According	  to	  David	  Korn,	  the	  Iraq	  desk	  ofFicer	  at	  the	  time,	  Helms	  was	  at	  the	  Tehran	  airport	  on	  March	  7	  when	  the	  Shah	  arrived	  back	  from	  Algiers.	  “He	  found	  the	  Shah's	  aides	  as	  uninformed,	  and	  as	  puzzled,	  as	  he	  was.”	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Shah	  also	  told	  Helms,	  “the	  cutoff	  of	  Iranian	  assistance	  to	  Barzani's	  Kurdish	  insurrection	  would	  also	  entail	  terminating	  all	  American	  assistance.”942	  The	  next	  afternoon,	  the	  Shah	  dictated	  a	  message	  for	  Helms	  to	  pass	  to	  Kissinger	  outlining	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  decision.943	  	   Reactions	  among	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  to	  the	  accord	  were	  mixed.	  Certainly	  there	  were	  those,	  like	  Helms	  and	  Lowrie,	  who	  hailed	  the	  agreement	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  achieving	  regional	  stability.944	  Kissinger,	  however,	  did	  not	  share	  in	  their	  jubilation.	  Upon	  learning	  of	  the	  deal,	  Kissinger	  was	  furious	  at	  the	  Shah,	  who	  had	  ignored	  his	  advice	  and	  led	  him	  to	  believe	  the	  deal	  was	  on	  hold.	  Further,	  he	  could	  not	  conceive	  how	  the	  accord	  was	  a	  good	  deal.	  Why	  would	  the	  Shah	  so	  carelessly	  trade	  a	  valuable	  coercive	  asset,	  like	  the	  Kurds,	  for	  a	  modest	  border	  concession	  on	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab—a	  deal	  that	  the	  development	  of	  Iran’s	  Gulf	  ports	  would	  render	  useless?	  In	  response,	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1975), p.1; and Pike Report, p.213.
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12-27. Available online: http://www.meforum.org/220/the-last-years-of-mustafa-barzani. 
943 “Iranian/Iraqi Agreement,” March 10, 1975, Op.Cit., p.2. 
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Middle East and South Asia, Box 14, Iran-State Department Telegrams: SECSTATE – EXDIS [1]), p.1. For 
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Kissinger	  sent	  the	  Shah	  a	  “frosty	  telegram,”	  questioning	  both	  the	  beneFits	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  Iraq’s	  sincerity.	  The	  telegram	  stated:With	  respect	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  there	  is	  little	  I	  can	  add	  to	  what	  I	  have	  already	  said	  to	  you	  personally	  during	  our	  recent	  meeting.	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  matter	  for	  Your	  Majesty	  to	  decide	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  your	  nation.	  Our	  policy	  remains	  as	  always	  to	  support	  Iran	  as	  a	  close	  and	  staunch	  friend	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  I	  will,	  of	  course,	  follow	  with	  great	  interest	  the	  evolution	  of	  Iraqi-­‐Iranian	  relations	  and	  of	  Iraqi	  policy	  in	  your	  area	  generally	  and	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  particular.945Kissinger’s	  anger	  was	  justiFied.	  He	  had	  spent	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time,	  money,	  and	  effort	  during	  the	  past	  three	  years	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  keep	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  destabilized	  and	  prevent	  the	  Soviets	  from	  cultivating	  a	  strong	  regional	  ally.	  To	  Kissinger,	  the	  Shah’s	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Kurds	  was	  a	  clear	  mistake.	  	   The	  Israelis	  were	  equally	  stunned	  by	  the	  Shah’s	  decision.	  As	  Parsi	  observed,	  “the	  agreement	  took	  Israel	  …	  by	  complete	  surprise.	  The	  Shah	  neither	  consulted	  nor	  informed	  his	  Israeli	  and	  American	  allies	  about	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Iraqis,	  nor	  did	  he	  indicate	  that	  the	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Kurds	  was	  in	  jeopardy.”946	  According	  to	  Randal,	  the	  Algiers	  Accord	  came	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  Israeli	  military	  ofFicers	  stationed	  in	  Kurdistan,	  including	  Zuri	  Sagy.	  “Two	  and	  a	  half	  battalions	  of	  Iranian	  artillery	  and	  antiaircraft	  guns	  and	  their	  troops,	  stationed	  in	  Iraq,	  were	  abruptly	  ordered	  back	  across	  the	  frontier,”	  explaining	  to	  their	  Kurdish	  and	  Israeli	  allies	  that	  the	  sudden	  move	  was	  a	  “routine	  troop	  rotation.”	  The	  Mossad	  team	  realized	  what	  had	  happened	  immediately,	  and	  Fled	  across	  the	  border,	  lest	  the	  Iraqis	  catch	  them.947 	  After	  a	  decade	  of	  unbending	  support	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  cause,	  this	  was	  a	  miserable	  way	  to	  end	  a	  highly	  productive	  relationship.	   As	  part	  of	  the	  agreement,	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  promised	  the	  Shah	  to	  give	  Barzani	  until	  March	  20	  to	  accept	  refuge	  in	  Iran	  or	  face	  military	  action,	  but	  the	  regime	  reneged	  on	  its	  promise.	  The	  day	  after	  the	  accord	  was	  announced,	  Iraq	  threw	  the	  full	  weight	  of	  its	  army	  against	  the	  Kurds,	  who	  were	  still	  reeling	  from	  the	  betrayal.	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According	  to	  Helms,	  Iraq’s	  offensive	  put	  the	  entire	  Algiers	  Accord	  in	  jeopardy	  and	  shocked	  the	  Shah;	  Saddam	  had	  “immediately	  [violated]	  the	  letter	  and	  spirit	  of	  their	  Algiers	  agreement	  by	  ordering	  an	  all-­‐out	  attack	  on	  the	  Kurds	  on	  all	  fronts.”948	  In	  dire	  straits,	  Barzani	  sent	  Kissinger	  a	  heartbreaking	  letter	  on	  March	  10,	  describing	  the	  tragedy	  unfolding	  in	  northern	  Iraq:	  Our	  hearts	  bleed	  to	  see	  that	  an	  immediate	  by-­‐product	  of	  [Iran	  and	  Iraq’s]	  agreement	  is	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  defenseless	  people	  in	  an	  unprecedented	  manner	  as	  Iran	  closed	  its	  border	  and	  stopped	  help	  to	  us	  completely	  and	  while	  the	  Iraqis	  began	  the	  biggest	  offensive	  they	  have	  ever	  launched	  and	  which	  is	  now	  being	  continued.	  Our	  movement	  and	  people	  are	  being	  destroyed	  in	  an	  unbelievable	  way	  with	  silence	  from	  everyone.Citing	  a	  moral	  and	  political	  responsibility,	  Barzani	  begged	  Kissinger	  to	  “take	  action”	  to	  stop	  the	  Iraqi	  offensive,	  help	  open	  a	  way	  for	  talks	  with	  the	  regime	  to	  negotiate	  a	  face-­‐saving	  solution,	  and	  use	  his	  personal	  inFluence	  with	  the	  Shah	  “to	  help	  [the	  Kurds]	  in	  these	  historically	  tragic	  and	  sad	  moments.”	  Barzani	  concluded	  by	  saying	  he	  was	  “anxiously	  waiting	  [Kissinger’s]	  quick	  response	  and	  action	  and	  [was]	  certain	  that	  the	  United	  States	  [would]	  not	  remain	  indifferent	  during	  these	  critical	  and	  trying	  times.”	  When	  Helms	  passed	  Barzani’s	  letter	  to	  Kissinger,	  he	  added:Since	  the	  Iranians	  clearly	  have	  blood	  on	  their	  hands,	  and	  we	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  on	  ours,	  an	  obviously	  distressed	  and	  disconsolate	  Barzani,	  it	  may	  be	  desirable	  for	  you	  to	  send	  him	  some	  kind	  of	  comforting	  message,	  otherwise,	  and	  maybe	  anyway,	  we	  will	  get	  a	  batch	  of	  unpleasant	  publicity	  which	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid.To	  avoid	  the	  publicity,	  Helms	  recommended	  continuing	  the	  subsidy	  at	  the	  present	  rate	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  Kurds	  providing	  continued	  intelligence	  on	  “the	  Kurdish	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  situation.”949	  	   On	  March	  13,	  the	  Shah	  managed	  to	  convince	  Baghdad	  to	  halt	  its	  offensive	  and	  allow	  him	  time	  to	  confer	  with	  Barzani.	  According	  to	  Korn,	  when	  the	  two	  met	  the	  Shah	  explained	  his	  concern	  about	  being	  drawn	  deeper	  into	  war	  with	  Iraq	  and	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  conclude	  an	  agreement	  with	  Iraq.	  However,	  the	  Shah	  said	  he	  saw	  the	  agreement	  as	  “temporary”	  and	  was	  not	  convinced	  Iraq	  would	  respect	  it.	  In	  the	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meantime,	  all	  aid	  would	  be	  terminated	  but	  the	  border	  would	  remain	  open	  for	  another	  thirty	  days,	  during	  which	  any	  Kurds	  who	  wanted	  to	  come	  across	  would	  be	  welcome.	  When	  Dr.	  Othman	  tried	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  decision,	  the	  shah	  cut	  him	  off:	  “I	  am	  telling	  you	  my	  decision.	  There	  is	  nothing	  to	  discuss.”	  This	  was	  a	  fait	  
accompli.950	   The	  CIA	  was	  quick	  to	  disassociate	  itself	  with	  the	  Kurdish	  tragedy,	  with	  Colby	  seizing	  upon	  Barzani’s	  letter	  to	  justify	  cutting	  off	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  Colby	  wrote:Because	  American	  policy	  had	  been	  to	  channel	  aid	  through	  Iran	  …	  any	  direct	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds	  now	  that	  resistance	  was	  crumbling	  would	  be	  even	  less	  defensible	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  past.	  [I	  doubt]	  the	  Shah—having	  ended	  his	  own	  aid	  to	  Barzani—would	  be	  willing	  to	  continue	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  American	  funds.	  From	  his	  own	  intelligence	  reports,	  Colby	  knew	  the	  Kurds	  were	  Finished	  and	  was	  buying	  time	  by	  suggesting	  Barzani’s	  proposal	  needed	  to	  be	  “studied,”	  knowing	  that	  would	  take	  time	  and	  by	  then	  it	  would	  be	  too	  late.951	   One	  discrepancy	  about	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  is	  whether	  Kissinger	  ever	  responded	  to	  Barzani’s	  plea.	  Kissinger	  states	  in	  his	  memoir	  that	  he	  “did	  not	  reply	  …	  to	  [Barzani’s]	  desperate	  pleas	  for	  help	  because	  there	  was	  nothing	  [he]	  could	  say.”952	  Similarly,	  the	  Pike	  Report	  cites	  a	  CIA	  cable,	  stating,	  “no	  reply	  has	  been	  received	  from	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Henry	  Kissinger	  to	  the	  message	  from	  Barzani.”	  The	  report	  indicates	  Barzani	  sent	  two	  further	  messages	  underscoring	  “the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  Kurds	  situation,	  the	  acute	  anxiety	  of	  their	  leaders	  and	  their	  emotional	  appeal	  that	  the	  USG	  use	  its	  inFluence	  with	  Iran	  to	  get	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  cease	  Fire.”953	  Given	  this,	  it	  is	  accepted	  that	  Kissinger’s	  lack	  of	  response	  was	  both	  callous	  and	  uncaring.954	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But	  Kissinger	  did,	  in	  fact,	  respond	  to	  Barzani.	  On	  March	  15,	  he	  sent	  Helms	  a	  message	  that	  was	  passed	  to	  Barzani’s	  CIA	  liaison	  on	  March	  17.955	  The	  message	  read:We	  appreciate	  the	  deep	  concern	  which	  prompted	  …	  Barzani’s	  message	  to	  Secretary	  Kissinger.	  We	  can	  understand	  that	  the	  difFicult	  decisions	  which	  the	  Kurdish	  people	  now	  face	  are	  a	  cause	  of	  deep	  anguish	  for	  them.	  We	  have	  great	  admiration	  for	  the	  courage	  and	  dignity	  with	  which	  those	  people	  have	  confronted	  many	  trials,	  and	  our	  prayers	  are	  with	  them.	  We	  will	  be	  talking	  with	  our	  Iranian	  friends	  and	  will	  be	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  General	  later.Though	  the	  letter	  avoided	  offers	  of	  further	  aid,	  Kissinger’s	  instructions	  to	  Helms	  reFlect	  great	  concern	  about	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  fallout,	  particularly	  if	  Barzani	  was	  to	  make	  the	  betrayal	  public.	  He	  stated:On	  the	  one	  hand	  …	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  responsibility	  not	  to	  cut	  them	  off	  suddenly	  and	  completely.	  You	  should	  Find	  a	  tactful	  way	  to	  mention	  the	  problem	  both	  the	  Iranian	  and	  U.S.	  Governments	  will	  face	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  elsewhere	  if	  there	  is	  a	  massacre	  and	  Barzani	  charges	  that	  he	  has	  been	  let	  down.	  The	  plight	  of	  the	  Kurds	  could	  arouse	  deep	  humanitarian	  concern.	  On	  the	  other,	  it	  would	  create	  an	  impossible	  situation	  if	  we	  were	  to	  be	  working	  at	  cross	  purposes	  with	  Iran.956Kissinger	  also	  ordered	  Helms	  to	  determine	  how	  Iran	  would	  handle	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  Finally,	  he	  approved	  the	  continuation	  of	  Barzani’s	  monthly	  subsidy;	  “a	  pitiful	  Band-­‐Aid	  considering	  the	  tragedy	  about	  to	  descend	  on	  the	  Kurds.”957	  	   With	  the	  Shah	  having	  cut	  him	  off	  and	  the	  U.S.	  indicating	  that	  it	  also	  could	  not	  continue	  the	  operation,	  Barzani	  returned	  to	  Kurdistan	  on	  March	  18	  and	  informed	  his	  top	  military	  commanders	  that	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  go	  on	  Fighting:	  It	  was	  a	  hopeless	  situation,	  but	  if	  anyone	  wanted	  to	  take	  up	  the	  battle	  in	  his	  place,	  Barzani	  said,	  he	  would	  give	  that	  man	  his	  full	  moral	  support.	  The	  offer,	  however,	  seemed	  more	  pro	  forma	  than	  real.	  To	  those	  who	  heard	  him,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Barzani	  was	  saying	  ‘this	  is	  the	  end,	  we	  must	  stop	  now.’	  So	  when	  he	  canvassed	  the	  room,	  the	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commanders	  agreed	  that	  without	  an	  open	  border	  through	  which	  to	  receive	  arms	  and	  supplies,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  continue….	  Following	  this,	  Barzani	  and	  his	  family	  Fled	  to	  Iran,	  where	  he	  was	  treated	  inhospitably	  for	  the	  next	  four	  years.	  In	  July	  1975,	  Barzani	  was	  diagnosed	  with	  lung	  cancer	  and	  required	  medical	  treatment	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  After	  considerable	  lobbying,	  Kissinger	  reluctantly,	  agreed	  to	  allow	  Barzani	  into	  the	  country,	  where	  he	  succumbed	  to	  cancer	  on	  March	  1,	  1979.958	   The	  tragic	  story	  of	  the	  Kurds	  does	  not	  live	  and	  die	  with	  one	  man.	  On	  March	  23,	  1975,	  well	  over	  100,000	  Kurdish	  Fighters	  and	  their	  families	  crossed	  the	  border	  into	  Iran,	  joining	  the	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  already	  in	  camps,	  while	  others	  accepted	  the	  regime’s	  “generous	  payments”	  for	  surrendering	  their	  weapons.	  The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war	  was	  a	  bitter	  period	  for	  those	  who	  stayed	  behind	  as	  the	  regime	  imposed	  its	  harsh	  authoritarian	  rule	  on	  Kurdistan,	  creating	  a	  security	  zone	  30	  kilometers	  wide	  along	  the	  Iranian	  and	  Turkish	  borders.	  According	  to	  McDowell,	  this	  involved	  razing	  as	  many	  as	  1,400	  villages	  by	  1978	  and	  the	  internment	  of	  at	  least	  600,000	  Kurds	  in	  resettlement	  camps.959	  But	  the	  worst	  fate	  was	  left	  for	  the	  villagers	  of	  Barzani’s	  hometown,	  Barzan.	  After	  its	  capture	  in	  1975,	  the	  villagers	  were	  transported	  to	  an	  internment	  camp.	  In	  July	  1983,	  when	  Kurdish	  rebels	  assisted	  the	  Iranians	  in	  capturing	  Haji	  Omran	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	  Iraqi	  forces	  rounded	  up	  8,000	  males,	  both	  young	  and	  old,	  who	  were	  then	  paraded	  through	  Baghdad.	  This	  was	  the	  last	  time	  they	  would	  be	  seen.	  For	  his	  part,	  Saddam	  openly	  acknowledged	  the	  slaughter:	  “They	  betrayed	  the	  country	  …	  and	  we	  meted	  out	  a	  stern	  punishment	  to	  them	  and	  they	  went	  to	  hell.”960
Conclusion
	   In	  the	  period	  between	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war	  in	  October	  1973	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  March	  1975	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Henry	  Kissinger	  was	  the	  driving	  force	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of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.961	  His	  dominance	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  meant	  that	  his	  personal	  views	  often	  overwhelmed	  a	  well-­‐informed	  analysis	  based	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  opinions.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  Kissinger’s	  personal	  policy	  often	  clashed	  with	  the	  State	  Department’s,	  which	  resulted	  in	  missed	  opportunities.	  For	  instance,	  following	  the	  October	  War,	  Iraq	  appeared	  to	  be	  tacking	  toward	  the	  West	  when	  it	  improved	  relations	  with	  Britain,	  France,	  Iran,	  and	  West	  Germany	  and	  made	  overt	  gestures	  aimed	  at	  improving	  in	  relations	  with	  America.	  And	  yet	  Kissinger	  ignored	  these	  signs	  and	  urged	  the	  Shah	  to	  attack	  Iraq	  so	  he	  could	  secure	  an	  Israeli	  withdrawal	  from	  Syria.	  While	  this	  made	  tactical	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict,	  it	  forfeited	  any	  chance	  the	  U.S.	  had	  at	  improving	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  and	  draw	  it	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets.	  This	  was	  a	  clear	  missed	  opportunity.	  Worse,	  Kissinger’s	  actions	  contributed	  to	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  March	  1974,	  which	  forced	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  Soviets	  for	  arms	  resupply.	  Arguably,	  a	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  had	  Iran	  not	  attacked	  Iraq,	  the	  regime	  might	  not	  have	  taken	  as	  strong	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  Kurds,	  who	  Baghdad	  viewed	  as	  Tehran	  and	  Tel	  Aviv’s	  proxies.	   When	  the	  war	  resumed	  in	  March	  1974,	  Kissinger	  increased	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds,	  approved	  humanitarian	  assistance	  for	  Kurdish	  refugees,	  and	  worked	  with	  the	  Israelis	  to	  transfer	  the	  Kurds	  with	  enough	  weaponry	  to	  keep	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  locked	  in	  a	  stalemate.	  Kissinger	  also	  cautioned	  Barzani	  against	  declaring	  autonomy	  because	  he	  believed	  it	  could	  create	  problems	  with	  America’s	  allies	  and	  could	  provoke	  an	  Iraqi	  offensive.	  Unfortunately,	  Barzani	  ignored	  Kissinger’s	  advice,	  declared	  autonomy,	  and,	  as	  predicted,	  the	  regime	  launched	  a	  major	  offensive.	  This	  account	  contrasts	  with	  the	  Pike	  Report’s	  claim	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  prodded	  Barzani	  into	  rejecting	  the	  regime’s	  autonomy	  offer.962 	  	   Kissinger’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  tragic	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  came	  to	  an	  end	  underscored	  just	  how	  involved	  he	  was	  to	  the	  operation.	  It	  is	  clear	  Kissinger	  saw	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  as	  a	  valuable	  means	  of	  advancing	  U.S.	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategy.	  After	  all	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  managed	  to	  tie	  down	  Iraq’s	  army	  during	  the	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October	  War,	  preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  strong	  Iraqi	  government,	  and	  proved	  valuable	  in	  drawing	  the	  Iraqis	  away	  from	  the	  Israeli-­‐Syrian	  front,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  May	  1974	  disengagement	  agreement.	  But	  Kissinger’s	  actions	  also	  suggest	  he	  felt	  a	  genuine	  obligation	  to	  help	  the	  Kurds	  defend	  themselves.	  After	  all,	  he	  consistently	  ignored	  the	  CIA’s	  warnings	  about	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  operation,	  approved	  considerable	  amounts	  of	  humanitarian	  aid,	  and	  went	  out	  of	  his	  way	  to	  provide	  the	  Kurds	  with	  advanced	  weaponry.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  valuable	  ally	  in	  advancing	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  Given	  this,	  Kissinger’s	  anger	  upon	  learning	  the	  Shah’s	  had	  ignored	  this	  advice	  and	  reached	  agreement	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  is	  understandable.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  decision	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	   In	  the	  end,	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  during	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  can	  best	  be	  explained	  by	  Cold	  War	  considerations.	  The	  Nixon-­‐Ford	  administration	  both	  saw	  the	  operation	  as	  a	  viable	  means	  of	  destabilizing	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  Soviet	  ally:	  Iraq.	  There	  is,	  however,	  no	  question	  that	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  in	  1974-­‐75	  took	  on	  Cold	  War	  dimensions.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  arming	  and	  supporting	  the	  Kurds,	  while	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  doing	  the	  same	  with	  the	  Iraqis.	  As	  Scowcroft	  recalled	  in	  a	  2011	  interview,	  “unfortunately	  the	  Kurds	  are	  pawns	  in	  great	  power	  politics	  …	  as	  they	  have	  been	  for	  a	  long	  time,”	  and	  like	  all	  pawns,	  they	  were	  expendable.963
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Conclusion
	   This	  thesis	  has	  shown	  that	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  between	  1958	  and	  1975	  are	  worthy	  of	  more	  consistent	  attention	  from	  Cold	  War	  scholars.	  Most	  have	  seen	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  as	  a	  signiFicant	  Cold	  War	  event	  but	  neglected	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  ensuing	  decade	  and	  a	  half.964 	  To	  date,	  only	  Peter	  Hahn	  has	  provided	  a	  detailed—though	  limited—account	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.965 	  However,	  it	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  much	  of	  the	  1958-­‐75	  period	  has	  Cold	  War	  relevance.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  lack	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  support	  for	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime	  during	  its	  war	  with	  the	  Kurds	  in	  1963	  stands	  out	  as	  an	  overlooked	  case,	  as	  does	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  support	  for	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  Arif	  regimes	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  has	  only	  recently	  been	  recognized	  as	  an	  important	  Cold	  War	  conFlict.966	  Given	  the	  limited	  historiography	  in	  this	  Field,	  this	  thesis	  clearly	  advances	  scholarship	  on	  both	  Iraq’s	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations.	   The	  central	  argument	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  between	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  Consistently,	  U.S.	  decisions	  and	  actions	  were	  based	  on	  the	  denial	  of	  Soviet	  Union	  inFluence	  over	  Iraq	  and	  the	  region.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  collaboration	  with	  Nasser	  to	  prevent	  the	  communists	  from	  coming	  to	  power	  during	  the	  1958-­‐59	  period;	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  support	  of	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime	  during	  its	  brutal	  war	  against	  the	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Kurds	  in	  1963;	  the	  Johnson	  administration’s	  bolstering	  of	  and	  friendly	  relations	  toward	  the	  anti-­‐communist,	  Arab	  nationalist	  Arif	  brothers;	  and	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  to	  undermine	  the	  second	  Ba’th	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regime	  after	  it	  appeared	  to	  pull	  Iraq	  into	  the	  Soviet	  orbit.	  Therefore,	  whenever	  a	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  appeared	  to	  display	  pro-­‐communist	  behavior,	  the	  U.S.	  took	  measures	  to	  counter	  this	  threat,	  often	  relying	  on	  covert	  action.	  Likewise,	  if	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  was	  viewed	  as	  potentially	  anti-­‐communist,	  the	  U.S.	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  engagement,	  cultivated	  friendly	  relations,	  and	  sought	  to	  prevent	  communist	  forces	  from	  gaining	  inFluence.	  In	  each	  instance,	  the	  primary	  motivation	  for	  American	  policies	  and	  actions	  was	  Iraq’s	  perceived	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	   Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  reaction	  to	  Iraq’s	  revolution	  was	  driven	  by	  its	  concern	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  could	  seize	  control	  of	  Iraq.	  This	  thesis	  showed	  that	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  saw	  events	  in	  Iraq	  during	  1958-­‐59	  as	  part	  of	  its	  Cold	  War	  competition	  with	  Moscow	  and	  premised	  its	  decisions	  on	  the	  need	  to	  block	  perceived	  Soviet	  advances.	  This	  led	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  consider	  working	  with	  Nasser	  to	  limit	  any	  communist	  advance.	  But	  America’s	  actions	  were	  not	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  preventing	  a	  communist	  takeover,	  and	  actually	  complicated	  matters.	  By	  working	  with	  Nasser,	  the	  U.S.	  unintentionally	  forced	  Qasim	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  the	  communists	  for	  support.	  However,	  when	  the	  communists	  eventually	  overplayed	  their	  hand	  during	  the	  Kirkuk	  rising	  in	  July	  1959,	  Qasim	  was	  convinced	  to	  turn	  to	  Iraq’s	  military	  for	  support.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  clear	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  did	  not	  share,	  as	  Blackwell	  claimed,	  a	  “common	  perception”	  of	  the	  communist	  threat.967	  The	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Iraq’s	  records	  make	  clear	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  fearful	  of	  Qasim’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  communists,	  whereas	  the	  British	  viewed	  Qasim	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  Nasser	  and	  tried	  to	  support	  him.	  This	  was	  particularly	  evident	  when	  the	  British	  warned	  Qasim	  of	  the	  Rashid	  Ali	  plot	  in	  late	  1958.	  Britain’s	  Flirtation	  with	  Qasim	  backFired	  when	  Iraq	  threatened	  Kuwait	  in	  1961.	  This	  thesis	  also	  shows	  that	  claims	  of	  American	  involvement	  in	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  assassination	  attempt	  against	  Qasim	  in	  October	  1959	  cannot	  be	  substantiated	  from	  the	  primary	  evidence.968 	  	   When	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  came	  to	  ofFice,	  it	  did	  not	  feel	  Iraq	  deserved	  the	  same	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  accorded	  by	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  and	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disbanded	  the	  SCI.	  This	  was	  a	  mistake.	  During	  1961-­‐62	  Iraq	  precipitated	  a	  range	  of	  crises	  involving	  Kuwait:	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  the	  expropriation	  of	  the	  IPC’s	  concessionary	  holding,	  and	  the	  downgrading	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  diplomatic	  relations.	  	   This	  thesis	  clariFied	  a	  number	  of	  claims	  made	  about	  the	  CIA’s	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  during	  1961-­‐62.	  For	  instance,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  CIA	  urged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  rebel	  against	  Baghdad	  during	  this	  time,969	  but	  this	  thesis	  shows	  that	  U.S.	  diplomats	  and	  intelligence	  ofFicers	  in	  the	  Field	  had	  warned	  Washington	  of	  an	  impending	  war	  and	  were	  ignored.	  Further,	  evidence	  from	  Soviet	  archives	  suggests	  the	  Soviets	  might	  have	  urged	  Barzani	  to	  Fight.970	  It	  has	  also	  been	  claimed	  that	  the	  CIA	  tried	  to	  “incapacitate”	  Qasim	  in	  1961-­‐62	  by	  mailing	  him	  a	  poisoned	  handkerchief,971	  but	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  Colonel	  al-­‐Mahdawi,	  the	  pro-­‐communist	  head	  of	  the	  People’s	  Court,	  would	  have	  been	  a	  more	  likely	  intended	  recipient.	  Finally,	  it	  has	  widely	  believed	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  behind	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  that	  overthrew	  Qasim	  in	  February	  1963.972	  While	  this	  thesis	  has	  further	  substantiated	  claims	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  plotting	  against	  Qasim	  during	  the	  1962-­‐63	  period,	  the	  CIA	  was	  also	  engaged	  in	  a	  major	  operation	  to	  obtain	  intelligence	  on	  Soviet	  weaponry.	  Furthermore,	  a	  high-­‐level	  CIA	  ofFicial	  based	  in	  Iran	  at	  the	  time	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  seized	  power	  the	  CIA’s	  plans	  to	  overthrow	  Qasim	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  Finalized.	  	   After	  years	  of	  frustration	  with	  the	  Qasim	  regime,	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  the	  Ba’thist	  coup	  as	  a	  welcome	  surprise.	  Some	  have	  argued	  the	  CIA	  provided	  the	  Ba’th	  with	  lists	  of	  communists,	  who	  were	  arrested	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  killed.973	  While	  the	  existence	  of	  lists	  is	  documented,	  U.S.	  ofFicials	  at	  the	  time	  suggested	  the	  Ba’th	  had	  previously	  determined	  the	  identity	  of	  ICP	  members	  and	  their	  supporters.	  Given	  this,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  did	  not	  need	  lists	  provided	  by	  the	  CIA,	  since	  they	  already	  knew	  their	  targets.	  Nevertheless,	  during	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime,	  Iraq	  became	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  With	  the	  Ba’thist	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists	  underway,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  retaliated	  by	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  publicly,	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accusing	  the	  regime	  of	  genocide	  at	  the	  UN,	  and	  even	  sponsoring	  a	  coup	  attempt.	  Correspondingly,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  urged	  its	  Arab	  allies	  to	  undermine	  this	  Soviet	  charge	  at	  the	  UN,	  approved	  a	  $55	  million	  arms	  deal	  with	  Iraq	  in	  August	  1963,	  and	  initiated	  a	  secret	  effort	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceaseFire.	  But	  in	  the	  end,	  disputes	  within	  the	  regime	  over	  the	  question	  of	  uniFication	  with	  Syria	  and	  the	  disastrous	  conduct	  of	  the	  war	  escalated	  to	  violence	  in	  November	  1963,	  leading	  the	  military	  to	  seize	  power	  just	  days	  before	  Kennedy’s	  assassination.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  events,	  Iraq’s	  signiFicance	  as	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground	  has	  clearly	  been	  overlooked	  in	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  during	  this	  period.	  	   During	  the	  Johnson	  years,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  once	  again	  at	  odds	  with	  its	  closest	  regional	  allies,	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  stemmed	  from	  the	  perception	  each	  of	  these	  states	  had	  of	  Iraq.	  From	  the	  U.S.	  perspective,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  was	  anti-­‐communist,	  it	  could	  accept	  Nasser	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  inFluence	  or	  even	  uniFication	  with	  Egypt.	  For	  Britain,	  as	  in	  1958-­‐59,	  its	  focus	  was	  not	  on	  the	  Cold	  War	  but	  its	  rivalry	  with	  Nasser.	  Throughout	  the	  1960s,	  Britain	  struggled	  with	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  local	  nationalists	  to	  its	  global	  empire,	  especially	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  and	  many	  in	  London	  believed	  Nasser	  was	  to	  blame.	  With	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Nasser	  regime	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  subsequent	  uniFication	  talks,	  the	  British	  viewed	  Iraq	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  their	  strategic	  position	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  The	  Israelis	  and	  Iranians	  shared	  Britain’s	  unease	  about	  Nasser’s	  growing	  inFluence	  in	  Baghdad,	  though	  for	  separate	  reasons.	  The	  Israelis	  were	  concerned	  about	  Iraq’s	  role	  in	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conFlict	  and	  wanted	  to	  tie	  down	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  inside	  the	  country.	  They	  also	  did	  not	  want	  Nasser	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  Iraq’s	  considerable	  oil	  wealth.	  Likewise,	  the	  Shah	  loathed	  Nasser	  and	  was	  distrustful	  of	  his	  intention	  to	  establish	  himself	  on	  Iran’s	  Western	  border.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  Britain,	  Israel,	  and	  Iran	  found	  common	  cause	  in	  seeking	  to	  undermine	  the	  new	  regime	  by	  supporting	  the	  Kurds.	  While	  Britain’s	  efforts	  during	  this	  period	  are	  not	  well	  documented	  in	  secondary	  sources,	  Iranian	  and	  Israeli	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  are.974	  Despite	  claims	  that	  the	  CIA	  encouraged	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  to	  support	  the	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Kurds,975	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  conclusion.976	  Instead	  this	  thesis	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  managed	  to	  achieve	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Iraq	  between	  1966	  and	  1967,	  culminating	  in	  the	  visit	  of	  Five	  Iraqi	  generals	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  January	  1967.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  destroyed	  whatever	  progress	  had	  been	  achieved,	  leading	  Iraq	  to	  sever	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	   After	  being	  expelled	  from	  Iraq,	  America’s	  policy	  toward	  the	  region	  was	  further	  complicated	  when	  Britain	  announced	  in	  January	  1968	  its	  intention	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  Gulf	  region.	  Fearing	  this	  would	  upset	  the	  regional	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  potentially	  provide	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  an	  avenue	  to	  expand	  its	  inFluence,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  adopted	  a	  policy	  that	  sought	  to	  buildup	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  as	  the	  region’s	  ‘twin	  pillars’	  of	  power.	  When	  the	  Ba’th	  Party	  came	  to	  power	  again	  in	  July	  1968,	  it	  posed	  different	  challenges	  to	  the	  U.S.	  than	  the	  First	  Ba’th	  regime.	  Despite	  Hahn’s	  claim	  that	  the	  U.S.	  initially	  viewed	  the	  second	  Ba’th	  regime	  favourably,977	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Arif’s	  moderate,	  anti-­‐communist	  regime	  was	  a	  clear	  loss	  in	  terms	  of	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy	  and	  threatened	  its	  interests	  in	  Iraq,	  the	  Gulf,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Indeed,	  the	  Ba’th	  Party’s	  radical	  policies	  toward	  Israel,	  its	  desire	  to	  renew	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  and	  its	  swift	  tack	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  military	  and	  economic	  assistance,	  convinced	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  it	  had	  become	  a	  vehicle	  for	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  Iraq’s	  sovereignty.	  Once	  again,	  the	  Cold	  War	  became	  a	  dominant	  factor	  in	  U.S.	  decision-­‐making	  toward	  Iraq.	  	   During	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  underwent	  a	  major	  shift.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  his	  term,	  Nixon	  avoided	  involving	  the	  White	  House	  in	  regional	  policies	  and	  preferred	  to	  focus	  on	  more	  signiFicant	  matters,	  like	  extricating	  the	  U.S.	  from	  Vietnam,	  the	  opening	  to	  China,	  and	  achieving	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Gulf	  was	  not	  a	  priority	  until	  the	  end	  of	  Nixon’s	  First	  term.978	  Instead,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  inclined	  to	  leave	  Gulf	  matters	  to	  Iran,	  as	  happened	  following	  Iraq’s	  killing	  of	  nine	  Jews	  in	  January	  1969,	  when	  the	  Shah	  provoked	  the	  1969	  Shatt	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crisis,	  urged	  the	  Kurds	  to	  resume	  the	  Kurdish	  War,	  and	  tried	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  in	  January	  1970.	  As	  Alvandi	  has	  observed,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  happy	  to	  encourage	  the	  Shah’s	  aggressive	  actions	  against	  Iraq.979	  Yet	  the	  Shah	  was	  outraged	  in	  March	  1970	  when	  his	  Kurdish	  allies	  agreed	  to	  a	  ceaseFire	  with	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  In	  the	  aftermath,	  Iran	  and	  Israel	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  U.S.	  that	  the	  March	  Accord	  was	  a	  Soviet	  plot	  to	  gain	  inFluence	  over	  Iraq,	  but	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  dismissed	  their	  efforts	  as	  manipulative	  and	  pointed	  to	  Iraq’s	  repressive	  campaign	  against	  the	  communists	  between	  March	  1970	  and	  September	  1971.	  However,	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  views	  on	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Gulf	  changed	  with	  the	  British	  withdrawal	  in	  December	  1971.	  Soon	  thereafter	  the	  U.S.	  learned	  Iraq	  had	  signed	  a	  secret	  arms	  deal	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  November	  1971	  and	  then	  ceased	  its	  repression	  of	  the	  communists.	  But	  the	  major	  turning	  point	  for	  the	  U.S.	  was	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  April	  1972,	  which	  effectively	  aligned	  Iraq	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   There	  is	  considerable	  disagreement	  among	  scholars	  as	  to	  why	  Nixon	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  Iran	  in	  May	  1972,	  with	  the	  majority	  arguing	  it	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  treaty,980	  while	  a	  minority	  believe	  the	  Shah	  had	  overinFlated	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  and	  manipulated	  the	  U.S.	  into	  building	  up	  Iran	  as	  the	  regional	  policeman.981	  Considering	  this	  scholarly	  debate,	  what	  is	  peculiar	  is	  there	  is	  no	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  agreeing	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  Tehran.	  Instead,	  the	  record	  shows	  Kissinger	  expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  Soviet-­‐Iraqi	  relationship	  and	  agreed	  with	  the	  Shah	  that	  something	  needed	  to	  be	  done.982	  The	  only	  ofFicial	  record	  of	  Nixon	  agreeing	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  Kissinger’s	  memorandum	  to	  the	  40	  Committee’s	  principals	  on	  August	  1,	  1972.	  The	  debate	  aside,	  Nixon’s	  approval	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  premised	  on	  Five	  factors:	  1)	  concerns	  about	  the	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  Soviet-­‐Iraq	  relations	  after	  the	  British	  withdrawal;	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2)	  Iraq’s	  enhanced	  importance	  after	  the	  departure	  of	  Soviet	  personnel	  from	  Egypt	  in	  July	  1972;	  3)	  a	  desire	  to	  build	  up	  the	  Shah	  of	  Iran	  as	  a	  regional	  power	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  encroachment	  on	  the	  region;	  4)	  U.S.	  concerns	  about	  Iraq’s	  nationalization	  of	  the	  IPC	  in	  June	  1972;	  and	  5)	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  Kurds	  could	  be	  a	  useful	  coercive	  tool	  to	  undermine	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Ba’thist	  regime.	  Clearly,	  Nixon’s	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  Kurds	  was	  not	  based	  on	  a	  naïve	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  manipulation	  but	  a	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  suggesting	  Iraq	  was	  drifting	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  orbit.	  Indeed,	  as	  Kissinger	  told	  Iraq’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  in	  December	  1975,	  the	  U.S.	  began	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  because	  it	  “thought	  [Iraq	  was]	  a	  Soviet	  satellite.”983	  The	  Cold	  War	  was	  clearly	  the	  common	  denominator.	   Following	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation,	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  bifurcated.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  in	  August	  1972	  the	  State	  Department	  sent	  diplomats	  to	  Baghdad	  with	  orders	  to	  improve	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations,	  while	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  White	  House	  sought	  to	  undermine	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  using	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  In	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  October	  War,	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  underwent	  a	  signiFicant	  thaw.	  This	  was	  because	  Saddam	  Hussein	  won	  a	  power	  struggle	  within	  the	  regime	  and	  moved	  to	  bring	  Iraq	  out	  of	  isolation.	  He	  settled	  Iraq’s	  longstanding	  dispute	  with	  the	  IPC	  and	  stabilized	  Iraqi	  politics	  by	  forming	  a	  National	  Front	  government	  with	  the	  communists,	  while	  improving	  relations	  with	  France	  to	  offset	  Western	  concerns.	  He	  also	  told	  journalists	  he	  was	  interested	  in	  improving	  U.S.-­‐Iraqi	  relations	  and	  then	  awarded	  U.S.	  Firms	  lucrative	  contracts,	  but	  the	  White	  House	  responded	  to	  Iraq’s	  gestures	  by	  increasing	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  Even	  during	  October	  1973,	  when	  Iraq	  resumed	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Britain,	  Iran,	  and	  West	  Germany,	  awarded	  further	  contracts	  to	  U.S.	  Firms	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Saudi-­‐led	  oil	  embargo,	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  increase	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds.	  The	  October	  War	  seems	  to	  have	  convinced	  Kissinger	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Kurds,	  whom	  he	  believed	  had	  prevented	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  from	  playing	  a	  signiFicant	  role	  in	  the	  conFlict.	  This	  was	  evident	  when	  Kissinger	  urged	  Iran	  to	  initiate	  hostilities	  in	  December	  1973	  and	  February	  1974,	  in	  order	  to	  force	  Iraq	  to	  withdraw	  its	  forces	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from	  Syria.	  While	  this	  tactic	  helped	  Kissinger	  secure	  Israel’s	  disengagement	  from	  Syria,	  it	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  resumption	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  War.	  	   When	  the	  Kurdish	  War	  resumed	  in	  March	  1974,	  it	  again	  took	  on	  Cold	  War	  characteristics.	  With	  the	  U.S.,	  Iran,	  and	  Israel	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  backing	  Baghdad,	  Iraq	  once	  again	  became	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground.	  The	  U.S.	  responded	  to	  the	  war	  by	  increasing	  its	  military	  and	  Financial	  aid	  to	  the	  Kurds.	  SigniFicantly,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Pike	  Report’s	  claims,984	  the	  U.S.	  also	  provided	  $1	  million	  in	  refugee	  relief.	  Also	  the	  Pike	  Report	  claimed	  the	  U.S.	  had	  prodded	  Barzani	  into	  rejecting	  Baghdad’s	  autonomy	  law,985 	  when	  in	  fact,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  had	  warned	  Barzani	  against	  declaring	  autonomy	  because	  it	  could	  provoke	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  into	  attacking.	  What	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Pike	  Report	  did	  not	  know	  was	  that	  Barzani	  and	  the	  Kurds	  could	  never	  have	  accepted	  Baghdad’s	  watered-­‐down	  autonomy	  law,	  because	  it	  excluded	  longstanding	  principal	  demands,	  like	  a	  proportional	  share	  of	  oil	  revenue,	  and	  it	  allowed	  the	  regime	  to	  veto	  any	  Kurdish	  legislation.	  The	  resumption	  of	  the	  war	  forced	  Iraq	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  obtain	  both	  arms	  resupply	  and	  military	  advisors.	  This	  had	  a	  signiFicant	  impact	  on	  the	  war’s	  outcome,	  since	  with	  Soviet	  assistance	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  for	  the	  First	  time	  managed	  to	  take	  and	  hold	  key	  areas	  in	  Kurdistan.	  As	  the	  war	  escalated	  throughout	  the	  fall	  of	  1974,	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  Kurds	  became	  more	  overt:	  it	  shelled	  Iraqi	  forces	  regularly	  and	  its	  military	  forces	  participated	  in	  battles	  (dressed	  in	  Kurdish	  garb),	  culminating	  in	  the	  shooting	  down	  of	  two	  Iraqi	  jets	  in	  December.	  Despite	  this,	  Iraq	  managed	  to	  take	  and	  hold	  ground	  throughout	  the	  winter	  of	  1974-­‐75.	  Fearing	  the	  Kurds’	  defeat,	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  Israelis	  sought	  to	  provide	  the	  Kurds	  with	  $28	  million	  worth	  of	  arms,	  hoping	  to	  hold	  off	  the	  Iraqis.	  Unfortunately,	  Kissinger’s	  efforts	  were	  fruitless.	  	   Despite	  the	  widely	  held	  view	  that	  the	  U.S.	  sold	  the	  Kurds	  out	  in	  March	  1975,986	  the	  decision	  was	  presented	  to	  Kissinger	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  While	  Kissinger	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had	  known	  the	  Shah	  was	  considering	  abandoning	  the	  Kurds,	  he	  believed	  he	  had	  talked	  him	  out	  of	  it.	  This	  was	  evident	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Barzani	  in	  February	  1975,	  where	  he	  agreed	  to	  meet	  with	  a	  Kurdish	  emissary.	  Nevertheless,	  Kissinger	  saw	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  as	  a	  valuable	  means	  of	  advancing	  U.S.	  Middle	  Eastern	  strategy.	  After	  all,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  tied	  down	  Iraq’s	  army	  during	  the	  October	  War,	  allowed	  Kissinger	  to	  secure	  Israel’s	  disengagement	  from	  Syria,	  and	  prevented	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  strong	  Iraqi	  government.	  In	  the	  end,	  Kissinger’s	  frustration	  upon	  learning	  the	  Shah	  had	  ignored	  his	  advice	  and	  had	  reached	  agreement	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  in	  Algiers,	  is	  explained	  by	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  Kurds	  were	  the	  ultimate	  Cold	  War	  card,	  to	  be	  used	  to	  advance	  U.S.	  interests,	  while	  denying	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  a	  strong	  base	  of	  inFluence.	  Once	  again,	  Cold	  War	  considerations	  were	  the	  driving	  motivation	  behind	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  in	  this	  period.	  	   This	  thesis	  shows	  that	  both	  the	  Pike	  Report	  and	  William	  SaFire’s	  highly	  critical	  articles	  have	  had	  a	  distorting	  effect	  on	  the	  historiographical	  discourse	  on	  the	  Kurdish	  War.987 	  Certainly	  the	  Kurdish	  operation	  was	  a	  “cynical	  enterprise,”988	  after	  all,	  it	  advanced	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  interests	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  Kurds.	  However,	  both	  the	  Pike	  Report	  and	  SaFire’s	  articles	  do	  not	  represent	  an	  objective	  assessment	  of	  the	  Ford	  administration’s	  handling	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  operation.	  This	  thesis	  shows	  that	  the	  Pike	  Report	  ignored	  inconvenient	  truths;989	  manipulated	  evidence;990	  misattributed	  quotes;991	  falsely	  accused	  the	  U.S.	  of	  not	  providing	  the	  Kurds	  with	  humanitarian	  assistance;992	  and	  Finally,	  claimed	  Kissinger	  had	  not	  responded	  to	  Barzani’s	  tragic	  plea,993	  when	  in	  fact	  he	  had.994	  As	  Gerald	  Haines	  argued,	  the	  Pike	  
Report	  was	  purposely	  designed	  to	  expose	  the	  CIA	  as	  a	  “rogue	  elephant”	  and	  scale	  back	  the	  White	  House’s	  control	  over	  foreign	  policy.995	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  was	  not	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the	  “textbook	  case	  of	  betrayal	  and	  skullduggery”	  that	  the	  Pike	  Report	  had	  led	  many	  people	  to	  believe.996	   It	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  Iraq	  actually	  played	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  than	  has	  been	  previously	  recognized.	  On	  three	  separate	  occasions	  between	  1958	  and	  1975	  Iraq	  became	  a	  Cold	  War	  battleground:	  in	  1958-­‐59,	  in	  1963	  and	  Finally	  in	  1972-­‐75.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  instances	  either	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  the	  U.S.	  relied	  on	  local	  or	  regional	  proxies	  to	  achieve	  their	  strategic	  objectives.	  The	  Kurds	  have	  often	  fallen	  victim	  to	  these	  machinations,	  being	  built	  up	  when	  it	  served	  the	  superpowers’	  designs,	  only	  to	  be	  dismissed	  abruptly	  when	  no	  longer	  needed.	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  the	  decisions	  and	  actions	  taken	  by	  each	  U.S.	  administration—from	  Eisenhower	  to	  Ford—were	  designed	  with	  one	  objective	  in	  mind:	  denying	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  inFluence	  over	  Iraq	  and	  a	  strategic	  base	  in	  the	  oil-­‐rich	  Gulf	  region.	  All	  the	  evidence	  contained	  herein	  proves	  that	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  was	  driven	  by	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  between	  1958	  and	  1975	  was	  truly	  a	  Cold	  War	  story.
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